

British and American governments competed and sometimes collaborated for influence in the region. By mid-century on the isthmus, however, the United States began to overshadow British control, first with the construction of the Panama Railroad (1850s), then with a series of military interventions (13 in total), and finally with the annexation of the Panama Canal Zone and creation of the new Republic of Panama in 1903. By the dawn of the twentieth century, the Caribbean seemed to look to the United States like the Mediterranean did to the British—a sea of imperial authority.

Imperial geopolitics, Aguirre argues, discursively made Panama into “an in-between zone, the geographical servant of other masters” (5). The isthmus became a place of transit rather than a place of residence within Anglo-American imaginations. Although mostly focusing on the experiences of foreign travelers, Aguirre also juxtaposes these outside views with local perspectives. As Anglo-Americans saw Panama as a “primitive” and historically backward region (allochronic thinking), Panamanians pushed back in numerous ways. They were not mere passive recipients of global forces. Many elites on the isthmus welcomed transnational trade, yet others fought and resisted—sometimes violently—the colossus of the north. “The new world of mobility modernity,” Aguirre concludes, “is double edged, creating on one side unprecedented possibilities for communication and movement, and on the other unhealed wounds that erupt in the fragmented spaces of history, memory, and representation” (164). Globalization on the isthmus, he shows, created both opportunity and destruction.

In this short yet impactful book, Aguirre offers readers a window into globalization’s multipronged history. *Mobility and Modernity* should, if carefully read, also spur many questions. When did Panama really discursively emerge as “an in-between zone”? Was it the product of British and American nineteenth-century ideas, or do we need to travel further back in time to the Spanish colonial era, or perhaps even to the region’s pre-Columbian history to understand this notion of interregional movement? Likewise, with the bigger question of globalization: Does this omnipresent process, as we understand it today, begin in the nineteenth century and its industrial revolution on land and sea? Or must we look to the twentieth century, or in contrast all the way back to the sixteenth century, as scholars such as Immanuel Wallerstein and other world-system thinkers would suggest? Aguirre contributes to these ongoing global debates in a provocative and truly thoughtful way. His book will interest scholars of US and British expansion, of Latin American and Caribbean history, and of global history more broadly.

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AIDAN BEATTY. *Masculinity and Power in Irish Nationalism, 1884–1938*. Gender and Sexualities in History Series. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Pp. 266. \$100 (cloth).  
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Aidan Beatty sets out to pursue two worthwhile goals with his monograph, *Masculinity and Power in Irish Nationalism, 1884–1938*. The first is to draw out Irish notions of masculinity as they relate to the formation of an independent Irish nation from the founding of the Gaelic Athletic Association to Eamon de Valera’s first Fianna Fáil government after the enactment of the 1937 Constitution. The second is to stress continuities from before, during, and after the revolutionary period of 1916 to 1922. Beatty chooses to use a running comparison between Irish nationalists and European Zionists and their respective masculine ideologies,

although the unevenness of the comparison—this is a book about the Irish, not Zionists—undermines the effectiveness of this interpretative strategy.

The book is composed of six main chapters and starts with the revolutionary era. Beatty then flashes back to the late nineteenth century to explore the development of masculinist ideas of power in a series of important institutions, among them the Volunteers, the police (later Garda Síochána), the Gaelic Athletic Association, and the Gaelic League. Beatty also provides an interesting exploration of the relationship between economics, land ownership, colonialism, and notions of manhood. Finally, the last substantive chapter—the most intriguing and thought-provoking in my opinion—details how locating the line separating the state from the Catholic Church was complicated because of a shared commitment to policing the social order, whether it was in the realm of prostitution, temperance, or dancing, particularly through the control of gender. All of these chapters are well written and well argued, and they admirably contribute to the growing historiography that has sought to highlight the manner in which nationalism (and the movements it spawned) were invariably not gender-neutral, but rather drew on both long-standing and evolving expressions of masculinity and femininity.

While acknowledging that a single monograph cannot accomplish all things regarding a topic as sweeping as this one, I believe that the lack of any discussion of clerical masculinity was a missed opportunity (or alternately, an avenue for future research). Beatty convincingly argues for the centrality of Catholic culture in construction of gender norms in Ireland but does not address the elephant in the room: priests and religious brothers. As nominal celibates, they did not offer a complete model for wider Irish masculinity. Nonetheless, as nationalists, sportsmen, imbibers, religious leaders, and disciplinarians, their views and actions obviously had a great effect on how the Irish imagined proper manhood.

The ubiquity of corporal punishment in schools at the hands of male authority figures could not help but have profound effects on Irish men and women. The literature on child abuse has long shown that children who are physically maltreated are more likely to be violent with their own children, creating cycles of violence across the generations. Beatty astutely argues that “Catholic-centric explanations serve ... to exculpate the state. Thus, in the context of a society that has ostensibly moved away from Catholicism, oppressive social control can be historiographically represented as something *Catholics* were responsible for *in the past*, whilst the state, then as now, remains blameless” (210; author’s emphases). Before the phrase “It could happen to a bishop” became a punchline alluding to secret children sired by members of the Catholic hierarchy and other scandals, the common phrase was used to convey the idea that bad things could happen to even the best of men. After the Ryan Report, it is hard to imagine a consensus that sees Irish bishops as the embodiment of untarnished virtue. An examination of the state’s tacit support for prevailing models of clerical masculinity—especially with regards to open secrets of illicit sexuality and physical violence—would have tied in well with Beatty’s other case studies and strengthened the overall argument.

Despite the book’s many strengths, Beatty somewhat oversells the uniqueness of his chronology and subject matter. While there are of course monographs about the revolutionary period, Irish historiography is not particularly bifurcated at any one date—not 1916, 1922, 1937, or 1949. Most major histories do not specially privilege a date in that range as a major dividing line for Irish culture, as opposed to Irish politics and governance. R. F. Foster chooses 1600–1972, Paul Bew 1789–2006, Alvin Jackson 1798–1998. Diarmaid Ferriter focuses on the whole twentieth century. In other words, there is no established consensus that Irish culture and society (as opposed to politics) drastically changed in those years, so there is not much to be debunked. Furthermore, while interesting in conception, I did not find the Zionist “mirror” to be particularly enlightening. Beatty uses a smattering of Irish- and Hebrew-language sources in his work, which certainly points to an uncommon linguistic repertoire, but the comparison never provides a novel interpretation of Irish masculinity beyond showing that it was indeed part of a wider European culture of gender construction. These

(possible) shortcomings are nonetheless easily overlooked in light of the overall contributions of this eminently worthwhile monograph.

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ANDREA BOSCO. *June 1940, Great Britain and the First Attempt to Build a European Union*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016. Pp. 393. \$67.56 (cloth). doi: 10.1017/jbr.2018.148

This is a book about the political influence of an idea and a movement dedicated to the creation and building of a federal Europe in the late 1930s, culminating in the historic British offer, endorsed by the British prime minister, Winston Churchill, of a Franco-British union in June 1940 that would form the basis of a larger European Union in the future.

Andrea Bosco has written a splendid account of the dramatic events of 1938–40 that occurred in Anglo-French relations, during which British and French governmental elites sought to work out a strategy to keep France in the Second World War at all costs in the face of the German *Blitzkrieg* that threatened to overrun the country. At its heart is the notion of “crisis” and the opportunities created for both federalists and nonfederalists alike to make momentous decisions that would in all likelihood be considered chimerical in normal conditions of peace. This understanding of crisis and the constitutional and political choices made available of course relies in particular on bold and imaginative political leadership and on timing. And it is a federalist political strategy most closely associated with Jean Monnet, the French international civil servant—often referred to as a functionalist-federalist—who later in 1950 wrote the Schuman Declaration and became both the architect and builder of the first post-war supranational organization, the European Coal and Steel Community, established in the Paris Treaty of 1951. Capitalizing on crisis was a similarly integral part of the federalist strategy of Altiero Spinelli, the leading political figure in the federal movement in Italy and the then European Community, who fought for a “constitutional and political Europe” while himself working during the 1970s and 1980s in the European Commission and European Parliament.

Bosco’s approach to identifying the political actors and organizations involved in this remarkable episode is to provide a sharp focus upon the following institutional and political contexts: the Federal Union movement; the New Commonwealth Society; the Pan-Europa movement; the role of the Foreign Office; the federalist debate on war aims in the British, French, and American press; the influence of Chatham House; and the important insights into the discussions on federalism in the War Cabinet. The key *dramatis personae* at the heart of this movement included Jean Monnet, Lionel Curtis, Lord Lothian, Lionel Robbins, Arnold Toynbee, Alfred Zimmern, Leo Amery, Sir Arthur Salter, Sir Robert Vansittart, Winston Churchill, and his private secretary, Desmond Morton. For the sake of brevity, I have singled out only a small coterie of public officials, academics, and federalist enthusiasts, but Bosco has identified an enormous array of political actors across the whole spectrum of the British Establishment whose individual activities can be construed as a complex network of interactions that together formed the basis of the political influence mentioned above.

Some of the material included in the book, especially on the Federal Union movement, is already well documented in the mainstream literature (to which Bosco has himself contributed), but in providing such a detailed account based upon archival sources previously unpublished, he has effectively set it in a much more fertile context than previous accounts, notably by