Symbols, Strategies, and Choices for International Relations Scholarship After September 11
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Pundits and officials have been remarkably united in their assertions that the “war on terrorism” is fundamentally a new kind of war. This is troubling, because it suggests that the world has stepped into terra incognita. No one—to draw a recent comparison—has suggested that this past winter’s standoff between India and Pakistan is fundamentally new, even though both nations are now nuclear powers. Indeed, in spite of the high stakes in Kashmir, the conflict feels familiar, partly because the two countries have long been mutually suspicious and often hostile, and because they are two states; we know how to think and to talk about them. And, one hopes, policymakers know how to reduce these tensions. In contrast, the war on terrorism has an almost surreal quality because of the utter novelty of the idea of a superpower fighting against a transnational, clandestine network or against the even more nebulous phenomenon of terrorism itself. Like the U.S. government, international relations scholars were caught largely unaware and were initially unprepared to offer much guidance on how the new crisis might develop.¹

In this essay I explore the place of terrorism in the study of international relations and offer some suggestions on how scholars in the field might handle the issue. In so doing, I echo recent calls for an integration of constructivist and rationalist perspectives, but suggest that the integration must take place as much at the level of empirical research as in the creation of theory. As a topic of inquiry, terrorism practically requires this kind of integration because it cannot be understood without reference to both symbolism and strategic behavior. Militants in the Al Qaeda network attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon not only because of the

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¹ More recently, however, international relations experts have begun to discuss the ways in which a war on terrorism will shift the structure of U.S. foreign policy. See Walt 2001/2002; and Posen 2001/2002.

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massive casualties they might inflict, and probably not because they felt that either attack would fundamentally destroy an American retaliatory capability, but also because of the meaning these structures held to audiences critical of U.S. power. One might—without resorting to an analysis of iconography in fundamentalist Islamic movements—be able to theorize about the strategic options available to political dissidents from Saudi Arabia. Alternatively, one might—without studying strategic interactions among local militants, international networks, and governments—analyze the changing nature of anti-American symbols in the Muslim world. Neither of these, however, would provide much of an answer about why these particular attacks took place or what kind of threat terrorism poses to states in a post-September 11 world.

The literature on terrorism has largely developed independent of international relations theory. Indeed, many international relations scholars will likely find frustrating some of the main strands of terrorism research, hobbled as it is by a paucity of good data and by the political sensitivity of the topic. Drawing on this literature, I investigate some of the key debates and trends, arguing that international relations scholarship might make important contributions by recognizing the importance of both symbolism and strategy in terrorist campaigns. In so doing, I focus on the political science and sociological work on social movements, work that has wrestled with the issues of political action and cultural framing in ways that might be instructive to international relations scholars. The field’s best option will be to use interpretive methods to research the meaning of political violence to terrorist groups involved in complex strategic games with dissident communities, local governments, and foreign powers. This means, in practice, that scholars should place more emphasis on discursive and ethnographic tools that address the iconography of violence and threat to terrorist groups, while bearing in mind that these symbols are manipulated and used in ways amenable to rationalist theorizing.

Terrorism Studies and International Relations

Terrorism has never occupied a central place in the literature on international security. Debates in the field have focused primarily on patterns of interstate conflict. Neorealist theories have posited a world of states as unitary rational actors competing in an anarchical system for the scarce good known as security. Critics of neorealism have opened up the “black box” of the state, traditionally emphasizing bureaucratic motives for action in the security sphere or the psychological constraints facing decision makers in moments of stress or in patterns of deterrence. Neoliberal institutionalists further posit that international institutions can mitigate the dis-

2. The classic statement is Waltz 1979.
4. See, for example, Jervis, Lebow, Stein 1985.
tributional conflicts posited by neorealist theory by systematizing reciprocity and the exchange of information between states.\(^5\) Especially after the end of the Cold War, constructivist theorists suggested that we need to understand the cultural contexts of global and domestic politics that inform the identities of leaders, as well as the norms accruing to those identities.\(^6\) Although there are exceptions,\(^7\) neither approach has concerned itself primarily with altering the focus on interstate conflict. Liberals challenge the neorealist emphasis on states as unitary rational actors, and constructivists argue that interests cannot be inferred from material structures as clearly as realists and liberals say they can. Both critiques, however, have largely focused on patterns of behavior in interstate relations.

Research on terrorism has thus developed independently of research on international relations. It has not been a moribund field, as the plethora of books and articles on the topic indicates, but it has often been devoid of the grand theorizing generally preferred in political science. And although the mainstays of the literature have been broad historical studies of terrorism or of individual terrorist groups, research on terrorism has never been divorced from policy concerns. This makes sense. Often ignored by erstwhile colleagues in international security, specialists on terrorism have found themselves speaking largely to policy audiences interested in long-term threat projections or narrow technical concerns like force protection.

The literature on terrorism thus often feels dated. The field had something of a heyday in the 1970s and the 1980s, as analysts rushed to understand the bewildering array of new leftist organizations in Europe, nationalist movements in Latin America, and religious movements, primarily related to Islam, in the Middle East.\(^8\) Even at this time, some were quick to see it in Cold War terms, emphasizing (in a few cases, correctly) the role of the Soviet Union in supporting worldwide terrorism.\(^9\)

Other specialists in the 1980s began to look for theoretical guidance where they could find it, which usually meant in fields other than political science. Organizational theory became extremely important to those specialists hoping to understand how terrorist groups form, how they create incentives for members, and how they survive over time.\(^10\) Others used criminology, hoping to recast the question of political violence by comparing terrorist groups with other clandestine networks, such as organized crime families or drug gangs.\(^11\) One popular framework for analysis has long been psychological, to understand how terrorist leaders can motivate their followers to risk or sometimes willingly take their own lives in bombings or other

attacks.\footnote{In fact, by the late 1980s, the political context had fallen so far out of the study of terrorism that Martha Crenshaw of Wesleyan University organized a conference entitled “Terrorism in Context,” emphasizing the conflicts and environments in which terrorist campaigns take place.} Since that time, the United States was struck so infrequently by terrorist groups that it virtually fell out of academic inquiry at major U.S. universities for much of the 1990s. Among policy specialists, those who had worked on nuclear strategy and conventional military strategy entered successive administrations, while terrorism specialists worked primarily at think tanks, occasionally called upon to present information on the use of terrorism in “asymmetric warfare.”\footnote{Of the books published on the topic between 1998 and 2001, most were policy reports published by think tanks working in part for the U.S. government, and works on “new terrorism,” emphasizing those groups that use weapons of mass destruction. This shift—inspired to some degree by the Aum Shinrikyo cult’s use of sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system in 1995—can be best seen in the work of Brian Jenkins, a RAND analyst considered one of the foremost experts on terrorism. In 1985, he argued that the use of nuclear weapons by terrorist groups was unlikely, because terrorists sought an audience for their attacks and because political concessions might be made less likely through resort to unconventional weapons. By 1998, however, the attack by Aum Shinrikyo and the rise of Islamic fundamentalist movements had convinced him that these constraints might no longer apply, and that nuclear terrorism was unlikely but far from impossible. Indeed, the new literature on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction coincided with a government emphasis on the topic that was so severe that an Israeli expert labeled it a “super terrorism scare,” one drawing attention from other pressing terrorist threats. In spite of the increasing violence of attacks by Al Qaeda (most notably, the simultaneous bombings of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya) against American targets, the focus of the literature in the United States on terrorism remained on the possibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction, mirroring the emphasis of the U.S. counterterrorism policy community to which it has been closely tied.}

Even so, the essential problem in the debate over whether terrorists are likely to resort to the use of weapons of mass destruction has been a fundamental challenge to scholarship on terrorism: terrorist groups operate clandestinely for obvious reasons, making them difficult to study. Moreover, as researchers on terrorism have

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Post} Post 1998.
\bibitem{Crenshaw} For the published outcome of the 1989 conference, see Crenshaw 1995.
\bibitem{Lemann} For a brief discussion, see Lemann 2001.
\bibitem{Lesser} Lesser, Hoffman, Arquilla, Ronfeldt, Zanini, and Jenkins 1999.
\bibitem{Hoffman} Hoffman 1998.
\bibitem{Stern} See Stern 1999; and Laqueur 1999.
\bibitem{Jenkins} Jenkins 1985.
\bibitem{Jenkins98} Jenkins 1998.
\bibitem{Sprinzak} Sprinzak 1998.
\end{thebibliography}
been alienated from political science—the discipline in which one might have expected to find their work—they have written largely for policy audiences. This has meant that the research agenda has followed political trends in this highly controversial topic more than a straightforward series of empirically grounded theoretical developments that would ideally define an area of inquiry. Within this literature, however, there have been important arguments and findings that together point to the way in which international relations scholarship might contribute.

Strategies and Symbolism in Research on Terrorism

We should not be surprised that scholars of international politics have largely avoided terrorism as a topic; by its nature, terrorism has fit poorly with the emphasis in international relations on interstate conflict. Additionally, the difficulty of pursuing research on terrorist movements makes them less attractive subjects—especially for graduate students—than states, which have secrets but have to pursue most of their activities in public. But Jenkins’s change of heart regarding the likelihood of terrorist use of nuclear weapons points to a common assumption about terrorist groups that can simplify research on them: that they can be understood to be rational. This is not to deny the utility of psychological studies of terrorist leaders, which might provide useful information to intelligence analysts and to criminological research. But assuming that terrorists are rational—that they calculate the utility of their actions and behave accordingly—provides an opportunity to analyze and to model their behavior, provided that one has information about their goals.

One important contribution to theories of terrorism based on a modified utility-maximizing approach is Martha Crenshaw’s 1985 discussion of the organizational politics of terrorist groups.\(^1\) Using Albert Hirschman’s *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* as a touchstone, Crenshaw articulates some of the main challenges facing terrorist groups, including the need to recruit members and maintain internal solidarity. In this view, terrorist organizations calibrate their activities not only to intimidate opponents but also to elicit support from ethnic, religious, or ideological communities with some affinity for the organization’s goals. This allows us to recognize the delicate balancing act that, for example, Palestinian Hamas must undertake, serving simultaneously as a violent wing promoting the creation of an Islamic state in Palestinian territory and as a social welfare organization capable of drawing support away from the Palestinian Authority.\(^2\) In ways reminiscent of Hamas’s efforts against the Middle East peace process, branches of the Irish Republican Army have chosen the “exit” option—first, the Provisionals from the Officials, then the Irish National Liberation Army from the Provisionals, and recently the “Real Irish Republican Army” from the Provisionals—when the main organization has been deemed insufficiently committed to violence or too predisposed to compromise.\(^3\)

\(^{1}\) Crenshaw 1985.
\(^{2}\) Mishael and Sela 2000.
\(^{3}\) On the history of the Irish Republican Army, see Bell 2000.
Terrorist groups are thus involved in complex games with both opponents and support communities, and by understanding the rules and incentives of the game, actors might affect choices. This point resembles proposed extensions of recent work by David Laitin and James Fearon on ethnic conflict and revolutionary movements.24

This approach allows researchers to theorize about why terrorists act, but it tells us considerably less about what kinds of actions terrorist groups will take. Not all terrorist groups are alike; indeed, it is nearly inconceivable that the Irish Republican Army or the Palestine Liberation Organization (before its legal reconstruction as the Palestinian Authority) would have carried out attacks on the level of those of September 11. Similarly, neither Al Qaeda nor Aum Shinrikyo would be likely to work to minimize human casualties, either by making clear warnings of bombings as the Irish Republican Army has or by focusing purely on anti-industrial violence, as Europe’s Animal Liberation Front has. The type of violence used, the target, and the extent of damage all become elements of strategies, and they cannot be understood without reference to the ways in which terrorist organizations conceptualize the nature of their struggles and the purpose of violent action. The meaning of violence—of attacking the World Trade Center, say, as opposed to the Grand Canyon—is central to terrorism, because terrorism itself focuses on the use of symbolic targets to intimidate an opponent into making political concessions.25

Scholars have approached the issue of symbolism and meaning in terrorism in different ways. In a recent book, Mark Juergensmeyer examines the use of violence by millennial religious groups—usually but not always with clear political goals—and argues that these organizations have adopted more destructive forms of violence than have their secular terrorist counterparts, because of the transformative power of nearly apocalyptic attacks. We see here, for example, Aum Shinrikyo’s sarin gas attack in Tokyo in 1995, Timothy McVeigh’s 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building, and Islamic fundamentalists’ 1993 (and now 2001, though Juergensmeyer’s book was released in 2000) bombing of the World Trade Center.26 Interviewing movement members and relying on key religious texts within each group, Juergensmeyer argues compellingly that each group’s iconography of violence can inform observers about what kinds of tactical decisions are possible or impossible. He is less concerned, however, about explaining the politics behind the terrorist acts—or the responses by opponents and supporters—

24. Lemann writes laudatorily of Fearon’s and Laitin’s research agenda and its potential applicability to terrorism, suggesting that the United States might provide better incentives for group members to defect. Nicholas Lemann, What Terrorists Want, The New Yorker, 29 October 2001, 36–41.

25. Indeed, it is the symbolic value of targets that distinguishes terrorism from other forms of political violence, because terrorist acts are designed to have primarily psychological consequences for an opponent, rather than to destroy an opponent’s material ability to fight. This is, of course, only one way—among many—of defining terrorism, but Crenshaw (1983) emphasizes this aspect of terrorist violence, which seems useful and relatively uncontroversial. For a lengthy discussion of the impossibility of a perfectly accepted definition of terrorism, see Hoffman 1998.

terrorist acts—or the responses by opponents and supporters—and the repertoire of violence to the decisions of movement leaders or members.

Robin Erica Wagner-Pacifici’s (1986) highly original study of the Red Brigades’ kidnapping and eventual murder of former Italian prime minister Aldo Moro provides an additional glimpse of how interpretive methods can focus on symbolic context and individual decisions.27 Using Victor Turner’s theory of the “social drama,” Wagner-Pacifici analyzes the ways in which officials, terrorists, and media figures all occupied scripted “roles” in the crisis. In this framework, established narratives affected these actors’ decisions—which Wagner-Pacifici investigates through close textual analysis of first-person accounts and media discussions—by informing them of their proper roles as protagonists in this drama. The focus on cultural scripts allows her to grasp the meaning of choices for each of the participants, though it offers few generalizable lessons for understanding how terrorist groups operate or how states respond. Its research methods, however, remain instructive in their connection of meaning to action.

“Collective Action Frames” in Social Movements

The literature on social movements has in recent years had to contend with similar concerns over the relationship between symbolism and strategy. This is perhaps unsurprising, because if the research on terrorism resembles any major body of work in political science or sociology, it is to studies of social movements.28 Although social movement research has historically been marked by the effort to explain the ability of movements to overcome collective-action problems, it has more recently begun to engage the ways in which movement leaders and members frame their interests and demands. The debate has not yet resulted in a clear consensus of how to best combine rationalist analyses of political action with attention to the socially grounded beliefs of participants, but the thriving discussion seems to have convinced most scholars that neither aspect can safely be ignored.

Social-movement theorists have long focused on the question of how movement organizations have avoided the obvious collective-action problems involved in possibly dangerous participation in political activities that will yield largely public goods. In the wake of social upheavals in the advanced industrial West in the 1960s and 1970s, scholars of social movements began to examine the role of movement organizations in mobilizing resources for political action. Ideally, the focus on organizations would also put self-interested actors in a larger political context.29 To explain how movement organizations could find themselves with changing fortunes

28. In fact, Donatella della Porta’s work on protest movements and terrorism in Western Europe has made her an acknowledged expert in both areas. See especially della Porta 1995. On the differences between social movements and terrorism, see Wieviorka 1993.
29. One of the classic statements is McCarthy and Zald 1977. For a brief overview, see also Jenkins 1983.
in terms of their ability to mobilize resources, scholars began to focus on political opportunity, ultimately arguing that changes in the structure of these opportunities could help to explain observable cycles of protest.\textsuperscript{30}

But as researchers turned their attention to those movements based in large part on identity-based claims, they began to focus on cultural variables, primarily because of the recognition that identities depend on socially constructed categories affecting people’s understanding of themselves and their environments. In this view, the issue of social meaning becomes central to the analysis, because political action becomes incomprehensible without reference to the ways in which movement participants understand themselves and their demands. This kind of investigation, however, has required something of an epistemological shift from rationalist analyses of movements and resources toward the use of interviews and discourse analyses to grasp the narratives that provide movement members with a common frame for action.\textsuperscript{31} In their turn toward examining movement language and rhetoric,\textsuperscript{32} social movement theorists have become increasingly concerned with linking meaning to action, or embedding rational movement activity within cultural “frames” that can unite activists and inform their behavior.\textsuperscript{33} Sarah Babb defines frames as “interpretive devices that people use to make sense of the raw data of experience.”\textsuperscript{34} Babb’s innovative contribution emphasizes the importance of these frames—which she understands in interpretive terms—without becoming culturally deterministic, because she finds that the empirical experiences of participants can invalidate the frames used by movement leaders. Without understanding the changing relationship between movement ideology and the economic interests of participants, one simply cannot explain outcomes for the U.S. labor movement in the late nineteenth century, for example.

This is not to argue that “frames” represent the only—or even the best—solution to the problem of relating social meaning and action. Like terrorist groups, however, social movement organizations rely on people’s willingness to engage in a specific repertoire of political activity, embedded in complex games between movements, states, and potential support communities. If the interpretive tools (including interviews, discourse analysis, and ethnographic studies) used by culturalists in social-movements research have contributed to our overall understanding of the problem, so too might similar investigations of terrorist groups or the communities that support them. At the very least, the social-movement literature provides a glimpse of how international relations scholarship might come to grips with a series of pressing issues if it is to engage terrorism seriously.

\textsuperscript{30} Tarrow 1988.
\textsuperscript{31} Couto 1993.
\textsuperscript{32} See, for example, Taylor 2000.
\textsuperscript{33} See Tarrow 1998; Johnston and Klandermans 1995; and McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001.
\textsuperscript{34} Babb 1996, 1034.
International Relations Theory, Terrorism, and Counterterrorism

Research on transnational social movements has already made an analogous contribution to international relations theory by bringing to the fore the socially constructed norms that constrain state activity. Its goals, however, have been different. Instead of focusing primarily on the internal behavior of these movements, scholars have addressed their ability to shift official discourses and positions away from those that might be inferred from states’ material interests. And, like much of the social-movement literature from the 1970s, it appears to be motivated in large part by sympathy with a given movement’s goals—for example, research on the human rights, anti-apartheid, and anti-land-mines movements.35 There has been some recent work on transnational crime,36 but research on violent transnational movements best construed as security threats will be largely uncharted territory for international relations scholarship.

The first requirement, of course, will be to broaden our understanding of security in order to recognize that terrorism is not simply a proxy for interstate conflict. This does not mean a prima facie rejection of realism; indeed, realism itself may provide a useful lens for understanding the coalition-building efforts of the U.S. government in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Research on international terrorism, however, can only benefit from the kind of ethnographic, discursive, and other interpretive research necessary to tease out the type of threats that transnational political movements may pose. Juergensmeyer’s focus—though analytically limited—on the iconography of religious movements provides one useful clue to where researchers might look. By examining how violence is discussed, praised, feared, and described in the communities that have supported religious terrorism, he has at least provided one typology that can distinguish types of terrorist threats.37 To give one potential example, similar interpretive research that addresses how dissident communities (ethnic, religious, political, for example) differentiate between proximate and distant threats may provide useful tools for determining when groups are likely to strike against international targets and when they will likely limit themselves to attacks on local opponents. If terrorist attacks aim not only to intimidate opponents but also to mobilize support and to increase recruitment, they may be explicable only with reference to the way a dissident community frames a common understanding of solidarity and threat.

Because terrorist groups are clandestine and most academics are not paid enough to take the risk to infiltrate terrorist movements, the field’s efforts might fruitfully focus on broader social debates and discourses in countries with experience in political violence. These sources can alert researchers to the ways in which potential support communities interpret the meaning and value of terrorist violence against local and international targets. For example, researchers might examine the

35. See, for example, Thomas 2001; Klotz 1995; and Price 1998.
use of political language by new religious movements in Japan, divergent images of the United States as a threat among the secular Palestinian leadership and public representatives of Hamas, or changes in the symbolic use of transnational corporations by the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) before and after its tactical shift toward reliance on kidnapping as a component of its campaigns.

Alternatively, researchers might seek to explain the different tactics and targets of those organizations with apparent links to Al Qaeda. This could begin with comparative assessments of the political language used by speakers at radical mosques in, for example, London or Paris, with those in Kuala Lumpur, where the Kumpulan Militant Mujahideen (KMM, or Chapter of Militant Holy Warriors) have apparently operated. This approach, which could entail a combination of ethnographic and discursive tools, would allow the researcher to analyze the social context within which militants have operated by specifying the “enemies” on which the language focuses, as well as its emphasis on transformational violence, which might be used to justify larger scale attacks, or on more explicit and limited goals. This interpretive work could then provide some evidence (though hardly conclusive) of the ways in which militants might understand their interests and motives. By stipulating which targets and which tactics seem to be broadly accepted within the terrorist group’s support community, the researcher might then be able to map the interaction between the group, its opponents (the government, another ethnic community, an external foe), and the community within which it operates. Tactics and targets that would appear to be illegitimate, judging from the public discourse in the larger community, would likely yield a drop in possible support, thereby affecting the group’s calculation of probable utility. Similarly, the expected response by the government would create another factor with similar effects. These interpretive comparisons would thus become the basis for establishing alternative preference structures necessary to model probable strategies of a given terrorist group.

Wagner-Pacifici’s argument that all participants in a terrorist crisis (terrorist groups and governments alike) are actors in a social drama reminds us additionally that symbolism can be equally important to governments as they fight alarming but poorly understood terrorist threats. Research on counterterrorism might adopt cultural frames to explain the range of acceptable or appropriate state actions. For example, the quick declaration by the Bush administration that it was engaged in a “war on terrorism”—in spite of a complete lack of clarity of how this war would

38. Though not a scholarly treatise, one example would be Serizawa 1996, which examines the Aum Shinrikyo cult not only through its own discourses but also through investigation of “new age” religions in contemporary Japan. Renowned novelists Haruki Murakami has also collected statements from those involved in the Aum Shinrikyo attack in his acclaimed Underground (2000)


Symbols, Strategies, Choices for IR Scholarship

resemble other wars—suggests that American choices have been constrained by national frames for understanding how the United States must respond to threats. In contrast, Japan’s distinctly nonmilitary approach to international terrorism reflects debates over the appropriate use of force by the state, political expectations that the government will safeguard Japanese lives rather than liquidate threats, and institutionalized conceptions of the Japanese as “unique” and unable to understand the threatening world around them. In other words, recognizing the symbolic context within which terrorist organizations, states, and support communities interact can better explain outcomes than would focusing solely on the material interests and strategic choices of each group.

That said, interpretive research alone will not sufficiently explain terrorist conflicts. Without some assumption of basic interests for terrorist groups (group survival, achievement of state goals, and the like) and of states (security from domestic and international threats), interpretive schema risk a kind of cultural determinism, in which terrorist conflicts are no more than the sum of their clashing discourses and symbols. Above all, terrorism is political violence. By ignoring the extent to which terrorist organizations, community leaders, and states make strategic choices that are contingent on their expecting other actors in a struggle to react in a certain way, we would remove a necessary piece of any reasonable explanatory framework.

This call for research on both symbol and strategy is hardly the first for a synthesis of rationalist and culturalist approaches in international security. Nor is it the first time in recent memory that an unanticipated major event has inspired a rethinking of the field of international relations. But September 11 represents a different kind of challenge, requiring not only theoretical creativity but also some methodological eclecticism and experimentation. The literature on terrorism has already raised important issues that international relations scholarship can address, and recent debates in research on social movements tell us that there are creative ways to link meaning and action in the study of contentious politics. An extension of contentious politics is now acknowledged as a problem of the first order for international security, and the research that can illuminate the phenomenon will be a


44. Interviews by the author with Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, Tokyo, 13 January 2000. On the discourses of Japan’s “unique” national identity, see Oguma 1995; and Aoki 1990.

45. See discussions in Katzenstein 1996; and Desch 1998.

difficult and largely unfamiliar shift for scholars across the field. Neither constructivists nor rationalists will have an easy claim that their perspective is superior, and scholars in each tradition will need to rethink how they approach international security. We have been told, however, that the war on terrorism requires sacrifice; this will no doubt be true for international relations scholars as well.

References


