

provenance. The earliest physical example Tarassuk has found of a domestically manufactured pistol dates from the early 1620s, and he admits that this as well as later models employed West European technology.

Although the author presents a useful and learned essay on Muscovite pistols, it should be noted that he displays an inordinate concern for deluxe specimens, neglecting the weapons that were used in combat. Similarly, his discussion of the industrial apparatus required in their manufacture will not excite historians of technology, although he does summarize rather efficiently the record of how the Muscovite state first relied on imports during the first half of the seventeenth century and then acquired the technological wherewithal to engage in domestic mass production. In all, it is a good but exceedingly skimpy work, valuable only because so little is available in English on the topic.

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RUSSIA IN THE ERA OF PETER THE GREAT. By *L. Jay Oliva*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969. viii, 184 pp. \$5.95.

Teachers who are bored with textbook treatments of Peter's reign or who have tired of V. O. Kliuchevsky and B. H. Sumner on the subject will welcome Oliva's foray into the field. His volume may herald a new trend in classroom-oriented writing on Russian history—away from the orthodox survey toward reinterpretations of more restricted periods and topics. Ian Grey and company may soon encounter healthy competition.

Addressed to students and general readers (those favorite targets of publishers' sales departments), Oliva's concise study has something to offer the specialist, too. Its strengths include clarity of perspective, balance of generalization and specifics, and sprightly writing. In contrast to previous scholarship, Oliva concentrates on the era rather than the man; he analyzes Petrine policies against the backdrop of early modern Europe. When combined with a thoughtful analysis of Peter's Muscovite inheritance, this "horizontal" perspective generates fresh insights into the motivations, actions, and limitations of the Tsar-Reformer. Peter becomes at once more comprehensible in terms of his own age and still more remarkable as a successful practitioner of several policies that, in retrospect, look astonishingly modern. To my mind, Oliva has struck a better balance between biographical detail, general developments, and interpretation than either Kliuchevsky or Sumner has. He provides a more solid appraisal of seventeenth-century Muscovy and of Peter's early career. Also stimulating are his analysis of Petrine politics, especially the role of the nobility therein, and his examination of the social forces that supported and opposed Peter's reforms.

As a sophisticated popularization Oliva's book realizes its purpose. Specialists may be less impressed, however. The author gives little new information; he scarcely indicates his sources; his bibliography is extremely selective; his buoyant style may irritate professional historians; and he has, inevitably, oversimplified some problems. He commits some factual errors as well. For example, the Trinity Monastery and Troitsa Monastery appear as two different institutions (in general, transliteration, translation, and the spelling of names, places, and technical terms are quite inconsistent); Tsar Michael (d. 1645) receives posthumous credit for the Ulozhenie of 1649. The important Preobrazhensky Office (*sic*) is mentioned twice but not explained. Read literally, a sentence on page 31 implies there were twenty thousand

*streltsy* regiments. No map is provided—surely a serious omission in an introductory work. Still, despite these rather minor imperfections, Professor Oliva should be congratulated for his provocative, lively reappraisal of a fascinating period and personality.

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KREST'IANSKAIA VOINA 1773–1775 GG.: NA IAIKE, V PRIURAL'E, NA URAL'E I V SIBIRI. By *A. I. Andrushchenko*. Akademiia nauk SSSR, Institut istorii. Moscow: "Nauka," 1969. 360 pp. 1 ruble, 65 kopeks.

The author of this posthumously published monograph devoted the last sixteen years of his life (1906–67) to studying the massive insurrection of 1773–75 that scourged the southeastern provinces of imperial Russia. In the process he compiled an immense collection of archival notes on the subject. The present volume, portions of which have appeared as articles over the past decade, capped Andrushchenko's long labors and served as his *doktorskaia dissertatsiia*. It is a fitting monument to a man who, despite disability from war wounds, mobilized his mental and physical resources to produce a respectable body of scholarship.

Andrushchenko's study exemplifies both the virtues and the defects of the dissertation genre. Meticulously researched and documented, his book is, within its chronological and territorial boundaries, exhaustive. His argumentation is clearly presented and his material logically arranged. He moves from generalizations to specifics and back again. He carefully assays previous scholarship, and voices his own opinion on controversial points. An exponent of Marxism-Leninism, he is aware of the variety and contradictions of past social phenomena. His monograph testifies to the percolating influence of recent theoretical debates in the USSR—elucidated for us in articles by Arthur P. Mendel—concerning methodology, social psychology, and the writing of history. Crucial terms which recur in Andrushchenko's interpretive passages are "complex," "peculiar," "contradictory," and the ubiquitous *odnako* ("but/however") which invariably heralds a qualifying phrase.

Compared to previous, often dogma-ridden Soviet scholarship on this topic, Andrushchenko's work generally displays levelheaded analysis based on the sources. He presents an original discussion of the rebels' ideology, stressing the importance of tsarist forms, and he demonstrates the insurgents' confusion over the shape of their revolutionary or postrevolutionary regime. He devotes half of one lengthy chapter to examining those industrial enterprises that did not support the rebels. Here he candidly observes that a prominent factor in frustrating the rebels' appeals was "the centuries-old inertia" of the enserfed peasantry (p. 321). He also acknowledges that religion, while not a major force in the rebellion, exerted some influence upon rebel ideology and that the clergy in several instances played an important role in the uprising. Finally, he indicates the military mistakes of the rebels, admits the existence of plundering and internal tensions among them, and refuses to idealize their methods of conscription and confiscation.

Andrushchenko's forte is facts and documentation. He is understandably proud of discovering some heretofore unknown archival sources. Three appendixes tabulate statistical data detailing the participation of non-Russian peoples in the revolt, the industrial enterprises that supported the rebels, and those that did not. These materials represent a pioneering effort at quantifying aspects of the uprising.