

WHO TAKES A SEAT AT THE PRO-POOR TABLE?

Civil Society Participation in the Honduran Poverty Reduction Strategy

Sara Dewachter
University of Antwerp

Nadia Molenaers
University of Antwerp

Abstract: Although much has been written on civil society participation in the formulation and monitoring of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), very little systematic and scientific evidence exists on the kind of organizations that participate and the elements that explain their involvement in these processes. This article considers one country case, Honduras, for which survey data were gathered from 101 civil society organizations (CSOs) in 2006. This study examines the characteristics these organizations display which explain (non)participation in the next participatory round of the PRSPs. The findings challenge some of the by now widely accepted ideas relating to the kinds of organizations involved in PRSP processes. The idea that predominantly urban-based, highly professional, well-funded, donor-bred-and-fed nongovernmental organizations participate is too blunt. The Honduran case shows that the players in participative processes are more diversified than much of the current literature on PRSPs suggests.

CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION UNDER THE NEW AID APPROACH: RATIONALE AND STATE OF THE ART

The World Bank launched the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in 1999, and it soon became the linchpin of a new aid approach. The principles of this new aid approach emphasize the importance of recipient ownership over national development strategies, pro-poor results, and civil society involvement in drafting and monitoring poverty reduction strategies. The production of such a PRSP gave access to debt relief, concessional assistance from the international financial institutions (IFIs), and more aid from the larger donor community. Moreover, the PRSP was promoted as a medium- and long-term national economic and social policy planning instrument (Lazarus 2008). The new aid approach indicates a desire to move away from donor-driven development to give more room to home-grown, government-led, and nationally owned poverty reduction strategies.

One of the most remarkable issues in the PRSP was the participation conditionality. Governments had to consult civil society during the formulation of the first PRSP draft, and participation had to become institutionalized through

The authors would like to thank Bart Kerremans, Robrecht Renard, and Nathalie Holvoet for their valuable comments, and the three anonymous LARR reviewers for their constructive critiques.

Latin American Research Review, Vol. 46, No. 3. © 2011 by the Latin American Studies Association.




Figure 1 *The Expected Role of Participation in the PRSP Philosophy*

Source: Molenaers and Renard (2006, 8).

monitoring mechanisms, particularly the annual progress reports (APRs), in which civil society would be involved. The PRSP approach held high expectations for civil society participation. The World Bank's *PRSP Sourcebook* argues that participation will contribute to more pro-poor development (figure 1). Added to this, it will contribute to accountable, transparent, and efficient processes for economic decision making, resource allocation, expenditures, and service delivery; to increased equity in development policies, goals, and outcomes; and to a shared (nationally owned) long-term vision among all stakeholders for development (Tikare et al. 2002). Last, because participation can contribute to democracy, democracy would possibly be strengthened as well. Participation as promoted under the PRSP marks a revolutionary shift from the micro (local and project) level to the macro (national and policy) level, from service delivery to influence on policy (Cornwall and Gaventa 1999).

More than sixty low-income countries have gone through the paces of the PRSP process, including the participation conditionality. Numerous reports and articles have focused on the issue of participation, the quality and impact of the processes, and the characteristics of the actors involved. In general, these reports tend to make rather negative overall evaluations of the processes. A very important criticism often mentioned in these reports is the fact that a strong bias could be noticed in participating stakeholders.

Quite a few reports highlight that PRSP processes tend to be dominated by urban-based, and in particular capital-based, middle-class, externally funded nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). It seems that NGO involvement, networks, and umbrella organizations served as proxies for reaching the poor and vulnerable, because the latter were almost invisible in the processes (Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité 2004; Driscoll and Evans 2004, 2005; Lazarus 2008; Siebold 2007; World Bank 2002). "Deficiencies of CSO-representativeness are not only a result of limited capacity to do outreach and to consult constituencies, it is also often due to the fact that they are dominated by urban professionals with limited contact to the poor" (McGee, Levene, and Hughes 2002; Siebold 2007; Trócaire 2004).

Often mentioned is the idea that the involved stakeholders have good relations with the donor community and/or the government. Moreover, the process is per-

ceived to be dominated by NGOs, often viewed as relatively rich organizations with greater access to donor resources than social movements have, which may be related to their access to all kinds of political fora at national and international levels. At the same time, it is argued that governments in most cases studiously avoided the involvement of the more dissident voices, leading to another, pro-government selection bias in who gets invited (CIDSE 2004; Driscoll and Evans 2004; Eberlei 2007; Siebold 2007).

Private-sector and mass organizations are involved in only a limited way. The relative absence of more traditional, member-based organizations (e.g., trade unions, peasant organizations, producer organizations) is considered problematic, especially because some of these organizations have strong links to the poor and enjoy more legitimacy, given their membership-based constitution (Driscoll and Evans 2005). All observers note that key sections of civil society (e.g., religious and community-based organizations, rural groups, indigenous people, children, persons with disabilities) were missing from the participation process (Stewart and Wang 2003).

The Honduran case, at first sight, confirms the previously mentioned findings. Honduras embarked on the PRSP process after the devastation caused by Hurricane Mitch in 1998, when it qualified for debt relief under the enhanced highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative (Trócaire 2006). First, an interim PRSP (2000) and later a full PRSP (2001) were elaborated. Subsequently, three PRSP progress reports were published in 2003, 2005, and 2007. As required, the full PRSP was subjected to a broad consultation by civil society through regional and sectoral meetings. In line with the full PRSP, the first and second progress reports have been presented in participatory meetings with civil society. The third progress report was drafted without broad-based civil society consultation.

In general, civil society organizations (CSOs) were not very happy with the participation processes. They felt that their views were not being incorporated in a process that resulted in nothing more than mere information meetings rather than real participation because of practical constraints (e.g., time, language) and lack of political willingness to incorporate the recommendations from civil society stakeholders (Possing 2003; Siebold 2007; Trócaire 2004). With regard to the representativeness of the participation process, participation was said to be "limited to a small number of organizations, with representatives of poor communities from rural areas, peasant associations and trade unions virtually excluded from the process" (Cornally, Crowley, and O'Neill 2003, 17). The only diverging finding comes from Cuesta and colleagues (2003), who found that, unlike the large and vocal civil society networks, the small, locally embedded organizations were not frustrated by the process. Quite the contrary, they felt gratified because they had made their views heard. On the whole, however, Honduran critiques on the participation process were similar to those made in other PRSP countries. In summary, most of the assessment reports seem to agree on some major deficiencies in the kind of organizations that participated in PRSP processes: most are NGOs (membership-based organizations are missing; the poor and vulnerable are missing); these NGOs are mostly urban based and capital based (rural organizations are absent; NGOs mostly have a lot of resources, which poorer organizations lack);

they are well placed in networks with the international community (e.g., donors and international NGOs); and participation is dependent on good connections with the donor community.

This article tries to scientifically test some of these criticisms on PRSP processes. Many assessments have become generally accepted criticisms of PRSP processes without having been put to the test (in one or more contexts).

When reviewing the more qualitative literature on Honduran history, we find that the criticisms on PRSP processes are very closely related to the history of Honduran civil society and the political situation. Most authors discern three periods in Honduran modern history (Boussard 2003; Espinoza 2003; Heinrich and Fioramonti 2008).¹ The first period, before the transition to democracy (in 1982), was an alternation of civil and military rule, characterized by periods of fierce repression that left an important mark on political culture in the country. The 1950s saw the rise of labor and peasant movements, which originally sprang up at the banana companies, run by very powerful foreign interests that had a significant say in national politics. Honduras at that time had a relatively strong civil society (labor and peasant movements), compared to its neighboring countries (Acker 1988). The transition to democracy, which constitutes a second phase in Honduran history (1982–1998), was initiated by the military rather than civil society. The labor and peasant movements by that time had been severely weakened by government repression, attempts to co-opt them, or attempts to erode their membership and power by creating parallel government-supported labor and peasant organizations. Moreover, a new type of organization began to develop and played an important role in the development of democracy in Honduras, namely the human rights organizations and, in their wake, other rights-based organizations like women's organizations. The third period started in 1998 with Hurricane Mitch. This hurricane caused enormous devastation in Honduras and required massive help. The response to the hurricane revealed the incompetence of the military and government. The reputation and influence of the military waned, while civil society gained momentum to demand changes vis-à-vis the government. But this time, the "new" CSOs are believed to play a pivotal role in a new type of civil society–government relation, which is more consensus oriented than previous confrontational strategies. Moreover, Hurricane Mitch also brought in foreign donors' assistance on an unprecedented scale. In contrast to the other powerful foreign actors, i.e., foreign companies and the United States, international donors claimed to have a legitimate place in the national policy arena (Seppänen 2005). The international donors, by imposing the PRSP agenda, pushed the Honduran government to open up political space for CSOs to participate in policy making.

Some important issues emerge from the historical context. Boussard (2003) finds that a cleavage exists between the old and the new civil society organizations. The old CSOs are still "stuck" in the confrontational approach toward the state and have not (yet) adapted to the changed modalities of interest representation, wherein participation in the government-led councils and meetings hold a

1. This overview of Honduran history does not take into account the coup against President Zelaya (June 2009), which has changed the political situation in the country.

center-stage position. The new civil society organizations, typically NGOs and those human rights and women's groups of the 1980s that managed to adapt to the new circumstances, are fit for this new constellation and are believed to take up the newly created space for civil society to a larger extent than old civil society organizations do (Boussard 2003). This creates friction, to a certain extent, between old and new civil society organizations.

Imposing participation does not mean that governments are convinced of the added value of civil society involvement. New forms of co-optation are likely to be used: by establishing commissions for participation without attributing any real power to them and by influencing the membership of those commissions such that they were very unlikely to come up with a unified voice, the government thereby curtailed the possibilities of civil society to use its countervailing power to influence policy making (Boussard 2003).² Therefore, various authors warn of the potentially harmful effects of organizing participation processes without attributing real influence to all players. If this is not the case, civil society might end up being only a puppet for legitimizing the government's and/or IFI's and international NGOs' agendas and becoming disillusioned with political participation altogether (Fraser 2005), or being sidetracked from other (more effective) forms of political participation. It is critical to take into account the prevailing power relations in participation exercises (Lazarus 2008).

An important idea to retain here is that the history of civil society development in Honduras explains how Honduran civil society is not a monolithic actor. Differences in types, size, interests, values, influence, and strategies of the organizations constituting civil society are enormous (Espinoza 2003; Heinrich and Fioramonti 2008). From that perspective, identifying in more detail who takes a seat at the pro-poor table matters greatly.

In the following section, we set out to test some of the critiques on participation in the Honduran case, but first we elaborate the model we used to test the determinants of participation of organizations.

MEASURING DETERMINANTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL PARTICIPATION

It is striking that many studies focus on determinants of individual participation, but finding a general theoretical and analytical framework that sets out to explain the participation of organizations in influencing or monitoring policy is more difficult. This is not to say that there are no studies on this topic, but the theoretical and analytical frameworks the studies use are generally less comprehensive than the highly sophisticated models used for measuring individual participation in associational or political life (Lavalle, Acharya, and Houtzager 2005).³

2. The open-access approach of the PRSP process led to a heterogeneous group of CSOs with regard to their ideology, capacity, expectations, and interests. This limited the ability to come up with a common civil society agenda and elaborate prioritized policy proposals. The government has used this as a justification to use a more top-down approach (Cuesta 2007).

3. Notwithstanding an extensive body of research and literature on participation and activities of interest groups (Andrews and Edwards 2004; Caldeira and Wright 1990; Golden 1998; Hojnacki and Kimball 1999; Nownes and Freeman 1998; Schattschneider 1960; Schlozman and Tierney 1983; Schlozman

One of the most valuable frameworks on determinants of individual-level participation was the civic voluntarism model developed by Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995). The authors start by posing the question, why do people not participate in politics? A threefold answer helps, in their opinion, to explain non-participation: because they can't (resource dimension); because they do not want to (dimension of preferences, engagement, interest, effectiveness perceptions); and/or because they were not asked to (recruitment dimension) (Brady et al. 1995; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). These three dimensions may also help us better understand and explain participation of collective actors.

The Resource Dimension

Individuals, but also organizations, need resources (time, money, and skills) to participate politically. In many PRSP evaluations, the lack of resources (especially financial resources and capacities) to effectively participate in policy debates was put forward as a reason for withdrawing from PRSP processes (Eberlei 2007; Siebold 2007). Similarly, the literature on interest groups, social movements, and nonprofit organizations also hypothesizes that organizational resources are positively linked to political action. The resource mobilization theory contends that the availability of resources increases the likelihood of collective action (Cress and Snow 1996; Edwards and McCarthy 2004).⁴ Organizational resources are used not just to explain the emergence or survival of social movement organizations (Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2004) but also to explain the bias toward the well-resourced in interest groups' political activity (Andrews and Edwards 2004; Caldeira and Wright 1990; Edwards and McCarthy 2004; Schattschneider 1960; Schlozman and Tierney 1986) and participation of CSOs in local budgetary councils (Lavalle et al. 2005).

To operationalize financial resources, researchers have used the organization's budget as an indicator (Guo and Acar 2005; Lavalle et al. 2005). Other studies use an index based on the material resources available to the organization (Cress and Snow 1996). In our case, we combined the previously mentioned operationalizations, using both the budget and the material resources index as an indicator for the material resources of an organization.

The time available to an individual, as a resource necessary for participation, finds its equivalent in the availability of professional staff within the organization. Full-time staff, part-time staff, and voluntary personnel can be distinguished. One could argue that the availability of staff is, to a large extent, a function of the availability of financial resources of the organizations. However, in the context of CSOs, taking into account the available volunteers is very important, because it can present a different picture in terms of the action potential of the organizations.

1984), models of factors explaining the political participation of interest groups, to the best of our knowledge, do not hold a center-stage position therein.

4. One of the prominent theoretical schools in social movement research since the 1970s is the resource mobilization perspective. Basically, the theory contends that preexisting social and organizational resources are paramount in explaining social movement emergence and mobilization (Cress and Snow 1996).

Some organizations have only a limited professional staff yet they may have an elaborate network of volunteers. The availability of volunteers thus is a resource that does not necessarily neatly correlate with the financial resources available to the organization. Therefore, we constructed an index, including all three forms of staff (full-time, part-time, voluntary), to capture the total amount of time available to the organization.⁵ Analogous with the civic voluntarism model and resource mobilization theory, we hypothesize that an organization with few full-time and/or part-time or volunteer staff is less likely to have the time at its disposal to participate in political action than an organization with abundant staff available.

The human resources available to an organization are a third type of resource important for explaining political participation. The educational profile of an actor has been the prime predictor of political participation (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998). Numerous empirical studies have confirmed the importance of education in explaining political participation in different types of political participation and in different geographical settings (Booth and Richard 1998; Egmond, De Graaf, and Eijk 1998; Klesner 2007; Martinez 2005; Moehler 2007; Seligson et al. 1999). Clearly, operationalizing the educational level of an organization is not as straightforward as operationalizing the educational level of an individual (i.e., highest level of schooling). In our research, the variable *educational level* measures the highest education level of the organization's board.⁶

The hypothesized relationship between resources and political participation thus states that, other things being equal, the more resources an organization has at its disposal, the more likely political participation will be.

The Political Engagement Dimension

Resources are one dimension that may enable or constrain participation, but the civil voluntarism model also refers to the willingness to participate. The interests at stake, the preferences of the participant, the level of political engagement, and the perception of usefulness of participation are important determinants for (non)participation (Almond and Verba 1965; Campbell et al. 1960; Conway 2000; Matthews and Prothro 1966). If an actor believes that a political action enhances the pursuit of a specific goal, his or her propensity to participate will be greater, other things being equal, than that of an actor who believes that his or her participation will be useless. Especially given that many CSOs emphasized the lack of impact of participation on policy making, one could hypothesize that the perception of effectiveness of participation will be important in explaining CSO participation.

5. The index is constructed as follows: overall staff index = (N full-time staff) + (0.5 × N part-time staff) + (weight × N volunteers). Because we did not find a standard approach to weigh the time spent by a volunteer in the assigning of weights in the construction of an overall staff index, we have checked for various weights (1 in 4, 7, and 14 days) for the volunteer contribution.

6. To compare the educational level among the various organizations, and because almost all organizations indicated the board as the highest authority of the organization, we opted to record the highest and the average level of schooling of the members of the board. The underlying assumption is that, because the board is the showpiece of the organization, qualified persons would therefore try to be on the board or even be pushed into it. Therefore the highest educational level of the organization's board can serve as a good proxy for the highest educational level of the whole organization.

Therefore we tested whether a CSO's perception of the efficacy of influencing public policy increases its intention to participate in the PRSP process.

However, there can also be strong incentives not to participate. A situation could arise in which an organization might actually stand to lose by participating. This could be the case for organizations with a pronounced ideological profile very incongruent with what is perceived as the ideological profile of the organizing actors of the participatory process. In such cases, CSOs might fear losing credibility with their (grassroots) supporters (Gidron et al. 1999). The hypothesized relationship is that the more incongruent the ideological profile of the organization with the organizers' profile, the less likely the organization is to participate.⁷

The Recruitment Dimension

Having the necessary resources and the will to engage in political activity does not always guarantee that individuals or, for that matter, organizations will in fact participate. Being asked or invited to join or act can increase the likelihood that an individual will participate (Brady et al. 1995; Moehler 2007). Recruitment has been found to importantly increase the propensity to participate. Social movement research finds the networks in which an actor is socially embedded to be crucial in explaining his or her participation in movement activities (Diani 1995, 2004). Similarly, Knoke (1990) found that recruitment networks, such as being connected to people involved in party politics, were also conducive for political participation, such as voting.

In the context of our research, recruitment networks could be translated into organizations' contacts with actors related to the PRSP participation process. Although the PRSP setup in general and in Honduras in particular is formally labeled as open-access, it has been argued that this political arena for policy influencing has been in reality less open than projected. In the Honduran case, it is the responsibility of the PRSP council to invite organizations to participate in the participatory councils.⁸ Informally, other PRSP-related actors (i.e., international donors or technical units within the ministries) may recruit organizations into the PRSP process by informing them about the process or by strengthening their perception of the potential effectiveness of their participation. These PRSP-related actors are operationalized as those actors typically involved in the new PRSP game. First, the members of the PRSP council are contacts of formal or direct recruitment. Second, a number of international donors that financially support the

7. The ideological profile of the organization was measured in several ways. The respondent was asked to indicate the program or ideas of which political party the organization could subscribe to most. Moreover, he or she was asked to situate him- or herself on a left-right continuum (Robinson, Rusk, and Head 1972). Furthermore, the respondent's active personal support for a political candidate during the last national elections (November 2005) was noted.

8. The PRSP council, or the Consejo Consultivo de la Estrategia para la Reducción de la Pobreza, consists of twelve representatives from civil society and five representatives from the government. Two representatives from the international donor community attend the meetings as observers. The twelve civil sectors are children and youths, women, the disabled, the elderly, domestic NGOs, social economy, *patronatos*, farmers, labor movements, formal economy, small and medium enterprises, and municipalities. Regional representatives often participate but do not have a formal vote.

implementation of the PRSP and especially the participation process can be considered informal or indirect recruitment contacts. Therefore, the hypothesized relationship between direct and/or indirect recruitment contacts and participation is that the more recruitment contacts are made, the more likely it is that the recruited organizations will participate.⁹ A final network variable is examined, namely the centrality of the CSO within the larger CSO network (i.e., in-degree centrality). The hypothesis states that CSOs central in the network are perceived by themselves and others to be leaders and as such will be more inclined to participate politically and function as representatives toward government and other actors (Diani 2003).

Control Variables

Organizational research generally uses the type and age of the organization as control variables (Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens 2005; Guo and Acar 2005; Lavalle et al. 2005). The history of civil society development in Honduras and the criticisms on the representativeness of participation in the PRSP process confirm the importance of these variables.

The first control variable is the *type of the organization*. We distinguish between first-level organizations, which do not have any other organizations as their members, and higher-level organizations, which are essentially umbrella bodies. Lavalle and colleagues (2005) found coordinating organizations to be more inclined to participate politically than other types of organizations. The *PRSP Sourcebook* has also pointed out the important role of these organizations as intermediaries between government and grassroots organizations (Tikare et al. 2002). Therefore, our research is guided by the hypothesis that higher-level CSOs are more inclined to participate, all other things being equal.

The second control variable is the *year in which the organization was founded*. Critiques were formulated that only new types of CSOs were participating in the PRSP process (Espinoza 2006). We have checked for possible relations between the organizational age and participation in three different ways. First, the continuous variable *organizational age* is introduced to control for the number of years an organization exists. The hypothesis behind this test is that the longer a CSO exists, the more contacts it has, and the more fully active it is, the more likely it will be to take part in participatory processes (Diani 2003). Second, the number of years since the organization was founded is also checked for as a dichotomous variable, coding 0 or 1 for foundation before or after the transition to democracy, which we have set as 1982 in Honduras's case (Polity IV 2003). Organizations created in times of democratization are theorized to be more inclined to participate politically (Lavalle et al. 2005). Finally, a third variable is also tested, namely an ordinal variable introducing Hurricane Mitch as an important landmark in the

9. Recruitment contacts are measured as the outdegree of a CSO in the network (relations between CSOs and donors or the PRSP council). The concept of outdegree refers to the number of ties an actor (CSO) has established with another actor (in this case international donors and the PRSP council). Apart from contact itself (as a dichotomous yes-no variable) with actors, we also took into account the frequency of the contact with those actors.

history of CSOs in Honduras, leading to the creation of the new type of civil society organizations (Espinoza 2003; Heinrich and Fioramonti 2008; Possing 2003).

METHODOLOGY

The data were gathered between January and September 2006 on 101 CSOs in Honduras. The research setup required a comparison of participating organizations with nonparticipating organizations. A stratified sampling strategy was used to ensure a sufficiently large number of participating organizations in our sample. First, a random sample of fifty organizations was taken from a subpopulation of participating organizations. Subsequently, an equally large random sample was drawn from the population of nonparticipating organizations.

We constructed the population of participating CSOs as follows. Listings were obtained from the last participatory evaluation meeting of the PRSP progress report. These meetings were held in six different regions. Four of the six regions were incorporated into the research (table 1). A random sample of each of the regional participants' lists was taken, controlling the number of organizations from each region, so that the relative weight of each of the regions is comparable to that in the original list of participants.

Why those four regions? The research design set out to incorporate variations between the different regions. The chosen indicators were the location of the region, the poverty profile of the region, and the involvement of regional civil society organizations in the PRSP process. Moreover, we checked for differences in political preferences in the regions (table 1).

Now we shall turn to the construction of the nonparticipating CSO population. Given that there are no readily available, all-encompassing lists of Honduran CSOs, a universe had to be constructed. An initial review of data sources provided

Table 1 Comparison and Selection of the Regions

Region (city where meeting took place)	Relatively rich/poor ^a	Center/periphery	PRSP involvement of the region ^b	Political preferences ^c	Region selected in sample
Choluteca	Poor	Periphery	Low	Mixed	X
Santa Rosa de Copán	Poor	Periphery	High	Mixed	X
Tegucigalpa	Rich	Center	High	Mixed	X
La Ceiba	Rich	Center	Low	Mixed	X
Tocoa	Poor	Periphery	High	Mixed	
San Pedro Sula	Rich	Center	Low	Mixed	

^aBased on Datos del Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda 2001, Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Sistema de Información para la Estrategia para la Reducción a la Pobreza indicators (<http://www.sierp.hn>).

^bBased on various interviews with CSO representatives.

^cBased on election results of congressional and presidential elections between 1980 and 2005 (Tribunal Supremo Electoral de Honduras).

us with a CSO database based on a civil society mapping exercise in 2000–2001 (Espinoza 2003). This mapping exercise provided a directory of CSOs based on what organizations could be found in a variety of documents (listings from the Ministries of Governance and Justice of registries of organizations that had obtained the *personería jurídica* from 1990 through 2001, and listings from bi- and multilateral donors of organizations and listings from umbrella organizations).¹⁰

To reduce biases, triangulation of sources is advised (Andrews and Edwards 2004). Therefore, our research has used a triangulation of different sources: a review of newspapers;¹¹ the Internet; an inquiry in the municipality of the largest city in the region; and finally, each of the respondents from the participating sample was asked to enumerate the CSOs with which they are in contact.¹² All of these CSO listings were then combined with the listings from the original mapping exercise to constitute our universe of CSOs. These organizations were segregated according to regions, with only organizations from the four selected regions retained. After constructing the population of nonparticipating CSOs, a random sample was drawn from each of the four regions, as was done with participating CSOs.

A total of 101 organizations were interviewed. The survey response rate was high (i.e., 75 percent). Twenty-five percent of the organizations were untraceable, but every organization that we were able to trace agreed to participate in the study. The duration of the interviews ranged between half an hour and two hours. The way in which the various organizations were approached was uniform to the extent possible (e.g., telephone conversation, the same introduction, and the same interviewer for all interviews).

RESULTS

The dependent variable of our research is participation in PRSP progress report consultation meetings, and before moving to the results, it is important to emphasize and validate the claim that political participation is a broad concept, encompassing various dimensions. McGee and Norton (2000) rightly point out that participation can range from information sharing to consultation, joint decision making, and initiation and control by stakeholders. The criticism made is that participation in PRSP processes was mostly limited to consultation or even a mere sharing of information in general (Eberlei 2007; Piron and Evans 2004) and in Honduras in particular (Possing 2003; Siebold 2007; Trócaire 2006). Though important in the whole debate on poverty reduction, whether the participation of the CSO has had any impact on the content of the PRSP process cannot be taken

10. The definition of civil society used in this mapping exercise is the definition offered by the Johns Hopkins Center “Estudio comparativo del tercer sector,” which defines CSOs as those displaying a number of common traits (i.e., organizations, nongovernmental, self-governing, nonprofit distributing, and voluntary; Espinoza 2003). For the remainder of the study, the same definition of civil society is used.

11. Three different newspapers (i.e., *El Heraldo*, *La Tribuna*, and *La Prensa*) were screened to capture differences in ideological tendencies and differences between regions.

12. The snowball method is a well-established technique to construct a population (Lavalle et al. 2005).

into account in this analysis. The actual participation of CSOs is seen as one step toward influencing the PRSP process, and therefore research on this point is important. From this perspective, participation (in our case, attending the meeting) does not reveal information regarding voice (the comments made by the actors at this meeting), influence (the leverage the actors had over the decision makers), or impact (the actual impact of the participation in terms of changing or keeping the content of the policies congruent with the actor's preferences).

We measured past participation in the review of the second annual progress report or APR (December 2004–January 2005) and probed the intention to participate in the upcoming review of the third APR that was planned in 2006–2007.¹³ We checked which of the 101 organizations had participated in the last APR and whether they intended to participate in the upcoming review. Seeing how our survey took place in 2006, the attendance lists of the 2004–2005 meetings for the second progress report could not be used as an indicator for measuring participation, as there needs to be a time lag to connect the independent variables (e.g., networks, perceptions about participation) meaningfully to the dependent variable (participation). Therefore, it was our intention to use the participants' lists of the future review of the third progress report as a dependent variable, representing participation in monitoring and evaluating the PRSP progress report. Of course, one can never be sure of future events taking place, especially when a change of government was due between the second and the third progress report. Hence, we also probed the CSOs to determine their intention to participate. The intention to participate could then be compared to actual participation once the consultation process for the third progress report had taken place. However, the third progress report has now been approved without organizing a broad participatory consultation process.¹⁴ Therefore, only the intention to participate can be used as a variable for participation in our research. Nevertheless, the CSOs' intention to participate in the next participatory meetings for PRSP progress report reviews is strongly correlated to their previous participation, constituting in our view a good proxy for actual future participation.¹⁵

Thus our research explains the intention to participate in PRSP participatory fora. As was explained earlier, we inquired about organizations' intentions to par-

13. A deliberate choice was made to undertake this study in a "mature" PRSP country, meaning that the country had been involved in the PRSP process for some time and that at least one PRSP progress report had been produced, so as to not have a distorted view of who participates in a PRSP participation process. At the beginning of the PRSP process, it could be more attractive for a CSO to become involved in the PRSP process, not knowing exactly what it is. Furthermore, it would not be fair to expect CSOs to instantly subscribe to a different logic created by the PRSP process in which more and more CSOs would take up the role of watchdog and advocacy organization. It is therefore especially interesting to see which CSOs are still participating after a number of years.

14. "The 2006 progress report was not submitted to civil society for a more ample discussion, as it was desirable. The major discussion took place in the Social Issues Cabinet, which approved it on March 2, 2007, and by the World Bank and IMF, both of whom provided valuable observations and which were included in this final report" (Unidad de Apoyo Técnico 2007, 16).

15. The gamma coefficient measuring the association between the intention to participate and previous participation in meetings for the review of the PRSP progress report is 0.547 and significant at the 0.002 level.

ticipate (or not) in the reviewing of the third PRSP progress report. The phrasing of the question was made as precise and concrete as possible and was loaded to limit socially desirable answering.¹⁶

The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, with 0 indicating no intention to participate and 1 indicating an intention to participate. Almost 40 percent of the organizations surveyed said that they would not participate in any future (similar) meetings to review the PRSP progress report; 60 percent indicated that they would.

Given the nature of the dependent variable, a binary logistic regression model was applied. A binary logistic regression sets out to model the odds of an event (in this case, intention to participate) and to estimate the effects of the independent variables (as put forward by our model) on those odds (O'Connell 2006). To check for the multicollinearity of independent variables, correlation analysis was performed.

Explanatory Value of Variables

The theoretical model contains nine variables (table 2).¹⁷ Continuous variables (availability of staff, organizational age, CSO network centrality, contact with PRSP donors) and ordinal variables (material resources, educational level, type of organization, contact with PRSP council) are incorporated in the model. To assess the significance of the model as a whole, we use the chi-square goodness-of-fit test.¹⁸ The logistic regression analysis finds that three variables significantly (at $p < 0.05$) explain CSOs' intentions to participate in PRSP participatory meetings: the educational level, contact with recruitment actors, and the type of organization. Because these are categorical variables, each level of the variable must be interpreted in relation to the reference category to provide meaningful results.

To interpret the meaning of these variables, we turn to the odds ratio estimates (Exp (B)) listed in table 2. The odds ratio estimate shows the predicted change in

16. The question asked was, "Nowadays many meetings are organized for all sorts of purposes. People cannot always attend all meetings because of any number of reasons. If next week, in [the city where the previous participatory meeting of that region was organized], a meeting would be organized in order to evaluate the Third Progress Report of the PRSP, would you attend this meeting?"

17. In addition, the model has also been tested including previous participation as an independent variable. The significant effect of educational level and contact with the PRSP council on intention to participate is confirmed and even stronger. Previous participation of the CSOs is also found to be significant in explaining their intention to participate, while reducing the effect of the organizational level of the CSO on participation.

18. The recommended test to assess the overall fit of the model is the Hosmer and Lemeshow chi-square test of goodness of fit. The analysis finds that the chi-square is not significant, which indicates a good fit of the model to the data. An approximate measure for the percentage of variance explained is the Nagelkerke statistics, which for our model is 0.376, which should be interpreted as 37.6 percent of the variance being explained by the model. The predictive accuracy of the model can be expressed by the classification table of the observed values and those predicted by the model. This table shows us that overall, 79.2 percent of the cases were correctly predicted by the model. The c statistic, which is the percentage of all possible pairs of cases in which the model assigns a higher probability to a correct case than to an incorrect case, is 0.826 ($p = 0.000$).

Table 2 Logistic Regression Analysis of the Model

Dimension	Variables	Full model			
		B	Wald	Sig	Exp(B)
Resources	Material resources		4.029	.133	
	Material resources (medium)*	−141	4.021	.045	.237
	Material resources (many)	−.873	1.305	.253	.418
	Staff	.002	.175	.676	1.002
	Educational level (higher education)*	1.944	5.748	.017	6.985
Engagement	Perceived efficacy		.579	.749	
	Perceived efficacy (some influence)	−.361	.190	.663	.697
	Perceived efficacy (much influence)	.055	.004	.952	1.057
Recruitment	Contact PRSP council (yes)**	1.604	7.74 ^F	.005	4.973
	Donor PRSP contact (yes)	−.004	.003	.953	.996
	CSO network centrality	.031	.043	.836	1.031
Control	Type of organization (higher level) *	1.205	3.980	.046	3.337
	Age of the organization	−.003	.049	.825	.997
	Constant	−1.482	1.679	.195	.227
Nagelkerke R ²		.376			
Predictive efficiency		79.2%			

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.001$

odds for a unit increase in the dependent variable. The odds ratio of categorical variables must be interpreted in terms of the baseline category (which has been set as the lowest category of the ordinal variables).

Let us first look at the resource dimension. From the three resource variables—material resources (aggregate level), the availability of staff, and the educational level of the organization—only the latter is found to significantly contribute to explaining CSOs' intention to participate. This is in line with what has been established time and again in the literature: education is a crucial variable for explaining political participation. A bivariate analysis of the association between the highest level of education (primary, secondary, or university level) and the intention to participate showed that the actual threshold for participation is between the levels of primary education and above, given that the difference between secondary and

university education is not relevant for explaining the intention to participate of CSOs. Therefore, the variable was dichotomized into a baseline category (highest educational level = primary schooling) and an alternative category (highest level educational level = above primary schooling). The results in table 2 reveal that the odds that an organization with a secondary or university education level intends to participate are seven times the odds that an organization with a primary educational level will participate. The variable is significant at the 0.017 level. The importance of education for CSOs' intention to participate in PRSP processes needs to be conceptualized as a threshold, set at primary schooling.

Interestingly, and contrary to the hypothesis, the relationship between material resources and intention to participate is not significant at the aggregate level. Hence, an increase in the level of resources of a CSO does not linearly increase the odds that it intends to participate. These results refute the hypothesis formulated by various theoretical perspectives (e.g., resource mobilization theory and the civic voluntarism model) that more resources would increase the likelihood of political participation. Likewise, it also disagrees with an often-formulated critique of the PRSP participation processes, namely that only the well-resourced CSOs participate. In Honduras, too, this critique was formulated in the advent of the formulation process of the PRSP. This finding seems to be surprising, although Lavalle and colleagues (2005) arrived at a similar conclusion. They found no relation between the availability of financial resources of the CSOs and their participation in the local participatory councils in São Paulo. The similarity in findings could be due to the organizational structure of the participation exercise: decentralized processes might reduce the cost of participation for organizations as opposed to continuous, capital city-based types of participation. Another explanation could be that "poorer" organizations see participation as a strategy to gain access to (resourceful) networks.

In addition, the degree of donor funding was not taken up in the model, as a *t*-test showed that CSOs intending to participate were not significantly more donor funded than those not intending to participate, thereby contradicting an often uttered criticism.

Turning to the second dimension, political engagement, the logistic regression points out that the perception of civil society's influence on public policy does not seem to have a significant influence on the intention to participate. This is quite a remarkable finding. When exploring different political strategies, we found that perceived effectiveness of the political strategy of participating in meetings with government is relatively low for all CSOs, both participating and nonparticipating. CSOs, on average, find protesting on the streets or influencing public opinion to be significantly more effective as a strategy for influencing policy making.¹⁹

To be clear, we also tested whether the ideological perspective of an organization was conducive to participation; however, ideological position (both on a

19. A five-item scale probed respondents to indicate the influence CSOs have on public policy making through different strategies (0 = no influence; 5 = a lot of influence). A *t*-test found that the protest and public opinion strategy were perceived as significantly more influential than meetings with government.

left-right spectrum and based on preferences for political party programs) was not found to be significant for the CSOs intending to participate.²⁰ However, some of the comments made by the CSOs indicated that very left-wing-oriented organizations were somewhat less inclined to participate. Some of them expressed a fear of being used to legitimize a government agenda and preferred to use more confrontational strategies.

We could also expect, in a country where clientelistic political networks are a part of the political culture, that these political networks would be paramount in explaining participation. The smaller opposition parties seemed to be over-represented in our sample of CSOs compared to the overall number of seats in Congress, which suggests that civil society aligns more with the opposition than with the two main political parties (Liberal Party and National Party). However, no significant relation was found between CSOs' party preferences and their intention to participate.

We turn to the recruitment dimension specified within the logistic model. The odds of an organization with PRSP council contacts intending to participate are five times higher than those of an organization with no such contacts ($p = 0.005$). This finding highlights the importance of networks for recruiting CSOs into participation, especially contacts with the PRSP council.²¹ Remarkably, the results of the logistic regression show no recruitment by the PRSP donors. The hypothesis stated that the more a CSO would have frequent contacts with donors that are highly active on the issue of PRSP participation, the more inclined the CSOs would be to participate in the PRSP processes. The data did show an association between contact with PRSP donors and intention to participate in the bivariate analysis. However, when controlling for the other variables in explaining political participation, this association disappears. Similarly, a bivariate positive association between network centrality and participation disappeared when introducing the variable in the full model.

Finally, the last dimension of the logistic model concerns the two control variables, namely organizational age and the type of organization.

No relation was discerned between organizational age and the intention to participate. Furthermore, two additional hypotheses concerning the timing of the creation of the CSO have been considered. Both the dichotomous variable taking

20. Few CSOs indicated an ideological profile (57) and pronounced political party preferences (39). Therefore the results must be seen as indicative rather than conclusive proof. Moreover, the reluctance of taking an ideological stance might be an indication of the sensitiveness of ideological and partisan preferences for civil society, especially those that depend on donor funding.

21. There could potentially be a problem of reverse causality between contact with the PRSP council and intention to participate. Our model assumes that the contact CSOs had with members of the PRSP council during the six months before the interview serves as a recruitment contact for their intention to participate in a potential future PRSP meeting. However, the reverse could also be true (i.e., because they intend to participate in a potential future PRSP meeting, they would seek contact with members of the PRSP council). However, the fact that no future PRSP meeting was planned makes the reverse less likely. Unfortunately, we were unable to find adequate instrumental variables to resolve the endogeneity issue, and readers should bear in mind that the coefficient on the variable *contact with the PRSP council* includes both contact with the PRSP council's effect on the intention to participate and the intention to participate's effect on the contact with the PRSP council. The estimated effect of contact with the PRSP council on CSOs' intention to participate is thus probably higher than the actual effect.

the beginning of democratic rule as a calibration point and the dichotomous variable taking Hurricane Mitch as a landmark event were not found to be significant in the logistic regression model, thus refuting the crowding out of old CSOs by the new CSOs.

Turning to the organizational type, we find that the odds of a higher-level organization intending to participate are more than three times greater than those of a first-level organization intending to participate ($p = 0.046$). This finding corroborates the importance of umbrella organizations in the participation process, as was suggested by the *PRSP Sourcebook*. The sourcebook stipulated that higher-level organizations should play an important role as intermediaries between national government and local-level stakeholders (Tikare et al. 2002). In addition, we checked for an urban bias in participation, but a bivariate analysis did not find CSOs from more urbanized settings (number of inhabitants) to be more inclined to participate in the PRSP process.

CONCLUSION

Participation in PRSPs has received a lot of attention, yet too little scientific research has tried to systematize evidence. Too many evaluation reports tend to jump too easily to oversimplified and generalized assessments of what is at first sight observable. This study tried to dig deeper to grasp the essential characteristics of organizations that intended to participate (or not) in the review of the PRSP annual progress report.

Interestingly, some participatory processes (like the decentralized PRSP consultation process in Honduras) can give opportunities to certain social groups from which one might not expect active involvement in public decision-making arenas. Our study showed that richer organizations are not more inclined to participate in meetings than poorer organizations. What matters most is the type of organization, its educational level, and its relational ties with other groups. These findings broadly concur with one of the rare studies on the same subject, albeit at the local level (i.e., Lavalle et al. 2005). When juxtaposing the findings of their research with ours, remarkable parallels appear. Neither study can confirm a significant relation between the intention to participate and the age of the organization, the type of issues it is involved in, or budget limitations. Both models find the type of organization and relational ties to be important factors in explaining participation. Whereas institutional embeddedness (especially contacts with political parties) was the variable explaining participation in São Paulo, in Honduras, direct recruitment contacts with the PRSP council were crucial. The level of education was not included in the São Paulo study. Although significant differences do exist, the parallel findings of both analyses suggest some consistency of factors explaining the political participation of CSOs in participatory fora.

REFERENCES

- Acker, A.
1988 *Honduras: The Making of a Banana Republic*. Boston: South End Press.

- Almond, G., and S. Verba
1965 *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Andrews, K., and B. Edwards
2004 "Advocacy Organizations in the U.S. Political Process." *Annual Review of Sociology* 30: 479–506.
- Barr, A., M. Fafchamps, and T. Owens
2005 "The Governance of Non-Governmental Organizations in Uganda." *World Development* 33 (4): 657–679.
- Booth, D., and P. Richard
1998 "The Political Context in Central America." *American Behavioral Scientist* 42 (1): 33–46.
- Boussard, C.
2003 "Crafting Democracy: Civil Society in Post-Transition Honduras." Ph.D. dissertation, Lund University, Lund, Sweden.
- Brady, H., S. Verba, and K. Schlozman
1995 "Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation." *American Political Science Review* 89 (2): 271–294.
- Caldeira, G., and J. Wright
1990 "Amici Curiae before the Supreme Court: Who Participates, When, and How Much?" *Journal of Politics* 52 (3): 782–806.
- Campbell, A., P. Converse, W. Miller, and D. Stokes
1960 *The American Vote*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Conway, M.
2000 *Political Participation in the United States*, 3rd ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
- Coopération International pour le Développement et la Solidarité
2004 "Are the Worldbank and IMF Delivering on Promises?" CIDSE–Caritas Internationalis background paper, Coopération International pour le Développement et la Solidarité, Brussels.
- Cornally, J., T. Crowley, and S. O'Neill
2003 "The Impact of Poverty Reduction Strategies on the Rural Sector in Honduras and Nicaragua." Trócaire for the International Fund for Agricultural Development, Trócaire, Maynooth, Ireland.
- Cornwall, A., and J. Gaventa
1999 "From Users and Choosers to Makers and Shapers, Repositioning Participation in Social Policy." Institute of Development Studies Working Paper No. 127, Brighton, Sussex, U.K.
- Cress, D., and D. Snow
1996 "Mobilization at the Margins: Resources, Benefactors, and the Viability of Homeless Social Movement Organizations." *American Sociological Review* 61 (6): 1089–1109.
- Cuesta, J.
2007 "Political Space, Pro-Poor Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy in Honduras: A Story of Missed Opportunities." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 39 (2): 329–354.
- Cuesta, J., R. del Cid, G. Dijkstra, and I. Van Severen
2003 *Aprendiendo sobre la marcha: La experiencia de la Estrategia de Reducción de la Pobreza en Honduras—Evaluación de Estrategias de Reducción de Pobreza en América Latina* [Learning by Doing: The Experience of the Poverty Reduction Strategy in Honduras]. Stockholm: Swedish International Development Agency and Institute of Social Studies.
- Diani, M.
1995 *Green Networks: A Structural Analysis of the Italian Environmental Movement*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
2003 "Leaders or Brokers? Positions and Influence in Social Movement Networks." In *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, edited by M. Diani and D. McAdam, 105–123. New York: Oxford University Press.
2004 "Networks and Participation." In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by D. Snow, S. Soule, and H. Kriesi, 339–359. Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell.

- Driscoll, R., and A. Evans
 2004 "Second Generation Poverty Reduction Strategies." Paper prepared for the PRSP Monitoring and Synthesis Project Overseas Development Institute.
 2005 "Second-Generation Poverty Reduction Strategies: New Opportunities and Emerging Issues." *Development Policy Review* 23 (1): 5–25.
- Eberlei, W., ed.
 2007 "Stakeholder Participation in Poverty Reduction." Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden Report No. 86/2007. Institute for Development and Peace, Duisberg.
- Edwards, B., and J. D. McCarthy
 2004 "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization." In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movement Research*, edited by D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi, 116–152. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Egmond, M., N. De Graaf, and C. Eijk
 1998 "Electoral Participation in the Netherlands: Individual and Contextual Influences." *European Journal of Political Research* 34 (6): 281–300.
- Espinoza, J.
 2003 *La sociedad civil en Honduras: Caracterización y directorio* [Civil society in Honduras: Characterization and directory]. Tegucigalpa: Editorial Guaymuras.
 2006 *From Consultation to Participation: Civic Civil Society Index Report for Honduras*. Tegucigalpa: Civicus Cehprodec.
- Fraser, A.
 2005 "Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: Now Who Calls the Shots?" *Review of African Political Economy* 32 (104): 317–340.
- Gidron, B., S. Katz, M. Meyer, Y. Hasenfeld, and R. Schwartz
 1999 "Peace and Conflict Resolution Organizations in Three Protracted Conflicts: Structures, Resources and Ideology." *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Non-profit Organizations* 10 (4): 275–298.
- Golden, M.
 1998 "Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?" *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 8 (2): 245–270.
- Guo, C., and M. Acar
 2005 "Understanding Collaboration among Nonprofit Organizations: Combining Resource Dependency, Institutional, and Network Perspectives." *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 34 (3): 340–361.
- Heinrich, F., and L. Fioramonti
 2008 *Civicus Global Survey of the State of Civil Society: Volume 1. Country Profiles*. Bloomfield, MI: Kumarian Press.
- Hojnacki, M., and D. Kimball
 1999 "The Who and How of Organizations' Lobbying Strategies in Committee." *Journal of Politics* 61 (4): 999–1024.
- Klesner, J.
 2007 "Social Capital and Political Participation in Latin America: Evidence from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru." *Latin American Research Review* 42 (2): 1–32.
- Knoke, D.
 1990 *Political Networks: The Structural Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- La Due Lake, R., and R. Huckfeldt
 1998 "Social Capital, Social Networks, and Political Participation." *Political Psychology* 19 (3): 567–584.
- Lavalle, A., A. Acharya, and P. Houtzager
 2005 "Beyond Comparative Anecdotalism: Lessons on Civil Society and Participation from São Paulo, Brazil." *World Development* 33 (6): 951–964.
- Lazarus, J.
 2008 "Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: Reviewing the Past, Assessing the Present and Predicting the Future." *Third World Quarterly* 29 (6): 1205–1221.
- Martinez, L.
 2005 "Yes We Can: Latino Participation in Unconventional Politics." *Social Forces* 84 (1): 135–155.

- Matthews, D., and J. Prothro
1966 *Negroes and the New Southern Politics*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.
- McGee, R., J. Levene, and A. Hughes
2002 "Assessing Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A Desk-Based Synthesis of Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa." Research Report No. 52. Brighton, U.K.: Institute of Development Studies.
- McGee, R., and A. Norton
2000 "Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategy: A Synthesis of Experience with Participatory Approaches to Policy Design, Implementation and Monitoring." Working Paper No. 109. Sussex, U.K.: Institute of Development Studies.
- Moehler, D.
2007 "Participation in Transition: Mobilizing Ugandans in Constitution Making." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 42: 164–190.
- Molenaers, N., and R. Renard
2006 "Participation in PRSP Processes: Conditions for Pro-Poor Effectiveness." Instituut voor Ontwikkelingsbeleid en -beheer Discussion Paper No. 2006(3). Antwerp: Institute of Development Policy and Management.
- Nownes, A., and P. Freeman
1998 "Interest Group Activity in the States." *Journal of Politics* 60 (1): 86–112.
- O'Connell, A. A.
2006 *Logistic Regression Models for Ordinal Response Variables*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Piron, L. H., and A. Evans
2004 "Politics and the PRSP Approach: Synthesis Paper." Working Paper No. 237. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Polity IV
2007 "Authority Trends 1946–2003: Country Reports: Honduras" (accessed November 21, 2007, at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/country_reports/hon2.htm).
- Possing, S.
2003 "Between Grassroots and Governments: Civil Society Experiences with the PRSPs." *A Study of Local Civil Society Response to the PRSPs*, Danish Institute for International Studies Working Papers 20, Copenhagen.
- Robinson, J., J. Rusk, and K. Head
1972 *Measures of Political Attitudes*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Schattschneider, E. E.
1960 *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Schlozman, K.
1984 "What Accent the Heavenly Chorus? Political Equality and the American Pressure System." *Journal of Politics* 46 (4): 1006–1032.
- Schlozman, K., and J. Tierney
1983 "More of the Same: Washington Pressure Group Activity in a Decade of Change." *Journal of Politics* 45 (2): 351–377.
1986 "Who Is Represented?" In *Organised Interests and American Democracy*, 58–87 New York: Harper and Row.
- Seligson, M., A. Conroy, R. Córdova Macías, O. Pérez, and A. Stein
1995 "Who Votes in Central America? A Comparative Analysis." In *Elections and Democracy in Central America*, edited by M. Seligson and J. Booth, 151–182. Revisited University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill.
- Seppänen, M.
2005 "Honduras: Transforming the Concessional State?" In *The New Conditionality: The Politics of Poverty Reduction Strategies*, edited by J. Gould, 104–134. London: Zed Books.
- Siebold, T.
2007 "Participation in PRS Processes: A Review of the International Debate. In *Stakeholder Participation in Poverty Reduction, Report 86*, edited by Walter Eberlei, 13–30. Duisburg: Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden.
- Snow, D., S. Soule, and H. Kriesi, eds.
2004 *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*. Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell Publishing.

Stewart, F., and M. Wang

- 2003 "Do PRSPs Empower Poor Countries and Disempower the World Bank, or Is It the Other Way Round?" Working Paper No. 108. Oxford: Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford University.

Tikare, S., D. Youssef, P. Donnelly-Roark, and P. Shah

- 2002 "Participation." In *A Sourcebook for Poverty Reduction Strategies*, 237–265 Washington, D.C.: World Bank Institute.

Trócaire

- 2004 "PRSP: Lessons Learnt—Recommendations to the World Bank, IMF and Donors for the 2nd Generation of PRSPs." Policy Briefing, Trócaire, Maynooth, Ireland.
"Strengthening Participation for Policy Influence." Trócaire Briefing Paper, September 2006, Trócaire, Maynooth, Ireland.

Unidad de Apoyo Técnico

- 2007 "Estrategia para la reducción de la pobreza: Informe de Avance 2006." Tegucigalpa: Secretaría del Despacho Presidencial Unidad de Apoyo Técnico.

Verba, S., K. Schlozman, and H. E. Brady

- 1995 *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

World Bank

- 2002 "Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A Retrospective Study." Washington, D.C.: Participation and Civic Engagement Group.