the exclusive world of Westminster, preoccupied with party battles and aware of legislative complexities. The Alliance was for too long mesmerized by the example of the Anti-Corn Law League which had apparently coerced Westminster by force of popular agitation. After 1870, the era of the “Caucus”, politics worked differently, yet the Alliance’s leaders never managed to work successfully within the confines of the Liberal Party. The history therefore reveals much about the political system of the time, so different from our own when Whitehall departments and interest groups dominate social legislation. Perhaps Dr. Dingle might have spread himself more in his conclusions in this direction. The liquor question reveals the relative autonomy of “High Politics” at Westminster at this period, with political leaders like Randolph Churchill and Sir William Harcourt able to take up social questions as weapons to embarrass both their colleagues and opponents.

J. R. Greenaway
School of Economic and Social Studies
University of East Anglia


Words are the essential tool of mental treatment. A layman will no doubt find it hard to understand how pathological disorders of the body and the mind can be eliminated by “mere” words. He will feel that he is being asked to believe in magic. And he will not be so very far wrong, for the words which we use in our everyday speech are nothing other than watered-down magic. But we shall have to follow a roundabout path in order to explain how science sets about restoring to words part at least of their former magical power.

Dr. Forrester’s book argues for the deep-seated importance of sentiments such as these – Freud wrote this in 1890 – to Freud’s life-long work. Complementing rather than dismissing recent accounts which have argued that Freud was above all a biological scientist, Forrester argues that psychoanalysis was first and foremost a therapy, and that the key to the therapy was the talking-cure. Encouraged by his encounters with hysterics and early dramatic case histories (such as Breuer’s treatment of Anna O), Freud early in his career formulated cardinal principles. Subjects were to talk – were in fact to say everything, whatever came into their heads. The very act of talking was in itself to be cathartic. The analyst was to listen to the content of the patient’s story, picking up its secret meanings. This was an important step, as much handling of hysterical patients, in the Charcotian mould, had scrutinized speech characteristics of the disturbed (e.g. aphasia) but had scarcely sought the key to these disturbances in the interior of the speech itself. And above all, overcoming repressions by recollecting past traumas and articulating them in words, the subject was to break the spell of the neurosis which had him in thrall (in 1895 Freud and Breuer called this “getting rid of it by turning it into words”).

Forrester insists that this pattern of verbalizing the repressed remained central throughout Freud’s clinical practice. Silence was illness; words were symptoms for him. Forrester shows how Freud’s interests clustered around those elements of consciousness where language would most likely be a clue to underlying disturbances – slips of the tongue, jokes, mistranslations from foreign languages, the significance of
proper and pet names, etc. Ideally the cure would be self-discovery via speaking, but Freud often put the words into his patients' mouths. Usually there was a mixture of the two, as here, where Freud is reporting his encounters with the Wolf-man:

"I had a dream", he said, "of a man tearing off the wings of an Espe". "Espe?", I asked, "what do you mean by that?" "You know; that insect with yellow stripes on its body, that stings". I could now put him right: "So what you mean is a Wespe (wasp)". "Is it called a Wespe? I really thought is was called an Espe". (Like so many other people, he used his difficulties with a foreign language as a screen for symptomatic acts.) "But Espe, why that's myself: S. P." (which were his initials). The Espe was of course a mutilated Wespe. The dream said clearly that he was avenging himself on [his nursery maid] for her threat of castration.

Examples such as this raise the question of how therapeutically important Freud believed it was that patients should discover and verbalize for themselves (it is not clear that the Wolf-man recognized that Espe was a mutilated Wespe, or indeed the deeper significance of the mutilation of the word). It is rather a pity that issues such as these, relating to Freud's actual therapeutic practice, are not followed through further in this book.

Forrester is rather chiefly concerned to map in some of the intellectual world underlying Freud's preoccupation with language. Forrester suggests that Freud's willingness to juggle with words and dabble in etymologies - by changing syllables and sounds to suggest cognate words, sometimes in different languages, whose meanings supposedly illuminated something suppressed - emerged partly out of a common nineteenth-century vision, that European languages all arose out of the same linguistic matrix, an Indo-European Ur-tongue. Freud's linguistic acrobatics bridged entities (which were really related but whose connexions had been hidden) by revealing a shared psycho-linguistic history (even if the subject's consciousness was scarcely aware of any such connexions).

Forrester also offers an illuminating discussion of how it was Freud's emphasis upon words having a deeply individual biographical-historical meaning for each patient (and their utterance a similarly individual power of release) that restrained him from adopting the ideas of universally valid symbol-meaning, annexed to language, such as those developed by Jung. For Freud, free association was what was called for. And perhaps most interestingly, Forrester (following Burrow and Foucault) suggests that the role of the analyst in the talking-cure - as the one who reads the meaning out of what the patient utters - developed out of nineteenth-century European - especially Germanic - philological and hermeneutic techniques. Both the Biblical and Talmudic emphasis upon the sanctity of the word and on verbal taboos, and the skills of carefully decoding layers of deeply-hidden meaning by verbal analysis were key influences. It becomes possible to speculate whether psychoanalysis developed quintessentially as a Central European science, not primarily because of traditions of neurologically-oriented medicine, but because of the eminence and orientation of philology within German-speaking scholarship as the queen of the human sciences.

Dr. Forrester's book is stimulating, but it is written in a fairly recalcitrant style; its thought is allusive and compressed. Few concessions are made to the reader by way of setting the scene, providing an intellectual biography of Freud (the chronological development of his ideas, and their sources, is subordinated here to their thematic

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analysis), or by internal signposting. At times its prose is hard to pin down. Thus p. 34:

Throughout Freud's writings we find that sexuality evokes a certain sluggishness in the mental apparatus, an absence of thought. (Though we should also be clear that this mysterious recalcitrance was also the occasion for the greatest intellectual efforts of which the psyche was capable; the problems posed by the recalcitrance of sexuality are the roots of intellectual activity.)

The ideas here are interesting, exploring the relationship for Freud between sexuality and thinking. But the passage troubles the reader: why "evokes"? "sluggishness" seems odd, as does "recalcitrance"; why the italicization of "by"?

Furthermore, the book is deliberately constructed as a tease. As Forrester notes on his penultimate page, he has written a work in the very area of Freudianism—linguistic psychology— which Lacan and his followers have made their own, but without mentioning Lacan. It was a positive decision—to get back to the linguistics of pure Freud directly, and not through the oracle of his most distinguished exegete. It was a decision thoroughly justified. But one is still left at the end with an open question about the book's status. Forrester asks

Is it a historical work, attempting to get straight the historical record, attempting to find a certain "reading" that could be reiterated endlessly, and still remain a definitive reading, as if, once read, Freud would not have to be reread? Or is this work an attempt to reformulate, via a historico-conceptual argument, the foundations of psychoanalysis, so that, where we once saw biology we now see philology, where we once saw symbolic decoding, we now see phonetic switching, where we once saw the discharge of fixated energy we now see the rule-like transformations of a personal script?

It is a mark of the intellectual rigour and perception of this book that these questions linger in the mind.

Roy Porter
Wellcome Institute


There are few studies available for those interested in the early history of Jung and Jungian psychology. (A dearth, when compared to studies on Freud.) So the sight of the title, Jung in context, is immediately welcome. Unfortunately, what Professor Homans means by context hardly suits the expectations of an ordinary language connotation of the word, i.e. some insight into Jung's thought via his personal or family history, community, cultural, or intellectual traditions. Instead we are brought, through the importation of other writers, to the broadest possible meaning of the word context, to the almost Laputan realms of society, modernity, and culture. From these perspectives we are to view Jung. In fact, most of Professor Homans's pages are filled with references to the other writers through whose distant perspectives he is attempting to see Jung, i.e. Peter Berger, sociology of knowledge; Weinstein and Platt, theory of modernity; Marthe Robert, view of two cultures; H. Kohut, processes of narcissism.

Of these perspectives, the one most thoroughly presented is Professor Homans's attempt to see Jung's psycho-biography from the point of view of Kohut's narcissistic processes. (Actually, the book could have been more honestly titled, Jung and narcissism.) But somehow the analysis of Jung gets swallowed up by the move to