Homer, Parmenides, and the Road to Demonstration

BENJAMIN FOLIT-WEINBERG
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It is widely agreed that Parmenides invented extended deductive argumentation and the practice of demonstration, a transformative event in the history of thought. But how did he manage this seminal accomplishment? In this book, Benjamin Folit-Weinberg finally provides an answer. At the heart of this story is the image of the hodos, the road and the journey. Brilliantly deploying the tools and insights of literary criticism, conceptual history, and archaeology, Folit-Weinberg illuminates how Parmenides adopts and adapts this image from Homer, especially the Odyssey, forging from it his pioneering intellectual approaches. Reinserting Parmenides into the physical world and poetic culture of archaic Greece, Folit-Weinberg reveals both how deeply traditional and how radical was Parmenides’ new way of thinking and speaking. By taking this first step towards providing a history of the concept of method, this volume uncovers the genealogy of philosophy in poetry and poetic imagery.

BENJAMIN FOLIT-WEINBERG is A. G. Leventis Research Fellow at the Institute for Greece, Rome, and the Classical Tradition at the University of Bristol.
Ancient Greek rut road.
HOMER, PARMENIDES, AND THE ROAD TO DEMONSTRATION

BENJAMIN FOLIT-WEINBERG
University of Bristol
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ABBREVIATIONS


BNP *Brill’s New Pauly*


List of Abbreviations

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Demonstration has been the cornerstone of claims to knowledge since at least the time of Aristotle. But demonstration, and, more specifically, the extended deductive argumentation that forms its backbone, has a history. As is widely agreed, that history begins with Parmenides of Elea, in whose poem we find the first recorded extended deductive argument – and with it, the first outline of a demonstration.

This is not the only reason why Parmenides has won acclaim, even veneration, from leading Western thinkers. Since the time of Plato (and – to judge from Parmenides’ influence on Zeno, Melissus, Democritus, and others – probably before), philosophers of many stripes, from Hegel to Heidegger, Russell to Popper to Anscombe, have celebrated Parmenides’ unique importance as

3. See e.g. Pl. Soph. 241d, Tht. 183e–84a.
4. See e.g. Hegel (1833) 296–7: ‘Mit Parmenides hat das eigentliche Philosophieren angefangen.’ (‘Real philosophy begins with Parmenides.’)
5. See e.g. the rhapsodic remarks at Heidegger (2000) 100–03, 145–54, where he enshrines Parmenides as the founder of Being (even, with Heraclitus, ‘the founder of all thinking’, p. 145), the first thinker to thematize Being-as-such and so open the field of ontology.
6. See e.g. Russell (1972) 55: ‘What makes Parmenides historically important is that he invented a form of metaphysical argument that . . . is to be found in most subsequent metaphysicians down to and including Hegel. He is often said to have invented logic, but what he really invented was metaphysics based on logic.’
7. See e.g. Popper (1998a) 146, where we read of ‘the almost unlimited power still exerted over Western scientific thought by the ideas of a great man who lived about 2,500 years ago: Parmenides of Elea’; see the same work for a discussion of Parmenides’ revolutionary conception of knowledge as the defining feature of Western science and rationalism (pp. 159–60). It is telling that Heidegger and Popper, whose mutual contempt was as deep as their ideas were incompatible, should both revere Parmenides as a heroic oecist of the city of logos.
the grandfather of their profession – though not always for the same reason. Historians of ancient philosophy and science similarly agree on the epochal importance of Parmenides’ contribution to Western thought but disagree on where, precisely, this importance lies. Some herald Parmenides for his primordial articulation of the notion of modality; others laud his groundbreaking advances in astronomy, especially his remarkable observation that the moon reflects the sun’s light (and, therefore, that the earth is spherical); others still foreground his seminal position in the atomic tradition. Whatever their differences, however, nearly all acknowledge that Parmenides is the first recorded person to make an extended deductive argument, and nearly all accept that his poem shares key features with what Aristotle will later call *apodeixis* or ‘demonstration’. As one of the 20th century’s leading historians of ancient thought put it, ‘the aims of *The Way of Truth* are clear: Parmenides sets out to establish a set of inescapable conclusions by strict deductive arguments from a starting point that itself has to be accepted. Those are features it shares with later demonstrations.’

Parmenides’ many other astonishing achievements do not, however, eclipse the fact that his confection of these three features – (i) proceeding from a starting point that has to be accepted (ii) by strict deductive arguments (iii) to establish an inescapable conclusion – marks a fundamental inflection point in the history of Western thought. The clarity with which we may state this is matched only by the intractable obscurity surrounding the development and fusion of these three features in Parmenides’ poem. This remains so despite agreement about Parmenides’ importance, and despite the quantity (and quality) of recent scholarship devoted to understanding Parmenides in relation to his

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9 See e.g. Palmer (2009).
12 Lloyd (2000) 244–45. See also Lloyd (1979) 67–79; Lloyd (1990) 81–86; and, more recently, and for an even more macroscopic perspective, Lloyd (2009) esp. 15–17; Lloyd (2017b) esp. 58–87; Lloyd (2018) esp. 39–56; and now Lloyd and Zhao (2018), for a comparison with ancient Chinese thought.
Two Enduring Problems

Presocratic predecessors and successors. Exploring the origins of this complex of features (i–iii) and providing an account of their emergence, both as individual items and as a complex formed from them (viz. a ‘demonstration’), forms the central task of this book.

Two Enduring Problems: A Parmenidean Greek Miracle, and ‘Why Verse?’

There are good reasons for this intractability. The task of relocating Parmenides in his intellectual context is beset by deep, even potentially insurmountable challenges. The few ipsissima verba of Parmenides’ Milesian predecessors are embedded in settings, doxographical or otherwise, strongly marked by their pursuit of other, post-Parmenidean, agendas. Unless new original fragments appear, or a new understanding of the spread of people, information, and ideas can be persuasively established – or both – attempts to pin down the relationships between Parmenides and Xenophanes, or Anaximander, or Anaximenes (not to mention Heraclitus) will remain largely speculative (and may say more

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13 Following the initial move by Barnes (1982), Curd (1998b) and Curd (2006), Osborne (2006), and Palmer (2009) re-examine Parmenides’ relationship to Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the atomists. For predecessors and possible contemporaries, see nn. 15–17 below.


15 For a sophisticated treatment of ‘grand narrative’ approaches from Zeller (1892 and 1919) through Cherniss (1935) and Guthrie (1962), Guthrie (1965) to the surveys of Barnes (1982) and Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (2007), see Palmer (2009) 1–45, esp. 20–25; and also Graham (2006), Graham (2010), Graham (2013). The critique of Osborne (2006) remains trenchant. Much good work on Xenophanes has appeared in the last two decades, considerable portions of which have a bearing on his relationship to Parmenides; see esp. Lesher (1999); Lesher (2008); Lesher (2013); Mourelatos (2002); Mourelatos (2008a); Mourelatos (2008b) xxii–xxiii, xxii n. 14; Mourelatos (2013b); Mourelatos (2016a); Mogyoródi (2006); Bryan (2012); also discussion in Curd (2011) 10–13, and now esp. Tor (2017).

16 See e.g. the deflationary comments of Cordero (2004) 8. Embers of the debate still smoulder: see e.g. Graham (2002a) and Nehamas (2002), followed up by Hermann (2009); Osborne (2006) 231–37 offers a different perspective on the controversy.

17 Not to mention possible relationships with Orphic and Pythagorean thought, and/or the myths and rituals of mystery cults; see n. 82 below.
about our own conception of how ‘philosophy’ ought to work than anything else).\textsuperscript{18}

Furthermore, our knowledge of the social, political, and intellectual dynamics of archaic poleis, especially in Magna Graecia, is too lacunose to identify with precision the influence of existing cultural, political, and legal institutions and practices on Parmenides.\textsuperscript{19} Vernant, responding to the connection between Hesiod and the Milesians posited by Cornford, mocked Burnet’s notion of the ‘Greek Miracle’, as if ‘[a]ll of a sudden, on the soil of Ionia, logos presumably broke free from myth, as the scales fell from the blind man’s eyes. And the light of that reason, revealed once and for all, has never ceased to guide the progress of the human mind.’\textsuperscript{20} These words first appeared more than half a century ago, and in the interim an army of distinguished scholars has laboured to disassemble the Greek Miracle edifice block by block. Parmenides’ great foundation stone has escaped untouched, however: even now, we still have no detailed account that would explain just how Parmenides invented deductive argumentation, nor even one that links it to his predecessors’ modes of speaking and writing persuasively. Before Parmenides, Presocratics merely asserted;\textsuperscript{21} after him, they argued, and attempted to demonstrate.\textsuperscript{22} It is still as if, all of a sudden, on the soil of Elea, deductive argumentation and the practice of demonstration broke free from mere assertion, as the scales fell . . . In practice, the result is, as Malcolm Schofield put it, that ‘it is nowadays commonly supposed that Parmenides was a creative genius not much in debt to anybody’.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{19} To the extent that they elucidate larger sociopolitical trends with direct bearing on Parmenides’ context much more generally, classic studies such as Vlastos (1947), Vernant (2006g), Vernant (1982), Vernant (2006a), Vernant (2006f), Detienne (1996), Detienne (2007), Lloyd (1979), Lloyd (1987) help us grapple with the larger ‘Why?’ but do little to address the ‘How?’ of precise developments pertaining to Parmenides (see e.g. Lloyd (1990) 96). For relatively recent studies on law, see Gagarin (2002) and Asper (2005). We can now also add interest in archaic architectural practices: see e.g. Tzonis and Lefaivre (1999), Hahn (2001), and Giannisi (2006).
\textsuperscript{20} Vernant (1982) 104.
\textsuperscript{21} E.g. Curd (1998a) esp. 5–6; this point will be discussed extensively in Section 6.1, ‘Sēma I’ below.
\textsuperscript{22} Though see qualifications by Curd (1998b), Osborne (2006), also Barnes (1982) 177.
\textsuperscript{23} Schofield (2003) 44.
Two Enduring Problems

It is useful to juxtapose the scarcity of our knowledge of Parmenides’ social, cultural, and political setting with another quirk of the last century and a half of scholarship on Parmenides. While we often seem to be able to say too little about the tradition within, and out of, which Parmenides developed extended deductive argumentation and the skeleton of demonstration, scholars have ignored, and even lamented, aspects of his poem about which we might say much.\textsuperscript{24} They have registered with dismay Parmenides’ linguistic extravagance, finding it incongruous with the triumph of austere reasoning whose birth we are supposed to witness in the ‘Route to Truth’\textsuperscript{25}. How could Parmenides have elected to compose in verse?\textsuperscript{26} (Especially if, as the consensus since Diels and Wilamowitz – not to mention Plutarch – has it, that verse is so defective.)\textsuperscript{27} What could have motivated him to use such richly textured, imagistic language to formulate a deductive argument?\textsuperscript{28} Why did he deploy the narrative mechanics and

\textsuperscript{24} See nn. 27–28, 79–81 below, for discussion of earlier treatments of Parmenides as poet. Fortunately, this book seems to be part of a groundswell of more culturally or poetically oriented assessments of Parmenides’ poetry, which, to my knowledge, have arisen independently of each other: see n. 28 below.

\textsuperscript{25} This attitude is no mere relic of the past; for a recent example, see Wedin (2014).


\textsuperscript{28} See Mourelatos (2008) 222–63 for an early embrace of linguistic polyvalence in Parmenides – and, exceptionally even by later standards, not only in the proem. After a hiatus, one finds Coxon (2009) [1986], Couloubaritsis (1990), Mansfeld (1995), Cerri (1999), Morgan (2000) 67–87, Miller (2006), Gemelli Marciano (2008) and Gemelli Marciano (2013), Palmer (2009), and Sassi (2018) – all of whose interests in linguistic ambiguity or polyvalence focus mostly, or exclusively, on the proem. Thankfully, times have begun to change. Robbiano (2006) makes use of Iser’s audience-oriented reception aesthetics (see esp. 22–34) to develop a more multifaceted account of Parmenides’ use of language and imagery, which are seen to work in service of transforming the audience itself. A recent entrant into the field, Ranzato (2015), drawing inspiration from Gernet’s notion of ‘the polyvalence of images’ as ‘a phenomenon of social memory’ (Gernet...
dramatic scenario of myth to stage reason’s great debut in Western thought?29

The impulses animating these questions are perhaps understandable. It will always be both tempting and, at least to some extent, unavoidable to read Parmenides backwards through the prism of the formalized second-order analysis of demonstration and deductive argumentation established by Aristotle. There is no obligation, however, to read Parmenides exclusively according to the rules of this canon, even though, in many of its essential features, it continues to define the way that we think and argue.30

In fact, it is precisely because the object of study here is in so many ways directly connected, and therefore immediately accessible, to our own intellectual practices, to what intuitively constitutes ‘good thinking’ today, that we must take special care.

How are we to do this? The question gives an extra bite to Geoffrey Lloyd’s insistence on the value to historians of ancient thought of the anthropologist’s distinction between ‘actors’ categories’ and ‘observers’ categories’.31 As a basic methodological principle, anthropologists attempt ‘to express the ideas, beliefs, [and] practices of the society in question in the terms used by members of society themselves – the actors’.32 What is at stake in doing so?
The aim of keeping as close as possible to the actors’ own categories is two-fold. Negatively, first, it helps to minimize the risks of assimilating alien ideas to our own, of assuming that the subjects studied have the same conceptual framework in mind that is suggested by the interpreter’s own (observer) categories. Positively, second, it allows an alien network of meanings to be built up in its own terms and be seen for what it is, as alien.\(^\text{33}\)

Both factors should be carefully considered in the case of Parmenides. While reading his ‘Route to Truth’ as no more and no less than the earliest attested example of an extended deductive argument helps us pinpoint one of Parmenides’ most important contributions to the history of thought, paradoxically, doing so blocks us from examining just how he accomplishes the very act – inventing extended deductive argumentation and the outline of demonstration – that we would study.

This is true on several levels. First, to characterize Parmenides’ poem as a deductive argument is implicitly to bestow upon it from the start all the qualities we today understand a deductive argument to possess; suddenly fragments 2, 6, 7, and, especially, 8, as ‘deductive arguments’, are truth-preserving, and so proceed according to a specific kind of logical necessity anchored \textit{a priori} in what we would call the laws of non-contradiction and the excluded middle.

Or at least they ought to. For, second, labelling the poem a deductive argument has the consequence of establishing a distinctive interpretive frame and corresponding set of hermeneutic expectations.\(^\text{34}\) Understanding it as a deductive argument first and last, one reads the poem against such criteria as validity and soundness, guards against such things as illicit modal upgrades\(^\text{35}\) or confusions of \textit{necessitas consequentiae} and \textit{necessitas consequentis},\(^\text{36}\) discusses its language and structure in the philosopher’s idiom of quantification and predication,\(^\text{37}\) claims

\(^{33}\) \text{Lloyd} (1992) 566.
\(^{34}\) Again, Barnes is exemplary: ‘Thus I shall … treat [Fr. 8] as an ordinary deduction’ (\textit{Barnes} (1982) 177–78).
\(^{35}\) Hardly a relic of past attitudes: see e.g. discussion in the astute \textit{Palmer} (2009), and the arguments of \textit{Lewis} (2009) and \textit{Wedin} (2014) for the enduring importance of the question of the ‘illicit modal upgrade’.
\(^{37}\) Little wonder that so much confusion surrounded Parmenides’ use of \textit{esti} for so long – if one renders his argument in notation whose lexicon includes \‘\exists\’ and \‘\phi\’, one is not only trapped in the anachronism diagnosed by \textit{Brown} (1994), one is perhaps blind to this very possibility, and thus also prevented in advance from transcending it.
Introduction

made *de dicto* and *de re*.\(^{38}\) Appropriate intertexts become the *Discourse on Method*\(^{39}\) or the *Critique of Pure Reason*,\(^{40}\) ‘On Denoting’\(^{41}\) or the *Tractatus*.\(^{42}\) This has consequences. Judged by rules unformed and standards yet unknown for hundreds or thousands of years, Parmenides is perpetually – but also, given his nonpareil innovation as a practising logician, inexplicably – on the verge of suffering amateurish lapses or committing schoolboy blunders.\(^{43}\)

Even more significantly for the present discussion, such a stance excludes from analysis – because by definition they should have no bearing on the deductive validity of the argument itself – the imagery that shapes, guides, and in\footnote{38}\footnote{39}\footnote{40}\footnote{41}\footnote{42}\footnote{43} historia. In fact, such a hermeneutic stance not only

\(^{38}\) Barnes (1982) is not alone in succumbing to the urge to render Parmenides’ argument in formal logical notation; analysts as diverse as Wedin (2014) and Mourelatos (2008b) do the same.


\(^{40}\) ‘Burnet once said . . . that we must not (as Th. Gomperz did) interpret Parmenides as Kant before Kant . . . But this is exactly what we must do’ (Popper (1998e) 143–44); see also Mourelatos (2008b) xli–xlii and Mourelatos (2013b).


\(^{42}\) Wittgenstein remains the most popular point of comparison in the anglophone world (though not only here – see also Jantzen (1976)); see, *inter alia*, Owen (1960) and Owen (1974) 275–76, Kahn (2009b), Williams (1981), the explicitly Wittgensteinian Mourelatos (2008b), M. Mackenzie (1982), Austin (1986) 15–16, and Wedin (2014). To this list we might also add Wilfred Sellars, a comparison detailed at length by Mourelatos (2008b) xlii–xlix and Mourelatos (2013b); Spinoza, Berkeley, Meinong are also in the mix (see e.g. Mourelatos (2013a) 161–63). The phenomenon is not strictly limited to latter-day philosophers; one even finds comparisons to Stephen Hawking’s *A Brief History of Time* (Cerri (2000) 67–69), while Popper is happy to place Parmenides’ ideas alongside those of Boltzmann, Einstein, Gödel (see here also Wedin (2014)) and Schrödinger (Popper (1998a)).

\(^{43}\) See some of the discussions cited in nn. 37–38, esp. Barnes (1982) and Lewis (2009). In response, some would-be ‘defenders’ of Parmenides, such as Wedin (2014), must find ways to explain that Parmenides actually ‘got it right’. More subtly, this impulse can become a guiding interpretative assumption through a charitable desire to ‘make Parmenides’ arguments good’ (Sedley (1999), McKirahan (2008) 173, Palmer (2009) 63–105). This last remark is an observation, not a criticism; see Ch. 6, esp. n. 164, for further discussion.
Two Enduring Problems

prevents these dimensions from being considered, but configures basic features of the text as problems. Why verse for a deductive argument?\textsuperscript{44} Why the dramatic encounter between \textit{kouros} and goddess in a proof about the nature of what-is?\textsuperscript{45} Why so many images, such figurative language?

Similarly, referring to the poem as (simply) a deductive argument makes it hard to avoid retrojecting onto the poem’s earliest audiences a sense of the privileged status deductive argumentation today enjoys as the authoritative means by which to prove the validity of a claim. But why should a contemporary of Parmenides have found the sequence into which he ordered his claims compelling in and of itself?\textsuperscript{46}

Third, to approach the ‘Route to Truth’ from the presumption that one is reading a deductive argument is to accept as a \textit{fait accompli} the very achievement one wishes to examine as the product of a complex process. The notion of a systematic argument of interlinked claims which begins from a necessary point of departure, proceeds from one claim to the next according to some kind of necessity, and ultimately arrives at a final destination, is all taken for granted of a demonstration (not least since these are among its defining features). But these are precisely the new elements that Parmenides introduces onto the discursive scene. To refer to Parmenides’ argumentative style as ‘deductive’ (and leave the matter there) is therefore to accept as a finished article that which we are in fact seeing fashioned before our eyes.

And this in turn, fourth, short-circuits from the start any attempt to examine the specific strategies and techniques by which Parmenides develops these new elements – precisely what we are interested in here. Calling this portion of his poem no less and no more than a deductive argument makes it seem as if this specific manner of advancing a claim (obviously and inherently superior, on this view, to its predecessors) had always been sitting around waiting to be discovered. To refer to Parmenides’

\textsuperscript{44} See nn. 26 and 27 above.
\textsuperscript{45} See nn. 28 and 29 above.
\textsuperscript{46} See e.g. Detienne (1996). The question is of course only as strange as, for example, the fact that the ancient Chinese felt little need to bother much with rigorous argumentation or proof; see Lloyd and Sivin (2002), Osborne (2006).
fragments 2–8 as a ‘deductive argument’ or a ‘demonstration’, with no further elaboration, thus threatens ipso facto to prevent us from gaining fundamental insights into the process by which deductive argumentation emerges, the very techniques and strategies Parmenides used to make this manner of expressing claims about the nature of what-is seem plausible, or even intelligible.

The Two Problems Resolve Each Other

Against this backdrop, Lloyd’s remark concerning the benefits of allowing ‘an alien network of meanings to be built up’ could hardly be more salutary. It is true that ‘the terminology in which [Parmenides] describes what he is doing is a very limited one’ and that ‘[h]e has no word for deduction’.47 (Indeed, why would he?) But Parmenides does have language to describe the arguments that span fragments 2, 6, 7, and 8: and this centres on the programmatically repeated notion of what he calls a hodos dizēsios or ‘route of inquiry’.48 What is more, if this ‘terminology’ is indeed ‘limited’ insofar as it is not part of a larger system of technical vocabulary coined for special purposes, it is in other ways far richer, deeper, and of more subtle texture for precisely the same reason. These terms, not being ‘technical’, remain the more powerfully charged by the currents of polysemy, ambiguity, intertextuality, and the play of signifier and signified, for remaining enmeshed in the web of language.

Or, rather, network. For in light of Lloyd’s call to use actors’ categories (and not – or not only49 – our own), the gap (between Parmenides and his predecessors) and the excess (in Parmenides’ use of language and imagery) discussed above can be seen to form two sides of the very same Parmenidean coin. More: these two mysteries (where did Parmenides’ extended deductive argument

47 See also Lloyd (1990) 81–84. One must be fair: the (important) point Lloyd makes concerns the importance of a well-developed technical vocabulary and other aspects of formalization, systematization, and other second-order activities.
48 Mourelatos (2008b) makes a strong case for this translation; for the semantics of the word hodos, which can mean, inter alia, ‘road’, ‘route’, ‘way’, or ‘journey’, see Folit-Weinberg (forthcoming, 2022) and Section 1.2 below.
49 It is ultimately, of course, the interplay between Parmenides’ terms and our own that will be of interest to us.
and move towards demonstration come from? Why the poetry, the polyvalent language, and myth’s mosaic of imagery?), once viewed together, cease to be mysteries at all. Rather, each can be seen to provide the key that unlocks the other. To address the question of how Parmenides invented extended deductive argumentation, that is, we must return to his poem prepared to read it as a poem: to attend to the densely imbricated richness of his language and the many layers of resonance compressed in, and radiating out from, key words; to trace with care the imagery that Parmenides puts into circulation and mobilizes, activates, and exploits; to read and hear this poem alongside its major predecessors in dactylic hexameter, with ears sharply attuned to echoes in linguistic and imagistic detail, dramatic setting, plot mechanics, and formal organization and structure; and to relocate this poem in the physical and social reality of its time and place.

In the ‘network of meanings’ Parmenides builds up in his poem, no nexus of language and imagery bears a greater symbolic charge, or is asked to do more work, than the figure of the hodos just cited and its related language of roads, travel, and journeying.50 My core claims are premised on the idea that providing an account of Parmenides’ invention of extended deductive argumentation requires that we examine the network emanating from, and compressed into, the phrase hodos dizēsios along three axes: the relationship between word and world, the relationship

50 Its major role is often acknowledged, only to slip from view immediately. Cordero (2004) is exemplary: we read that ‘it is precisely the image of the journey and the way (i.e. route) . . . that will be central in Parmenides’ philosophy. Indeed, this will become the presentation of the single way for thought to travel, and the demonstration of the foundations establishing that only this way exists. The notion of “way,” represented . . . mainly by hodos, appears 15 times in the Poem. This fact, which is not accidental, shows that for Parmenides, knowledge is gained by a “route,” a “journey,” a conceptual course, . . . we may say that with Parmenides’ Poem, the image of the way, or more broadly, that of a “journey” as a method of access to the truth, makes its entry in definitive form into the domain of philosophy’ (p. 23, emphasis original). Even as he acknowledges that ‘[w]ith respect to this image in Parmenides, the most complete study continues to be Chapter 1 of Mourelatos (1970)’ (Cordero (2004) 23 n. 68), he develops this line of analysis no further, and the point does not reappear; Couloubaritakis (1990) deserves mention as an exception of sorts. See even now: ‘although the Parmenidean image or motif of the way (hodos) has a decisive function and far-reaching consequences . . . it has been somewhat neglected’ (Hülsz Piccone (2013) 153).
between signifier and signified, and the relationship between text and intertext. I shall address these points in turn.

The Agenda: A General Outline of the Book

First: archaic Greek roads were not at all like our own. The physical nature and social function of archaic Greek roads (to be discussed in Chapter 1.1) have been neglected by analysts of Parmenides, but have a crucial bearing on our understanding of Fragment 8. One of the most striking features of Parmenides’ text is the notion of necessity that defines the claims he advances and, depending on one’s interpretation, the sequence in which these claims are advanced. The multifarious techniques he uses to express this notion – including the invocation of personified forms of dikē, anankē, moira, and (possibly) themis; the deployment of images of binding or fettering (frs. 8.14, 8.26, 8.31, 8.37) and reference to ‘bounds’ or ‘limits’ (Fr. 8.26); and, most arrestingly, the repeated use of the words chrē and chreōn with a sense that is still hotly disputed – have been much discussed, with one exception: the physical nature of ancient Greek roads.

Second: the semantics of the word hodos and its neighbours in the Homeric semantic field impose a distinctive shape upon the overarching contours of Parmenides’ hodos dizēsios. The semantic analysis conducted in Chapter 1.2 will suggest a conceptual footprint whose outlines are defined by the fact that in the Homeric semantic field, a hodos is always a hodos to somewhere, a journey oriented towards, and undertaken with reference to, a fixed, stable final destination, to an end. The thematic use of the word hodos thus inscribes the endeavour denoted by the phrase hodos dizēsios within a distinctively teleological framework.

51 The relationship between different interpretations of Fragment 8 and this point will be discussed at length in Ch. 6 below.
52 See e.g. Mourelatos (2008b) 25–29, 277–78 for an analysis of what Mourelatos terms the ‘Fate-Constraint’ and his study of the semantics of chrē and chreōn, respectively; see also Benardete (1965) and Palmer (2009).
54 This is part of a larger study of the semantics of road words in Homer; see Folit-Weinberg (forthcoming, 2022).
Finally, Parmenides’ use of the figure of the *hodos* orchestrates a complex web of associations with the use of the word and image in the *Odyssey*, and *Odyssey* 10–12 (and especially 12) more precisely. Here we are fortunate to be able to draw on two important studies of this relationship. Nearly six decades ago Eric Havelock first made the case for a Parmenides inspired by *Odyssey* 10–12:

> We suggest . . . that he composed a philosophical poem partly in the mood of an Odysseus, voyaging successively to Hades and past the Planctae and Scylla and Charybdis to Thrinacia’s isle . . . Once books ten to twelve of the *Odyssey* (or a section approximating thereto) are accepted as his central frame of reference, the patterning of his poem becomes clearer and some of his symbols become easier to interpret.\(^{55}\)

Another of Havelock’s major insights was to reject the commonplace – still evident even in many sophisticated contemporary accounts – that one should draw a clear distinction between Fragment 1, with its symbolism, imagery, and narrative mode of organization, and the remaining fragments, particularly 2–8, where the ‘real philosophizing’ is thought to occur; his insistence that the influence of the ‘Homeric echoes’ in Parmenides ‘is not confined to the “proem” but affects also the general structure of Parmenides’ philosophical argument’ is of decisive importance.\(^{56}\)

Alexander Mourelatos’s influential 1970 study, *The Route of Parmenides*, developed this fundamental insight in a number of essential ways.\(^{57}\) One important step forward was his elaboration of Havelock’s vague parallels between the itineraries Circe narrates to Odysseus and those Parmenides’ goddess

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\(^{55}\) Havelock (1958) 137–38. Havelock (pp. 138–40) teases out five points that constitute this ‘central frame of reference’ for an intertextual reading of Parmenides alongside *Odyssey* 10–12: (i) a journey of questing/inquiry that involves (ii) a *hodos* that splits and (iii) traverses terrain beyond normal human bounds through a domain of special knowledge (iv) under supernatural directive (v) to a place where there is no becoming and no passing away.

\(^{56}\) Havelock (1958) 135–36; he continues: ‘It is one of the oddities of all this criticism [of Parmenides’ poem] that while most – though not all – of the Homeric echoes in Parmenides have been noted, the evocative contexts in Homer, from which they are mostly drawn, have been ignored’.

\(^{57}\) Mourelatos (2008b) 1–46, esp. 16–25, 29–34, 39–41. For Havelock’s personal influence on Mourelatos, see Mourelatos (2008b) xvii–xviii. In addition to these two studies, see Pfeiffer (1975); Böhme (1986) 35–85; and Coxon (2009), esp. 7–11; as well as Cassin (1987); Cassin (2011); Floyd (1992) 251–60; and Granger (2008).
narrates to the *kouros*.\(^{58}\) Perhaps even more importantly, Mourelatos explicitly theorizes the relationship between these two texts, pairing the distinction between ‘motifs’ and ‘themes’ with a theory of metaphor according to which a metaphor sometimes ‘fashions a new outlook, a new concept’.\(^{59}\) Just as when metaphors of this type are used, ‘old words, old motifs, old images are appropriated and extended towards the expression of ideas and concepts which are still in the process of development and formation’, so Mourelatos claims that ‘Parmenides uses old words, old motifs, old themes, and old images precisely in order to think new thoughts in them and through them.’\(^{60}\) Specifically, ‘the image of the route mediates a new concept of the nature of thinking and knowing’.

By pointing the way towards a reading of Parmenides that identifies the profound influence of Homer on his poem, Havelock and Mourelatos have each taken us forward a long way. Even so, their analyses leave several fundamental questions unanswered. Just how does Parmenides actually accomplish his mediation of a new concept of thinking and knowing? What specific role does the figure of the *hodos* actually play? In other words, how does the surface level of language (words, motifs, images) examined by Mourelatos relate to the ‘general structure of argument’ that Havelock invokes? And how do the individual words and images that Mourelatos studies achieve the revolutionary outcome – an ‘entirely new mode of thinking and knowing’ – that he identifies? Between individual words and general structure lies the entire domain of argumentation – its principles of construction, its architecture, its patterns of formation. And between

\(^{58}\) Mourelatos (2008b) 24: ‘In both cases, we have in this order: (a) an initial choice between two routes; (b) an explanation that one of these invariably leads to planē (cf. the very name Planktai in the *Odyssey*, the adjective *panapeuthea* in Parmenides); (c) a further explanation that the remaining route calls for expert navigation and that most mortals fail at it (*Od*. 12.73–110; cf. B6, B7); (d) detailed instructions for the correct navigation of this remaining route (*Od*. 12.115–26; cf. B8).’

\(^{59}\) See Mourelatos (2008b) 11–12, 37–38 for his discussion of Erwin Panofsky’s and Max Black’s theories of metaphor, respectively. Mourelatos insists that the image of the route is a motif and not a theme; to call it a theme would require that ‘Parmenides intended to give us an allegory of Odysseus’ return journey to Ithaca’ (p. 32) – an interpretation that Mourelatos resists, but Cassin (1987) advances.

\(^{60}\) Mourelatos (2008b) 39.

\(^{61}\) Mourelatos (2008b) 39.
(Met)hodology

the whence of the image and the whither of a new mode of thinking\textsuperscript{62} lies the entirety of the (met)hodos.\textsuperscript{63} The terrain that forms these ‘betweens’ is what we shall explore in chapters 3 and 4 (on Homer, and \textit{Odyssey} 12 in particular) and chapters 5 and 6 (on Parmenides’ ‘Route to Truth’, and especially fragments 2 and 8, respectively).

(Met)hodology

But how? We began with Geoffrey Lloyd’s observation that it was Parmenides ‘who was – as all recognize – the first to produce a sustained deductive argument’.\textsuperscript{64} Note Lloyd’s use of the word ‘argument’ rather than ‘reasoning’. Though the relationship between argumentation and reasoning is theorized differently by different thinkers, Lloyd’s use of ‘argument’ undoubtedly refers to a discursive undertaking, as opposed to the mental activity often captured by the term ‘reasoning’.\textsuperscript{65} It is thus the domain of discourse

\textsuperscript{62} As Aristotle has it at \textit{EN} 1174b5–6, for which see e.g. Ackrill (1997) [1965] and Graham (1980).

\textsuperscript{63} As has been observed on occasion, Parmenides’ ‘hodos of inquiry’ represents the decisive first step in the transition from \textit{hodos} to ‘method’ (\textit{meta + hodos}), a transition I am currently examining elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{64} Lloyd (1979) 69. Lloyd takes as one of his ‘principal questions’ the relationship of dependence between ‘the development of philosophy and science’ and ‘the deployment of new \textit{techniques of argument}’ (p. 66, emphasis mine); see Lloyd’s ch. 2 more generally, esp. 67–79.

\textsuperscript{65} See here both Harman (1986) esp. 3–20, a prominent analytic philosopher, and Walton (1990), a prominent argumentation theorist. As Walton puts it: ‘note that “argument” and “reasoning” are conceived here as two different terms. Reasoning is used in argument ... we define reasoning as occurring within discourse or argument’ (pp. 402–03). Other aspects of the distinction between reasoning and argument: where reasoning involves beliefs, argument is merely formal. As a result, arguments are ‘\textit{cumulative} in a way’ that reasoning ‘need not be. In argument one accumulates conclusions; things are always added, never subtracted. Reasoned revision ... can subtract from one’s views as well as add to it’ (Harman (1986) 4, emphasis original).

It should be emphasized that the value of the dichotomy as it is deployed here does not depend on the specific terminology one uses to articulate it (see e.g. Hacking (2012) 600, where hand-work as well as head-work come under the umbrella of ‘reasoning’, for a different way of parcelling up the field). Rather, the three benefits to the reasoning/argument distinction as deployed here are: (i) emphasizing that Parmenides’ accomplishment is a discursive phenomenon, and must be studied accordingly; (ii) avoiding the misunderstanding that I want to claim that Parmenides is the first person to perform deductive inferences of any kind (I do not); and (iii) anticipating the possible objection that deductive inference is a fundamental cognitive capability with no history. Finally, note that unlike Netz (1999) (see esp. 6–7, and also Hacking (2012) 606–07), in this book I make no attempt to exceed the realm of discourse by linking my research to any field in the larger domain of cognitive studies (though I do not claim that to do so is necessarily mistaken).
that Lloyd identifies as the decisive locus of innovation of Parmenides’ contribution to early Greek thought in this case.

This is a crucial insight. The distinction between reasoning and argument allows us to formulate a much more precise account of Parmenides’ place in the history of thought. If it would be absurd to say that Parmenides was the first person to reason deductively, it is of the utmost importance that he is the first person we have any record of attempting to articulate his deductive reasoning in the form of an explicit (and extended) discursive framework. Accordingly, any attempt to examine the origins and early evolution of deductive argumentation, or to examine the strategies by which Parmenides develops it, must be located at the level of formal discursive organization. My claim will be that in its formal organization – in the articulation of its arguments and in the manner in which these arguments are connected to each other – Parmenides’ revolutionary sequence of deductive arguments is deeply influenced by the Homeric strategies of narration deployed in *Odyssey* 12. These, I shall contend, form the basic underlying architecture of Parmenides’ epoch-making arguments.

To tie all these threads together: if Parmenides’ main achievement occurs at the level of discourse (not reasoning), and if his indebtedness to Homer can be found not only at the level of language or motif (as Mourelatos has it) but at the level of the poem’s structure and organization (as intimated by Havelock), what we need is a theoretical apparatus that allows us to identify, at the level of discourse (i.e. spanning the levels of both the individual word and, especially, ‘general structure’), the structural continuities that link Parmenides’ fragments 2, 6, 7, and 8 to *Odyssey* 12.

Michel Foucault’s analysis of discursive regularities, undertaken in his *Archaeology of Knowledge*, offers just such an apparatus. Although this neglected masterpiece has been criticized for presupposing too static a view of discursive regularities (and therefore having difficulty accommodating, let alone explaining, change), this quality is precisely what makes it so valuable in this setting: 66 for all that Parmenides’ deductive

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66 Though the accusation is misguided; see esp. *Kusch (1991)* for a thorough defence of Foucault’s project.
argumentation has traditionally been presented as a radical rupture with the past, one of my main goals in this book is to emphasize its fundamental similarity to the mode of narration that structures *Odyssey*. Explaining how Foucault’s notion of ‘discursive regularities’ can help us identify more precisely the level at which Parmenides most relies on – and best analyse the specific ways he refashions – the Homeric poem he inherits requires a brief discussion of *Archaeology of Knowledge*. It is helpful to understand the *Archaeology of Knowledge* as expressing a kind of methodological manifesto for a programme of an Annaliste epistemological history; this is so insofar as it fuses the French Annales School’s interest in the formation of series, viewed from the perspective of the *longue durée*, with a focus on the processes of knowledge production and a fine-grained concern for distinctive layers or strata of continuity and discontinuity that define the relationships between these different processes.

One of the fundamental units of analysis produced by this fusion is the discursive regularity. For the Annales School so closely associated with it, investigating the *longue durée* involves looking at regular patterns or ‘structures’ formed by the relationship between such things as, for example, ‘geographical frameworks, certain biological realities, certain limits to productivity’ and specific patterns of human activity – such as, for example, ‘the

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Incidentally, the focus here will primarily be on just one component of discursive regularities, namely the ‘level of concepts’, and, even more specifically, the sublevel of ‘forms of succession’ (see esp. Foucault (1972) 34–43, 79–88, and discussion in Ch. 3 below).


It is with respect to this complex of features that the term ‘archaeology’ comes to the fore. Other parallels include: an interest in prehistory, either of a culture or of a discipline or science; the use of a relative, rather than an absolute, chronology where what matters is whether strata come above or below each other; and an interest in delimiting discrete strata that are linked by regular or repeated instantiations, either of material culture or of discursive productions. See especially the charts in Kusch (1991) 108 and Elwick (2012) 622; these can help us conceptualize the different levels at which Parmenides might be influenced both by Homer on the one hand (e.g. at the level of concepts), and thinkers such as Anaximander, Anaximenes, Xenophanes, or Heraclitus on the other (e.g. at the level of objects) – or both (e.g. at the level of enunciative modalities).
persistence of certain sectors of marine life, the endurance of roads and trade routes, and the surprising unchangeability of the geographical boundaries of civilizations’ – that they shape.\textsuperscript{70} For Foucault, the patterns of human activity to be investigated are made of words: Foucault’s structures are formed by series of utterances, inscriptions, texts – of discursive events.

The ‘event’ in ‘discursive event’ is important. Foucault sets his sights not merely on what might (according to the rules of grammar or logic) have been written or said, but rather on what was actually written or said – at a particular moment, by a particular historical actor using a particular conceptual vocabulary, in a particular format, and via a particular form of publication. As suggested, however, it is not single events but rather series of them that are of interest. And just as any historical set of events can form a series, so discursive events, in the fact of their being said or written (when other linguistic sequences could have been produced, but were not), can form a series, too. Likewise, just as the series that members of the Annales School investigated have their own underlying patterns and rules of production and accumulation, so, too, will the category of series formed by discursive events: namely, a discursive regularity.\textsuperscript{71}

What Foucault’s notion of discursive regularities provides historians of thought, then, is an excellent set of tools to examine discursive landscapes from the perspective of the \textit{longue durée}. It is precisely in this landscape that, as we saw, Parmenides’ great innovation is located – and also where his relationship to Homer’s \textit{Odyssey} must be excavated. We can therefore restate Mourelatos’s

\textsuperscript{70} Braudel and Wallerstein (2009) 178–79. Taken together, these form various levels of ‘slow history’ that collectively form an ‘infrastructure’ (Braudel and Wallerstein (2009) 181) which ‘traditional history has covered with a thick layer of events’ (Foucault (1972) 3); see also Wallerstein (2009) for an illuminating excursus on the notion of the \textit{longue durée}. It would also be possible to frame this project’s topic of investigation in terms of a discursive infrastructure underlying Parmenides’ pioneering use of extended deductive argumentation.

\textsuperscript{71} For example, between statements; ‘between groups of statements thus established (even if these groups do not concern the same, or even adjacent, fields . . .); relations between statements and groups of statements and events of quite a different kind’. Provided one ‘defines the conditions clearly’ it would be ‘legitimate to constitute, on the basis of correctly described relations, discursive groups that are not arbitrary, and yet remain invisible’ (Foucault (1972) 22). This network of relations, then, is what Foucault attempts to capture with the phrases ‘discursive regularity’ and ‘discursive formation’.
premise—‘the image of the route mediates a new concept of the nature of thinking and knowing’—with a new level of specificity and insight: the discursive regularities (explored in chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6) that link Parmenides to Homer mediate the transition from the Odyssey’s narration of human movement through physical space in time to Parmenides’ path-breaking deductive argumentation (movement through logical space in discursive sequence) and move towards demonstration. Even more specifically, and to preview one of my primary claims here in full: Circe’s hodos lays before our eyes a blueprint of the discursive architecture that Parmenides used to build the first attested sequence of extended deductive argumentation in Western thought.

**Aims: What Is and Is Not at Stake**

Above, I emphasized the importance of reading Parmenides’ poem as a poem, not merely an argument; this is particularly important, I suggested, where the relationship between Parmenides’ poem and Homer’s Odyssey, particularly book 12, is considered. This might imply that I intend to proceed according to the rules of intertextuality as normally understood: namely, line up two bits of text; show, via distinctive features common to both, that there is a high probability that the later text interacts with the former; and then tell a good story about how part of the second text’s meaning is generated as a result of this interaction.

Inevitably, some version of ‘lining up the texts’ will indeed occupy much of what follows, and I shall discuss in a number of places the points of overlap between Odyssey 12 and Parmenides’ poem that are sufficiently marked to justify the exercise. This procedure remains an invaluable component of sound textual analysis in my view; indeed, it is worth emphasizing that the fundamental

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72 See n. 61 above.


74 See in particular chs. 5 and 6, also Section 2.5, ‘Parmenidean Strategies’ and Section 4.3, ‘Concluding Remarks’. But, as always, there are also places where the level of markedness is less clear-cut, and one should be careful not to press the point too far; see again esp. Section 4.3.
observation that prompted the current study is the deep but hitherto unobserved set of similarities between *Odyssey* 12 and Parmenides’ ‘Route to Truth’, and that these similarities remain the starting point, and the anchor, for all that follows below.

Intertextuality takes many forms, however, and can be evaluated from many perspectives. The crucial difference between this endeavour and most literary criticism now practised in Classics is that what the two poems under consideration here share most of all is a discursive architecture, a similar manner of structuring different units of text. That is to say that the intertextuality between Parmenides’ poem and *Odyssey* 12 does not so much generate meaning in the former text (though it may also do this at times) as provide a framework or structure for its shape at a variety of different levels. It is for this reason that I referred above to the ‘discursive blueprint’ that *Odyssey* 12 offers Parmenides, and it is for this reason that the toolkit offered us by Foucault’s *Archaeology of Knowledge* is so valuable.75 It is because my aim is to confront this last relic of the Greek Miracle – the genius Parmenides indebted to no one for his invention of extended deductive argumentation – that I have given such prominence to Foucauldian archaeology.76

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75 See Section 4.2.3, and especially Ch. 4 nn. 62 and 63 for further discussion of Bakker, Kelly, and Currie in the context of the intertextual relationship between Parmenides’ poem and Homer.

76 It is this specificity of insight provided by Foucault’s toolkit that I believe justifies the decision not to discuss in terms of metaphor the relationship between Homer and Parmenides, word and concept, and image and structure, as Mourelatos and others do. As noted above, what Mourelatos’s account lacks is a clear connection between the micro-structure of word and image and the formal macro-structure of deductive argumentation and the other two features of demonstration highlighted above. At best, the framework of metaphor simply does not offer the same highly nuanced and precise level of insight as Foucault’s system.

There may also be other reasons for caution, however. In light of the distinction between actors’ and observers’ categories, if one takes seriously Lloyd’s analysis of Aristotle’s (highly polemic) invention of the concept ‘metaphor’ (see especially Lloyd (1987), but also important subsequent discussions in Lloyd (1990), Lloyd (2004), Lloyd (2012) 72–92, Lloyd (2015), Lloyd (2017a), and Lloyd (2017b)), there would be important risks associated with relying on a dichotomy between the literal and the metaphorical when discussing Parmenides. For, as others have shown, the concept of the literal is surprisingly difficult to pin down when discussing early Greek texts (see e.g. Padel (1992) 9–11, 41–42 on ‘pores’, and Stevens (2003), esp. 69–92 on the ‘long arm of Zeus’ in *Iliad* 15.604–95). In Parmenides’ poem, one might ask which *hodoi* are ‘literal’ and which ‘metaphorical’? And – no less importantly – what precisely is to be gained from making such a distinction in the first place?
Aims: What Is and Is Not at Stake

In Chapter 2 I argue that, since Parmenides is operating within the same cultural and poetic milieu as his late archaic comrades in verse, we should approach his poem with the same general assumptions about late archaic receptions of Homer that we bring to bear on his fellow poets. I therefore assume that Parmenides is interacting directly with a Homeric text that is relatively fixed, and that this text is largely similar to the one that has come down to us. I have adopted this position partly for convenience, since doing so enables me to ‘line up the texts’ and compare their discursive architecture and other features in the most concrete fashion. Incidentally, I also take the view that this assumption is in fact correct, a point I shall touch on again at the beginning of Chapter 2, where I discuss late archaic receptions of Homer in greater detail. It does not seem to me, however, that the core thesis for which I argue below would be much damaged should one adopt a different perspective on any number of Homeric questions. Provided that one’s view of the process of Homeric textualization or canonization still allows one coherently to discuss, for example, the A-B-C pattern, or the notion of catalogic discourse in Homer, there is ample scope to discuss the possibility of a similar discursive phenomenon associated with narrating the itinerary of a hodos.

If the markedly close correspondences between *Odyssey* 12 and Parmenides’ proem and the ‘Route to Truth’ allow us to posit an intertextual relationship between the two texts, there is no need to commit to a more specific characterization of this intertextuality. Whether this intertextuality is ‘deliberate’, whether Parmenides’ ‘Route to Truth’ is part of a larger discursive regularity involving not only Homer, but an entire body of now-vanished poems

There is, finally, one more concern regarding the kind of analysis to which discussion of Parmenides’ poem in terms of ‘metaphor’, such as Ferella (2017) and Ferella (2018), often leads. Cognitive theories of metaphor begin from the ahistorical, socioculturally ungrounded assumption that the essential nature of the human mind and body make the ‘conceptual metaphor AN ARGUMENT DEFINES A PATH’ a sort of pre-discursive, universal Ur-notion (presumably somehow prior to language), of which Parmenides’ poem is but ‘one linguistic realization’ (Ferella (2017) 107–08). But what evidence should compel us to find such a view persuasive, especially in light of research demonstrating fundamental differences in spatial cognition across cultures? (See e.g. Levinson (2003) and remarks in Lloyd (2007) 23–38 and Lloyd (2017b) 336–39.) Indeed, my analysis will in fact attempt to show that, as a historical matter of fact, precisely the opposite is true: in Parmenides’ poem, and thus, so far as we know, in the development of extended deductive argument as such, it is rather the case that the path (=hodos) defined the argument.
portions of which were organized by the figure of the *hodos* (or whether both are or can be true!), are questions about which I remain agnostic. What matters is that the texts are so similar in the way intimated above and analysed below. I submit that the primary discussion that follows in *chapters 3–6* stands up just as well whether one chooses to see these similarities as emerging organically out of a thought culture for which Homer is our best witness or as the product of deliberate invocation of Homer – or indeed to see them as anything in between. In every case, what remains true is that, once one accepts the discursive similarities between Homer and Parmenides, the latter is no longer a ‘creative genius in debt to nobody’.

These questions about the relationship between Homer and Parmenides having been addressed, it is important to take a step back. By staking out this field (Parmenides’ poem, along with the necessary context: physical, linguistic, cultural, and, above all, poetic and discursive), this method (Foucauldian archaeology, supplemented both by more traditional literary criticism and by attending to discussions of Parmenides’ arguments), and, most of all, this strictly delimited aim (explaining Parmenides’ invention of the outline of demonstration and the practice of extended deductive argumentation), my intention is to avoid a number of other possible issues. Despite my insistence on the importance of reading Parmenides’ poem as a poem, it is not my goal to examine Parmenides’ relationship to the larger hexameter tradition or the rich world of archaic poetry as a whole. While I shall indeed conduct a strategically targeted survey of these topics in *Chapter 2*, because my principal goal is to provide an account of Parmenides’ invention of extended deductive argumentation and the practice of demonstration, the main task is to identify and articulate the ties that

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77 In an ideal world, one could recapture one of the main virtues of the term ‘*intertextuality*’ as originally used, namely, the ability to sidestep questions of authorial intentionality that do not seem to be of great consequence for the present discussion.

78 I owe the formulation of the above dichotomy to an anonymous reader for Cambridge University Press.

79 For a study along these more comprehensive lines – though one which, in keeping with the ideas of *Gernet* (2004), centres around myth rather than poetry strictly – see *Ranzato* (2015), also *Tor* (2017).
bind the extended deductive argument and characteristic moves of demonstration that Parmenides makes in fragments 2, 6, 7, and especially 8, specifically to his time, place, and linguistic and poetic milieu. This is not, of course, to deny or devalue the connections between Parmenides and other predecessors in hexameter verse, notably Hesiod and notably in the proem;\(^\text{80}\) rather, these simply do not have a great bearing on a discussion of Parmenides’ invention of extended deductive argumentation. Similarly, my interest in siting Parmenides within the world in which he lived and, especially, in relation to his poetic predecessors, means that, while I shall make some strategic comparisons between Parmenides and his poetic contemporaries – especially Pindar\(^\text{81}\) – in Chapter 2, I shall not attempt to examine these relationships in a comprehensive way. Illuminating and valuable though such a project would be, it is not clear this would shed much light on Parmenides’ use of extended deductive argumentation.

A similar point may also be made regarding the tradition of reading Parmenides’ poem against the backdrop of ritual, mystic, mantic, or other religious texts and contexts. Attempts to reconsider Parmenides in his sociocultural context or to attend to the poetic texture of his language have often come from scholars who have searched for evidence to support readings in this vein.\(^\text{82}\) However

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\(^{80}\) As examined in e.g. Fränkel (1975)[1930]; Fränkel (1973)[1951]; Fränkel (1968) [1955]; Bowra (1937); Gigon (1945); Jaeger (1948); Dolin (1962); Schwabl (1963); Furley (1973) 3–4; Heitsch (1966) 201–02; Heitsch (1974); Pfeiffer (1975); Pelikaan-Engel (1978); Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (2007)[1983] 256 n. 1, 262; Couloubaritis (1990); Wöhrl (1993) 172–73; Tulli (2000); Miller (2006) 7–9; Robbiano (2006) esp. 150–54; Most (2007) 80–84; Palmer (2009) esp. 54–55; Kraus (2013) 454. See now especially Ranzato (2015), and extensive discussion in Tor (2017). For a fuller discussion of Parmenides and Hesiod, see Ch. 2 below.

\(^{81}\) For Pindar, in addition to the works by Fränkel and Bowra cited in n. 80 above, see notably Deichgräber (1950); Mansfeld (1964); Woodbury (1966); Pfeiffer (1975) 68–69; Böhme (1986); D’Alessio (1995); also Morrison (1955) 60; Durante (1976) 123–34, esp. 131–33; Slaveva-Griffin (2003) 231–32; Ranzato (2015) esp. 25–26, 128–29, 148–49.

\(^{82}\) See esp. Burkert (1969), Feyerabend (1984), Sassi (1988), Kingsley (1999), Gemelli Marciano (2008) and Gemelli Marciano (2013), and Ustinova (2009) and Ustinova (2018), many of which are developed by Robbiano (2006), Ranzato (2015), and Tor (2017) 265–77 (see also discussion below in Section 4.2.3, ‘Krisis: Assessments and Cautions’, where extensive bibliography can be found). One of the main challenges to the view that we misread Parmenides’ poem by failing to locate it primarily within a mystic tradition is the fact that, as Mourelatos (2013a) 163 points out, ‘within less than a generation, Parmenides’ text was placed in the same genre as the works of Melissus, Philolaus, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, Democritus, Diogenes of Apollonia, while these
stimulating these discussions may be in their own right, however, they too have little bearing on the task of accounting for Parmenides’ invention of extended deductive argumentation. This is partly because much of this branch of scholarship focuses on the proem, and is much less convincing when it moves beyond this, especially to fragments 2–8, the main focus of my analysis.83

While this line of thinking does little to illuminate Parmenides’ invention of extended deductive argumentation in its own right, the two strands of scholarship are neither necessarily hostile nor incompatible. As has recently been argued, accepting the notion that Parmenides’ poem represents, or is the product of, a divine revelation, or is otherwise tied to mystic rituals, does not preclude an interest in the rigour or origins of his argumentation.84 In short, however rich this vein of research is, it operates at a tangent to the current inquiry into the emergence of extended deductive argumentation and the practice of demonstration.85

On another note, despite my insistence on the value of Foucauldian archaeology to the endeavour at hand, I do not claim to have delineated any kind of larger archaic Greek discursive regularity or regularities per se. It is tempting, of course, to consider how the topics discussed below might constitute some part of such a thing, and the discussion in Chapter 3 of A-B-C patterns and catalogic discourse, for example, gestures towards what part of a hypothetical discursive regularity of this sort might look like; likewise, the common features shared by the two hodoi described in Odyssey 10 and 12 offer us enticing grounds for speculation. The overwhelming absence of other texts from this period, however, prohibits us from going further.

Comments of a similar sort might also be made regarding the so-called Doxa portion of Parmenides’ poem. Much of the most exciting

83 See particularly Mourelatos (2013a) for a powerful response to the attempt in Gemelli Marciano (2013) to push the line of thinking presented by the works cited in n. 82 into the argumentation that makes up frs. 2, 6, 7, and 8.


85 For example, though one may strongly disagree with the thrust of the readings advanced in Gemelli Marciano (2008) and Gemelli Marciano (2013), one can still learn a great deal from the many fine observations on display there concerning the poetic texture of Parmenides’ poetry.
recent scholarship on Parmenides has involved reconsidering the old, vexed question about the relationship between *Doxa* and the ‘Route to Truth’. These discussions of *Doxa* have certainly given us a more robust understanding of what Parmenides hoped to accomplish in his poem, and they are an important step forward. Be that as it may, the question of Parmenides’ invention of extended deductive argumentation and the outline of demonstration are not, so far as we can tell, immediately connected to the *Doxa* section of his poem. As a result, the only occasion to discuss it will come in the final section of this book (Part III: *Doxai*), a deliberate non-conclusion that offers more general reflections on the *Doxa* section’s relationship to the ‘Route to Truth’, particularly in the light of the Homeric analysis developed here.

If it is not my goal to provide an exhaustive view of Parmenides in relation to his poetic or religious context, neither will it be my concern to advance my own specific interpretation of Parmenides’ arguments, less still to stake out a view on what precisely Parmenides’ larger philosophical positions are. (Though in Chapter 6 I shall examine how the view advanced in the pages below might square with various interpretations of Parmenides’ arguments presented by others, and what new light the account offered here can shed on these interpretations.) By the same token, however, I do claim that those who in the future wish to offer specific interpretations of Parmenides’ arguments will need to explain how their interpretations can be reconciled with the analysis undertaken in this project. The point is not categorically to deny that a given thinker, on account of thinking from within a specific tradition, is able to argue in a specific way or to make specific arguments (especially when that thinker is as radical and innovative as Parmenides). But no such categorical denial need be presumed here; if some readers will insist that form cannot

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87 Though I intend to address this in forthcoming publications.

88 Though one could nevertheless imagine a set of claims approaching this; see e.g. Hacking (2002b).
determine content, we must equally insist that form *does* necessarily shape the matrix of possibilities for content in a distinctive way. To conclude: if the domain explored in this project is not deemed prior to philosophical analysis of Parmenides’ arguments, neither should philosophical analyses of Parmenides’ arguments take rigorous priority over considering the argumentative form in which they are expressed. That is, should the claims advanced in this book be found persuasive, they would need to be borne in mind as a crucial set of factors for scholars to use in formulating their understanding of Parmenides’ arguments. From this, it also follows that the findings presented here ought to serve as one of the main criteria by which the strengths and weaknesses of interpretations of Parmenides can be assessed.

One final observation: I do not actually get down to the nuts and bolts – the particles, the modally charged negations, the aspects and tenses – of Parmenides’ text until Chapter 5, halfway through the ‘Routes’ portion of the book. In structuring my overarching argument this way, and in the manner in which I have elected to style the book’s larger programme and Table of Contents, I have assumed a relatively high degree of familiarity with Parmenides’ poem on the part of the reader; without this, the relevance and importance of the material discussed in chapters 1, 2, and especially 3 and 4, to the problem at hand will be less clear. This strategy is not without its risks. Parmenides is hardly a ubiquitous presence in the contemporary Classics curriculum, and proceeding on this assumption may induce some frustration in a portion of my potential audience. Nevertheless, I hope that scholars of the archaic reception of Homer, and of Homer himself, will find material of value in Chapter 2, and in chapters 3 and 4, respectively; likewise, I hope that all who have occasion to consider ancient Greek roads and their associated lexicon will find something useful in Chapter 1. On the other hand, I have faced a challenge of the reverse nature in writing Chapter 2, where my goal is to bring the discussion of Parmenides into contact with recent advances in the study of the archaic reception of Homer; here I have tried to make the discussion rich enough to be fruitful for scholars of Parmenides without being tiresome for scholars in the field of literature. This proved a delicate balancing act; in view
of the risks and rewards of writing for different – and sometimes rather distant – subfields of the discipline, I ask forbearance from readers who would have charted the *hodos* of argument otherwise.

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These, then, are the stakes. From one perspective, the scale of this project might be deemed enormously ambitious: to trace the origins and early evolution of extended deductive argumentation and the practice of demonstration, thereby delineating a key portion of the genealogy of the Western conception of knowledge. From another, however, the domain of inquiry is narrow and its epistemic stance humble: this is simply an attempt to read a poem with attention to the richness of its language and imagery, in relation to its cultural context, and alongside its poetic predecessors – no more and no less than what any poem deserves. To perform an archaeological excavation of this buried *hodos* and recover the first instalment of this invention of the concept of method – a μῦθος ὁδοῖο, if ever there was one – we must rethink and re-examine the methods of our *hodos* and the *hodos* of method.
PART I

PROOIMIA
What is a *hodos*? The urgency of the question will be obvious to any reader of Parmenides’ Greek. We have already noted the degree to which the word and image are woven into the very heart of the poem’s fabric, however much that fact may have been deplored by the purists who guard the gates to Logos’ wing of the academy. Similarly, we have already observed the ways in which the traditional impulse to read the ‘Route to Truth’ portion of Parmenides’ poem (frs. 2–8) as a deductive argument – no more and no less – have at best ignored this question, and at worst precluded its being investigated further, rendering it *panapeuthēs*; if Parmenides is *already* making a deductive argument, and if he is *only* making a deductive argument, who would think to ask what a *hodos* is – and why, anyway, would it matter? How could the chance, contingent facts of archaic Greek means of travel by land and technical questions of road construction have any bearing on a timeless argument concerning the timeless questions of the nature of what is?

We may recall once more Lloyd’s observation that ‘the terminology in which [Parmenides] describes what he is doing is a very limited one’. Viewed from the perspective of the mature, well-developed technical vocabulary with which Aristotle or the Stoics, for example, can undertake not only various kinds of proofs and demonstrations, but also second-order reflections on these topics, this is undoubtedly true. All Parmenides has at his disposal are the resources of ‘ordinary’, ‘everyday’ objects and the power and resonance of epic poetry and myth. And yet, for precisely the same reason, Parmenides has at his disposal *all* the resources of ‘ordinary’, ‘everyday’ objects and the power and resonance of

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1 Lloyd (2000) 245.
epic poetry and myth. In this chapter, then, I shall take a closer look at just what this material was that Parmenides had to work with; in the first part (Section 1.1), I shall examine the physical nature and social function of archaic and classical Greek roads as realia, while in the second (Section 1.2), I shall examine the semantics of the Homeric vocabulary of roads and journeying, especially the word *hodos*, relevant to Parmenides’ poem.

## 1.1 Archaic and Classical Greek Roads

So what, then, is a *hodos*? Fortunately, we are better able to answer the question now than we were during most of the twentieth century. Although some of the key facts about archaic and classical Greek roads have long been known, the current view has only recently come into focus thanks to light shed by the last few decades of scholarship on the physical nature of the Greek *polis*. That roads are on the scholarly agenda at all is in itself a minor revolution; for the better part of the twentieth century the topic was largely neglected, attracting the odd monograph, an article here or there in the archaeological bulletins, and the occasional insinuation into chapters devoted to other topics. Until recently, the conventional wisdom regarding roads in archaic and classical Greece could be summarized as follows. To begin with, there weren’t many. Those that did exist were generally rudimentary and rather crudely constructed. The emergence of a well-developed system of roads was thought to depend on the existence of an empire or other central authority rich enough to be able to build a highway network, centralized enough to plan it, and oppressive enough to need one in order to administer (and, if necessary, subdue) far-flung, subordinate provinces. Seen this way

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2 Putting the matter in these terms calls to mind Easterling’s discussion of what she calls ‘plain words’ in Sophocles; see Easterling (1999). That there are fundamental questions of genre that complicate, and limit, the comparison cannot be denied – but that the comparison can be hazarded at all is telling.

3 For a fuller study of Homeric road words, see Folit-Weinberg (forthcoming, 2022).

4 This includes Despotopoulos (1940), Forbes (1955), Forbes (1964), Young (1956), MacDonald and Rapp (1972) 25–29, Casson (1974), White (1984), and the important Pritchett (1980).
way, road networks seemed incompatible with the fierce independence that defined that patchwork mosaic of Greek *poleis* before Alexander. The Persians, who impressed Herodotus with top-notch roads (in the time of Xerxes, a messenger could cover the 2,600 km from Sardis to Susa in nine days, a rate unmatched until the Napoleonic era) were ruled, of course, by a tyrant king who could afford to build them – and who needed to. Further road building was left for the Romans. Hence Greek road building’s relative neglect, historically speaking, as a meritorious subject of inquiry.

The combination of new archaeological evidence and the emergence of a new way of conceptualizing both the evolution of the *polis* and what a *polis* is have, however, slowly chipped away at the foundations of that traditional construction and helped produce a new one.

First, the *polis*. François de Polignac’s *La naissance de la cité grecque* (1984) has been variously critiqued, developed, and nuanced, but its enduring legacy is a conceptualization of the evolution of the *polis* (and, indeed, of theorizing what it means to be a *polis*) that links that evolution to the relationship between urban nucleus or nuclei and places of religious, economic, or

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6 And still: the 1,500-page *Oxford Handbook of Engineering and Technology in the Classical World* dispenses with non-Roman road-building in less than a page, citing only Forbes’s outdated study, Theseus’ mythical journey from Troezen to Athens, and Pausanias (Quilici (2008) 552–53). See also comments in Lohmann (2002) 73–76.
7 Giannis Pikoulas in particular has revolutionized our understanding of ancient Greek roads; see Pikoulas (1995) esp. 25–26, 273–323, 332–46 on Corinth, the Argolid, and eastern Arcadia; Pikoulas (2002) on Arcadia; Pikoulas (2012) esp. 515–42 for dating, and 587–96 for concluding remarks on Laconia; see also Pikoulas (1999), Pikoulas (2007). Building on Pikoulas are Marchand (2009a) and Marchand (2009b); Lolos (2011) esp. ch. 3 and remarks at 93–97; Korres (2012). Ober (1985) is comprehensive but addresses a later period; for more recent bibliography, see Fachard and Pirisino (2015). Each of these authors makes the case for networks of carriageable roads that connected *poleis* from the archaic era onwards. Dillon (1997) esp. 34–38 and Elsner and Rutherford (2005) also touch on aspects of interest to this chapter.
strategic significance in the surrounding environment.\(^9\) In de Polignac’s own words, ‘it is impossible to separate the evolution of urban centres from the overall process of organization of territory’.\(^{10}\) And it is impossible in turn to consider the relationship between urban centre and territory (and, \textit{a fortiori}, the organization of a territory) without according a primordially important role to the road. This has sometimes been acknowledged (though too rarely explored at length), as when de Polignac discusses the importance of the sacred ways linking an urban nucleus or nuclei to extra-urban sanctuaries.\(^{11}\) At the most mundane, and certainly the most obvious, level, without some means of physical communication facilitating movement from town to extra-urban sanctuary, the great processions that have been recognized as vital for the formation and consolidation of a single social unit would not have been possible – for how else could the necessary carts, elaborate processions, and cult paraphernalia make it the many kilometres from town to sanctuary or sanctuary to town?\(^{12}\) No less significant were the social, political, and economic consequences of road building that linked urban centres (or sanctuaries) to marble quarries or mines, for example, or to a port, or to sites of cultic importance, or, indeed, to other \textit{poleis} and trading partners.\(^{13}\)

It is also true that the increasing significance of roads in this emergence of the \textit{polis} might be extended along many other axes. Following scholars who have compared the construction of roads from pre-existing paths or tracks to the relationship between writing and speech,\(^{14}\) or have discussed the evolution of the


\(^{10}\) de Polignac (2005) 63.


\(^{12}\) For general treatments, see Graf (1996), Kavoulaki (2011); for processions and the ritualization of space, see e.g. Calame (1990), Kavoulaki (1999), and Sourvinou-Inwood (2011) for Athenian processions, Herda (2011) for the procession of the Molpoi (with extensive further bibliography). For processional roads, see e.g. Coulton (1976), Hölscher (1999) 74–83 and Hölscher (2007) 166–67, Giannisi (2006), Herda (2011) 74.


\(^{14}\) See e.g. Tilley (1994) 29–30.
1.1 Archaic and Classical Greek Roads

‘visual semiotics’ of the *polis*, it is important to stress the conceptual effect of the fixed, manifest, and highly visible form of expressing and articulating the linkages between an urban nucleus and sites of importance in its territory.\(^{15}\) One example of special importance concerns the decisive role played by roads in defining the domains developed in new colonies and demarcating the framework – here understood in a peculiarly literal sense – according to which land could be differentiated into public and private or partitioned into *klēroi* for allocation to new citizen-settlers.\(^{16}\) Or again, how, once fixed, these roads became public sites around which cemeteries and monumental grave markers sprang up to advertise the wealth and status of the local aristocracy and prominent families.\(^{17}\) What would emerge in all of these cases is the manner in which roads play a decisive role in the organization, systematization, regularization, and ritualization of space – topics linked to Parmenides’ ‘Route to Truth’ by the central role played by roads in the ordering of space, be it physical, mental, or discursive.

### I.1.1 Physical Nature and Construction

This is not, however, the place to undertake these sprawling examinations concerning the manner in which roads order space and organize territories; what is most relevant here is the physical nature of these roads, something never previously considered in relation to the use of the figure of the road in the poetry of Homer,

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for example, or Pindar, or, most pertinently, Parmenides. For what is meant by ‘road’ in all the settings adduced above are not the myriad mule paths and beaten tracks that criss-crossed the countryside. Nor are we discussing, as often seems to be assumed, the roads, constructed from mortar, concrete, stone slabs, and cement, that would later serve as one of Rome’s most celebrated exports and cultural signifiers. Rather, the stony Greek terrain (and, perhaps, the slightly more modest finances of the individual polis) demanded another method of road construction. This is what has often been called the ‘rut road’, ‘track road’, or, in Mure’s enduring phrase, the ‘stone railway’: a pair of grooves engraved into the rocky Greek terrain. Ultimately, we shall see that giving proper consideration to the physical nature of archaic Greek roads will open up a new horizon onto Parmenides’ ‘Route to Truth’ and its skilful exploitation of language and imagery in the service of fashioning a new notion of discursive arrangement, one that involves a prescribed movement along a path (or, as we would call it, logical necessity; see Chapter 6 below).

If Mure was right to insist that these ruts were not merely the product of repeated use but were intentionally constructed, how were these rut roads constructed? Particularly jagged sections of terrain might call for the levelling of the road’s surface; more often, however, the surface of the road was left alone, and the set of

18 In the case of Homer, the only relevant body of scholarship one can find addresses the important figure of the oimē (see Ch. 3). The oimē is unlike a hodos insofar as contemporary scholarship imagines the bard to travel it by foot, not wheeled vehicle; but it is like Parmenides’ hodos of inquiry insofar as it is already blazed into the terrain of myth and therefore articulates a prescribed movement (one undertaken, furthermore, under the custody of a female divinity with privileged access to knowledge).

19 See Section 1.2 below and Folit-Weinberg (forthcoming, 2022) for the semantics of various road words.

20 See Mure, travelling in Greece in the early to mid-nineteenth century: ‘The term rut must not be understood in the sense of hole or inequality worn by long use and neglect on a level road, but of a groove or channel purposely scooped out at distances adapted to the ordinary span of a carriage, for the purpose of steadying and directing the course of the wheels . . . in the same way as the sockets of our railroads. Some of these tracts of stone railways, for such they may in fact be called . . . ’: Mure (1842) 251. A number of nineteenth-century visitors to Greece record observing ruts: see Pritchett (1980) 167–80 and esp. 180 nn. 95, 97, 98.

21 See n. 20 above.

22 Young (1956) 95; see also n. 26 below.
grooves is the only sign of the road builders’ presence. Ruts could be cut to a depth of anywhere from 1 to 30 cm. We know less than we might about the technical detail of this construction; perhaps our best evidence comes from an inexplicably neglected passage in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia where Persian ‘superintendents of the road builders’ (οἱ τῶν ὀδοποιῶν ἄρχοντες) are told that soldiers deemed unfit for service with the spear, bow, or slingshot must carry the wood-cutting axe (πέλεκυς ξυλοκόπος), the mattock or pickaxe (σμινύη), and the shovel (ἄμη), respectively, ‘in case there should be need of any road building’ (ὅπως ἐντδέξας, Xen. Cyr. 6.2.36). Whichever specific instruments may have been employed, the road ruts were carefully squared and polished. As the enduring presence today of some ancient ruts attests, this method of road construction produced a result that was unusually resistant to daily wear and tear and weather damage in comparison to other road-building techniques. Evidence suggests that roadbeds could also be constructed across portions of the route that did not traverse rocky terrain, and that these, too, were rutted; the road track, that is to say, was probably entirely continuous from origin to destination. These roadbeds were confected of gravel or pot sherds mixed with earth.

Casson and others have claimed that cart roads had a ‘more or less standard gauge’ across the board, but there was evidently at least a certain degree of variation. At the Athenian Dipylon Gate and along the Sacred Way the median average gauge is 1.45 m, for example, while a rutted road 23 km north of Sparta has a gauge of 1.35 m, and even narrower tracks with gauges of 1.23 m and 1.25 m have been recorded near Mycenae and Cardamyle.

23 Casson (1974) 69; see also Forbes (1955) and Forbes (1964) 101–02.
24 Pikoulas (1999) 251; for road ruts 50 cm deep at a quarry near Agrigento, see Pike (1967) 601.
26 Or rubble from old buildings: Morgan (2003) 146; see also Bronner (1973) 18–19. For roadbeds and ruts, see Pikoulas (1999) 251, Pikoulas (2007) 82 for most up-to-date bibliography. On engineering, see also Lohmann (2002) and also Vanderpool (1978), Sanders and Whitbread (1990).
respectively; on the other end of the spectrum, Despotopoulos reported gauges of 1.55–1.60 m on roads in the Argolid and between Orchomenus and Larymna.\textsuperscript{27} Even among the roads in Laurium one finds gauge differentials of up to 6 cm. Likewise, the width of the ruts themselves varied from 6 cm to 14.5 cm. Nevertheless, it seems likely in most cases that any given cart would have been able to negotiate nearly all the roads just mentioned.\textsuperscript{28}

Greek roads were certainly more at the mercy of topography than their Roman successors, and, as a result, often meandered through relatively level valley terrain regardless of the extra distance such a course might entail (footpaths and beaten tracks offered more direct but less level routes that were generally not suitable for wheeled vehicles).\textsuperscript{29} This is not to say, however, that Greek engineers lacked the know-how to undertake more ambitious engineering projects when they saw fit: in the area around Laurium alone, Young catalogues many instances of what he terms the ‘terraced road’, the ‘cut-and-terraced road’, the ‘dam road’, and the ‘dyke road’.\textsuperscript{30} One may also note the use of so-called ‘groove roads’ over portions of especially smooth rock; here, bands of shallow grooves (like those on the ascent to the Athenian Acropolis) were chiselled out at an angle transverse to the cart’s path in order to afford purchase on the slick surface.\textsuperscript{31} Recent studies have also observed more daring instances of engineering, including the construction of roads on slopes exceeding a 10–15 per cent gradient, or at very high altitude (e.g. over the north crest of Taygetus, at 1,600 m).\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{27} Pritchett (1980) 169–81, Young (1956). Pritchett insists on a ‘standard gauge of about 1.40m’ (p. 177), likewise Pikoulas (1999), Pikoulas (2007); Forbes refers to a ‘normal gauge’ 1.44 m – see Forbes (1955), Forbes (1964) passim. For the Diolkos at the Isthmus of Corinth, see Raepsaet (1993). The gauge in Italian Magna Graecia seems to have been nearer 1.50–1.60 m; see e.g. Pike (1967) esp. 604.

\textsuperscript{28} For this question vis-à-vis the dynamics of wheeled vehicles, see Crouwel (1992), also Lorimer (1903), Burford (1960), and Richardson and Piggott (1982). On the ability of the same vehicle to travel between poleis, see Casson (1974), Pikoulas (1995).

\textsuperscript{29} Forbes (1964) 103, Young (1956) 97, Pikoulas (2007) 83, Rackham (1990) 105–06. See also Korres and Tomlinson (2002) 47.

\textsuperscript{30} Technical questions discussed at Young (1956) 95–96; for Mycenaean predecessors, see e.g. Kase (1973).

\textsuperscript{31} Young (1956) 95; see also Tréheux (1955).

\textsuperscript{32} Pikoulas (2007) 83.
The now-ubiquitous comparison of the ‘rut road’ to a kind of stone railway (or, as a more recent scholar puts it, a ‘negative railway’), a comparison that Mure had made as far back as 1842, is especially worth commenting on here. Once a vehicle’s wheels were ‘in the groove’, as it were, its route and its destination were locked in no less than its wheels (see frontispiece). This proved especially problematic when two carts confronted each other on the open road, for the vast majority of roads seem to have been single-tracked for the better part of their course (though a handful of the busiest roads, notably between Athens and Delphi and Sparta and Olympia, were in some places given double tracks). The extent of the challenge this presented to ancient travellers is difficult for the modern user of roads to fathom fully. One strategy for coping with such challenges was to construct a series of (often infrequent) lay-bys or turn-offs, which allowed two vehicles to pass each other; if a pair of carts travelling in opposite directions encountered each other, the two options were thus for one to retreat to the nearest lay-by or, if there were none in the area, to physically remove the vehicle and its wheels from the track, which must have been a heavy task indeed. The situation in mountainous areas has seemed so hazardous as to prompt one scholar to speculate on the necessity of watchmen to oversee traffic at key points of important routes; at the very least, a set of protocols governing right of way would seem to have been needed in such situations, even if it is lost to us now. (At this point in the discussion it is considered de rigueur to craft a joke about Oedipus, Laius, and the first recorded case of road rage in antiquity.) Of course, this position of being locked into a fixed course could also be beneficial if, say, one needed to execute a turn while descending a steep slope surrounded by cliffs (a scenario with which any driver or bus passenger on the modern Greek road is terrifyingly familiar); here the ruts act as a kind of ‘guard rail’. This situation is worth bearing

33 Pikoulas (1999) 251; see also n. 20 above.
34 Casson (1974) 70 thinks the most heavily trafficked quarry roads were given double tracks; see also Lолос (2003) 143 and n. 20. Euripides seems to refer to precisely such a double-tracked road at Electra 775, where we find a δίκροτος ἁμαξίτος; see esp. Denniston (1939) ad loc.
in mind when considering the labour (and wide arc) required to turn a cart whose wheels are higher than its frame.\(^{37}\) Again, this fundamental aspect of travelling via rut road will be important in our discussion of Parmenides below, particularly in relation to his invention of the notion of logical necessity (see Chapter 6).

### 1.1.2 Social Context

What little we do know about the administration and supervision of ancient Greek roads comes from the classical period and does not shed much light on how such affairs were managed in the archaic period.\(^{38}\) Some scholars imagine construction and repair to have been a liturgy, others that it was a quasi-imperial endeavour of ‘a powerful central authority’, and others still that hoplite armies served as road crews.\(^{39}\) Hard evidence is in short supply.\(^{40}\) *Intra muros*, it seems that in the classical period the *astynomoi* (and later the *agoranomoi*) were tasked with keeping streets clean, while the *hodopoioi*, of which there were five at Athens, according to [Aristotle] (*Ath. Pol.* 54.1), were to look after their repair with the assistance of public slaves;\(^{41}\) the regular appointment of these officials may well have been a fourth-century development, however.\(^{42}\) Plato’s *Laws* contains

\(^{37}\) Chevallier (1976) 88–89. White (1984) 136 writes that ‘good brakes are important, but the little evidence we have does not suggest that braking was satisfactory’ for wheeled vehicles. See Crouwel (1992) 52–53, 73–74, 91–93 on controlling various chariots.

\(^{38}\) Pritchett (1980) 145–51 remains the most comprehensive; I draw liberally from it here. Pikoulas (1999) 254 insists that ‘the creation of the [rut road] network [in the Peloponnesse] is to be dated to the seventh century (at the latest), with the middle of the sixth century . . . as a landmark for its later development’; see also Pikoulas (1999) 306–09, Pikoulas (1995) 349–55. In addition to the studies cited in n. 7 above, there is evidence of rut roads at the Isthmian Sanctuary predating the fire there c. 475 BCE; see Broneer (1973) 18–19. For a *terminus ante quem* of the sixth century for the rut road near Larymna, see Oldfather (1916) 42.

\(^{39}\) See Casson (1974), Pikoulas (2007) 84 (for the quotation), and Ober (1991) 174–79, respectively.

\(^{40}\) Pace Lolos (2003) 143.

\(^{41}\) On the *hodopoioi*, see BNP, Rhodes (1972) 237. Again, one might have expected that Xen. *Cyr.* 6.2.36 (see p. 37 above), which addresses the ‘superintendents of the road builders’ (οἱ τῶν ὄδοποιων ἄρχοντες) should there be need of ‘any road building’ (τι ὄδοποιος), would be helpful for any discussion of this topic.

\(^{42}\) See Pritchett (1980) 147 and n. 10 and Rhodes (1981) *ad* 54.1 for further discussion and bibliography. Aeschines’ *In Ctes.* 3.25 states that the controllers of the theoretic fund ἱσαεν δὲ καὶ ὄδοποιοι; Rhodes (1981) *ad* 54.1 interprets this to mean that the former ‘provided
a lengthy passage on the responsibilities of the so-called *agronomoi*, one of which was to oversee sixty young men from each tribe tasked with beautifying the countryside, conserving its waters, and attending to the roads (760a–761a); it is doubted whether this position ever actually existed in Athens.\(^{43}\) Nor do inscriptions always provide unequivocal answers. A pair of inscriptions regarding bridges on the road to Eleusis, for example, tell different stories: the older, from 421/20 BCE, provides for the construction of a stone bridge at public expense by decree of the Athenian *ekklēsia* (*IG* I\(^2\) 81), while a decree by the deme of Eleusis (*IG* II\(^2\) 1191) exactly 100 years later honours one Xenocles for constructing a stone bridge at his own expense.\(^{44}\) An Athenian copy of an Amphictyonic Law of 380/79 BCE arrogates to the Amphictyones responsibility for repair of roads and bridges, presumably those leading to Delphi and Pyloi (*IG* II\(^2\) 1126.40–43).\(^{45}\) Herodotus tells us that in Sparta, judgement concerning the public roads was the prerogative of the kings alone (6.57.4).\(^{46}\)

In Herodotus’ description of the events leading up to the denouement of the Persian campaign against the Scythians, we find a sentence that begins as follows (4.136):

> ἅτε δὲ τοῦ Περσικοῦ μὲν τοῦ πολλοῦ ἕόντος πεζοῦ στρατοῦ καὶ τὰς ὀδοὺς ὥστε οὐκ ἔπισταμένου, ὅπερ οὖ τετμημένων τῶν ὁδῶν.

But seeing that the Persian army was for the most part footmen and did not know the *hodoi*, since they had not been *tetmēmenai*.

Many translations here render ὅπερ οὖ τετμημένων τῶν ὁδῶν ‘since the roads had not been marked’.\(^{47}\) Other scholars, however, take the word *téμενων* much more literally: ‘just as in the English language roads are “constructed,” in Greek they were “cut”


\(^{44}\) Pritchett (1980) 150.


\(^{46}\) Michell (1964) 110–11, esp. 110 n. 7; see also Lolos (2011) 95, who looks at the evidence from Thucydides and Xenophon, and also Lolos (2003) 43, Pikoulas (1999) 307.

\(^{47}\) As in Godley’s Loeb translation; Rawlinson is more apt: ‘... had no knowledge of the routes, which are not cut in Scythia’ (357).
Construing τέμνειν as ‘to cut’ rather than simply ‘to mark’ draws support from a passage in Thucydides (2.100), who notes, for example, that it was King Archelaus who was responsible for most of the fortresses and roads to be found in Macedonia in Thucydides’ day, for it was he who ‘cut the highways/major roads’ (ὁ δόσολος εὐθείας τεμει) in the region.

The passage from Herodotus raises the question of the nature and extent of road signs, signposts, or road markers of other kinds in archaic and classical Greece. Historically, the consensus was that such things had come only with the Romans and their road-building expertise.

Archaeological finds from Attica suggest otherwise, however. An inscription on the Altar of the Twelve Gods in the heart of the Athenian agora reads (IG II² 2640):

[ἡ πόλις ἔστω σαγενὶ με βροτοίς μνημείον ἀληθές
πάσιν] σημαίνειν μέτρον ὀδοιπορίας
[ἐστιν γὰρ τὸ] μεταχεύθειν πρὸς δώδεκα βωμῶν
[πέντε ἐπὶ?] τεσσαράκοντ’ ἐγένετο στάδιοι.

(The city) set (me), a true record (for all) men
To indicate (the length) of the journey:
The distance to the Altar of the Twelve Gods
From the harbour is (five and?) forty stades.

The inscription itself is dated to the end of the fifth century, but the original altar is thought to have been built in 522/21 by Peisistratus (grandson of the tyrant) and perhaps renovated around 425 BCE.

Whether or not this altar was conceived of as the epicentre of the Athenian polis, the basis or focal point anchoring a larger system

48 Detienne (2009) 68.
49 On the semantics of eutheia hodos, see Lolos (2003) 140. Pikoulas (1995) 22 n. 38 and Lolos (2011) 93 n. 3 connect this terminology with the engraving of road ruts. Incidentally, at Ar. Thesm. 1101, one also finds the verb with keleuthos in reference to the ‘cutting’ of a path through the air (that keleuthos appears when the route in question cleaves the air, not land, is fully consistent with the way that the word is used in Homer; see Folit-Weinberg (forthcoming, 2022)). Eur. Phoen. 1, where Jocasta appeals to Helios, τὴν ἐν ἀστροις οὐρανοῦ τεμνόν ἡδόν (1), is a more complex case, not least on account of its questionable authenticity; see Mastronarde (1994) 142 and n. 1.
50 See e.g. the passages excerpted in Salvat and Servais (1964) 272 n. 1.
of measurement, from the moment of its installation is not certain; what seems clear, however, is that by Herodotus’ day at the latest, it occupied precisely this role. Moreover, no critic of Parmenides’ poem could fail to be struck by two features of this extraordinary object: first, that the marker declares itself to record and convey some kind of truth – it has been erected as a mnēmeion alēthes; and second, that this record is truthful insofar as it accurately ‘signs out’ aspects of a ‘journey’. Truth, journeying, and the details of the route-to-be-journeyed are thus all linked within one discursive and conceptual network on the face of the altar at the heart of the agora.

There is more, however. It has sometimes been speculated that this altar should be seen as part of a larger project of spatial organization, monumentalization, and political consolidation that would also have included the installation of the celebrated herms which dotted the roads of Attica, reportedly erected by Peisistratus’ uncle, Hipparchus. These road markers, set up at the halfway points between the town centre (presumably measured from the Altar of the Twelve Gods) and the deme to which the road led, bore on one face information about the journey being undertaken (notifying travellers that they were halfway between the town and their destination) and on the other a moralizing or philosophical maxim devised (or at any rate selected) by Hipparchus. Fortunately, the pseudo-Platonic dialogue Hipparchus records two of the maxims inscribed by the Athenian tyrant: ‘walk thinking just thoughts’ (στείχε δίκαια φρονόν) and ‘do not deceive a friend’ (μη φίλον ἔξαπάτα). These peculiar objects take on a particular charge and interpretive frisson in light of

53 See Herodotus 2.7.1 for the Altar of the Twelve Gods as the ground zero of Athens: ἐστὶ δὲ ὁδὸς ἐς Ἡλίου πόλιν ἀπὸ βαλάσσης διωνύστη παραστηθείς τὸ μήκος τῇ ἐς Ἀθηνέων ὁδὸν τῇ ἀπὸ τῶν διωδέκα θεῶν τοῦ βωμοῦ φερούσῃ ἐς τε Πίσαν καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν νηὸν τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου.

54 On the relationship between herms and the altar of the Twelve Gods, see Lohmann (2002) 76–79, Long (1987) 159–60 (bibliography at 160 n. 83). Regarding dating the herms, the confluence of literary evidence (Pl. [Hipparch.] cf. 228b–229d) and archaeological evidence (a herm found in situ near modern-day Koropi in Attica) is enticing; see the classic Osborne (1985) esp. 48–51 and, more recently, Tomlinson (1998) 33–35 and Lohmann (2002) 76–79 for further discussion.

55 So the Hipparchus reports (see n. 54 above). Although only one side of the Koropi herm survives, it seems to corroborate the dialogue’s claims exactly, reading: [Ἰ]ν μήνσει Κεφάλης τε καὶ ἄστεος ἀγλαὸς ἕρμης (IG I3 1023). See also Parker (1996) 80–83, Wrede (1986) esp. 5–8.

56 Pl. [Hipparch.] 229a4 and 229b1, respectively. For hermeneutic complications and considerations surrounding these maxims, particularly in light of the distinctive medium
Parmenides’ poem insofar as they, too, form an explicit link between roads, travelling, and what we would now call philosophical (or at least ethical or moralizing) thinking. Indeed, the unique form of the herm embodies in and of itself this (very Parmenidean) linkage between the itinerary of a voyage and philosophical or moralizing thought, expressing it in the form of a single, unified object: two faces, very literally, of the same stele.

Proper consideration of the possible links between the herms and Parmenides’ poem is undertaken in Chapter 6, when Parmenides’ poem itself will be examined, but Mourelatos’s interpretation of Parmenides’ notion of a sēma which stands ‘on the hodos’ of inquiry (Fr. 8.2–3) is evocative enough in this setting to deserve being mentioned, even briefly, at this juncture:

In Parmenides’ own language: To reach the goal of the ‘quest,’ we must go by the route ‘is.’ To stay on that route, we must keep an eye on the ‘signposts’ along the way. To be faithful to the imagery, we might think of the signposts as imperatives like: ‘always look for that which is simple, immobile, complete.’ Parmenides puts this less expressively by saying: ‘along the route there are many signposts that [or “as to how”] . . . ’ (B8.2–3).\(^57\)

Seen against Mourelatos’s characterization of Parmenides’ sēmata, we may say (without wishing to press the claim too hard) that Hipparchus’ herms, likely built not so long before Parmenides’ poem was composed, offer an extremely arresting set of possible parallels.\(^58\)

The herms and the road network connecting the demes to Attica are, of course, deeply tied up with several dynamics specific to that region, especially those related to the consolidation of Athenian political power and the relationship between the central city and the demes.\(^59\) The use of road markers and road signs in archaic

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\(^57\) Mourelatos (2008b) 94.
\(^58\) For Parmenides’ dates, see Ch. 2, n. 1 below; note that, for example, West (1971) 220 n. 3 puts Parmenides’ birth later but hypothesizes that his poem was composed in the 490s.
Greece was, however, by no means limited to Attica. A road sign or signpost (the French excavators refer to it as a ‘stèle indicatrice’) from the island of Thasos has been securely dated to the decade between 450 and 440 BCE. This ‘stèle indicatrice’, located in a sanctuary at the south-eastern tip of the island, lists the distances from the marker to two other points on the island, the polis (on the northern coast), by way of Ainyra, and a location known as the ‘Diasion’ in the (village or town of) Demetron (presumably in the south-west quadrant of the island); below this, we then get a third distance, from the ‘Diasion’ to the polis by way of a seaside route (peri thalassan) that presumably traces out the circumference of the island’s western and northern coasts. The Altar of the 12 Gods and Hipparchus’ network of herms were hardly unique.

Emerging from both literary and archaeological evidence, then, is a picture that becomes highly suggestive when viewed alongside Parmenides’ use of the language and imagery of roads, travelling, and journeying. In concluding this discussion of the physical nature and social function of archaic and classical Greek roads as realia, I would like to highlight two points most of all. First, that we should find the distinctive nexus comprising the practice or concept of journeying, information about an itinerary, philosophical or moralizing maxims, and claims about truth – all apparently Parmenidean – linked in various ways on several road signs or spatial markers in the later archaic and classical period offers us a valuable invitation to reassess aspects of Parmenides’ poem that critics have found confusing or simply ignored. The second point, which is perhaps even more consequential, concerns the implications we may draw from considering the techniques of archaic Greek road construction and the mechanics of travel these dictated for journeying by wheeled vehicle. More specifically, the archaic and classical Greek hodos for wheeled vehicles, a rut road that locked the vehicles that travelled on it into a prescribed track,
offered Parmenides a tremendously powerful conceptual resource. In Chapter 6 I shall examine the claim that one of Parmenides’ major undertakings is to articulate some means of ‘reach[ing] toward a new notion of metaphysical or logical necessity’. Ultimately, I shall argue that invoking the image of the archaic Greek rut road (and the prescribed motion along a track that it entails) – now in the form of a *hodos dzēsios* that leads necessarily from point to point in sequence across the terrain of an argument – is one of Parmenides’ most important strategies for accomplishing this goal.

The erection of different kinds of road markers or road signs and the creation of a network of road signs and systems of organizing and systematizing travel by road seem to have occurred more or less during Parmenides’ lifetime. These developments should be viewed in relation to processes of territorial consolidation and the monumentalization of architecture occurring in the same years, but that is not an argument against keeping them in mind as we read Parmenides’ poem. Just the opposite. If his was a time when space, by virtue of being incorporated into the framework of the *polis* and its ritual, political, and economic linkages, became increasingly measured, marked, signed, controlled, ordered, regularized, and systematized, what better model could he have found to impose order on discursive space than a *hodos dzēsios*: the route, journey, or road of inquiry?

1.2 The Semantics of the word *hodos*

We have seen, then, what a *hodos* was in archaic Greece. But what did the Greeks mean by the word *hodos*? The main aim of this section is to map out the relevant portions of this word’s semantic field in Homer.

This task is pertinent to our understanding of Parmenides on three counts. The first concerns the polysemous nature of the word *hodos*. As is increasingly recognized, Parmenides had a subtle but devastating talent for wordplay more generally, and for capitalizing on linguistic ambiguities of precisely this sort more

62 Mourelatos (2008b) 40.
The study undertaken in this section will help us appreciate how central this technique was to Parmenides’ rhetorical and poetic – that is, meaning-making – strategies. Recognizing that Parmenides’ central, programmatic word *hodos* has two distinct meanings is thus a matter of no small hermeneutic urgency. As we shall explore below, the word *hodos* can signify either a kind of physical object or a kind of activity. That the same word encompasses both senses offers Parmenides a resource he exploits with virtuosic skill; the effect, of enormous importance to his project, is to yoke together both senses, each of which offers him something crucial and distinctive, and to harness their combined power in the service of mediating a new concept of the nature of thinking and knowing. It is strategies like this that help Parmenides wring the most power out of the linguistic tools available to him, the better to think new thoughts in and through old words.\(^{64}\)

This urgency deepens when we take into account what the two specific meanings of the word *hodos* are. The second point concerns the value of the first meaning of *hodos* to Parmenides’ purposes. As we shall explore in Section 1.2.1, when the word *hodos* signifies an object, this is often an object of the sort discussed in Section 1.1, namely, a road suitable for wheeled traffic. As we saw, once one sets out on such a road, one is committed to follow it until it ends; wheels locked in the ruts, one cannot swerve, deviate, or circle back from the prescribed path. As we shall examine in Chapter 6, this provides Parmenides with a crucial – and, to date, entirely unobserved and unexamined – resource for groping towards a primordial articulation of what would come to be called logical necessity.

Similarly, the third point concerns the value of the second meaning of *hodos* to Parmenides’ larger endeavour. As we shall discuss in Section 1.2.2, when the word *hodos* signifies an activity, it is something intrinsically teleological, something, that is, inherently directed towards a terminal destination and a conclusive goal. This basic fact of the meaning of *hodos* imparts

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\(^{63}\) See Introduction, n. 28 above.

\(^{64}\) See again Introduction, 1.4 and nn. 60 and 61 for discussion of Mourelatos’s arguments and their importance.
a distinctive conceptual footprint to Parmenides’ *hodos dizēsios*. The significance of this conceptual footprint must be evaluated in light of the third feature common to Parmenides’ argument and the paradigm of demonstration that evolves from it identified by Lloyd: that both proceed to an inescapable conclusion.\(^{65}\) In short, the inescapability comes from the sense of a *hodos* as an object, the conclusiveness from the sense of *hodos* as an activity. These are topics we shall take up more fully in Chapter 6; in this chapter, I merely lay the groundwork for the analysis to be undertaken there.

I have elsewhere conducted a more comprehensive study of the semantics of road-related words in Homer.\(^{66}\) There, I discuss at greater length the framework I shall assume below; this centres on the distinction between a sense of *hodos* that denotes an object, and another that denotes an activity. We shall examine each in turn.

### 1.2.1 The hodos as an Object

In contrast to *keleuthoi*, which (in the plural) are paths of some kind, usually through the sea or the heavens, and thus generally part of the natural constitution of the world, the *hodos* as an object is almost invariably part of the *built* landscape,\(^ {67}\) generally speaking, a *hodos* is constructed.\(^ {68}\) When Nestor first proposes that the Achaeans build the wall guarding their ships, he ends by singling out the importance of building gates into this wall (*Ilac 7.340*):

\[\dot{\delta}φρα \deltaι\′ \alphaυτά\omegaν \ιτππηλασίη \οδός \ει.\]

*So that through them there might be a road suitable for horse-drawn vehicles.*\(^ {69}\)

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\(^{65}\) See Introduction, 2 and n. 12.

\(^{66}\) See Folit-Weinberg (forthcoming, 2022).

\(^{67}\) See Folit-Weinberg (forthcoming, 2022) for the difference between a *hodos* and *keleuthoi*.

\(^{68}\) Though need not necessarily be. Becker’s observation that ‘*hodos* is the street’s “superordinate concept” [übergeordneter]’ (Becker (1937) 20) is shrewd; he is here referring to *agwa*, but the point seems to hold for the whole lexicon of overland routes, paths, tracks, streets, etc., not all of which will have been built. See also *LfgrE* s.v. *hodos*.

\(^{69}\) See Wilcox (1976) ad loc., for the optative. For this rendition of ιτππηλασίη see e.g. *DELG* s.v. *elaunô*, Cunliffe.
This is not a throw-away phrase; the line is repeated when the Achaeans do, in fact, complete these gates a hundred lines later (*Il. 7.439*). The product of deliberate foreplanning and laborious construction (as we are reminded when Apollo undoes all this fine work in an instant; cf. *Il. 15.355–58, Il. 15.260–61*), this ἵππειασή ὁδός provides an illuminating point of contrast to a functionally similar entity, one that also takes horse-drawn vehicles from one side of the Achaean fortifications to the other – the passage ‘bridged’ by Apollo in *Iliad* 15. The former is the product of planned, organized construction, the latter an ad hoc creation produced in an instant and by a foot, stemming from the exigencies of the moment. The first is a *hodos*, the second a *keleuthos*.

Connected to this notion of constructedness is a sense of purposiveness: a *hodos* is constructed to serve a purpose, and one more enduring than the momentary demand of siege logistics. As the phrase ἵππειασή ὁδός suggests, adjectives or adjectival phrases modifying the *hodos* as an object often refer to the kind of traffic the *hodos* is intended to support. The association with wheeled traffic is particularly notable. Revealing here is the fateful road Odysseus’ men take en route to the palace of the Laestrygonians, along which they encounter the daughter of the local king and queen. In the event, we are told (*Od. 10.103–04*):

οἱ δ᾽ ἱσαν ἐκβάντες λείην ὁδόν, ἣ περ ἀμοβαί
ἀστυθ᾽ ἀφ᾽ υψῆλῶν ὄρεῶν καταγίνεον ὕλην.

They disembarked and travelled along a smooth *hodos*, on which wagons often bore timber down to the city from the high mountains. Compare this with the *keleuthos* that Apollo promises Hector he will ‘smooth’ (*λεαίνω*, *Il. 15.261*) before the Trojan advance. Where that *keleuthos* was provisional, the Laestrygonians’ ‘smooth road’ has been constructed for a specific purpose within the framework of what appears to be a larger pattern of usage (note the imperfect καταγίνεον), one that is presumably related to a regular need for timber. Also related to the *hamaxa* is, of

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70 See e.g. the concluding remarks of Bouchet (2006).
71 In Attica several of the oldest rut roads are those serving the marble quarries in Mount Pentelicon and the silver mines in Laurium; for these, see Young (1956) and Goette (2002). On the importance of vehicles servicing sites of this sort, and thus the need for
course, the ὁμάξιτος. While the precise role it plays in the course of Hector’s flight from Achilles in Iliad 22 is not entirely clear,\(^72\) that the word itself, originally (and usually) an adjective modifying hodos, means ‘carriageable’, ‘able to be traversed by a hamaxa’, is clear.\(^73\)

The benefit and level of sophistication of the hodos as a ‘carriageway’ becomes obvious in the neat contrast between the Laestrygonian road and an image we find in a simile depicting Menelaus and Meriones as they labour to drag the body of Patroclus from the field (Il. 17.742–44):

\[
\text{ὅς θ᾽ ἡμῖνοι κρατερὸν μένος ἁμφιβαλόντες}
\text{ἐλκὼς ἐξ ἄρεος κατὰ παπαλόεσσαν ἀταρπόν}
\text{ἡ δοκὴν ἦ ἐν δόρῳ μέγα νήμιον...}
\]

And as when mules, straining with all their might,
Drag out of the mountain heights along a rocky beaten track
A beam or great ship-timber . . .

Making do with a mere atarpos – a ‘beaten track’ of the rugged sort that Odysseus will have to take through wooded country and steep terrain to get from the sea-level harbour to Eumaeus’ hut inland (τρηχεῖαν ἀταρπόν | χῶρον ἁν ὑλῆεντα δι᾽ ἄκριας (Od. 14.1–2))\(^74\) – the mules struggle mightily just to bring one beam down from the mountain; on the Laestrygonian road, one may bring it down by the wagonload.\(^75\)

Similarly, we may contrast the level of construction and sophistication associated with both the Laestrygonian wagon hodos and the ἵππηλασίη ὁδὸς through the gates in the Achaean wall with one

specially constructed roadways affording passage to these wheeled vehicles, see Burford (1960), Crouwel (1992).

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\(^{72}\) See Bouchet (2006) for extended discussion.

\(^{73}\) For analysis and sources of the etymology, see Bouchet (2006) 276 n. 18; Lolos (2003) 142–43 for (mostly much) later sources.

\(^{74}\) The country road from Eumaeus’ hut to the fountain where Melanthius is encountered is referred to as both a παπαλόεσσα ὁδὸς (Od. 17.204) and an ἄταρπος (Od. 17.234); see Lolos (2003) 150–51. Herodotus uses the word for Ephialtes’ path over Mount Callidromon (7.212, 213, 215), as does Thucydides (4.363). Contra Becker (1937) 35, it seems more useful to see the contrast as one of functionality as much as level of construction: an atarpi(itt)os would then be a road that is not accessible by wheeled vehicle, though it may well be passable by means other than foot (e.g. mule).

\(^{75}\) Regarding the width of the atarpos, Edwards (1991) ad 742–43 notes: ‘the beam is clearly dragged behind the mules, not slung between them’.
of the very few Homeric examples of overland *keleuthoi*. After the embassy to Achilles in *Iliad* 9 proves fruitless, Agamemnon and Menelaus confer in the dead of night and decide to summon the Greek chieftains to a midnight council. Having settled who will go to rouse whom, Menelaus asks whether he should return to Agamemnon or stay with Ajax and Idomeneus, whom he is to visit; Agamemnon replies that the latter makes more sense, lest they miss each other in the course of their errands (*Il.* 10.66):

πολλαὶ γὰρ ἀνὰ στρατόν εἰσι κέλευθοι.

For many are the *keleuthoi* up and down the camp.

In contrast to the very limited number of specially constructed, carriageable *hodoi* communicating the Greek camp with the Trojan plain or serving as a landmark in *Iliad* 22, these seem to be merely ways of getting through the camp between the tents and the ships, ways of passage that take on a kind of object residue by being used repeatedly and habitually.\(^\text{76}\)

The contrast between the ‘many *keleuthoi*’ through the camp and the single ‘smooth *hodos*’ in the land of the Laestrygonians or three ‘*hodoi* suitable for wheeled traffic’ penetrating the Achaean wall (if we imagine one per gate, and three gates) is neatly exemplified in the simile used to describe Ajax as he leaps from ship to ship to fend off the Trojan advance (*Il.* 15.679–84):\(^\text{77}\)

\[\text{ὡς δ᾽ ὅτ᾽ ἀνήρ ἵπποισι κελητίζειν ἐὰν εἰδῶς,}
\[\text{ὅς τ᾽ ἐπεὶ ἐκ πολέων πίσυρας συναεῖρεται ἵππους,}
\[\text{σέας ἐκ πεδίου μέγα προτὶ ἄστυ δίηται}
\[\text{λαοφόροι καθ᾽ ὄδόν πολέες τὲ ἐπὶ θηραστὸ}
\[\text{ἀνέρες ἡδὲ γυναῖκες ὁ δ᾽ ἐμπεδὸν ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ}
\[\text{θρόσκων ἄλλοτ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλον ἄμειβεται, σὰ δὲ πέτονται...}

And as when a man who knows well the art of leaping from horse to horse, Having yoked together four choice horses, Speeding from the plain to the great city, drives Along the main thoroughfare: and crowds marvel at him,

\[\text{76} \text{Kahn adduces this sentence in support of his claims regarding *keleuthoi* of night and day; see Kahn (2009a) 113. The contested status of *Iliad* 10 is perhaps not without consequence here.}\]

\[\text{77} \text{See Bouchet (2006) for the relationship between a *hamaxitos* and a *laophoros hodos*, particularly in the Iliadic context.}\]
Men and women alike, as he keeps leaping, safe and steady,
Now to this horse, now to that one, while the stallions fly on . . .

The juxtaposition of the ‘many keleuthoi’ through the camp with the single λαοφόρος ὁ δός is telling. In the first case, in the absence of any of the limitations imposed by the need to construct a more sophisticated hodos, the number of keleuthoi available for use proliferate to such an extent that even two individuals who are expressly seeking each other may nevertheless fail to happen upon one another. By contrast, there being but a single route along which to transport one’s team of yoked horses (or Laestrygonian timber, or Trojan wagons), the attention of the many men and women who live along the λαοφόρος ὁ δός is concentrated on the single location of the road. In short, the hodos as an object signifies something that is generally constructed, built for a purpose, and, as a result, able to accommodate heavier traffic – especially, in contrast with the atarp(it)os, wheeled vehicles.

1.2.2 The hodos as an Activity

The word hodos also signifies a kind of activity. In Homer, no verb – and no cluster of words – is more closely associated with the word hodos used in this sense than those derived from τέλος, ‘end’. Such verbs take hodos as a direct object three times and are used passively with hodos as the patient subject twice more.

Closely related to this is the fact that, unlike the word keleuthos, which often appears in the middle of an episode of travel, the word hodos (especially when paired with a verb derived from τέλος) often appears either before the journey in question has occurred or after its completion. The first pairing in the Odyssey between hodos and a verb derived from τέλος takes place early, in the debate in the Ithacan agora, and provides an excellent example. Telemachus’ proposal to raise a news-gathering expedition is met with scorn by Leocritus, who suggests that Telemachus will never get around to leaving Ithaca and so ‘will never accomplish the hodos’ he wishes to undertake (τελέει δ’ ὁ δὸν οὐ ποτε ταύτην, Od. 2.256). After
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Telemachus does, in fact, embark on just the journey in question, Antinous remarks (*Od.* 4.663–64):

> ὡ πότοι, ἥ μέγα ἔργον ὑπερφιάλως ἔτελεσθη. Ἑπεμάχῳ ὁδὸς ἤδει φάμεν δὲ οἱ οὐ τελέσθαι.

For shame! A great deed, this *hodos*, was accomplished
For Telemachus, and outrageously so: and we said that it
would not be accomplished for him.

The completion of the return leg of this journey – despite the
suitors’ attempted ambush – occasions a virtually identical out-

The same pattern of usage – namely, a verb derived from τέλος
taking *hodos* as its object at the precise moment the journey
emerges as a totality, either just before it has begun or upon its
completion – characterizes Odysseus’ journeys as well as
Telemachus’. When Odysseus appeals to Circe to launch him on
his voyage home from Aeaea (*Od.* 10.483–84):

> ὡ Κίρκη, τέλσόν μοι ὑπόσχεσιν ἧν περ ὑπέστης,
>  ὁἰκάδε πεμψέμεναι...

Circe, fulfil for me the promise that you made
To guide me home...

she responds, using the verb *teleo* as a pivot (*Od.* 10.491):

> ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλην χρή πρῶτον ὁδὸν τελέσαι.

But first you must complete another journey.

At the moment when Odysseus and his men are so close to
completing their *nostos* that they descry Ithaca’s hearth fires, we
find this pairing again. That their journey is to all intents and
purposes finished is precisely the concern, for what his crewmates
lament is that, because the journey is essentially over, they will
have no further opportunity to gain the spoils of war or collect gifts
from abroad – as Aeolus’ bag of winds makes it seem Odysseus
has (*Od.* 10.41–42):

> ἡμεῖς δ’ αὐτὲ ὁμὴν ὁδὸν ἐκτελέσαντες
>  οἴκαδε νισσόμεθα κενεάς σὺν χείρας ἔχοντες.
But we, who have completed to the end the very same journey, 
Return home empty-handed.

In sum, we may observe two things. First, the *hodos* as an activity-like concept is something that one can ‘complete’, ‘accomplish’, ‘fulfil’. Second, that it is just at the moments when one views a journey as a single, unified project to be undertaken (viewed prospectively) or already essentially completed (viewed retrospectively) that one discusses a *hodos* and does so in terms expressed by verbs derived from *τέλος*.

The association between the word *hodos* and words derived from *τέλος* is not limited to the relationship between verb and patient. When Athena encourages Telemachus in the aftermath of the agora debate, she claims that, just as his father, Odysseus (Od. 2.272–73),

οἶς κεῖνος ἐνν τελέσαι ἔργον τε ἔπος τε
οὐ τοι ἐπειδ' ἀλὴν ὅδος ἔσσεται οὐδ' ἀτέλεστος.

Was such a man who accomplished his word and deed, 
So then your *hodos* will not be vain or unfulfilled.

Athena’s assimilation of ‘accomplishing’ something – an *ergon*, an *epos* – to a *hodos* that is not ‘vain’ or ‘unfulfilled’ reveals another aspect of this meaning of *hodos*. The adjectives ἀλὴν and ἀτέλεστος represent a key cluster of modifiers associated with the *hodos* as an activity-like concept in the *Odyssey*. These feature most prominently in the discussions surrounding Telemachus’ journey. In a reprise of the debate in the agora, the suitors respond to his proposed *hodos* with the same contempt displayed by Leocritus; this time, Telemachus stands his ground, declaring (Od. 2.318):

ἐίμι μὲν, οὐδ' ἀλὴν ὅδος ἔσσεται ἢν ἀγορεύω.

But indeed I shall go, nor will the *hodos* of which I speak be vain.

Not long after he completes the first leg of the journey in question, another authority figure, this time Nestor, urges Telemachus onwards

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78 See e.g. Holwerda (1963), Waanders (1983).
79 The other alludes to the length (Od. 17.426) or difficulty (Od. 3.288, 14.235) – or both (Od. 4.393, 4.484) – of a *hodos*.
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by invoking the same notion, in this case the spectre of a τηύσιῃ ὁδός, a ‘fruitless *hodos*’, that must be avoided (*Od.* 3.316 = *Od.* 15.13; Athena delivers the second admonition). Closely related, then, to the notion of accomplishing, completing, fulfilling a *hodos* is a concern with the *hodos* that is potentially ἀτέλεστος, ἀλή, or τηύσιῃ, ‘unfulfilled, fruitless’, ‘vain’, ‘useless’.

The sense mobilized here extends beyond a journey that is simply un unfinished or incomplete – one that somehow terminated before its scheduled point of conclusion – to suggest that a notion of purposiveness is inherent in the words these adjectives modify; an ‘unfulfilled’ *hodos* would not be one that is merely unfinished, but one that fails to fulfil or accomplish its purpose. The point can be expressed in two possible ways. The more modest claim is that, just as ‘a stone can be sightless but not blind’ (for ‘to be blind requires that one be in the sight game’), so in order for a *hodos* to be ἀτέλεστος, ἀλή, τηύσιῃ, ‘unaccomplished, fruitless’, ‘vain’, ‘useless’, it would have to be in the ‘accomplishment’, ‘fruitfulness’, or ‘usefulness’ game to begin with. A *hodos*, then, would be a notion with just such a nature that it is susceptible to predications involving the notion of purposiveness. Second, given the frequency with which the predications in question are made, we could push the point further and say that not only is purposiveness an inherent aspect of the notion of a *hodos* as an activity-like concept, but it is one of the aspects of this notion emphasized most prominently in Homeric usage.

Moreover, specific purposes are frequently attributed to this or that *hodos* used as an activity-like concept. This is most commonly expressed via a verb of motion used in conjunction with a future participle. In fact, a number of the passages we have reviewed do precisely this. Exemplary again is the rest of Circe’s reply to Odysseus when the latter asks her to ‘fulfil her promise’ (*Od.* 10.491–94):

*άλλ’ άλλην χρή πρότον ὄδόν τελέσαι καὶ ικέσθαι εἰς Αἴδαο δόμους καὶ ἑπανῆς Περσεφονείης, ψυχῇ χρησμένους Θηβαίου Τειρεσίαο, μάντηος ἀλασοῦ, τοῦ τε φρένες ἐμπεδοί εἴσι*

But you must first complete another hodos and come
To the house of Hades and dread Persephone
In order to receive a prophecy from the spirit of Theban Tiresias,
The blind seer, whose wits abide steadfast.

We shall see in other passages below how frequently the ‘verb of motion + future participle’ construction appears alongside the word hodos. While the nexus of adjectives identified above demonstrates the intrinsic relationship between the hodos as an activity-like concept and a sense of purposiveness more generally, this sense is often rendered explicit by the use of grammatical constructions that specify a particular purpose associated with a particular hodos.

Similarly, the word hodos is often accompanied by a pair of lexical items: the spatial affix -δε and the preposition εἰς, both of which identify a clear spatial goal or destination.81 When Odysseus calls on Circe to ‘fulfil her promise to him’ (τέλεσόν μοι ύπόσχεσιν ήν περ ύπέστης, Od. 10.483) this promise consists in ‘guiding (me) homewards’ (οἶκαςε πεμψέμεναι, Od. 10.484). Her response, we saw, redirects this hodos towards another destination: to the underworld (Od. 10.491). For his part, Odysseus casts this sense of destinationality into sharp relief by echoing Circe’s line initial εἰς Ἀίδος, again emphasizing the destination (Od. 10.501–02):

ὢ Κίρκη, τίς γάρ ταύτην όδόν ἡγεμονεύει;  
εἰς Ἀιδός δʼ οὐ πιῶ τις ἀφίκετο νημελαίη.

O Circe, who will guide us on this hodos? 
To Hades no man has ever yet travelled in a black ship.

This exchange mirrors the opening scene of the Telemachy proper. There, too, a female divinity proleptically narrates to another member of the House of Laertes a hodos that he ought to accomplish,82 in this case, of course, it is Athena, disguised as Mentor, who sets the poem’s plot in motion by addressing Telemachus as follows (Od. 1.279–90):

81 See e.g. Smyth 1588, 1589, Smyth 1680a, for -δε and εἰς + accusative, respectively.
82 As the narrator will refer to the itinerary delineated by Athena (Od. 1.444): βούλευε φρειαίν ἥσιν όδόν τήν πέφραδ’ Ἀθήνη. (‘So Telemachus was pondering in his mind the hodos Athena had made manifest to him.’)
But for yourself, I shall counsel you shrewdly, and hope you will listen. Fit out a ship with twenty oars, the best you can come by. And depart for the purpose of asking about your father, who is so long absent . . . First go to Pylos, and there question the great Nestor, And from there go to Sparta to see fair-haired Menelaus, Since he came home last of all the bronze-armoured Achaeans . . . But if you should hear that he has perished and no longer lives, Then return home to your beloved native land.

Just as Circe’s hodos was to the house of Hades and dread Persephone in order to consult the spirit of Tiresias, so Athena spells out a clear itinerary: first to Pylos to talk to Nestor, then to Sparta to Menelaus, and finally back to Ithaca (and, again, in the service a clearly defined goal – gathering news about Odysseus – designated through the same purpose construction). Characteristic of the discourse of the hodos is the appearance of place-names-cum-destinations tagged with the local, direction-indicating lexemes -δε and εἰς. Whether one is completing a hodos, narrating a hodos, or guiding someone else’s hodos, in the Odyssey the hodos in question is a hodos to somewhere.83

It may prove useful at this juncture to introduce a pair of distinctions from the linguistic analysis of verbal aspect and philosophical analysis of action: that between the perfective and imperfective, and between events and processes, respectively.84 Introducing these terms is an act of bricolage, not engineering; these two dichotomies provide models from which we may usefully draw inspiration, and I wish to stress that they are to be understood here as serving a purely provisional, heuristic role.

83 See also Mourelatos (2008b) 19.
Verbal aspects are ‘different ways of viewing the internal temporal constituency of a situation’. The fundamental distinction in the domain of aspect is between the so-called perfective and imperfective. The perfective ‘presents the totality of the situation referred to’, which is to say that ‘the situation is presented as a single . . . whole’; the perfective aspect can therefore be said to depict the situation ‘from the outside’. The imperfective ‘make[s] explicit reference to the internal temporal constituency of the situation’; it may therefore be said to look at the situation ‘from the inside’.  

The aptness with which this description of the perfective can be applied to the relationship between the word hodos and verbs derived from τέλος is evident. In the situations discussed – Telemachus’ proposal in the agora; the suitors’ dismay at his departure for, and then successful return from, the mainland; the resentment of Odysseus’ crewmates as Ithaca hoves into view – there is no interest in the internal dynamics, phenomenological experience, or series of individual actions that make up the hodos discussed. Instead, the emphasis falls on the journey understood as a ‘single whole’ presented ‘in totality’ and viewed, whether after the fact or before it, ‘from the outside’.  

Second, we observed that in the cases where verbs derived from τέλος are involved, the hodos in question is yet to be embarked upon or has already been completed (or virtually so). This is a phenomenon that holds more generally across nearly all uses of the word hodos as activity-like concept; if aspect matters, so, too, does tense. Notably common is the relationship between the hodos and the future tense. The exchange between Odysseus and Circe is again exemplary. Odysseus responds to Circe’s injunction to ‘accomplish another hodos’ by asking (Od. 10.503):

Comrie (1976) 3; see Comrie (1976) 3 n. 1 for further discussion.

The place of what is usually referred to as the ‘perfect’ (to be distinguished from the ‘perfective’, one half of the dichotomy ‘perfective/imperfective’) in this schema is a fraught topic; see Comrie (1976) 5–6.

Comrie (1976) 3.

Comrie (1976) 4.

This is in stark contrast to passages where the word keleuthos features; there, the focus is emphatically on the ‘inside’ of the action, the attendant range of experiences, details, and sensations that comprise the process of travelling a keleuthos. See Folit-Weinberg (forthcoming, 2022).
The pairing of this particular verb with *hodos* as its object is also characteristic; on two other occasions we find characters who volunteer to provide just this service. Another common pairing sees *hodos* stand with a future form of ἐἱμί or one of its compounds. Fresh from the Ithacan agora, Athena reassures Telemachus (*Od. 2.272*):

οὐ τοι ἐπειθ’ ἀλή ὁδὸς ἔσσεται οὐδ’ ἀτέλεστος . . .

Nor will this *hodos* be vain or unfulfilled for you . . .

and repeats this encouragement, retracing the arc of ring-composed exhortation (*Od. 2.285*):

σοί δ’ ὁδὸς οὐκέτι δηρὸν ἀπέσσεται . . .

Not for long will this journey remain absent for you . . .

Laodamas, the impertinent Phaeacian nobleman who challenges Odysseus to try his hand at the discus, repeats the claim verbatim (*Od. 8.150*): the future journey to be taken from Ithaca to the mainland, or from Scheria to Ithaca, lies ahead of each pair of interlocutors, both of whom view it ‘from the outside’, as a ‘totality’ and a ‘single whole’.

It is not enough, however, to observe that a *hodos* presents a journey in its totality as a single whole as if ‘from the outside’. As the persistent linkage with words derived from τέλος suggests and the affiliation with the complex of adjectives, the purpose construction, and the directional indicators -δε and εἰς confirm, the single whole the *hodos* represents is teleological. That is to say, *it is constituted in relation to an end* – an end-as-destination and an end-as-purpose. As we have seen, a *hodos* is a *hodos* to somewhere in particular, a *hodos* one travels for a purpose.

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90 At *Od. 6.261*, Nausicaa concludes her interview with Odysseus with ἐγὼ δ’ ὁδὸν ἰγμονεύσω, while at *Od. 7.30* Athena appears in disguise to proffer the very same assistance. See also Mourelatos (2008) 18–21.

91 See here Porzig (1942) 306–07.

92 Cf. also: *ll. 9.43, Od. 2.318* (discussed above), *Od. 12.57*. By contrast, the word *keleuthos* arrives at just the moment when the activity of travelling it denotes is placed before our eyes as an act in progress; see again Folit-Weinberg (forthcoming, 2022).
One element of the definition of ‘perfective’ given above can be examined further in relation to the ‘activity-like concept’ sense of _hodos_: this is the claim that the perfective presents a situation in totality as a single whole ‘without reference to its internal temporal constituency’. In fact, as we shall explore at much greater length in chapters 3 and 4, the _hodos_ as an activity-like concept is intimately concerned with the internal structure of the single whole it presents; it is simply interested in this internal structure in a way that differs markedly from the depiction of the ‘internal temporal constituency’ effected by _keleuthos_. Introducing the second distinction, between ‘events’ and ‘processes’, can explain this difference more precisely.

The distinction emerges at the intersection of linguistics and philosophy. At its modern base is the Kenny–Vendler classification of what may be referred to as ‘situations’ (Figure 1.1). Here it may be useful to present the schema with examples.

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93 Mourelatos’s modifications are designed to take into account the full bundle of factors involved in a predication, rather than the Kenny–Vendler analysis of ‘verb-type’: Mourelatos (1981) 421. The Kenny–Vendler typology is usually portrayed as consisting of ‘states’, ‘activities’, ‘accomplishments’, and ‘achievements’.

94 Examples culled from Mourelatos (1978) 415 and Graham (1980) 119. Because I am interested in ‘actions’ (undertaken by human or divine agents) rather than the ontologically broader ‘occurrences’ (including events or processes occurring in the natural world), I retain the Kenny–Vendler framework and designations, with the exception of ‘process’ for ‘activity’ (despite Mourelatos (1993)). Thompson (2008), a landmark in Roads: Words and Things

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![Figure 1.1 Modified Kenny–Vendler typology](https://www.cambridge.org/core/core/terms.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/BD8F6DD0BCF2CF25A05977546BEFB87D)
What is crucial here is the distinction between ‘processes’ and ‘events’ (and ultimately between ‘processes’ and ‘accomplishments’). Unlike processes, events are ‘telic’; that is, they ‘have the fuller integration implied by the posit of reaching a goal or giving closure to a process’.  

‘Events’ can be further split into ‘accomplishments’ and ‘achievements’, distinguished by whether or not the action ‘is conceived of as lasting a certain period of time’. While achievements ‘capture either the inception or the climax of an act’ but ‘cannot in themselves occur over or throughout a temporal stretch’, accomplishments ‘have duration intrinsically’. This combination of the durative and the telic, then – the fusion of ‘a process leading up to the terminal point as well as the terminal point’ – provides the essential qualities of the accomplishment. It also gives us an important insight into the power and capaciousness of the hodos as an activity-like concept to encompass a wide range of phenomena and experiences, processes and products within its basic conceptual framework.

There is one final distinction between ‘processes’ and ‘accomplishments’ that is relevant. Processes are ‘homogeneous’: ‘if “Jones is . . . running for half an hour,” then it must be true that “he is . . . running for every time stretch within that period”’. By contrast, accomplishments are ‘heterogeneous: “in case I wrote a letter in an hour, I did not write it, say, in the first quarter of the contemporary field of ‘action theory’, endorses Mourelatos (1978) and Mourelatos (1993) as fundamentally important.

Mourelatos (1993) 386. Put another way, events ‘involve a product, upshot, or outcome’ (Mourelatos (1978) 417). By contrast, processes are ‘essentially atelic’: ‘pushing-a-cart qualifies as an activity regardless of whether the cart is pushed to some destination’ (Mourelatos (1993) 386). It follows from this that we may say that ‘the time stretch of [processes] is inherently indefinite, for they involve no culmination or anticipated result’ (Mourelatos (1978) 416). Accordingly, per Comrie (1976) 44, processes ‘can be protracted indefinitely or broken off at any point’ in a way that events cannot; the classic illustration of this distinction points to the difference between, say, interrupted singing and interrupted house building: if I have been singing but am interrupted, I can still say, ‘I have sung’; but if I have been building a house and am interrupted, I cannot claim, ‘I have built a house’.

Comrie (1976) 41.

Mourelatos (1978) 416.

Comrie (1976) 47.

that hour”’. The homogeneity of processes can be assimilated to that of ‘mass terms’ (as opposed to ‘count terms’); ‘bottle’ and ‘necklace’ can be identified as discrete, countable items whereas ‘wine’ and ‘gold’ are mass terms, not discrete, countable items. Mass terms ‘generally do not have plural forms, or if they do there is a meaning shift: wines are types of wine’. Closely related to this is a difference in the nature of the structure or internal constitution of that which is denoted by the term in question: a bottle is not made up of other bottles nor a necklace of necklaces, in the way that gold is made up of more gold or wine of more wine.

We may take the second point first. Recalling that the hodos Athena ‘made manifest’ to Telemachus was defined by the sequence of destinations it encompassed (to Pylos, then Sparta, then back home) and the purpose for which it was undertaken, we may speak of the hodos as being concerned with the inner constitution of the journey to be taken understood as a whole, the series of distinct and identifiable items that together constitute the skeleton of the route. Likewise, Leocritus uses the word hodos when he casts doubt on Telemachus’ fundamental ability to undertake the journey (i.e. as a whole) at all. What is at issue for Telemachus at this stage is not where he ought to go or mustering the will to do so (he has already received Athena’s instructions and pep talk), but rather mustering the specific means to get from point A to point B (Od. 2.212–13):

άλλ’ ἀγε μοι δότε νῆα θοήν καὶ εἰκοσ’ ἐταίρους,
οἳ κέ μοι ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα διαπρήσσωσι κέλευθον.

But come, grant me a swift ship and twenty companions
Who can effect my passage from here to there.

The ensuing discussion in the agora concerning the itinerary and the journey-as-a-whole sees the word hodos used repeatedly (five times in 200-odd lines, one of the highest concentrations of the word hodos in the course of Homer), but the actual setting sail and the sailing itself is twice referred to as a keleuthos. In short, when the actual process of travelling is in question, the word keleuthos is

used; when the structure of the route or the entirety of the journey is in question, we find the word *hodos*.

### 1.2 The Semantics of the word *hodos*

There is a fundamental distinction between two senses of the word *hodos* in Homer: one denotes (a) an object, and the other (b) an activity. Understood as an object (a), a *hodos* is usually a built road, one that passes over land and often supports wheeled traffic (i.e. a ‘rut road’). One of its primary referents is the object discussed in Section 1.1 above – the rut-road *hodos* that leads those who travel upon it, wheels locked into the track, unyieldingly, inexorably, necessarily, from a point of origin to a prescribed destination. Understood as an activity (b), a *hodos*, like the perfective (the form often taken by verbs that govern *hodos* used in this sense), looks at the notion of the journey ‘from the outside’, that is ‘as a single, unified whole’. Moreover, the Homeric *hodos* activity is an ‘accomplishment’ – an activity with intrinsic duration but one linked with a clear end, an end which we have seen is an end not only in time (in the sense of closure or finality), but in space (in relation to a terminal destination) and also in relation to a goal or purpose (in the sense of accomplishment or fulfilment). We find *hodos* used in this sense where the emphasis is on the structural framework of the journey *qua* unified whole. Fundamental to the Homeric use of the word *hodos* in its sense as an activity is its very close ties to a range of lexical items indicating destinationality and purposiveness. The *hodos* as an activity, that is to say, is marked by a strong sense of teleology: a *hodos* is always a *hodos* to somewhere, undertaken for a purpose.

Looking forward to Parmenides, these distinctions bear heavily on his use of language and the resonance of the imagery he evokes. Scholars have largely failed to appreciate the complex semantics of the Homeric language in which Parmenides composes his verse, as if he were already writing a treatise in the notation of today’s formal logic and not composing a poem in dactylic hexameter. When Parmenides fashions his sequence of deductive arguments as a *hodos* of inquiry, we should understand this to mean travelling...
a hodos (b) along a hodos (a): a journey to a conclusion undertaken for the purpose of gaining knowledge along a kind of inexorable rut road inscribed into the terrain it crosses. We shall explore what exactly this means for Parmenides, his notion of what we would call logical necessity, and the shape of his hodos of inquiry in Chapter 6.
The mid- to late sixth century into which Parmenides was born was a time of profound changes that touched nearly every aspect of society, from poetry to politics, architecture to astronomy, economics to epistemology.\(^1\) During this period and in the decades before it, new settlements, including Parmenides’ own Elea,

\(^1\) Parmenides’ dates are notoriously controversial. The two main possibilities for his birth are 544–541 or c. 515 BCE, and in many ways the question comes down to whether one finds greater reason to doubt the timeline provided by Diogenes Laertius (9.21–23), likely on the authority of Apollodorus (see e.g. Cordero (2004) 5–6 and footnotes), or Plato in his *Parmenides* (esp. 127a–c).

One can undermine the historical accuracy of both sources with unnerving ease. As has been pointed out, the earlier date creates a suspiciously tidy chronology of events related to Parmenides; thus his birth would coincide neatly with the foundation of Elea and the *floruit* of Xenophanes, and his own *floruit* precisely with Zeno’s birth; see e.g. Burnet (1930) 170; Coxon (2009) 40; Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (2007) 240.

On the other hand, if one takes Plato to be a virtuoso dramatist, it is tempting to see motives other than strict historical accuracy behind his account. Plato clearly has much to gain from staging a contest between, for example, a young Socrates, who presents a well-developed Theory of Forms (something which should in itself make us suspicious), and the venerable old master who critiques it; as has been observed (see e.g. Mansfeld (1990) 64–68 and esp. Cordero (2004) 5–8), it is attractive to see Plato as undertaking a (philosophically Parmenidean) revision of his own Theory of Forms by ventriloquizing his self-criticism through the suitably august figure of Parmenides. What is more, the precision of Plato’s dating need not imply, as Guthrie had it, that Plato ‘had no reason to give such exact information about their ages unless he knew it to be correct’ (Guthrie (1965) 2); as Thanassas, who observes that such precise datings are more or less unparalleled in the Platonic corpus, suggests, ‘the reverse is actually the case: Plato would have had no reason to provide such trivial details unless he wanted to present as credible something that in reality could not have taken place’ (Thanassas (2007) 10 n. 5). There are of course other instances where Plato’s dates are notably unreliable; in *Timaeus* 20d, Solon is presented as twenty to thirty years younger than is possible; see Untersteiner (1958) 19.

Finally, scholars of archaic poetry have also found the earlier date attractive for reasons entirely unrelated to doubts about the strict historicity of Plato’s account; see here D’Alessio (1995), whose primary interest is Pindar’s relationship to Parmenides. Another striking feature of this debate is that some of those who plump for the later date, including West (1983) and West (2011b), still date Parmenides’ poem to about 490 BCE on the premise that the figure of the *kouros* is autobiographical and the poem composed shortly after the event it describes. Conversely, if one is inclined to doubt Plato’s dating, but sees in the *kouros* nothing more than a literary construction, one easily ends up at a similar date of composition.
continued to spring up all around the Mediterranean and Black Sea;² Persian encroachments across the Greek east scattered westward Ionian refugees and their cultural and intellectual traditions; the monumental Greek temple as we know it was coming into its own.³ Prose was born;⁴ so was the map; so, too, was (non-alloyed) money.⁵ For the purposes of this chapter, however, one of the most important developments was the series of fundamental shifts that were playing out in the world of archaic poetry during this era, particularly concerning the social status and conceptualization of Homer. If sections 1.1 and 1.2 of the previous chapter located Parmenides in his physical environment and linguistic milieu, respectively, this chapter will in turn locate him in the world of late archaic poetry in which he worked.

Doing so yields three benefits. The first concerns Homer’s position of unparalleled cultural prominence and social prestige in Parmenides’ era. In recent decades, scholars have begun assembling a mosaic of evidence that suggests important changes during this time in how Homer and the poems attributed to him were conceptualized and how poets of the day interacted with him. By the late archaic period, thinking one’s social and aesthetic values, one’s views on the nature of knowledge and poetic craft through, against, or otherwise alongside Homer had become a widespread phenomenon. Moreover, when Parmenides was composing his poem, creative reappropriation of the Homeric poems was becoming an established habit. Just as we would miss something of deep importance were we to fail to appreciate the physical nature of the actual roads with which Parmenides and his audience would have been familiar, or were we to elide the semantic nuances of the road vocabulary that Parmenides makes central to his poem, so must we also grapple with how Parmenides fits into the dynamics that defined the relationship between late archaic poets and the epic poems they used and abused, adapted and critiqued. What, generally speaking, were other poets in Parmenides’ era doing?

⁴ Usually credited to Anaximander or Pherecydes of Syros. Notable discussions in e.g. Goldhill (2002), Kahn (2003), and Granger (2007); for Pherecydes, see Schibli (1990).

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Working and reworking Homer, and reworking Homer yet again. In this and subsequent chapters of this book, I unquestionably privilege Homer in my reading of Parmenides – perhaps, as scholars with other interpretative perspectives on Parmenides may argue, excessively so. But as scholars of late archaic poetry have recently demonstrated, and as I shall emphasize in this chapter, poets in the late archaic period accorded Homer a place of unusually exalted privilege. Accordingly, our understanding of Parmenides’ poem will benefit from incorporating the insights gained by recent scholarship on late archaic poetry generally, and the early reception of Homer more specifically. Put differently, my emphasis on reading Parmenides against Homer is simply a reflection of, and commensurate with, the level of cultural influence Homer had earned in Parmenides’ own time.6

Second, resituating Parmenides in his time and place will open up new perspectives on the precise nature of Parmenides’ engagements with Homer. As so often when discussing both archaic Greek poetry and ‘the Presocratics’, what appears normal or exceptional often depends on how we narrativize and periodize the development of individual thinkers and patterns of thought, poets and poetic traditions, and alongside whom we do, or do not, place the poet or thinker in question. When Parmenides is viewed not as a successor to Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, or Xenophanes, nor as a predecessor to Zeno, Melissus, Empedocles, or Plato (and, eventually, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Cynics, and, ultimately, as is not uncommon, Russell and Wittgenstein, or Heidegger and Derrida), but rather alongside his late archaic companions in verse such as Ibycus, Simonides, and Pindar, we get a different picture of important features of his poem. This is particularly true concerning his use of dactylic hexameter, the dramatic scenario of his proem, his epistemological orientations and aims, and key words, phrases, and lines in his proem and the ‘Route to Truth’.

This brings us to the third, and most consequential, point. Relocating Parmenides in his poetic context will help us

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6 Though I should emphasize that by no means do I wish to minimize the effect of other influences, much less to rule them out entirely; my interest lies in making the case for a significant interaction with Homer, rather than against the influence of others.
understand more precisely both the intellectual challenges he faced and the set of cultural and poetic resources he had at his disposal in facing them. Of central importance on this score is the extraordinary epistemological tumult of Parmenides’ era and the decades immediately preceding him. One key current in this epistemological fomentation is a poetic and intellectual tradition that runs from Hesiod by way of Xenophanes, two thinkers with whom scholars have often seen Parmenides engaging.\(^7\) I shall thus begin this chapter by building on recent scholarship on this theme to outline the poetic and intellectual state of play that Parmenides would have inherited from these poet-thinkers, and the precise challenges their work would have presented him. Framing the discussion this way does not, however, mean we should understand this Hesiodic-Xenophanean line of thinking as disconnected from the conception of, and engagement with, Homer that seems to have played such an important role in the late archaic poetry of Parmenides’ peers and near-contemporaries; rather we must be prepared to see how these two stories intersect and are intertwined. Thus, having proceeded by way of other examples of late and mid-to-late archaic engagements with Homer (especially in poems by Ibycus, Pindar, and Simonides) and the epistemological stakes at play in these engagements, I shall ultimately loop back to Parmenides’ place in the Hesiodic-Xenophanean tradition armed with fresh insights into Parmenides’ strategies for addressing the challenges this tradition presented.

To summarize: three strands of the backdrop to Parmenides must be examined. My argument in this chapter will be as follows. First, I shall set the stage by exploring the challenge to which Parmenides needed to respond and the larger epistemic framework within which he needed to work (in Section 2.1, ‘Hesiod’s Muses, Xenophanes’ Doubt’). Second, I shall look at the late archaic period’s interest in Homer, especially the Invocation of the Muses in \textit{Iliad} 2, and the

\(^7\) For Parmenides and Hesiod, see \textit{Introduction}, n. 80. One of the most important developments in Presocratic scholarship in the last few decades is the rehabilitation of Xenophanes’ reputation and the new perspectives this has opened on Parmenides’ work; see \textit{Introduction}, n. 15.
resources this provided Parmenides in meeting that challenge (in Section 2.2, ‘Archaic Receptions of Homer’). Third, I shall consider the larger epistemico-poetic milieu within which Parmenides would have been operating in order to appreciate more fully his response to the Hesiodic-Xenophanean tradition (in Section 2.3, ‘Poetics and Epistemology’). Finally, building on these three sections, I shall explore how Parmenides, finding himself in the situation described in the third section, deploys the resources explored in the second to overcome the challenge outlined in the first (in Section 2.4, ‘Parmenidean Strategies’).

2.1 Hesiod’s Muses, Xenophanes’ Doubt

The best way to establish the larger stakes at play in this chapter, then, is to consider Parmenides’ rather more well-established place in the poetic and intellectual tradition that begins with Hesiod and moves primarily by way of Xenophanes. Scholarship on this topic often centres on the infamous lines 27–28 of the Theogony. There the Olympian Muses, having withdrawn from their idyllic perch on ‘highest Helicon’ (Th. 25), quite literally condescend to address Hesiod while he tends his flocks in the human world below; underscoring his lowly status (Th. 26), they make the following declaration (Th. 27–28):

ἵδιμεν ψεύδεσα πολλά λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὀμοία,
ἵδιμεν δ’, εὐτ’ ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι.

We know how to compose many lies indistinguishable from things that are real,
And we know, when we wish, to pronounce things that are true.

Shaul Tor’s recent study Mortal and Divine in Early Greek Epistemology can help us make sense of the bewildering implications of these lines and the reams of scholarship that they have justifiably provoked. 8 One of the virtues of Tor’s analysis is that it

8 Tor (2017), with 61–103 devoted to Hesiod and an excellent discussion of lines Th. 27–28 at pp. 62–64. I will not attempt a bibliography of the vast discussion on these vexed lines, especially since a comprehensive, systematic account can be found at Tor (2017) 62–64, with extensive bibliography in the footnotes, of the ‘truths only’, ‘lying Muses’, and ‘ambiguous’ interpretations. I have also been influenced by Clay (2003) 49–80.
transcends the usual impasses – do Hesiod’s Muses lie to others but tell the truth to him, and, if so, does he gain knowledge from them? Do Hesiod’s Muses lie to him? Is there any way of knowing? – by reassessing the place of these lines in the Hesiodic corpus more generally. Seen from this perspective, Hesiod’s Muses are not staking out an epistemological position (that Hesiod’s Muses reject Homeric epic, for example, and authorize his own) but rather constructing an epistemological framework.  

This framework is premised on the idea that only by interacting with the divine is Hesiod’s poetry possible, and can be broken down into three parts.  

First (i) is the need to assess ‘what mortals and gods are like’, especially by attaining insight into the nature of ‘the epistemic capacities and limitations of mortals’; second (ii), as follows from the limitations of mortals established in the first point, ‘it is only through a special and privileged interaction with the divine that the mortal poet can produce potentially true (since divinely disclosed) accounts of matters that lie beyond human cognition’; finally (iii), ‘the mortal cannot know the truth-value of these accounts’.

There are two fundamental benefits to framing matters this way. First, of use both immediately and later in the chapter, this analysis allows for a concise comparison between the views of Hesiod, Xenophanes, and Parmenides. Following Hesiod, both Xenophanes and Parmenides agree on the importance of point (i). Xenophanes, however, rejects the possibility of point (ii), denying that mortals (poets or otherwise) ‘can produce potentially true (since divinely disclosed) accounts of matters that lie beyond human cognition’; Xenophanes also develops a particularly strong and explicit version of point (iii). This is an excellent starting point for discussing the intellectual state of play Parmenides would have inherited.

I express my gratitude to the author of Vogel (2019) for discussing this passage with me. For a different view, see e.g. Heiden (2007).

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10 Tor (2017) 64.
11 Tor (2017) 310; see Tor (2017) 83–93 for the Theogony, and pp. 97–103 for Works and Days and general conclusions.
12 Tor (2017) 310.
13 Tor (2017) 310–11.
Second, of value at the end of this chapter, this perspective helps liberate us from the old dichotomy between rationality and irrationality, between reasoning and divine disclosure. More specifically, we would no longer need to see an incompatibility between the terms that form these traditional dichotomies: the reasoning in Parmenides’ poem may be intimately related to, and indeed perhaps made possible by, the fact that it is divinely disclosed.\(^\text{14}\)

Xenophanes’ rejection of point (ii) and development of point (iii) are particularly apparent in Fragment 34:\(^\text{15}\)

\[
\text{καὶ τὸ μὲν οὐν σαφὲς οὕτως ἄνήρ ἴδεν οὐδὲ τις ἔσται}
\text{εἰδώς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων·}
\text{εἴ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένοι εἰπὼν,}
\text{αὐτὸς δὲ φῶς οὐκ οἶδε· δόκος δὲ ἐπί πᾶσι τέτυκται.}
\]

And indeed that which is clear and certain truth no man has seen
Nor will there be anyone who knows about the gods and what I say about all things;
For even if, in the best case, someone happened to speak just of what has been fulfilled [someone chanced to say the complete truth],
Still he himself would not know; but opinion/belief is allotted to all.

As has often been remarked, it is precisely the kind of poetic inspiration described in Homer’s famous Invocation of the Muses in \textit{Iliad} 2 that must be at least one of the main targets of Xenophanes’ critique;\(^\text{16}\) whatever the ambiguity embedded in Hesiod’s own poetic or theological epistemology, Xenophanes declares the hotline (or, no less importantly, the perceived and socially accredited hotline) to the Muses definitively severed. \textit{Dokos}, ‘opinion’ or ‘belief’, is the best that mortals ever get.\(^\text{17}\)

Considering matters from this perspective helps us more clearly take stock of the challenges facing Parmenides and the strategies

\(^\text{14}\) See Tor (2017) 10–60, esp. 10–19.
\(^\text{15}\) Translation mine, influenced by Tor (2017) 128–31; see Lesher (1992) 156–57, Tor (2013) 10 n. 23, Tor (2017) 128–29 and notes. See also Fragment 18.
\(^\text{16}\) See e.g. Lesher (1992); Mogyoródi (2006); Lesher (2008); Graziosi and Haubold (2009) 110; also Tor (2017) 130–31, in whose view Xenophanes targets primarily mantic and divinatory practices.
\(^\text{17}\) Though, as we shall discuss in Ch. 6 below, Fr. 18 does allow for a temporally extended process by which human understanding can be developed and improved.
he deploys to negotiate and overcome them, a question to which I shall return in the final movement of this chapter (‘Parmenidean Strategies’). We can now summarize Parmenides’ position vis-à-vis this strand of Hesiodic-Xenophanean thinking as follows. In the background stand two Hesiodic premises. Owing to the nature of god and man, truth (because divinely disclosed) can come only via an epistemically significant interaction with the divine; nevertheless, owing to the nature of mortals’ own limitations, they cannot be certain of the truth-value of the information they receive in this transaction with divinity. The view Parmenides would oppose is expressed by Xenophanes, who flatly denies the possibility of any unmediated disclosure from divinity, and forcefully underscores the inability of mortals to know the truth (as opposed to merely believing the claims at which they arrive in the course of their inquiries).  

In short, and setting the stage for this chapter’s final section, meeting the challenge that Xenophanes set down thus involves (a) effecting an encounter with a Muse-like divinity, that she may disclose truth, and (b) finding a way to abolish any doubt as to whether what has been disclosed actually is the truth. I shall return below to Parmenides’ strategies for meeting these challenges; in order to understand these strategies, however, it will first be necessary to examine aspects of the archaic reception of Homer (in the next section, ‘Archaic Receptions of Homer’) and the larger epistemic and poetic context in which Parmenides was working (Section 2.3, ‘Poetics and Epistemology’).

2.2 Archaic Receptions of Homer

As discussed above, with the exception of Havelock and Mourelatos, scholars have often been reluctant to read Parmenides alongside Homer. It is precisely, however, in Parmenides’ time that a revolution occurs in the way that Homer is conceptualized and, more pertinently here, that Homer ascends

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to the dominant cultural position with which we now associate him; one might even say that it is in this time that Homer first becomes inescapable.\textsuperscript{19} It is during this period that the name ‘Homeros’ first appears – not incidentally, in the mouths of critics like Xenophanes, who could proclaim that \(\varepsilon\xi\ \alpha\rho\chi\eta\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\theta\ "\'Ομηρον \ \epsilon\pi\epsilon\ \mu\epsilon\mu\alpha\theta\acute{\i}k\alpha\sigma\i\i\tau\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\acute{\epsilon}ς\ ('\text{from the beginning, all have learned from Homer'}', B10),\textsuperscript{20} or Heraclitus, for whom τόν τε Ὀμηρον ... άξιον ἐκ τῶν ἄγωνων ἐκβάλλεσθαι καὶ ῥατίζεσθαι (‘Homer deserves to be kicked out of the \(\alpha\gamma\omega\nu\epsilon\sigma\) and beaten with a stick’, B42).\textsuperscript{21} They would in due course be followed by, among others, Simonides, Pindar, and Bacchylides, though these often took a less acerbic tone.\textsuperscript{22} In the fragments of Stesichorus (like Parmenides, a western Greek),\textsuperscript{23} scholars now detect a level of detailed interaction with the \(\textit{Iliad}\) and the \(\textit{Odyssey}\) qualitatively different from anything that had come before, and \textit{recherché} enough in nature to suggest an intertextual engagement.\textsuperscript{24} In the \textit{Hymn to Apollo}, speculated by some to have been performed on Delos in 523/22 BCE,\textsuperscript{25} we see in the notorious boast concerning ‘a blind man, living in rocky Chios, all of whose songs are the best among posterity’ (\textit{H.Ap.} 172–73) the first surviving allusion to Homer as the ‘absolute classic’ he has been ever since.\textsuperscript{26} The


\textsuperscript{20} See also Xenoph. Fr. 11.

\textsuperscript{21} See also Heraclitus B 56. For the implications of these fragments from both Xenophanes and Heraclitus for our understanding of Homer, see esp. Burkert (2001) 45; Graziosi (2002) 57–60; Graziosi (2008) 28.


\textsuperscript{23} See discussions in Ercoles (2013) and Finglass and Davies (2014) 6–18 for Stesichorus’ dates and location.

\textsuperscript{24} See e.g. Burkert (2001) and Kelly (2015) (the adjective \textit{recherché} is his: p. 39); also, from a slightly different perspective, Carey (2015), esp. 54.

\textsuperscript{25} See Burkert (1979), esp. 54–58; Burkert (2001) 110–13, with bibliography on the debate at 110 n. 61; Janko (1982) 109–14; West (2011b) 241; see also further discussion below.

establishment of the Great Panathenaea and the institution of regular recitations of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* (also possibly in 522 BCE) has long been advanced as another seminal moment reflecting (or announcing) the canonicity of Homer, the stabilization of the Homeric text, or both.\(^\text{27}\) Perhaps his first out-and-out literary critic, the allegorist Theagenes of Rhegium (a *polis* not far from Elea)\(^\text{28}\) seems to date from around this time as well.\(^\text{29}\)

The tremendous impact of this shift on late archaic cultural production has been carefully examined in the last several decades. One particularly rich vein of this scholarship explores the relationship between Odysseus’ preamble to the Phaeacians at *Od*. 9.2–11, the so-called ‘Golden Verses’, and different kinds of late archaic poetry and thought, particularly in relation to the symposium.\(^\text{30}\) This is not the place to delve into this scholarship, but a few of its key findings, which encompass a range of late archaic poets and thinkers including Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Simonides, Bacchylides, and Pindar, may be listed here. One is that addressing the question of ‘what is finest’ that Odysseus broaches in *Od*. 9.2–11 became central to the process of self-fashioning in sympotic poetry and its associated cultural milieu.\(^\text{31}\) Another, notable in the context of Parmenides’ relationship to Homer, is that one strategy for answering this question successfully involved quoting, troping, recontextualizing, and reworking bits of the Homeric text.\(^\text{32}\) Finally, this in turn reveals the enormous cultural prestige attached to the lines of Homer; as

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\(^{27}\) The event is given a position of definitive importance by scholars who otherwise find little to agree on in matters Homeric, including e.g. *West* (1999); Janko (1998) 13; Janko (1992) 20–32; *Nagy* (1996a) 66–67; and *Cassio* (2002), esp. 115. See M. Finkelberg (2017) for an up-to-date discussion (with bibliography) of this large and contested topic.


Andrew Ford’s discussion of the citation of *Il. 6.146* in Simonides 19 (*IEG*) makes clear, these lines ‘draw their authority from being accepted as words said by Homer himself and not by another’. In sum, this strand of scholarship gives us a window onto a cultural milieu where chunks of Homeric text were a kind of precious metal that could be collected, beaten into new forms, recast with one’s own visage imprinted on the front, and put into circulation anew. Homerizing, that is, was rampant in the late archaic period.

These well-known points are worth recapitulating here for two reasons. First, my argument in subsequent chapters relies on Parmenides’ dealing with something like the *Odyssey* that we have now. I say ‘like’ because the core of the analysis I shall undertake below does not ultimately hinge on word-by-word intertextual readings. Nevertheless, there are many features shared by Parmenides’ poem and Homer’s text (particularly *Odyssey* 12, my main point of comparison in chapters 3–6) that do take place at the level of language; and since Parmenides, if he engaged with Homer’s *Odyssey* 12 word by word, line by line, would have had to have done so with some version of the *Odyssey*, I shall not shy away from presuming an intertextual relationship between the two poems at times to bolster my case. It is therefore very helpful – though again, in the last analysis, not absolutely necessary – to proceed on the basis that the *Odyssey* 12 that Parmenides would have encountered closely resembled the one we have at our disposal today.

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33 Ford (1997) 101. That is, should a unit of text be ‘adduced and accepted as Homer’s words’, it ‘demands attention in itself because of its source’. Notably, this presupposes some kind of fixed and canonical Homeric text.

34 Rather, I shall claim that certain elements of Parmenides’ poem – and, most importantly, its discursive architecture (discussed in Ch. 3) – are inherited from, and rework, *Odyssey* 12. See also discussion above in the ‘Aims’ section of the Introduction.

35 For claims that Stesichorus engaged with Homer in this way, see Kelly (2015), esp. 43. For a good discussion of evidence for Pindar’s literate engagement with Homer, see e.g. West (2011a) and Spelman (2018a) 101–110 with notes.

36 Incidentally, one could support this position equally well with an account of the Homeric poems’ influence that emphasized either a process of canonicity or a process of textualization, provided one accepted that by the late archaic period this process was already well underway. See Nagy (2014) for a good recent summary of his views; for criticism of Nagy and his school, see e.g. Janko (1998), Finkelberg (2000), Cassio (2002), Graziosi and Haubold (2015), and Ready (2017) 500–04, many of whom focus on increasing canonicity.
Second, that Homer was ascending to a place of unparalleled prestige in the late archaic era is a point that, as we have seen, has been severely underappreciated by scholars of Parmenides. Exploring what this widespread ‘Homerizing’ during the late archaic era meant for Parmenides’ contemporaries, and especially his fellow poets, will provide a crucial context for my own interpretation of Parmenides. With this background in mind, my next goal in this chapter will be to examine a specific example that demonstrates these dynamics at work in the late archaic era. In particular, a brief look at a series of receptions of Homer’s Invocation of the Muses from *Iliad* 12, in Ibycus’ so-called ‘Polycrates Ode’, Pindar’s *Paean* 6 and *Paean* 7b, and Simonides’ ‘Plataea Elegy’, will provide powerful evidence of the kind of detailed engagement with a Homeric text very much resembling our own that I think we should see in Parmenides’ poem (*Section 2.2.1*, ‘Invoking the Muse(s)’). 37 On the other hand, juxtaposing the overlaps between Solon’s so-called ‘Eunomia’ (3 G.-P.=4 W 2) and Homer and between Parmenides’ poem and Homer (*Section 2.2.2*, ‘Far from the Beaten Track of Men’), a brief digression from my larger argument, will also bring into sharp focus aspects of Parmenides’ poem that have often been acknowledged but are not always discussed at the length they deserve.

### 2.2.1 Invoking the Muse(s)

“Ἔσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι Ὁλύμπια δῶματ’ ἐξουσαι —
ὢμεῖς γάρ θεαι ἐστε πάρεστε τε ἱστε τε πάντα,
ἡμεῖς δὲ κλέος οίον ἀκούομεν οὐδὲ τι ἴδμεν.

Tell me now, Muses, who dwell upon Olympus —
For you are goddesses, and are present and know everything,
While we hear only rumour, and know nothing.

37 Not coincidentally, Dr Henry Spelman has used these poems by Ibycus, Pindar, and Simonides as case studies for examining late archaic intertextual engagements with Homer; I am most grateful to Dr Spelman for sharing unpublished work with me, and commend to the reader his forthcoming publication on the topic, my debt to which will be very clear.
2.2 Archaic Receptions of Homer

So begins one of the most memorable and distinctive passages in the entire Homeric corpus, the Invocation of the Muses (Il. 2.484–93) that precedes the Catalogue of Ships (2.494–759).³⁸

Although it used to be commonly assumed that poets throughout the archaic period engaged with the Homeric poems in a detailed, textualized way, scholars now take a more cautious view regarding such early archaic poets as Archilochus, Mimnermus, and Alcman.³⁹ How best to assess the relationship between archaic poetry and Homeric epic remains one of the thornier problems occupying scholars of ancient Greek literature.⁴⁰ Even so, with Ibycus’ so-called ‘Polycrates Ode’, almost certain to have been written before Polycrates’ demise in 522 BCE (and perhaps dating from as early as c. 560 BCE),⁴¹ even sceptical scholars have found firmer ground upon which to posit an intertextual engagement with Homer.⁴² The Invocation of the Muses and Catalogue of Ships in Iliad 2 are widely agreed to be a major point of reference;⁴³ one finds Homeric resonances that run the gamut from Ibycus’ use of particles to his compressed treatment of the Catalogue of Ships.⁴⁴ Most pertinently here, as in the Invocation of the Muses, Ibycus juxtaposes the limited capabilities of the mortal poet to the superior powers of the Muses.⁴⁵

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³⁸ For the distinctive features of the ten-line invocation, see esp. Krischer (1965) and de Jong (1987).
³⁹ See comments in e.g. West (1999) and Kelly (2015) for Mimnermus, Swift (2012) and Swift (2019) – where further bibliography can be found – for Archilochus.
⁴⁰ For a summary of the current state of play, see e.g. Kelly (2015) and Currie (2016), esp. 33–36.
⁴¹ For the possibility of the early date, see Wilkinson (2013) 8–12, esp. 12. For a date between the late 530s and 522 BCE, see Hutchinson (2001), esp. 231–32, and Hutchinson (2001) 257–59; for an extended discussion of Ibycus’ dates in general, see Hutchinson (2001) 228–35.
⁴² Notable here are the remarks of Fowler (1987) 36–37.
⁴⁴ See e.g. Budelmann (2018) 172.
⁴⁵ This is true whether one takes the first word of line 25 to be thnatos, as advocated by Hutchinson (2001) 244–46 and Wilkinson (2013) 71–73, or autos, as suggested by West (1966b) 152–53 and West (1975) 307. For further discussion, see Woodbury (1985) 197.
Similarly, Pindar’s *Paean* 6.50–61 and *Paean* 7b.10–20 seem to interact closely with the *Iliad’s* Invocation of the Muses. Here Pindar, too, mirrors specific features of the Invocation’s phraseology and grammar, especially in *Paean* 6.54–57. More notably here, in contrast to the omniscience attributed to the Muses, mortal men are in both cases expressly characterized by their fundamentally limited epistemic status. As Pindar puts it (*Paean* 6.51–53):

\[\ldots \tauαύτα θεοίσα \[\text{μ]\έν πιθείν σοφο[ς]\ δυνατόν, βροτοίσιν \delta\' \text{ἀμάχανο[νεύ]ρέμεν}. . . \]

\[. . . \text{It is possible for the gods}
To persuade wise men of these things,
But for mortals there is no means to discover them. . . \]

n. 10; also Hardie (2013) 10 n. 2. Following Wilkinson (2013) 50–52, the key portion of the text is (lines 23–26):

\[\ldots \text{καὶ τὰ μὲν \[\text{σμ]}\άναι \varepsilon\υ \text{Ἐλεκωνίδ[έ]}\ισ] \varepsilon\μβαιν \varepsilon\λόγω[ι, \text{θυσισμὰς}] \varepsilon\δ' \text{φο[ς]} \text{κ[ερ] άνὴρ διερ[έ]σ . . .]. τὰ ἐκαστα εἴποι. . . \]

These things the skilled Heliconian Muses could embark upon (?) in speech well, but no living mortal man (?) could tell every detail . . .


47 If one accepts SM ii, 27–32, *Paean* 6.54–55, ἵστε \[\text{δ]\τι[λ], \text{Μοῖσαι, | πάντα is a clear echo of ἵστε τε \text{πάντα (Il. 2.485). Spelman (n. 37) will provide a detailed analysis of this point, and also grammatical similarities; for a different view on how to punctuate *Paean* 6.54–57, see Rutherford (2001a) 300 n. 13.}

48 See for now Woodbury (1985) 197–98 for a comparison of these four passages.

49 Following Rutherford (2001a) 299. The antecedent of *tauta* in line 51 is missing; though supplements have proliferated, what is required of Pindar is to recount an episode from the mythical past, and it is to this – be that the episode itself, or the labour of telling it – that *tauta* almost certainly refers; what is at stake in both cases is the accuracy of the account that follows.
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Similar dynamics define the scenario in Paean 7b.15–20.50 Scholars have also found much in Simonides’ so-called ‘Plataea Elegy’ that echoes the Invocation of the Muses and the Catalogue of Ships, especially in different aspects of its apparent sequence and structure.51 Most saliently for the present discussion, much of the oblique reference to Homer in lines 15–18 seems to be a summary of the Invocation of the Muses (15–17).52

οἴσιν ἐπ’ ἄθανατον κέχυται κλέος ἄνδρός ἔκητι
ὅς τερ’ ἵπποικάμων δέξατο Πιερίδ[ων] πᾶσαν ἀληθείν.

On them [sc. ‘the Danaan leaders in battle’ (14)] immortal kleos has been poured by the will of a man
Who received from the violet-tressed Pierians
The entire truth.

As e.g. West (2011a) does, I follow the text of Rutherford (2001a) 243–45:

ἐ]πεύχο[μαι] δ’ Όυρανοῦ τ’ ἔμπεπλωθ θυγατρί
τ]υφλο[ί γάρ] ἀνδρῶν φρένες,
ὁ στις ἀνευθ’ Ἐλικωνιάδῶν
βαθείαν ε…[.]….ο[ν] ἐρευνάι σοφίας ὑδόν.

I pray to the well-robed daughter of Uranus,
Mnemosyne, and her girls
To provide a resource.
For blind are the minds of men
Whoever without the Heliconians
. . . seeks out the deep path of wisdom.


Text from West (1993). The supplement πᾶσαν ἀληθείν, offered by Parsons in the editio princeps, is widely (though not universally) accepted.
The foregoing cases, however briefly sketched, provide a programmatic set of examples supporting the view that in the late archaic period, poets working across a range of genres, from elegy to epinician to the paean, were engaged in a deep and fine-grained way with what seems to be a fixed text of Homer that resembled our own. More specifically, *Iliad* 2’s Invocation of the Muses, one of the very few places in Homer where the poet/narrator *does* identify himself (or herself) in the first person and speak directly in his (or her) own voice, seems to have been an object of unusual fascination for poets in this period. We shall return to this point in the final section of this chapter (‘Parmenidean Strategies’).

### 2.2.2 *Far from the Beaten Track of Men*

First, however, it will be beneficial to entertain a brief digression contrasting Parmenides’ relationship to Homer with that of Solon’s so-called ‘Eunomia’ (3 G.-P.\(^2 = 4\) W\(^2\)) to *Od*. 9.2–11. Most pertinent are lines 7–10:

> δήμου θ’ ἡ γεμόνων ἀδίκος νόος, οἷς ἐτοίμου
> ὑβριστὸς ἐκ μεγάλης ἁγίας πολλὰ παθεῖν
> οὐ γὰρ ἐπιστάωται κατέχειν κόρον οὐδὲ παροῦσας
> εὐφροσύνας κοσμεῖν δαιτὸς ἐν ἡμική.

And unjust is the *noos*\(^{55}\) of the leaders of the *dēmos*, and they are certain

To suffer many woes from their great *hybris*:

For they do not know how to restrain excess, nor

To conduct in an orderly and peaceful manner the festivities of the banquet at hand.

It is not possible to pin down the precise relationship between Solon’s poem and the *Odyssey* with much confidence.\(^{56}\) Be that as it may, the breadth and depth of this poem’s parallels with *Od*. 9.2–11 justify its inclusion in this discussion, as does the

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54 Translation adapted from Gerber (1999) 113.
56 See n. 30 above for scholarship on the larger question of the relationship between elegy and Homer.
striking way this handful of lines presents many of the paradigmatic items of vocabulary and concerns of elegiac poetry. As Odysseus establishes links between *euphrosynē* (*Od*. 9.6), the *dēmos* (*Od*. 9.6), and the orderliness of the banqueters (*hēmenoi hekseiēs*, *Od*. 9.8), so Solon’s poem links these elements in their absence from the disorderly city (cf. ll. 9–10). In both cases, the feast and feast-like setting of the symposium frame reflections on man’s place in the world in respect to material abundance, good governance, society at large, and the question of justice more broadly.

In this, the relationship between these portions of the *Odyssey* and Solon’s ‘Eunomia’ (however we should understand it) provides a striking point of contrast with Parmenides. Too often, perhaps, we are in a hurry to pinpoint – or litigate – connections between passages of archaic poetry and Homer, rather than considering which specific portions of Homer may be connected to these passages – and, most importantly, why.

The similarities between Odysseus’ observations at the well-laid table of Alcinous and its negative image in the perverted feasts of the suitors and the disorderly tables of Solon’s city in turmoil are in every sense a world apart from Parmenides’ poem. This also suggests an important contrast between Parmenides’ poem and the genre of elegy of which Solon’s is so fine a specimen. With the heroic feast and the institution of the symposium, we arrive at the heart of archaic sites of reflection on well-ordered forms of human society and right relations between men. Unlike epic, elegy takes place not in the distant past of heroes but in the time of men; a common topic is the history of the symposiasts’ *polis*, and recounting this in the elite, aristocratic setting of the symposium consolidates a shared class identity by emphasizing the basis on which it is asserted.

One could hardly think of a topic or set of concerns more remote from Parmenides’ sphere of interest. His poem is precisely not grounded in the time of men; unlike elegiac poetry, its theme has precisely nothing to with the common past of any specific class, or any particular polis, its history, foundation myths and common heroes, or collective identity. In fact, a considerable portion of the proem’s labours are dedicated to distinguishing the nature and context of the poem as emphatically as possible from the world of men in which the civically oriented poetry of the sympotic or ‘historical’ elegists is embedded. If the city is mentioned (Fr. 1.3), it is left behind immediately, from the opening lines of the proem, the poem is located ‘far from the beaten track of men’ (ἀπ’ ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου, Fr. 1.27). Similarly, if any question concerning man’s fate arises in the proem, this is only for it to be dismissed quickly by the divinity into whose protective custody the kouros is taken (e.g. Fr. 1.26, where it is announced that no ‘evil fate’ [μοῖρα κακή] has brought the kouros this far). Similarly, Parmenides’ poem is untouched by words of, for example, the semantic fields of hybris (cf. ‘Eunomia’ 8), euphrosynē (cf. ‘Eunomia’ 9), the atē family, habrosynē, or any of the other terms used so ubiquitously in elegy to invoke the just calibration of cause and effect, behaviour and consequence, action and outcome. Parmenides’ grand but static Dike guards the entrance to the goddesses’ transcendental Beyond, her agency restricted to the domain of guardswoman and gatekeeper (Fr. 1.14–17) – a far cry from the vast supervisory and regulatory power she is arrogated by Solon, for example. Though the greeting between goddess and mortal is warm, we find no hint of

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60 Also noted by Nightingale (2007) 191, who addresses a similar nexus of topics in classical philosophy in Nightingale (2004). In light of Parmenides’ influence on Plato, and thus, at least indirectly, later thinkers, I consider the following paragraphs to have major implications for the later tradition that Nightingale (2004) examines; many aspects of the conceptual footprint of philosophic theoria that Plato develops would seem to be a very clear Parmenidean legacy.

61 For the textual crux at Fr. 1.3, see e.g. Coxon (2009) [1986], Lesher (1994b), Cosgrove (2011), Palmer (2009) 376–78, where further discussion and bibliography can be found, also Ch. 5, n. 8 below.

2.2 Archaic Receptions of Homer

feasting, the drinking of wine, or anything that hints at symportic practice or culture. Similarly, there can be no question of the right relations between man and his city, or even man and his fellow man, for it is precisely to leave behind the world of men that the proem marshals its resources. Considering the portions of the Odyssey that archaic poets found useful for articulating their perspectives (or at least resembled when they did so) dramatically underscores that, by contrast, the world of Parmenides’ poem is a world specifically devoid of other men and their institutions, their division of wealth, responsibility in war, or the prerogatives of high status in the social order.

Equally telling is the portion of the Odyssey with which Parmenides does engage. This, too, can be found in the stories Odysseus embarks upon in his speech to Alcinous: the first half of Odyssey 12, at just the moment when Odysseus finally prepares to depart from Circe’s never-never island paradise (to be discussed below in Chapter 4). As scholars have pointed out, this episode in many respects represents a climax of the fairy-tale ambience of the Apologoi, the Elsewhere par excellence against which the Odyssey articulates its conception of normal human relationships. Arguably, no portion of Homer stands more aloof from the polis and its metonyms than this divine fantasy.

The inverse point can also be made. Though we are very largely dependent here on what the trash heaps of Egypt disgorge, the evidence we do have suggests that the Circe episode does not seem to have been tremendously popular in the archaic era. Nor does the existing inventory of pottery (again, a regrettably fragmentary source of evidence) suggest that artists working in other media were more enthusiastic. This, too, is instructive. It is not difficult to discern why this passage should have held such little allure for elegiac poets at the same time as Parmenides found it so attractive, just as the reverse is true for Od. 9.2–11.

63 See Ch. 5 n. 35 below for the significance of the hand gesture, which echoes an interaction between divinities and a mortal, not mortals and mortal, in Homer.
64 See chs. 5 and 6 below for an extended discussion of the similarities between Parmenides’ poem and Odyssey 12.
66 Of course, we must be wary here of the ‘what you see is what there is’ fallacy discussed by Kelly (2015).
A similar set of points can also be made about Parmenides’ engagement with Hesiod. Scholars of elegiac poetry have a long history of examining the importance of Hesiod for elegiac poets. As the ‘Golden Verses’ of the Odyssey and other scenes from the world of mortals, such as Odysseus’ interactions with the wicked suitors, provided an appealing intertextual opportunity to reflect on the social order and the nature of justice human and divine, so it is Hesiod’s Works and Days that accounts for the lion’s share of archaic elegy’s engagements with Hesiod.

The Hesiod we find in Parmenides, however, is not the stern moralist of the Works and Days but the Muse-sponsored conduit of facts about the cosmos we find in the Theogony. In the proem especially, scholars have observed a number of striking intertextual links between Parmenides and Hesiod. As has been much discussed, lines 1.11–20 of Parmenides’ proem contain many points of contact with Theogony 736–66, where Hesiod describes the ‘great bronze threshold’ that leads to the Underworld. The Hesiod that interests Parmenides, and whose words and images he reworks, is the Hesiod who sings the birth of gods and the structure of the cosmos, not the poet of well-tilled soil and the righteous hearth. What place could a discussion of an Iron Age, or a jeremiad lamenting its arrival, have in Parmenides’ poem?

2.3 Poetics and Epistemology

Homerizing, then, was a widespread phenomenon in the time of Parmenides, but Parmenides’ engagements with Homer are

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67 For Parmenides and Hesiod, see n. 8 above.
68 In addition to such classics as Jaeger (1966), see more recently Koning (2010), Hunter (2014), and Stamatapollou (2017).
69 Jaeger (1948) 93: ‘That we need consider only the Theogony as Parmenides’ model, and need not concern ourselves with the Works and Days, is evident upon closer comparison.’
70 See Section 2.4.2, ‘Whose Muse’, below.
distinctive in ways that bring into sharp focus defining features of his poem. As we move now towards the larger stakes involved in Parmenides’ relationship to Homer, it is important to put the foregoing discussion of the importance of *Iliad* 2 for late archaic moments in its broader social and intellectual context. Of central importance will be the question of what kind of claim to truth – and made by whom – would have been possible in Parmenides’ time.

We discussed above the powerful currents of epistemological change, driven in part by thinkers such as Xenophanes, that swept through the mid- to late archaic world.\(^\text{72}\) Into this world of changing knowledge entered a dizzying array of new men, each staking their claim to wisdom and the truth – statesman-sages, cosmologists, mythographers, physicians, as well as diviners, prophets, seers, and other clairvoyants claiming insight into the will of the gods.\(^\text{73}\) Alongside these social and political developments, the more widespread advent of writing, as well as an increasingly pervasive process of the Panhellenization of myth, may well have resulted in the proliferation of incompatible versions of the same myths, whose differences, now being fixed in writing for comparison, were more conspicuous.\(^\text{74}\) In short, Parmenides was born into a time of radical epistemological fomentation.

The various late archaic echoes of the Invocation of the Muses examined above provide a fascinating glimpse (albeit through the distinctive lens of poetry) into this changing conceptualization of knowledge by allowing us to trace the shifting contours of the relationship between poet and Muse. One way to tell the story of these shifting contours requires us to set matters against the backdrop of epic (or at least Homeric epic) as characterized by, and itself embodying, a maximalist conception of truth and

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\(^\text{72}\) See esp. R. Osborne (1997), also Lloyd (1979), esp. 257–59; Lloyd (1987); and works cited in n. 73 below.

\(^\text{73}\) See, alongside Lloyd (1979) and Lloyd (1987) (and earlier classics such as Detienne (1996), Vernant (1982), and Vernant (2006g)), e.g. Kahn (2003); Dillery (2005); and, Granger (2007) 406–11. The point will also be discussed with reference to Xenophanes in Chapter 6 below.

\(^\text{74}\) Scodel (2001), esp. 125. For a detailed study of this question in regard to Pindar, see West (2011a). As he concludes: ‘Pindar acknowledges that these poetic sources have an authority that he cannot simply ignore but must re-evaluate by insight into the nature of the tradition’ (p. 67). Scodel is responding in part to Nagy (1990b) 52–81. See also Finkelberg (1998) 166–67 and Thomas (1992) 115.
truthfulness. Scholars have developed this conception through a variety of rubrics, which include a ‘poetics of truth’, complemented in turn by a ‘rhetoric of traditionality’ (and, alongside this, a ‘rhetoric of universality’ and a ‘rhetoric of indifference’), grounded in part within a ‘semblance of fixity’ of epic language and its status as ‘special speech’, and the ‘traditional referentiality’ characteristic of bardic practice.75

According to the notion of a poetics of truth, the Muses are understood very literally to be eyewitnesses who have first-hand knowledge of the events to be narrated, and they convey these accurately, completely, and unproblematically to the bard via divine inspiration; he in turn acts as their mouthpiece, transmitting the information the Muses have witnessed first-hand directly through his song.76 This poetics of truth is expressed through, and supported and complemented by, the rhetorical stances characteristic of Homeric epic listed above.77 These stances have been discussed partly in terms of epic’s general reluctance to foreground the persona of the poet. If the poet’s persona is often introduced for the purpose of establishing a relationship with a specific audience, keeping the individual singer out of the picture allows epic to preserve a ‘notional equidistance from all audiences’;78 by eliding their own presence, bards also emphasize that the song derives directly from the Muses. What is more, any new innovations to the story are added as subtly and discreetly as possible, and are even referred to as if they were already common


76 See esp. Finkelberg (1998) 68–73. (Put differently, ‘for Homer, everything in poetry is truth’: Finkelberg (1998) 73.) As she observes, the seriousness with which we should take the idea that the Muses were conceived of as literal eyewitnesses is underscored by the way Hesiod and other theologians handled the issue of describing affairs that occurred before the Muses themselves were born (p. 72). See also e.g. Ford (1992) 80–82; Thomas (1992) 115; Pratt (1993); also discussed in Granger (2007), but with problems – see below.


78 Griffiths (1983) 44; Graziosi and Haubold (2009) 107. This also ensures that what the poet says can be trusted, since it has not been distorted by the pressures of tailoring the story told to this or that specific audience and its social demands (viz. it adheres to a rhetorics of indifference’; see Scodel (2002) 65–89, esp. 70–73). See esp. Nagy (1990b) 52–81, esp. 68–69, for a discussion of this question in terms of rejecting the local and epichoric in favour of the Panhellenic.

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The effect is immeasurably heightened for being expressed in the special repertoire of epithets, patronymics, and other formulae that make epic ‘special speech’ and, along with type scenes, familiar tropes, and plot points that are encompassed by the notion of epic traditional referentiality.

If parts of this argument draw heavily on the Invocation of the Muses in *Iliad* 2, this picture of the relationship between bard, Muse, and truth contrasts notably with the relationship to the Muses fashioned in the late archaic poems that, we have seen above, were indebted to this purple passage of the *Iliad*. Remarkably, in his ‘Ode to Polycrates’, Ibycus styles his Muses σεσοφισμέναι, ‘practical, technically skilled/clever’ (23). Questions of truth (or falsity, for that matter) are conspicuously absent from this poem; what matters in the ‘Polycrates Ode’ is precisely that which the poet of the *Iliad* suggests is inferior to the Muses’ knowledge (cf. *Il.* 2.485–6): kleos – who gets it, who gives it, and how (46–48). Simonides’ task in the ‘Plataea Elegy’, meanwhile, is not to transmit otherwise-unknowable information about the mythical past, but to transform the facts of a recent event into an account worthy of its magnitude. Accordingly, the poet, who asks his Muse to serve as epikouros, a ‘(foreign) auxiliary’ (21), designates her share in the poetic labour as ‘preparing the charming adornment of our song’ (μελίφρονα κόσμον ἀοίδης | ἠμετέρητης, 23–24). Both poets allude to *Iliad* 2 to draw pointed contrasts that highlight the distinctiveness of their own themes, goals, and modes of expression from the Homeric predecessor whom they glorify at the same moment as they depart from him. Similarly, on the reconstruction of the texts currently favoured, in

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79 Scodel (2001) 111–12. As Scodel (2002) 88 points out, this practice ‘could not be sustained if other versions were directly available for comparison’. See also Scodel (2017); Graziosi and Haubold (2009) 107–08.

80 For the repertoires, see Kahane (1997), Bakker (1997); for special speech, see Bakker (2005); for traditional referentiality, see esp. Foley (1991) and Foley (1999).


82 For what is at stake in lines 46–48, see esp. Goldhill (1991) 117–19; for a different view, see Spelman (2018a).

83 See Aloni (2001), esp. 95; Stehle (2001); Obbink (2001); Rutherford (2001b).

84 For an intriguing comparison with Parmenides Fr. 8.53, see Rutherford (2001b) 46.

85 See in this vein Barron (1969), Woodbury (1985), and Steiner (2005).
**Paean** 6 and especially 7b, engagement with Homer becomes a site for Pindar to radically refashion his poetic persona.\(^86\) The Invocation of the Muses in *Iliad* 2 seems to have offered later poets a powerful site for expressing claims about their social function and status as poets, articulating their aesthetic and epistemological positions, and crafting their own poetic identities.

This perspective accords with a popular view concerning Pindar’s epinicians. As in the case of praising a living patron, or valorizing in song a recent battle of great importance, celebrating a victor and his recent victory would seem to require no recourse to an apparatus of truth-telling – the fact of the victory is self-evident, the accuracy of what is being reported for celebration hardly in question. Even when he recounts myths, however, nowhere in the large corpus of his surviving epinicians does Pindar claim recourse to the Muses to vouchsafe the veracity of the account he provides.\(^87\) Rather, not dissimilar to what we have seen Ibycus and Simonides do, Pindar appeals to them on matters concerning the beauty and propriety of his songs.\(^88\) The late archaic Muses of Ibycus, Simonides, and Pindar’s epinicians cut rather a different set of figures from their epic sisters, more honey-voiced technicians or arbiters of propriety than guarantors of truth; their aegis bears the sign of poetic craft and social decorum, not epistemological absolutism.

\(^86\) See esp. D’Alessio (1995) 178–81; 170; Rutherford (2001a) 248–49 (who bases his argument on content, not form); and, from a slightly different angle, Stamatopoulou (2017) 45–47. D’Alessio’s interpretation of Pindar’s relationship to Homer would take on an ironic cast in light of the relationship between Parmenides and Homer that I propose below. As I shall argue, Parmenides responds to an epistemological crisis, precipitated in part by those who reject Homer as an authoritative source of truth, by – among other things – returning to Homer’s epic hexameters, his use of mythical narrative (including specific Homeric dramatic scenarios), and his close relationship to the omniscient Muse(s); on D’Alessio’s view ((1992) 369–73; (1995) 178–180), it is precisely Homer’s verses that Pindar rejects. Parmenides is ‘far from the beaten track of men’ in that he rejects the answers offered by e.g. his Milesian predecessors, or perhaps Xenophanes, and partly due to his conservatively rebellious return to Homer; the ‘beaten path’ Pindar travels far from, by contrast, would be none other than Homer’s own. This also highlights the importance of genre and the traditions in which each poet works; the trope by which one poet-thinker cloaks his return to Homer can just as easily be the trope another poet-thinker uses to reject him.

\(^87\) Scodel (2001); nor, for that matter, does he appeal to them regarding any other matter involving truthfulness.

2.3 Poetics and Epistemology

2.3.1 Diachronic Change or Generic Difference?

What does this imply for the epistemological milieu within which Parmenides would have been composing his verse? Answering this question depends in part on whether we see the differences between *Iliad* 2 and subsequent reworkings of it as the result of being products of different eras or of different genres.

The former case has found many advocates. It is easy to set the differences between Homer, and Ibycus, Simonides, and Pindar’s epinicians against the backdrop of the enormous ‘revolution in wisdom’ that took place during the archaic period, largely as a result of, and in turn partly as a cause of, the many different features cited in the opening paragraphs of this chapter and this section, respectively.\(^89\) Particularly pertinent would be the question of writing discussed above, whose effects we may already have observed in the discussion of Pindar’s *Paean* 6 and 7b.\(^90\) Thus ‘both Pindar and Hecataeus . . . faced with multiple and contradictory versions [of myths] . . . acknowledge the impossibility of believing everything the tradition has handed down . . . Pindar argues for his modifications, while Hecataeus expects the reader to share his understanding of what is likely’.\(^91\) On this view, Pindar ‘cannot use the Muse to support the truth of his claims, because poetry has already made claims that he wishes to reject’.\(^92\) That is to say, in the world of late archaic poetry, ‘[t]he Muses do not bear witness or take an oath. The poet must stand by his own words.’\(^93\)

Not long after Ruth Scodel, an expert on archaic poetry, concluded her study of Pindar’s epinicians with the remarks quoted above, a more philosophically oriented scholar could cite the paeans of the same poet to argue for quite a different story of epistemological change in the mid- to late archaic period; thus Herbert Granger claims that ‘Pindar never gives up his reliance on

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\(^89\) See nn. 2–5, 72–73 above.
\(^90\) See esp. n. 74 above.
\(^91\) Scodel (2001) 136. See also West’s study ‘Pindar as a Man of Letters’ in West (2011a) 66.
\(^93\) Scodel (2001) 124; the same holds true for other ostensibly truth-seeking and truth-recording endeavours, such as those undertaken by Hecataeus.
the Muses for truths that are difficult to get at’. The incompleteness of our evidence does not allow us to determine whether we should best understand a possible contrast between the Muse of Pindar’s epinicians and those of his paeans as a negative statement about the nature of the epinician – that, like the Muse of elegy, the epinician Muse is not there to be a conduit of truth – or a positive statement about the (Pindaric) paean, or perhaps both. With respect to *Paean* 6 and 7b, at any rate, it is hard to imagine that the holy nature of the performance setting and the poetic genre are not important. The speaker of *Paean* 6 begins by appealing, by Zeus, to ‘Golden Pytho, famed for seers’ (1–2), to welcome him, ‘a prophatas of the Pierians, famed in song’ (5–6) in the sacred time (5) of the Delphic *theoxenia* (cf. lines 60–61); this is not the occasion to entertain questions of fictionality, or lying Muses, or anything but the most sombre, most ardent commitment to the truth. One can see why an allusion to the most epistemically aspirational portion of all epic would be valuable.

Even so, the dynamic described by Scodel does not seem to be ameliorated. In fact, the contrary seems to be true – local legends surrounding the origins of the festival apparently create a conflict with the cyclic (i.e. ‘Homeric’) account, and it is precisely this which appears to precipitate Pindar’s appeal to the Muses in the first place – one needs to undertake major strategic manoeuvres if one is to convince the audience to trust an account that contravenes Homer’s. Even in this unusually sacred context, however, the best one can do is be persuaded by the Muses and, having been persuaded, persuade other men who, for their part, display (or

94 Granger (2007) 410; he cites the two paeans discussed above and a non-epinician fragment (Fr. 150 Maehler, also Bacchyl. Fr. 9.1–6).
97 One could extend the argument to the genre of paeans generally. What little consensus there is suggests that this is an important expression on behalf of society at large; see the slew of excellent studies on the topic since 1990, including Käppel (1992), esp. 13, 34, 62–66, 341–49; Schröder (1999), esp. 22–31; Rutherford (2001b), esp. 85–86, 183–185; Ford (2006). Useful, too, are these scholars’ reviews of each other’s work, including Rutherford (2001c) on Schröder, and Käppel (2002) on Rutherford; see also D’Alessio (1994) and D’Alessio (2000).
98 Rutherford (2001a), Kurke (2005); see n. 37 above.
prove?) their wisdom by being persuaded in turn. A similar dynamic appears to be in play in Paean 7b. There, the best the speaker can hope for from the Muses is a ‘resource’ or ‘facility’ to ‘seek the deep path of wisdom’ (18–20) – a far cry from the direct transmission of knowledge depicted in Iliad 2. The stakes of the matter are brought to the fore clearly in line 42: before introducing two alternative stories concerning the origins of Delos that are hard to reconcile, the speaker of the poem99 asks: τί πείσομα [ι]; (‘what will I believe?’).100 In the end, invoking the Muses cannot resolve the problem of impossibly accreted accounts (some of them in the authoritative name of Homer) or of incompatibilities between local and Panhellenic traditions; all it can do, especially when bolstered by the holiness of time, place, and rite, is endow with a special gravitas the ethical criteria or political motivations that have shaped the poet’s account.101 On this view, that is, the Muses are a strategy for coping with poetic belatedness and the narrative overdetermination that would be one of its primary symptoms; and, as the question at Paean 7b.42 emphasizes – ‘what will I believe?’ – it is a strategy with clear limits.

If anything, then, the examples of Paeans 6 and 7b seem to reveal precisely the limitations of the poet’s recourse to the Muses as guarantors of truth, even in a setting where getting the story right would be a matter of the utmost significance. Even in a poetic genre of direct appeal to a divinity at that divinity’s holy festival, truth is not transmitted directly from the all-knowing Muse but, rather, in the face of multiple and contradictory accounts and with no means to discover it (βροτοῖ σιν δ’ ἀμάχαινο[ν εὔ]ρέμεν), wise men must be persuaded, that they may in turn persuade others. Whatever μαχανία (Paean 7b.18, cf. Paean 6.53) one manages to

100 One alternative, involving an attempted rape by Zeus, the speaker quickly deems incredible (ἐπιστά με], line 45); other details gesturing to another story – one that stands at odds with key portions of the Hymn to Apollo – are then asserted, some of them, it would seem, simply on the poet’s own authority. See Rutherford (1988) 68–70 and Rutherford (2001a) 250–52 for analysis of Pindar’s accounts vis-à-vis the Homeric Hymn to Apollo. Just how difficult it is to reconcile the different versions presented by Pindar and the Hymn to Apollo is up for debate; see e.g. Rutherford (2001a) 252 and n. 37 above (also pertinent for other matters in this paragraph).
101 See e.g. Scodel (2001) 133.
get from the Muses, and however one understands this term, the relationship between man and Muse is plainly far more mediated and circuitous than in *Iliad* 2.

More challenging to a strictly diachronic account, according to which a ‘poetics of truth’ was ‘superseded’ by a poetics of some other kind, may be the Homeric Hymns, and especially the *Hymn to Apollo*. The dating of this poem is of course contested, though it is notable that three heavyweights of twentieth-century classical scholarship should converge on an account that would see portions of the *Hymn to Apollo* dated to Parmenides’ lifetime, or merely a handful of years before his birth. As with Pindar’s *Paean* 6 and Delphi, if one envisions a performance in 523/22 on Delos, are we really to expect that a poem dedicated to the god at a grand festival celebrating him on his own holy isle is best understood within the frame of a ‘poetics of fiction’? This is a doubtful proposition. However clearly self-aware the poem is, and however cleverly the poet constructs, or fabricates, his own identity, in the end this is serious stuff; one can only assume its story was proposed, and intended to be received, as fact.

By the same token, the dynamics of divine interaction and poetic identity in the Homeric Hymns differ fundamentally from

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102 D’Alessio (1995) 170–71 observes the relationship between the εὐμαχανία for which Pindar appeals to the Muses (Pae. 7b.16–17, cf. Pae. 6.53) and the condition of ἀμηχανία that plagues mortals in Parm. Fr. 6.5 – in both cases, mortals are afflicted by blindness (τυφλοί at Parm. Fr. 6.7; τυφλός... at Pae. 7b.18) and struggle to find the correct *hodos*. See also Ranzato (2015) 128–29, 142 n. 56. Finally, some scholars reject that μαχανία has any epistemological valence; for Stamatopoulou (2017) 47, the term denotes poetic competence instead.

103 See esp. Rutherford (2000), and also Halliwell (2011), ch. 2. Interestingly, the Homeric Hymns are not discussed by Finkelberg or her critics, such as Rutherford or Halliwell. Burkert (1979) 62; Burkert (2001) 110–12; Janko (1982) 112–13; West (2003) 9–12; West (2011b) 241. See also Aloni (1989) and Aloni (1998) 65–78. It is striking to see West and Janko so closely in agreement, though they disagree on which portion came first (notably, others, including Clay (1989), assert that the poem was composed all at once; see Chappell (2011) for further discussion). Burkert (1979) 42 points out that the Delian portion of the poem presupposes the construction of a temple to Apollo and Delos, which has been dated to 540–530.

104 The more so if one accepts the view that the Homeric Hymns fill the gap between Hesiod’s *Theogony* and the age of heroes recounted in Homeric epic and that ‘[e]ach hymn describes an epoch-making moment in the mythic chronology of Olympus and, as such, inaugurates a new era in the divine and human cosmos’ (Clay (1989) 15). For a useful overview of scholarship on this topic, see Chappell (2011).

those in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. The Homeric Hymns begin with the speaker’s ‘I’ and close with a farewell to the divinity in the second person, thus ‘differentiat[ing] the hymn from epic recitation where the Muse is asked to sing and the speaker appears to submerge or meld his own voice with hers’.  

A hymn’s second-person parting salutation to the divinity hymned contrasts notably with the naming of the god in the third person in the standard opening of the hymns; over the course of a hymn itself, that is to say, the gap between human and divine has been bridged, the bard having ‘somehow precipitated an epiphany of the god’ in and through the very act of singing.  

Once again, attention to genre is critical. Where *Paean* 6 and the *Hymn to Apollo* both address the same god at a sacred festival hosted at one of his major hubs of worship, the dactylic hexameter of the hymn goes hand in hand with a far more immediate relationship not only to the divinity, but to truth; the epistemic complexity we find in *Paean* 6.50–58 and *Paean* 7b.15–20 only underscores the immediacy of access presumed – or indeed effected – by the hymn.  

However epistemically constrained a late archaic composer of paeans or epinicians might have been, a poet roughly contemporary with Parmenides could nevertheless still claim the kind of access to divinity presupposed by a poetics of truth – but only in the specific parameters of the hexameter Homeric hymn.  

There is one final consideration to take into account before moving on to Parmenides. If a diachronic story about a ‘poetics of truth’ giving way to a ‘poetics of fiction’ has come under fire on the grounds that (in certain genres) a ‘poetics of truth’ persisted into the late archaic era, so, too, critics have challenged this paradigm from the other direction. As Stephen Halliwell has

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107 Clay (2011b) 235.
109 Clay (2011b) 235. Put differently: ‘if epic makes the heroic past present, the *Hymns* make the divine present’ (Clay (2011b) 236).
110 Finally, if the *Hymn to Apollo* we have was formed by merging two pre-existing poems, or by adding a second portion to an older hymn to Apollo, we would see one example of the epic rhetoric of traditionality in action; unlike Pindar, who highlights a number of different versions of the same myth, and then evaluates the veracity, or at least the merits, of each, the poet responsible for the *Hymn to Apollo* would have found an ingenius way of incorporating both into a single, true, whole.
argued, to the extent that we can discern a Homeric poetics, it contains more than just truth.\textsuperscript{111} No doubt Halliwell is correct to insist that even as far back as Homer we should see a more complicated dialectic between a ‘poetics of truth’ and an understanding of poetry as ‘a powerfully transformative agency which carries hearers . . . outside of themselves’;\textsuperscript{112} indeed his arguments on this score provide an important corrective to the view that the Homeric Muses are only there to guarantee the truth of the bard’s story. That is not to say, however, that they cannot do both. Acknowledging the power of the Homeric Muses to ‘transmut[e] even the extremes of human unhappiness into an experience of intense beauty worthy of immortal minds’ need not necessarily imply that the old position – that ‘Homer epic predicates of itself a mode of truth-telling which amounts to a kind of historical veracity, the full and accurate relating of a heroic past in songs performed by human bards but informed by the divine knowledge of the Muses’ – is in fact ‘far less secure than it is often taken be’.\textsuperscript{113} This is a point we shall take up in the next section.

\textbf{2.4 Parmenidean Strategies: A Culmination}

We are now in a position to tie the three threads of the above sections together. As we saw in Section 2.1, in Hesiod’s epistemic framework, truth (because divinely disclosed) can come only as the result of an epistemically significant interaction with the divine; but, owing to the nature of their own limitations, mortals cannot be certain of the truth-value of the information they receive from this divinity. Xenophanes then flatly denies the possibility of any unmediated disclosure from divinity, and forcefully underscores the inability of mortals to know the truth, as opposed to merely believing the claims at which they arrive in the course of their inquiries. Meeting the challenge set down by Xenophanes thus involves, first, effecting an encounter with a Muse-like divinity, that she may disclose truth, and, second, finding a way to

\textsuperscript{111} Halliwell (2011) esp. 36–81.

\textsuperscript{112} Halliwell (2011) vi and 67, respectively.

\textsuperscript{113} Halliwell (2011) 67 and 54, respectively.
abolish any doubt as to whether what has been disclosed actually is the truth.

What resources would Parmenides have had at his disposal to meet these two challenges? In Section 2.3 (‘Poetics and Epistemology’) we examined the possibility that there was a bardic ideal that, couched in rhetorics of traditionality, universality, and indifference, operated according to a poetics of truth. What might this have meant in Parmenides’ time? We saw that Halliwell seemed to question whether there was any such ideal at all. Whether critics today accept this is an open question – but, crucially, that is a separate matter from whether late archaic poets and thinkers would have done so. In essaying an answer to this second question, one may observe that the analyses of Halliwell and Finkelberg suggest that much of one’s view of Homeric poetics depends on how much prominence one gives the Invocation of the Muses in Ilıad 2, which provides the strongest evidence for the position Halliwell finds less secure than is assumed. Though she examines a number of episodes with metapoetic significance, Finkelberg (as is not uncommon in modern discussions of Homeric poetics) invests Ilıad 2.484–93 with programmatic significance, citing it in full at two pivotal moments in her argument. Halliwell, by contrast, begins his analysis with the opening lines of the Ilıad, and relegates the Invocation of the Muses in Ilıad 2 to a footnote.

The claim need not be that one position is correct and the other mistaken with respect to Homeric poetics itself. Rather, what matters, I suggest, appears to be which of the Homeric invocations

114 The pattern is hardly limited to fellow travellers: see e.g. Ledbetter (2003), who gives the Greek and the English in full twice (pp. 17, 21) and translates the English again at p. 47; likewise Pratt (1993) 47–52. Clay (2011a), who begins her discussion of Homeric poetics by quoting Ilıad 2.484–93 in full, observes that this is the locus classicus ‘from which every discussion of Homeric poetics takes its start’ (16); see, since then, Graziosi (2013) 71–72, and earlier classics such as Nagy (1979) 16, Ford (1992) 60–62, Scedel (2001) 109, and Scedel (2002) 71–72.

115 Finkelberg (1998) 48, and esp. 71, where Ilıad 2.484–93 provides the foundation for her discussion of Homeric poetics in the crucial third chapter of her book.

116 Halliwell (2011) 58, and see 61 n. 49 for the sole discussion of Ilıad 2’s Invocation of the Muses in its own right; it is downgraded on Halliwell’s telling to one of five ‘localized’ ‘invocations … tied to particular narrative details’ (p. 61). See also 57 n. 39, a section on invocations in general.
to the Muses or other metapoetic moments one makes exemplary in forming one’s opinion of Homeric poetics; make *Il. 2.484–93* your programmatic example, and it is unsurprising if you end up with a poetics of truth (and perhaps it would even be surprising if you did not).

If this is so, there would seem to be important implications for assessing how late archaic poets viewed Homer. Here the discussion in Section 2.2 (‘Archaic Receptions of Homer’) can help provide us with an answer. The recurring interest in *Iliad* 2’s Invocation of the Muses we have observed suggests that the answer to the question ‘Is the “poetics of truth” position less secure than thought?’ must, for the late archaic period, be at least a qualified ‘no’. The qualifications are important. There may indeed be gaps between Homeric theory and practice, and whether the original audiences of Homer deemed all the poetry they heard to be truthful is a separate question. As ever, the patchiness of the evidence we do have, both in terms of the scarcity of poems that remain, and of the fragmentary state of the papyri we are lucky enough to possess, means that any conclusions we reach about them must be tentative. This does not mean, however, that we cannot make good use of the evidence we have. And what we appear to find, particularly in Ibycus’ ‘Polycrates Ode’ and Simonides’ ‘Plataea Elegy’, suggests that these archaic poets did in fact attribute a poetics of truth to Homer, even if – or perhaps precisely because – they wished to forge different generic and poetic paths. As Pindar’s reworkings of *Iliad* 2 in his *Paeans* appear to indicate, however, the possibility of realizing this ideal in full in one’s own poetry was by this time severely constrained, if not entirely foreclosed. Finally, we have seen that roughly contemporary with Parmenides were at least a few poets who maintained an implicit belief in the power of poetry to effect a more direct, less mediated relationship with the divine: the poets behind the Homeric Hymns, composed in a version of the dactylic hexameter *Kunstsprache*.

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2.4 Parmenidean Strategies: A Culmination

With this evidence in mind, here is the view of Parmenides’ task that I propose. Parmenides, product of the late archaic era, inherited an epistemological framework articulated by Hesiod and further developed by Xenophanes. Alongside this Hesiodic framework there was also an ideal, however inaccessible by this date, of a bardic poetics of truth. Constrained by the Hesiodic-Xenophanean framework but with the resources of the second tradition at his disposal, Parmenides’ aim was to reinstall (or even, perhaps, properly to install for the first time) a maximalist epistemological position and stake a credible claim to an iron-clad epic poetics of truth.\(^{118}\)

2.4.1 Contact with the Divine: Reinstalling the Muse

Parmenides’ proem represents a multipronged strategy designed to fulfil this aim.\(^{119}\) The first task is to reinitiate contact with the divine, in order that an epistemically significant interaction with this divinity might occur. Hesiod’s Muses descended to earth to ambush Hesiod on his own turf. Perhaps this was the first sign of trouble for the poetics of truth – the divine truth-tellers lower themselves to the domain of mortals, ‘mere bellies’ though they are (cf. Th. 26). Not so with Parmenides, who, as we have seen, works overtime to locate his encounter with the divine as far as possible from the world of men, ‘far from the beaten track of men’ (\(\alpha\pi\tau\alpha\nu\rho\omega\tau\pi\nu\alpha\nu\ \epsilon\kappa\tau\omicron\sigma \pi\alpha\tau\omicron\ \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu\), Fr. 1.27). The Homeric Hymns offered a strategy for making not the epic past but rather the divine present; through the hymn itself, the poet would effect an epiphany. But the hymns do so by summoning the gods into the world of men. Parmenides does one better: his proem does not appeal to the

\(^{118}\) Less pressing would have been the challenges facing Pindar or even Hecataeus, that of being crowded out by competing and incompatible versions of myths, some of them already in Homer’s name; rather, it is Xenophanean scepticism, and perhaps Ionian enantiomorphism, that would have provided his chief obstacles and targets. For enantiomorphism and adjacent concepts, see esp. Curd (1988b), also Mourelatos (1973), Mourelatos (1990), Miller (2006), and Tor (2017).

\(^{119}\) Robbiano (2006) 62–74 makes good use of Genette’s notion of a ‘paratext’ to characterize the proem. A paratext is ‘a zone not only of transition but also of transaction’ where one deploys ‘pragmatics and a strategy’, a ‘threshold’, a ‘vestibule’ or ‘undefined zone’ between the inside and the outside’ (Genette (1997) 1–2; emphasis original). One could hardly find a more apt description of the proem’s function.

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Parmenides the Late Archaic Poet

divine to be present in the world of mortals, but transports the human kouros to the extraordinary world of the divine.\textsuperscript{120} Scholars have debated whether the proem depicts a katabasis or an anabasis.\textsuperscript{121} As usual with Parmenides, there are reasons to think that the ambiguities are intentional and beneficial.\textsuperscript{122} One proposal that has gained favour recently sheds light on the essence of what the journey in the proem accomplishes; namely, that it is best understood as an apobasis: a journey that goes not necessarily ‘up nor down, but away from and beyond appearances and the world of the senses’.\textsuperscript{123} The proem thus dramatizes a journey to an Elsewhere, a literally transcendental ‘Beyond’ that can serve as the right place for divine disclosure to occur.

2.4.2 Whose Muse?

A journey to what kind of divinity? Scholars have long debated the identity of the goddess.\textsuperscript{124} Again, one strongly suspects that Parmenides’ ambiguity is strategic.\textsuperscript{125} Functionally, however, the goddess plays precisely the same role in Parmenides’ poem

\textsuperscript{120} Also noted by Tor (2017) 313. For another discussion of Parmenides and the genre of the hymn – with some characteristically sharp insights – see Calame (2013).

\textsuperscript{121} See Ch. 5 below, also Tor (2017) 347–59 for a systematic analysis of scholarship on the proem.

\textsuperscript{122} See n. 125, also Section 2.4.5 below; for an example of this logic applied to the proem in a fruitful way, see e.g. Miller (2006).

\textsuperscript{123} Cosgrove (2011) 38–39. Cosgrove (38 n. 65) attributes the term to Mourelatos, who first suggested a similar interpretation in print in 1970; he also cites approvingly Boeder’s conclusion that the goddess ‘empfängt ihn dem “Jenseits” zu allen Erscheinungen’ ((1962) 121). This view accords with what Tor (2017) 359, following Curd, styles the ‘we’re not in Kansas anymore’ view. Schofield (1987) 357 frames the matter well: ‘[t]he implicit question tackled in Fr. 1 is: “What puts someone in the position to raise and understand the goddess’s questions of Fr. 2?”’


\textsuperscript{125} See e.g. Tarán (1965) 15–16, 31; Mourelatos (2008b) [1970]; Coxon (2009) 280–81; Floyd (1992) 255; Miller (2006); Tor (2017) 355 n. 25. If, as I shall discuss below, Parmenides’ situation requires him to mobilize as fully as possible the resources of myth, religious ritual, and extended deductive argument, why close doors to any powerful registers of meaning-making and cultural practices that could be of service in this great struggle to announce truth? See also pp. 109–110, 241–47 below.
as the Muses do for the poet. That Parmenides’ goddess plays a role functionally similar to an epic Muse is not a new idea.126 But, in contrast to most earlier forms of this claim, I think we should see Parmenides’ goddess as much closer in kin, not to Hesiod’s cunning Heliconides, but rather, in light of the above discussion, to the Homeric underwriters of an absolute and incontestable epistemological guarantee to a mortal who would otherwise be constrained by crippling epistemic limitations.127

Consider the following comparison. Scholars have from time to time remarked on the similarities between Th. 27–28 and Parmenides’ Fragment 1.29–30.128 Immediately preceding Fr. 1.29–30, the goddess has graciously received the kouros, and after a short preamble observing that the journey was ratified by Themis and Dike, informs him that ‘it is right that you should learn all things’ (χρεὼ δὲ σὲ πάντα πνεύσθαι, Fr. 1.28). This is elaborated to mean (Fr. 1.29–30):

Both the unshaken heart of well-rounded reality
And the notions of mortals, in which there is no genuine trust.

The Hesiodic passage, which is indeed similar in important ways, is worth repeating (Th. 27–28):

We know how to compose many lies indistinguishable from things that are real,
And we know, when we wish, to pronounce things that are true.

Finally, consider again the Invocation of the Muses in Il. 2.485–86:

127 Nightingale (2007) 190, and Granger (2008), to be discussed at greater length below, are welcome exceptions to the tendency to focus solely on Hesiod’s Muses at Homer’s Muses’ expense.
129 See e.g. Palmer (2009) 378–380 for discussion and e.g. Mourelatos (2008b) xxxiv for a counterpoint.
For you are goddesses, and are present and know everything, while we hear only rumour, and know nothing.

Which of these earlier engagements with the epic Muses do Parmenides’ lines more closely resemble? Tor’s discussion is again instructive, though this time because it embodies the scholarly consensus on the answer to this question. In his discussion of these lines, he observes that ‘like Hesiod, and unlike Homer who remains more in the background, Parmenides makes central the figure of the mortal agent who is identified with the poetic voice’. But this is mistaken in two ways: Tor’s dismissal of Homer is unjustified, and it is in fact Homer, and not Hesiod, who provides tighter parallels in several important respects. In fact, as the dichotomy ήμεῖς...ὑμεῖς...θεαί underscores, we find here precisely in Iliad 2.485–86 what Tor goes on to claim is missing, on account of which he relegates Homer to the background: namely, ‘a first-person encounter with an all-female divine apparatus’. As has been suggested, one reason that Iliad 2’sInvocation of the Muses proved such a focal point for the early reception of epic is precisely because it is one of the few places in Homer where the poet/narrator does identify himself in the first person and speaks directly in his own voice (‘Ἐσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι, Iliad 2.484’), and his addressee is none other than ‘an all-female divine apparatus’ (ὑμεῖς...θεαί). Placing Parmenides’ Fr. 1.29–30 alongside Iliad 2.484–86 shows that the case for relegating Homer to the background is not a strong one. In fact, the reverse is true: not only should we not relegate Homer to the background, but proper consideration of all three

130 Tor (2017) 312.
131 It should be acknowledged that asserting a strong set of links between Hesiod and Parmenides is one of the core planks of Tor’s thesis, and it is thus understandable that Hesiod should be the main point of bardic reference (as indeed Homer is in this book). It is nevertheless still wrong to relegate Homer to the background and ignore the closer connections between Iliad 2.485–86 and Od. 12.27–141 and Parm. Fr. 1.29–30 and what follows.
132 Tor (2017) 312.
133 See e.g. de Jong (1987) 47–52; Richardson (1990) 181; Graziosi (2013).
passages makes clear that we must rather place him even more squarely in the foreground than Hesiod. In *Il.* 2.485–86, we find a dichotomy between epistemic extremes (ἳστε τε πάντα . . . οὐδὲ τι ἰδμεν); these are mapped onto an ontological distinction between divine and (by implication) mortal (ὑμεῖς . . . θεαί ἐστε . . . ἰδμεῖς). In Hesiod, the first dichotomy is transformed from an epistemological to a discursive statement (i.e. from knowledge of the truth to the accurate or specious communication of this knowledge); the distinction between gods and mortals, meanwhile, is no longer expressed.\(^{134}\) In Parmenides, as in the Homeric Invocation of the Muse, we find the first dichotomy articulated in epistemic terms once again: the distinction is between true knowledge of reality (ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμέξ ἦτορ) and a lack, or defective-ness, of knowledge (δόξας, τῆς οὐκ ἐνι πίστις ἀληθῆς). Likewise, as in *Il.* 2.485–86, this also coincides with, or is mapped onto, a distinction between divine and mortal; the inferior option is expressly linked to the human (βροτῶν δόξας, Fr. 1.30), while, as Tor himself persuasively shows, the epistemically superior option is intimately linked to the divine.\(^{135}\) The only respect in which Parmenides’ account more closely resembles Hesiod’s is that it is his unnamed goddess that announces these dichotomies (χρεώ δὲ σε πάντα πυθέσαι, Fr. 1.28), as do Hesiod’s Muses (ἰδμεν ψεύδεα . . . λέγειν . . . ἰδμεν . . . ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι, *Th.* 27–28); in Homer, the narrator speaks in his own voice to appeal to the Muses for the transmission of information (Ἔσπετε νῦν μοι, *Il.* 2.484).

What we find, then, are unquestionable commonalities across all three passages that make it valuable to consider Parmenides’ lines as being in dialogue with both his primary epic predecessors. All three passages establish an epistemically charged relationship between a mortal narrator, who speaks in the first person, and an epistemically privileged female divinity or divinities. Like *Th.* 26–28 (but not *Il.* 2.484–86), Parmenides’ lines issue from the all-female divine apparatus. What Parmenides’ Fr. 1.28–30 and

\(^{134}\) Of course, the dichotomy between gods and mortals suffuses the general ambience of the opening passage of Hesiod (and may be implied by the derogatory comments of *Th.* 26), but it is not stated, and it is not a constitutive feature of the dichotomy articulated that Hesiod’s Muses do articulate.

\(^{135}\) Tor (2017).
Il. 2.484–86 have in common with each other (and not with Th. 26–28) is much more extensive, however: each (a) articulates a dichotomy between two epistemic extremes; (b) explicitly affiliates the epistemically inferior term with the mortal, and associates the epistemically superior term with the divine (expressly in the case of the Iliad, implicitly in Parmenides’ poem); and (c), grants the mortal, who speaks in the first person, apparently unproblematic access to the privileged divine knowledge of the female divinity/divinities in what follows.

There is in fact another passage of Homer that cements even more firmly the case for bringing Homer from the background to make it the primary intertext for Parmenides; since exploring its connections to Parmenides’ fragments 1.21–8.49 will form much of the remainder of this book, however, I shall only gesture to it here. Comparing Parmenides’ goddess to Hesiod’s Muses, Dolin observes: ‘[t]o replace the specific, well-defined Muses of Hesiod, Parmenides has created an abstract blend of the sun-daughters of Thrinacia and Circe’.\(^{136}\) Swap ‘Homer’ for ‘Hesiod’ and emphasize Circe a bit more strongly, and the statement captures the scenario masterfully. One hardly needs the semantic acrobatics of the phrase ‘all-female divine apparatus’ to point out that in Odyssey 12, and especially lines 27–141, a single female divinity with privileged access to knowledge (Circe) provides an urgently important, true, and trustworthy account of reality to her male, mortal charge (Odysseus).\(^{137}\) Moreover, as we have also seen above, Odysseus’ speech to Alcinous – and indeed the entire Apologoi as a whole, of which Odyssey 12 forms so memorable a part – appealed to poets and thinkers over millennia in part for the very reason that ‘the figure of the mortal agent is identified with the poetic voice’\(^{138}\).

\(^{136}\) Dolin (1962) 96.

\(^{137}\) See esp. Ch. 5, also Ch. 6 for a much deeper elaboration of the many linguistic, dramatic, conceptual, and discursive connections between the tissue of Parmenides’ fragments 1.21–32, 2, 6, 7, and 8.1–49 and Od. 12.27–141.

\(^{138}\) Tor (2017) 312. Some have even gone so far as to suggest that the birth of historiography cannot be understood otherwise; see e.g. Marincola (2007) 35–37, 55–57 for the influence of Odyssey 9–12 on historiographers from Hecataeus onwards. See also Granger (2008) 10.
2.4 Parmenidean Strategies: A Culmination

2.4.3 Crossroads

There is another major advantage to seeing Parmenides’ goddess as resembling not Hesiod’s cunning Heliconides but rather a brilliantly crafted fusion of Homer’s trustworthy Muses and Circe. Recall point (iii) from Section 2.1 above, namely, that mortals have no way of knowing whether the accounts they get from the Muses are true or not. As Th. 27–28 makes clear (especially within the context of Hesiod’s conception of man and god, and male and female), mortals cannot ever really know what information they receive from divinity is the truth, and what is merely lies. Reading Parmenides against Homer’s Invocation of the Muses rather than Th. 27–28 reveals one of his most extraordinary strategies for addressing this issue. All three pairs of lines establish at least one fundamental dichotomy. The (mortal) speaker of the Iliad declares an essential distinction between absolute divine knowledge (ὑμεῖς ... θεαὶ ἔστε, ἱστε τε πάντα) and abject human ignorance (ημεῖς ... οὐδὲ τι ἵδομεν). Hesiod’s Muses cruelly exploit this ignorance by taking the superior information they can offer (ἵδομεν ... ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι) and a specious lookalike (ἵδομεν ψεύδεα ... λέγειν ἑτύμοισιν ὀμοία) and mixing them up, polluting with lies like mud in the water of the Olympian spring the Muse-derived bardic poetics of truth. Here, however, Parmenides deploys an ingenious rhetorical stratagem: by rigorously filtering out the truthful distillate (in the ‘Route to Truth’), its epistemic purity personally guaranteed by the divine, and leaving the epistemic sludge (Doxa) to stand on its own, Parmenides’ Muse-like goddess sanitizes epic discourse once more.\footnote{And, as in Homeric invocation of the Muse, there is one line for the complete truth of the immortals and one for the low ignorance of men. Or as in the cave of the Nymphs, where there are two hodoi, one for the immortals, one for men (Od. 13.109–12); or as there are two gates for dreams, ivory for the deceptive, horn for the etuma (Od. 19.560–69).} She can begin her task of abrogating the Heliconian mischief of Th. 27–28 and undoing its epistemological damage by restoring the Olympian clarity of the interlinked dichotomies of Il. 2.485–86; these neatly differentiate between high and low epistemic positions and map them onto two separate ontological domains, the divine and the human, while giving the human...
(who is also the first-person narrator) otherwise-unobtainable access to the divine perspective.

In fact, this is only the first move of a multistep programme that Parmenides’ (Homerid-) Muse-like goddess undertakes to smelt out the epistemic alloy Parmenides inherits from Hesiod’s mischievous Muses and separate the pure ore of truth (ἀληθείας εὐκυκλέος ἄτρεμές ἠτορ) from doxastic slag (βρωτῶν δόξας, τῆς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής). Unlike Hesiod’s Muses, who simply tell Hesiod what they wish and leave it for him to decide what is true and what merely resembles the truth, when she provides the kouros her account of reality, Parmenides’ goddess makes a point of ring-fencing trustworthy from untrustworthy discourse with a cordon sanitaire at Fragment 8.50–52 (cf. esp. Fr. 8.50: ‘here I end my pístis logos’). What is more, she also has her master manoeuvre: the hodos. Or rather, hodoi: for she will distribute the two stuffs, one pure and trustworthy, the other bankrupt or mixed (depending on how one interprets their relationship to fragments 6 and 7, and their relationship in turn to Doxa) to two different paths, the one no longer able to contaminate the other or confuse mortals as to its status. As we shall explore at length in chapters 4 and 5, the image of the forked hodos offers Parmenides’ goddess an extraordinary point of conceptual leverage to prise off the doxastic from the true.

2.4.4 Narrators and Voices

As we saw, this analysis does, however, bring to the fore one important distinction between Il. 2.484–86 and what follows it, and Parmenides’ Fragment 1.29–30 and what follows it. As in Theogony 27–28, the goddess(es) speak in her (or their) own voice, while in Il. 2.484 and following all we hear is the appeal of the first-person mortal narrator.141 This only reaffirms the passage’s resemblance to Homer, however – though not

140 See Palmer (2009) 378–80 for discussion; see also e.g. Mourelatos (2008b) xxxiv for a counterpoint.

141 The Muses are appealed to, but they register no expressly stated presence, be it in bodily or vocal form, in the text; see de Jong (1987), esp. 45–53; Richardson (1990) 181–82.
necessarily with just *Iliad* 2. In the *Theogony*, all that we hear from the goddesses themselves is their taunt to the first-person narrator, who resumes in his own voice immediately after and in the remainder of what follows. Here again, Odysseus’ conversation with Circe at *Od.* 12.27–141 provides a much better parallel.

Even more strikingly, we see yet another benefit of reading Parmenides’ against the backdrop of *Odyssey* 12, a comparison that helps us see more clearly one of Parmenides’ most dazzling manoeuvres for establishing the trustworthiness of his account, and banishing any uncertainty about its veracity. Πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοίδοι, Solon is said to have warned: ‘the poets tell many lies’ (25 G.-P. = 29 W²).¹⁴² And even if a poet can somehow be trusted not to lie, the foregoing discussion of Pindar hints at another major problem. We saw above the great gulf between the direct transmission from Muses to man in *Il.* 2.484–93 and the relationship to the Muses that Pindar depicts in *Paean* 6.50–58 and *Paean* 7b.15–20. In a best-case scenario, epistemically speaking, Pindar was to be given μορφανία by the Muses (*Paean* 7b.17, cf. *Paean* 6.53), but not even this would prevent him from confronting fundamental *apor-iain* (cf. *Paean* 7b.42–52) which he lacks the resources to surmount beyond what his own moral compass and sense of credibility can provide. The very asking of the question τί πείσομαι; (*Paean* 7b.42) is deeply telling. Can one imagine the epic bard asking a similar question as he contemplates a dubious account of, say, the effects of Achilles’ wrath on the Trojan War? Even were a poet’s commitment not to lie were known to be absolute, how could an audience know that he or she, having to ask τί πείσομαι;, really had unmediated access to the truth?

The precise nature of this complex of problems becomes clear when one considers another moment in *Paean* 6, where the speaker characterizes himself as a προφάτας of the Muse (*Paean* 6.6), and, likewise, when he (or perhaps a character?) declares μαντεύεσο, Μόισα, προφατεύσω δ’ ἕγω (Fr. 150 Maehler).¹⁴³ Both passages have provoked a number of


¹⁴³ See discussion in Maehler (1975), Rutherford (2001a), Ledbetter (2003), and Maslov (2015) 197–200. As we saw above, Fr. 150 is also cited by Granger (2007) in support of his argument. See here also Bacchylides Fr. 9.1–6 (Maehler). How one translates the
interpretations, but even on the most epistemically optimistic reading of these fragmentary texts, such a relationship between poet and Muse would be of little use to someone trying to respond to the challenge set down by Xenophanes in his Fr. 18, which clearly includes a criticism of diviners. This optimistic reading of *Pae. 6.6* and Fr. 150 posits an analogy between, for example, the Delphic oracle and someone who interprets the meaning of the oracle, and the Muses and Pindar; just as the first ‘are never false . . . and only their interpretations may be true or false’, so the Muse never tells the poets anything false, but the poets sometimes misinterpret them. But how does this guarantee the veracity of what poets say? This reading spares the poet from the accusation of lying, but that is not the same as saying he can always be relied upon to render the correct interpretation. More to the point, if Xenophanes rejects the possibility of precisely this kind of unerring interpretative trenchancy on the part of diviners, how could one hope to counter his critique by offering a model of access to the truth analogous to the very same one he questions?

By contrast, the more ‘humble’ reading of *Pae. 6.6* and Fr. 150 has it that Pindar is merely the ‘spokesman’ or, quite literally, the mouthpiece of the Muses (viz. ‘one who speaks on behalf of others’) just as the ‘Delphic priests are the spokesman of the Pythia’. Again, however, one must ask how such a relationship between poet and Muse could be of value to someone attempting to respond to Xenophanes’ scepticism. The problems come clearly into view in what remains of the body of the paean. As we saw, Pindar there contradicts the *Odyssey* in his own telling of the story of Neoptolemus; the implication is that the Pindaric speaker, not Homer, is the true ‘spokesman of the Muses’.

But what is to stop another poet from coming along

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144 Tor (2017) 104–30, esp. 104–16, for discussions of divination in the time of Xenophanes; Dillery (2005) and Flower (2008) provide an important backdrop here.


146 Maslov (2015) 201, more generally 197–201. Note that this sense of ‘mouthpiece’ is thus very different from e.g. Finkelberg’s discussion of Homer’s Muses.

147 See Maslov (2015), n. 37 above.
in the future and playing the same game with Pindar’s *Paean* 6? And how does one know which mortal poet is the true spokesman of the Muses, and which merely a Homeric pretender? If Parmenides’ goal is to eradicate completely any confusion, uncertainty, or ambiguity surrounding the epistemic status of his message, being a Pindaric προφάτος of the Muse will not suffice, then, no matter how one interprets the phrase. We are no further than we were in Section 2.3.

Whether Pindar is to be understood as the interpreter of the Muse or her mouthpiece, Parmenides can go one better. His Muse needs no προφάτος: she speaks for herself, directly. We see here what is perhaps the most important upshot of Parmenides’ engagement with a portion of the *Apologoi* (viz. *Od*. 12.27–141), the one extended portion of the epic narrated in the first person, which thus sits somewhere between the style of character speech and narration, whose speaker occupies a role between ‘storyteller and poet’, speaker of *epos* and purveyor of *aidos*. Choosing the portion of the *Odyssey* that is presented by a (mortal) internal narrator, Odysseus, who narrates at length his interactions with, *inter alios*, figures with special access to knowledge (such as the divinity Circe or the seer Tiresias), allows Parmenides’ *kouros* to speak in the first-person ‘I’, as Odysseus does, while presenting his divinity in her own words, just as Circe and her epistemically privileged ilk are presented in the *Odyssey*. The result is hard truth presented in direct speech: Parmenides offers us *alētheia* straight from the source. A figure of privileged access to knowledge directly akin to the Muses speaks not through the poet as she might through an epic bard, in his voice and in his words: instead, the privileged source of knowledge is itself *directly quoted* by the speaker, and thus presented, immediately and unmediatedly, to the audience of the poem. The Muse no longer speaks through the mouth of the poet; rather, through an astonishing narratological sleight of hand, the Muse speaks for herself. By making Circe’s speech to Odysseus in *Odyssey* 12 the key intertext that he reworks, that is, Parmenides goes beyond the epistemic status implicitly asserted for the

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148 The dichotomies are to be found in de Jong (1992), esp. the concluding remarks on p. 10, with reference to categories explored in the Griffin (1986), Beck (2005), and Bakker (2013).
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remainder of the *Iliad* by the Invocation of the Muses. His Muse needs no mouthpiece to give voice to the truth.

### 2.4.5 Argument

The goddess still has a final trump card to play, however. Her *coup de grâce*, an absolute guarantee rebutting Xenophanes and abolishing once and for all any uncertainty about the truth status of his claims, able to withstand the most gruelling and rigorous elenchus (as he puts it in Fr. 7.5) is an extended deductive argument, beginning from a point that all must accept.149 As we shall see in the following chapters, she begins from a point that must be accepted (for who could reject it? cf. Parm. Fr. 2.7–8); moves on the rut road of argument (and who could swerve from it?); and ends at her fixed, final, ultimate, inevitable destination. Parmenides offers a better criterion for persuasion than the ethical canon of Pindar: iron-clad argument. We might be tempted to see here a Parmenidean version of the classic Homeric idea of ‘double motivation’.150 On the one hand, the extended deductive argument is the proper complement of the unmediated divine disclosure that the *kouros* – and all of us, future listeners and readers – are party to. On the other, it comes straight from the mouth of the goddess, the very font of truth incarnate. Of late archaic poetry, Scodel wrote, ‘[t]he Muses do not bear witness or take an oath. The poet must stand by his own words’ (which could also be applied to early prose writers, like Hecataeus). In Parmenides’ poem, thanks to his spectacular mythifying (if not versifying) and his breathtaking narratological pas de deux, the poet does not need to bear witness or take an oath – the Muse stands by her own words. How could those words fail to persuade, beginning from a point all must accept and moving by way of extended deductive arguments to an inevitable conclusion (delineating, that is, the key outline of a demonstration)?

Incidentally, it bears emphasizing that the interpretation I have sketched out here is entirely compatible – or at least not *a priori*  

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149 See Introduction, n. 12.
150 See Dodds (1951) 1–18 and Lesky (1961).
incompatible – with readings of Parmenides’ poem that focus on possible links with ritual or initiatory practices, language, or cults that may have been prevalent in Parmenides’ Elea.\textsuperscript{151} Here we can benefit from Tor’s explosion of the dichotomy between reasoning and revelation,\textsuperscript{152} and also from, for example, Ranzato’s use of Gernet’s notion of the ‘polysemy of myth’.\textsuperscript{153} The benefit of these interpretative approaches becomes clear when comparing the conception of Parmenides’ goddess for which I advocate here with the views of, for example, Herbert Granger. As Granger puts it:

Parmenides is endeavoring to reshape the age-old practice of the appeal to a divine Muse into that which he takes to be the real value that lies behind the mythology of the Muse and of the whole tradition of divine revelation. The poem helps prepare us for the appreciation of the goddess as a persona who is symbolic of non-empirically based reason, and Parmenides is engaged in the demythologization of the Muse into a priori reason, the exercise of which yields truths without the aid of evidence provided by our perception.\textsuperscript{154}

Some similarities with the arguments made here will be obvious; Parmenides’ goddess is indeed a rhetorical device with the full weight of Homeric authority behind her. But she need not only be this. We may therefore part ways with Granger on two fundamental points. First, in keeping with Ranzato, Miller, and others, we should embrace the notion of a Parmenidean poetic discourse that allows for the goddess to occupy more than one role in more than one network of mythical or ritual associations at the same time; this interpretative flexibility would exemplify one kind of major pay-off that comes from reading Parmenides’ poem as a poem. Second, liberated from the need to see a tension between the

\textsuperscript{151} E.g. Kingsley (1999) and Kingsley (2003), Robbiano (2006), Gemelli Marciano (2008), Gemelli Marciano (2013), Ranzato (2015), Tor (2017), and earlier proposed or adumbrated by Burkert (1969), Feyerabend (1984), and Sassi (1988). Of course, to the extent that these readings, such as Gemelli Marciano (2013), are deemed to be incompatible with an account of Parmenides that emphasizes the role of extended deductive argumentation, there is indeed ipso facto an incompatibility, but this is imposed from the other side, as it were.

\textsuperscript{152} Tor (2017), esp. 11–60, 338–46.

\textsuperscript{153} Ranzato (2015), esp. 15–16; see Introduction, n. 28 for important predecessors.

\textsuperscript{154} Granger (2008) 14; he then goes on to discuss this phenomenon in relation to the Invocation of the Muses in \textit{Iliad} 2 (Granger (2008) 15); see, for similar dynamics, Laks (2013), who differentiates between ‘phenomena’ and ‘references’, and a process of rationalization (an analogue of Granger’s demythologization) in the transition from the first to the second.
goddess’s divinely disclosing a revelatory truth or making an *a priori* extended deductive argument, we need not be compelled to claim that Parmenides demythologizes anything. Instead, rather than seeing him as stripping old symbols of their meaning, we should see in Parmenides a virtuoso myth-maker who marshals together meaning-making symbols from different discourses and, activating their individual powers at different points and in different ways, harnesses each of these within one supercharged but unified, coherent whole. Parmenides’ goddess need not be reducible to any single ‘real’ value, but can have many different faces that she reveals at different times, or even at the same time depending on where one stands. So (if the historical Parmenides did indeed know the cults he is sometimes claimed to have known, or even if the discourse of his community was strongly affected by them) she can be like Demeter, Persephone, or Mnemosyne, depending on one’s preferred ritual context;\(^1\) so she can *also* be like a Homeric Muse guaranteeing the absolute truth of the poem; so she can *also*, as we will discuss in chapters 5 and 6, be like Circe in *Odyssey* 12; and, provided one can make the cases for historical legitimacy and poetic relevancy properly, so can she also, perhaps, be like other characters as well. Parmenides loses nothing on this view except his status as a proto-analytic philosopher, an Enlightenment voice crying out in the archaic wilderness. And what he gains is the power of the poet, a thinker and user of language who taps the power of linguistic polysemy and polyvalence, socially and religiously charged imagery, pre-existing poetic traditions and the cultural institutions of his time and channels them all to the same end.

### 2.4.6 Dactylic Hexameter

Finally, we may also observe that the foregoing discussion also bears on Parmenides’ use of verse. As noted above, one consequence of the overwhelming tendency of scholars to read Parmenides as a philosopher rather than a poet – or, to make

\(^1\) See n. 124 above.
a slightly different point, of the tendency of scholars of ancient philosophy, but not of ancient poetry, to read Parmenides – has been to make it peculiar, at best, and a ‘grievous scandal’, at worst, for him to have composed in verse. It is here that we see clearly how placing Parmenides within a chronology that does not begin with the Milesians, and includes or abuts not only Xenophanes, Heraclitus, or Zeno, but also the likes of Ibycus, Simonides, Pindar, and the Hymn to Apollo, grants us access to a new face of the kaleidoscope of his poem.

What has relocating Parmenides in the context of late archaic poetry added to this topic? Three insights. First, we see even more clearly how inappropriate the Muse-less form of prose would have been for his endeavours. If overcoming the obstacles established by Xenophanes was of major importance for Parmenides’ project, and if this in turn required effecting an encounter with the divine, what possible use could prose, the medium of the new men of Ionian empiricism, have been? From this perspective, it would have been no more appropriate for Parmenides to have written in prose, one might think, than for a modern-day logician to undertake a proof in sonnet form.

But, second, and on the one hand, relocating Parmenides in the context of late archaic poetry should also make his choice of dactylic hexameter seem even more radical than has usually been acknowledged. The critics who have denigrated Parmenides’ poetic abilities universally wish he had opted for prose instead. Rowett is right to suggest that verse was the default form for the elevated and authoritative kind of speech act undertaken by Parmenides. However, as the discussion above has also made clear, if by the late archaic period verse was still the authoritative medium in which to convey important ideas of some length, the ‘special speech’ of dactylic hexameter does not seem to have been. As we touched on above in our discussion of Od. 9.2–11 and later elegiac congeners, elegy seems to have been far and away the preferred medium for examining or

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157 See n. 4 above.
announcing vitally important truths during Parmenides’ time.\textsuperscript{159} It is true, as Sider points out, that Xenophanes, who wrote long compositions in elegy, ‘reserves his more scientific and philosophic writings for hexameters’.\textsuperscript{160} These are all extremely short, however; whereas his elegiac fragments 1 and 2 clock in at twenty-four and twenty-two lines, respectively, his longest surviving hexameter composition is four lines (Fr. 34), and it does not seem that this was part of a longer continuous treatise.\textsuperscript{161} By Parmenides’ time, the great boom in hexameter poetry represented not only by the \textit{Iliad} and \textit{Odyssey} but also, \textit{inter alia}, the Cyclic Epics, the \textit{Hymn to Aphrodite} and the \textit{Hymn to Demeter}, and other poems such as the \textit{Catalogue of Women} and the \textit{Shield of Heracles}, seems to have slowed to a trickle; this is often taken to go hand in hand with the development of new modes of poetic expression to treat the topics of epic myth, often while making liberal use of epic diction, such as Stesichorean choral lyric.\textsuperscript{162} Those who did continue to use dactylic hexameter for compositions of more than just a few lines often seem to have been associated with special guilds of rhapsodes particularly comfortable dealing with the artificial language of epic.\textsuperscript{163}

In short, we should entertain the possibility that the gap between the end of the oral hexameter tradition and Parmenides is a chasm more expansive than is often acknowledged; to speak the ‘special speech’ of epic was neither obvious, nor, I suggest, was it easily

\textsuperscript{159} As Kahn (2003) 156 observes in his discussion of Xenophanes’ use of verse, ‘[i]n the sixth century, elegiac verse was used for the pamphleteering function that was served by the funeral oration in Plato’s day’; see also e.g. Sider (2006) and Gagné (2009) esp. 28–30.

\textsuperscript{160} Sider (2006) 338–39. For reference, West (2015) 66 imagines the length of Mimnermus’ elegiac \textit{Smyrneis} and Simonides’ elegies on the battles of Artemesium and Plataea to have been of ‘considerable length’, possibly running into the hundreds of lines; Stesichorus’ \textit{Geryoneis} is estimated to be 1,300 lines at a minimum (Finglass and Kelly (2015) 7).

\textsuperscript{161} For the debate about whether his histories of the founding of Colophon and Elea are in elegiac or epic metre, see Lulli (2011) 42–46. The key question concerns the best interpretation of \textit{epē} in Diogenes Laertius 9.20. The increasing scholarly interest in elegy has shifted opinion away from the older idea that Xenophanes composed in hexameter to the view the composed in elegiacs; see esp. Bowie (1986) 31–32.


\textsuperscript{163} For discussions of the shadowy guild of bards, such as the Homeridae, see Burkert (2001) 102–03; Cassio (2002). Such figures as Panyassis and Cheorilus, later to be elevated by Hellenistic scholars to the all-star club of epic poets including Homer and Hesiod, should also be taken into account; see here esp. Lulli (2011).
accomplished in a socially or intellectually persuasive way. That a thinker should have used verse to express his urgently important ideas in the late archaic period should come as a surprise to no one; that he should have done so in dactylic hexameter – and at such length, and at this late moment in the archaic period – appears bold. Just as for Pindar it was apparently quite a radical act to depart from the authority of the ‘well-trodden track’ of Homer when it came to matters of poetic content, so for Parmenides – who, to the best of our knowledge, was not a member of any kind of rhapsodic guild or the like – to return to the authority of Homer’s dactylic hexameters in choosing the poetic form in which to compose a poem of more than 160 lines (and perhaps up to around 500 or 600 lines) was also, so it would seem, quite radical.

Third, and on the other hand, the foregoing discussion should also make dactylic hexameter seem even more desirable for Parmenides’ purposes in ways that extend beyond what the critics mentioned above have already proposed. The discussion of

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164 The most recent edition of Parmenides’ poem includes 161 lines attributed to Parmenides; LM 3–4. Scholars have long imagined Doxa to be longer than Alētheia; according to Diels’s influential reconstruction, the seventy-eight surviving lines of Alētheia represent nine tenths of the whole section, while ‘according to a less certain appraisal, perhaps 1/10 of the Doxa’ is represented by the forty-four verses that survive (Diels (1897) 25–26). This adds up to thirty-two lines of the proem, roughly eighty-five lines for Alētheia, and ~400–450 for Doxa, or around 510–560 lines in total (or perhaps even substantially less: LM 4 reckon the poem’s total length to be 300–400 words). For a different view, see Kurfess (2016).

165 While it would be an overstatement to compare this act to Pierre Menard’s twentieth-century edition of Don Quixote – the lengthy Hymn to Hermes, for example, is often dated to ~480 BCE (see e.g. West (2011b)) – it is not unhelpful to spend at least a bit of time examining it in such terms, especially when considering other arguments advanced to explain Parmenides’ use of verse. This is especially true for what we might dub an ‘anchoring innovation’ school who suggest, first, that the perplexities of radical new material are rendered more easily digestible by anchoring it in the familiar old garb of epic; and, second, that the new points thus stand out more clearly, the better to be brought to the audience’s attention for further examination; see here Pfeiffer (1975) 61; Wright (1997); Wöhrle (1993), esp. 173–74; Most (1999a) 355; Granger (2008) 14; and for anchoring innovation, Sluiter (2017). The effect of using dactylic hexameter to expound one’s physical or metaphysical theories will have been far less radical, of course, for anyone (Empedocles, for example) writing in the shadow of Parmenides.

166 For strong arguments that dactylic hexameter is precisely what one would expect from a Parmenides who puts his message in the mouth of his goddess, see esp. Kahn (2003) 157; Most (1999a) 355; Mansfeld (1964) 273; Tarán (1977) 654; Tor (2017); also Reinhardt (1916) 301–02.
Ibycus, Simonides, Pindar’s *Paean* 6 and 7b, and the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* make clear how much the medium dactylic hexameter had to offer a thinker labouring to respond to Xenophanes’ challenge. If in Simonides’ day, the bard of the *Iliad* could be said to have ‘received the whole truth [πᾶσαν ἀλήθειήν]’ from the Muses, what could be more useful to Parmenides’ purposes than to assimilate himself to that tradition and claim that same possibility for himself? If, for Ibycus, the Muses could ‘embark upon’ what ‘no living mortal man could tell’, what could be more valuable for Parmenides than to reinitiate contact with their kind? Conversely, if the surest connection to the divine that even so grand and numinous a figure as Pindar could claim (and at the Delphic *theoxenia* no less!) is μαχανία, and if the most this amounts to is to be persuaded by the Muse (if one is wise) and to persuade other wise men in turn; or to have one’s blindness eased (but how much?) as one seeks out the deep paths of wisdom, we see in the gulf between these positions and the scenario depicted in *Il.* 2.484–93 just how much Parmenides had to gain from earning access once again to the use of dactylic hexameter. The one genre that managed to maintain direct, immediate contact of a kind with the divine, the Homeric hymn, pointed to a strategy for reanimating the special speech of epic and reactivating the old rhetorics of traditionality, indifference, and universality *en route* to reclaiming a poetics of truth.

2.5 Conclusion

One of Parmenides’ most urgent aims was to resurrect (or, depending on how much one wishes to concede to Halliwell’s interpretation, properly to install for the first time) a poetics of truth. From the perspective of the late archaic era, at least, *Iliad* 2’s Invocation of the Muses was seen to set out an ideal of epistemological absolutism. The deep ambiguities inscribed into the foundations

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167 For this translation of the problematic lines 24–26 of Ibycus’ ‘Polycrates Ode’ and for a discussion of other alternatives, see n. 45 above.
of Hesiod’s epistemology (and indeed his entire conception of the cosmos and the place of mortals within it) both expose the tensions that may always have been inherent in the epic tradition of the bards (otherwise, why should a rhetoric of traditionality have been necessary in the first place?), and also articulate the framework that would define subsequent conceptions of epistemology. The other poets of Parmenides’ late archaic era, whether they looked back on the ideal of *Iliad* 2 with nostalgia or playfully rejected it, seem both to have entertained this ideal and accepted that matters of truth and falsity were, in their time at least, more complex. A revanchist Parmenides set out to revitalize – or realize for the first time – an ideal that may or may not ever have been unambiguously in circulation. His Muse would speak the absolute truth – and, like Circe to Odysseus, she would do so directly, in her own voice.

In crafting a socially and intellectually compelling response to Xenophanes’ challenge, Parmenides was faced with the task of speaking many languages, telling many stories, producing many texts at the same time. Reinstating a poetics of truth, invested with the extraordinary weight of the epic past and its canonical bard (who had received the whole truth from the violet-tressed Muses) was a task that only the most rarefied maker of myths – a poet in the etymological sense – could tackle. In Parmenides’ poem and in his goddess, we can discern a new kind of ‘double motivation’ (double at the least): to dramatize an effective reunion with an all-knowing divinity, and in her own domain, her own proper and carefully guarded site of truth, that a poetics of truth might be (re) instated once and for all; and, to be absolutely certain, through the Doom-ful, Fate-ful, unyielding power of necessity, movement via the path of argument (no turns, no swerves, no other routes permitted) that no voyager on the ‘Route to Truth’ could fail to achieve anything short of full knowledge of the truth. The most elegant versifier to have plied hexameter fields Parmenides may not have been. But the foregoing analysis reveals a poet whose dexterous command of mythical and religious imagery can match even the most brilliant of his near contemporaries. In fact, the case
Parmenides the Late Archaic Poet presents perhaps the finest adjunct of all to the Muses’s diadem\textsuperscript{168} – not the clear-voiced, honey-tongued Muse of elegy or lyric, but the Muse who speaks an irrefutable truth in her own voice, directly to her audience.

\textsuperscript{168} See Introduction, n. 27.
PART II

ROUTES
We discussed in the Introduction how a Foucauldian theoretical apparatus could help us identify and examine the specific discursive connections linking Parmenides to Homer, extended deductive argumentation and demonstration to narrative poetry. In fact, I shall hone in on a rather a small subset of the grand archaeological system that Foucault details in his ARCHAEology of KNOWledge. There, in section II of chapter 5, devoted to ‘The Formation of Concepts’, one finds a discussion of ‘forms of succession’, the different sets of patterns or rules that dictate the arrangement of statements in their sequence.¹ Foucault identifies three ‘forms of succession’, and these will provide the framework for the rest of this chapter and much of what follows in the rest of the book.²

After addressing the Foucauldian apparatus briefly, I shall then spell out my purposes in using these terms in the remainder of the book; my strategy will be to contextualize each of these three ‘forms of succession’ within the existing field of scholarship on Homer and narrative more generally (Section 3.1, ‘The Theoretical Apparatus in Context’). I shall then put these terms to work by examining the text of the Odyssey more generally (3.2, ‘How the Hodos Organizes Homeric Discourse’) before addressing the portion of that text most crucial for Parmenides, the first half of book 12, in Chapter 4. What will emerge is that the hodos has the capacity to organize the shape and structure – the ‘forms of succession’ – of a discourse, in this case Homer’s text, in a distinctive way. I shall ultimately argue that the shape and structure of the discursive organization delineated in this chapter

¹ See Foucault (1972) 62–70 for the formation of concepts, Foucault (1972) 62–63 for the forms of succession.
² See Figure 3.1 below for a diagram illustrating the relationship between the three components discussed in the following sections.
The *hodos* in Homer provides a blueprint of Parmenides’ groundbreaking extended deductive argumentation, the topic of chapters 5 and 6.

Perhaps the most important level of analysis of the ‘forms of succession’ is the most macroscopic of the three, the level of the ‘rhetorical schema’. Foucault defines this as the rules or patterns according to which ‘descriptions, deductions, definition, whose succession characterizes the architecture of the text, are linked together’. A core claim developed in chapters 5 and 6 is that one of the main levels of continuity between the first half of Homer’s *Odyssey* 12 and Parmenides’ ‘Route to Truth’ is to be found at the level of the rhetorical schema. Tracing this continuity will give us a decisive insight into both Parmenides’ strategies for refashioning his ‘new way of thinking and knowing’ and the underlying ‘architecture of the text’ that determines the shape and structure of his extended deductive argument.

The second and third levels Foucault articulates are the ‘ordering of enunciative series’ and the ‘levels of dependence’, respectively. The categories discussed under the rubric ‘ordering of enunciative series’ are in fact the same categories that elsewhere traffic under the name ‘Discourse Modes’, ‘Text-Types’, or, more traditionally, ‘Rhetorical Modes’. In Foucault’s scheme these are three in number: we may refer to them here by their more familiar names, ‘narration’, ‘description’, and ‘argument/inference’. Foucault does not define the ‘levels of dependence’, electing instead simply to exemplify them; the examples given include ‘hypothesis/verification, assertion/critique, general law/particular application’. Although Foucault stresses that ‘types of dependence’ between units of statements need not be ‘superposable on’ the categories that comprise the ‘orderings of enunciative series’, that is in fact precisely how I wish to make use of these categories in the analysis to come. More specifically, I shall take the ‘orderings of enunciative series’ as the base units of analysis in my discussion of various *hodoi* elaborated in the course of the

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3 Foucault (1972) 64.
3.1 The Theoretical Apparatus in Context

Odyssey, and, with these in hand, shall attempt to see how the rhetorical schema governed by the figure of the hodos determines an overarching pattern of organization – a discursive architecture distinctive to the figure of the hodos – out of these base units.⁵

If it is dry work to summarize technical aspects of Foucault’s system in the abstract, the application of this schema in what follows will make it clearer what precisely is meant by the terms in question, and how they work. I shall undertake this in Section 3.2; the next step, however, is to anchor Foucault’s apparatus in current discussions in Homeric scholarship.

3.1 The Theoretical Apparatus in Context

3.1.1 The oimē, Themes, and Rhetorical Schemata

At first glance, Foucault’s notion of a rhetorical schema might be thought to approach two topics in Homeric studies: the use of metapoetic devices, and so-called catalogic discourse. The latter we shall explore below (see Section 3.1.4); the former we shall examine here, in large part to clarify one way in which I do not intend to use Foucault’s term when discussing epic poetry.

Scholars have discerned a number of metapoetic images at work at various points in the Iliad and the Odyssey. According to one view, the poem is a craft production, an object constructed in the manner of Odysseus’ raft, for example, or his well-made bed.⁶ According to a more well-developed tradition, the Homeric text has been seen to emerge at the intersection of imagery related to weaving and sewing.⁷ The unavoidable point of comparison in this context, however, is the oimē, or ‘path of song’.⁸

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⁶ Developed at greatest length by Dougherty (2001); see esp. 27–37, 177–83.

⁷ See e.g. Nagy (1996a), esp. 65–113 and Nagy (1996b), esp. 59–86.

The hodos in Homer

Although there may seem to be many tantalizing similarities between the oimē as a metapoetic figure and what we shall examine under the rather cumbersome name of the ‘rhetorical schema of the figure of the hodos’, caution must be exercised. One prominent conceptualization of the oimē takes each particular segment of the path to be a ‘theme’ in the Parry–Lord sense, the idea is that these oimai are ‘tracks cut into the landscape’ that link together end on end and, taken collectively, define a ‘map’ of Epos. Are these oimai, perhaps, coextensive with Foucauldian rhetorical schemata?

The answer, at least in this book, is no. The reason the answer is no depends in part, however, on just what it is that one means by oimē. The way that the word is used in the Odyssey suggests that an oimē in fact comprises a relatively large unit. Demodocus’ postprandial performance, described in terms of an oimē in one of only three passages where the word appears in Homer, encompasses ‘The Quarrel of Odysseus and Achilles’; later, Odysseus will ask him to ‘move along [the path of song] and sing “The Fashioning of the Wooden Horse”’. These are both apparently rather lengthy productions; if that is the case, their scale is larger than that to which the rhetorical schema of the hodos will refer. (For comparison, Circe’s foretelling of Odysseus’ hodos in Odyssey 12, the central example of the rhetorical schema of the hodos that I examine below, occupies slightly more than 100 lines (12.27–141) of the four books of aoidē Odysseus makes it through in a single evening with the Phaeacians; one hardly imagines that

9 One aspect of overlap that is noteworthy, however, is that knowledge of the oimē and the hodos (in the Odyssey) are both apparently bestowed upon mortals by actors who are either divine (the Muses in the case of the oimē; Athena, Circe, and Proteus for the hodos) or otherwise have privileged access to knowledge (Tiresias). For the Muses and the oimē, see Thalmann (1984) 123–29; Thornton (1984) 33–39; Ford (1992) 42–48; Giannisi (1997) 139–40; and esp. Clay (2011a) 116–17. Passages relating to the hodos will be discussed below; see also Section 2.4.2, ‘Whose Muse’, above.

10 This is, for example, Ford’s view ((1992), esp. 40–43); for the classic articulation of a ‘theme’, see Lord (2000) 68–98 and the survey in Foley (1990) 240–47, 279–84.


12 See Od. 8.72–82, esp. 8.74–77, ὀμῆς τῆς . . . νείκος Ὀδυσσής καὶ Πηλείδω Ἀχιλῆς, and Od. 8.492–95, esp. 492–93, ἀλλ’ ἄγε δὴ μετάβητι καὶ ἔτος Πηλείδας ἀνθρακίνοιον (after Ford (1992) 43). The grammar in Od. 8.72–75 is contested; see e.g. Stanford (1959) ad loc. and Thornton (1984) for opposing views, see also Heubeck, West, and Hainsworth (1988) 351.

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Demodocus discharges his duties with such brevity.) On this understanding, an oimē would seem to be something considerably longer than the amount of text governed by a rhetorical schema, at least as we find it in Homer.\(^\text{13}\)

Other discussions of the oimē emphasize the idea that it is something that a poet can hop on or off at any number of points along the grand path of Epos as a whole. On this view, as a poet performs, ‘no matter how small the scale of the performance’ he or she would simply be on the oimē, the ‘path of song’, in virtue of orally performing a poem.\(^\text{14}\) There is an important question, not always clearly expressed, about whether this idea should focus on the word-by-word, line-by-line process of bardic composition, or whether individual units on this larger epic path of song correspond to something closer to a Parry–Lord ‘theme’.\(^\text{15}\)

In the first case, the claims scholars have made about the way that the structure of a text conforms to certain patterns – and is perhaps even dictated by certain rules – are very much of the sort I shall develop below. Here again, however, there is an important difference of scale. This strand of analysis of the ‘path of song’ addresses units of text – phrases and lines – of a smaller scale than I intend to investigate via the term ‘rhetorical schema’; rather, units of text of this size are better discussed under the rubric ‘types of dependence’, addressed in Section 3.1.3 below.

In the second case, it is possible to imagine the relationship between a theme and an oimē as corresponding to, or perhaps instantiating, a form of the narratological distinction between story and plot or narrative. This is an attractive hypothesis, and it opens a vista onto an exciting perspective of Homeric poetics. But any such relationship between story and narrative is also different in kind from the relationship I wish to capture under the term ‘rhetorical schema’. Why so? If, on the one hand, any theme can be

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\(^{13}\) In principle, however, there is no necessary limit circumscribing the length of a portion of discourse governed by the rhetorical schema of the hodos; had there been more to see between Aeaea and Thrinacia, or had Odysseus narrated his other journeys differently, the schema might have governed a much longer portion of the poem.


\(^{15}\) For the first view, see the seminal Bakker (1997), followed by Minchin (2001), Minchin (2008), Bonifazi (2008), Bonifazi (2012), and also Clay (2011a) 96–119, which develops it effectively; for the second, see n. 10 above. See also n. 17 below.
expressed along the path of song (and, on this view, all themes necessarily would be) and, on the other, every path of song maps onto simply one or another of the ‘themes’ in the mythic repertoire, then the level of connection between the content of the story (the theme) and the manner in which it is narrativized (via movement along the path of song) as plot is necessarily a rather general one.\textsuperscript{16} By contrast, as we shall see, the rhetorical schema governed by the *hodos*, at least as I examine it here, dictates a far more precise relationship between story and narrative. While it is undoubtedly valuable to combine the two understandings of *oimē* as ‘theme’ and ‘path of song’,\textsuperscript{17} current scholarship on this topic allows for considerable flexibility in the relationship between the level of story and the level of plot – and this gap between the more macro structure of a theme and the micro structure of a visual poetics of the *oimē* is precisely the gap filled in part by the rhetorical schema that will be so important in what follows.\textsuperscript{18}

16 Take the first example Lord introduces in his discussion of themes: ‘[t]he first major theme in the “Song of Bagdad” (I, No. 1) is a council, one of the most common and most useful themes in all epic poetry . . . The sultan has received a letter from his field commanders who have been besieging Bagdad for twenty years without avail. He summons his councilors together, asks them what to do, receives evil advice from one of them and good advice from another, and the theme is concluded with the writing of an imperial letter to Bosnia and dispatch of the messenger’ (Lord (2000) 68). The events that comprise this theme might be narrativized in any number of ways within the framework of the poet’s visualized movement along the *oimē*; the fact that the poet travels an *oimē* need not dictate, for example, whether the good advice precedes or succeeds the bad, whether the good advice is presented in one sentence and the bad advice in 100, what other details or events might be introduced between the two, and all manner of other things of this nature.

17 See ch. 2 of Bakker (2013) (esp. charts at pp. 25 and 33) on the possibility of linking Proppian analysis with the ‘topical poetics’ suggested by the *oimē*, on which see also Ford (1992) 40–41. It is unsurprising that the Apologoi, where narrative episodes are mapped more or less one-to-one onto different locations (see e.g. Lowe (2000)), is the place where this connection would emerge – a point not without consequences for the material discussed in the remainder of this chapter.

18 This in some ways mirrors the gap between Havelock’s ‘general structure’ of Parmenides’ argument and Mourelatos’s use of a theory of metaphor to examine what the *hodos* offers Parmenides (see Introduction, pp. 13–14); again, this is the gap I believe Foucault’s framework helps us bridge. As we shall see below, the episode with Circe is distinctive precisely \textit{because} it ‘simultaneously constitutes a topographic route with precise indications of what will happen at each stage \textit{and} a narrative itinerary’ (Clay (2011a) 117, emphasis mine). This is quite different from a poetic conceit or a device of memory according to which ‘the imaginary journey of a poet can be identified with the story’ (Giannisi (1997) 140); see discussion at Clay (2011a) 116 n. 56.
3.1 The Theoretical Apparatus in Context

3.1.2 Text-Types, Discourse Modes, and Enunciative Modalities

Classic studies of text-types define these to be ‘underlying (or overriding) structures that can be actualized by different surface forms.’ On the traditional view, there is always a single, dominant (underlying or overriding) text-type that characterizes any given text. Because the roots of this approach to textual analysis are to be found in literary criticism, the text-type ‘narration’ has received the most attention and usually serves as the central, positively constructed term against which other text-types are negatively defined. Two aspects of narration are usually deemed key characteristics: first, that narration depicts ‘events or sequences of events’ and, second, that the ‘order in which events happen is significant’. By contrast, description is ‘oriented to the statics of the world – states of affairs, enduring properties, coexistants’; it often introduces elements of the story-world – persons, places, things – and/or attributes qualities to these elements.

While in the case of narration the text’s underlying progression is primarily temporal, in the case of description the text’s underlying progression is primarily spatial. Scholars have often claimed that important implications follow from this. As noted, the narration of events whose temporal order is significant endows their narration with ‘a natural principle of coherence, one that enables the narrator to construct his presentation sequence . . . according to the logic of progression inherent in the line or chain of events itself; from earlier to later’; by contrast, and significantly

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19 It is for this reason that different text-types can ‘routinely operate at each other’s service’ (Chatman (1990) 10–11). This relationship is sometimes claimed to be radically different in oral poetry; see e.g. Bakker (1997) 57.
20 The field is, of course, known as ‘narratology’. For a critique of this narrative-centric perspective, see e.g. Chatman (1990) and Koopman (2018).
21 The first phrase comes from Genette (1982) 127, the second is the formulation of Koopman (2018) 20 on the basis of his discussion of Genette, Gerald Prince, and David Herman (see also e.g. Smith (2003) 26). See Koopman (2018) 15–23 for good discussion and further bibliography.
23 On the traditional view, in the former case, the story time advances along with narrative or plot time; in the latter, it need not. See e.g. Smith (2003) 14, 26–29; Allan (2009) 173, 179. It is worth noting that I generally rely on Forster’s terminology of ‘story’ and ‘plot’ (or, less frequently, Genette’s ‘story’ [histoire] and ‘narrative’ [récit] (Genette (1980) 25–29)) to refer to what Bal (2009) 5–6, de Jong, and others call ‘fabula’ and ‘story’.

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for the analysis to be undertaken here, ‘the descriptive sequence’ is denied ‘any natural resource of coherence’. 25

More recently, the study of discourse modes, a linguistically inspired method of analysis, has emerged in parallel to the study of text-types. 26 The key insight animating this enterprise is that several features of the surface text preponderate in – or are understood to be the hallmark of – narrative or descriptive portions of text. 27 We may note three features.

First, verb forms. Tense-aspect in particular has long been recognized as ‘the most important distinctive linguistic feature’ associated with each of the text-types or discourse modes. 28 Reflecting the fact that narration is usually defined in connection with the notion of the event, the aorist and historical present are often intimately associated with narration; so, too, as we shall see, is the future tense when the narrative takes the form of a ‘prior narration’. 29 Person and mood also prove significant: description does not use the second person or the imperative mood, both of which can be found in narration.

Second, the notion that the underlying progression of the text is temporal in narration and inherently unordered in description has a correlate at the surface level of the text. This can be seen from two perspectives: from the perspective of the story and from the perspective of the plot. On the one hand, narrative portions of a text usually progress along with time in the story world; on the other, the passage of time in the story-world is most commonly expressed through, or recorded by, a sequence of narration. By contrast, movement through a descriptive passage does not necessarily suggest the passage of time in the story-world, nor does the passage of time in the story-world necessarily register in passages of description. 30

Third, textual progression is often marked by temporal adverbs (or combinations of temporal adverbs and specific particles) in the

26 See Smith (2003) 38–42 for comparison of the traditional rhetorical typology, based on form and function, and the linguistically oriented analysis of discourse, which focuses more on grammatical and other surface features of the text; see also Kroon (2007) 66.
27 See Allan (2007), Allan (2009), Allan (2013), and the studies in n. 26 above.
3.1 The Theoretical Apparatus in Context

case of high-narrativity portions of text. On the other hand, spatial adverbs (or combinations of spatial adverbs and specific particles) predominate in high-descriptivity sections.31

So much for narration and description. What of argument? In fact, typologies of ‘argument’ are much harder to produce. There are three obstacles. First, the topic is under-researched, and analysts of discourse modes or text-types have simply not devoted much attention to differentiating ‘argument’ from ‘description’ or ‘narration’.32 Second, in cases where analysts have undertaken this task, their definitions of ‘argument’ are usually so inextricably bound up in a formal, modern understanding of what constitutes an argument that it is difficult to apply such a category to a pre-Aristotelian text like the Homeric poems.33 The third stems from Parmenides’ own role in developing argument (and, specifically, extended deductive argument) and the fact that he is a key point of transition in the forms that an argument might take. Since this very transition is the central topic under investigation here, as noted in the Introduction, deciding what constitutes an ‘argument’ without already assuming the accomplishment of the phenomenon whose development we are attempting to observe is a problem.

For the purposes of this project, I shall consider a portion of text to instantiate an ‘argument’ discourse mode if it is formed of a cluster of statements that are linked inferentially; that is, if it is formed of a cluster of statements some of which explicitly provide a justification or rationale for others.34

31 Koopman (2018) 43–46, esp. chart on p. 46. Koopman’s discussion of narrativity and descriptivity in terms of a gradient is valuable.


33 See e.g. the view that: ‘In passages of the Argument and Information modes, the entities are mainly General Statives and Abstract Entities’ (Smith (2003) 31), which takes no account of, for example, practical syllogisms, the dominant kind of ‘argument’ in Homer; see Gill (1998) 41–60 and Knudsen (2014), esp. 40–79. Even more problematically, Smith’s definition of ‘argument’s textual features centres on progress by metaphorical motion (Smith (2003) 31) – almost precisely what I claim is being developed for the first time in Parmenides; see Introduction, n. 76 for similar dynamics regarding the concept of the metaphorical.

34 This formulation is indebted to Gill (1998), esp. 41–60; Knudsen (2014), esp. 42–43; Peradotto (1990), esp. 60–93. It is illuminating to recognize the importance of the
text, argument sections will be particularly densely populated by conditional clauses\textsuperscript{35} or purpose clauses, which tease out the implications of certain actions or justify pieces of instruction, and by specific uses\textsuperscript{36} of epei\textsuperscript{37} and gar\textsuperscript{38} (to be examined in further detail below).

### 3.1.3 A-B-C Patterns, and Types of Dependence

Some long-standing conversations in Homeric scholarship, particularly classic studies on catalogues and battle scenes, provide important parallels for the notion of a ‘type of dependence’\textsuperscript{39} In the Catalogue of Ships, for example, every entry is organized in relation to (a) ‘nation/generals’, (b) ‘places’, (c) ‘number of ships’;\textsuperscript{40} in some instances, further genealogical background for key protagonists is provided.\textsuperscript{41} These categories can also be examined under a more general typology where anecdotes supplement the ‘basic information’ (e.g. names and places in the question, ‘Why?’), seen by Anscombe to have a special connection with ‘reasons for action’, or, as Davidson has it, an explicit ‘rationalization’ of action; for discussion, see e.g. Thompson (2008) 85–89, esp. 85–86. We might loosely say that in Homer, ‘argument’ presents a ‘rationalization’ of action in this sense. Finally, it is worth acknowledging that there are instances where the lines between argument and other text-types are less clear; the surface features of the text discussed in nn. 35–38 thus take on an outsized importance.


\textsuperscript{36} See here Knudsen (2014) 42.

\textsuperscript{37} For uses of epei of interest here, see Muchnová (2011) 124 and Rijksbaron (2002), esp. 86 n. 4. For epei in Homer, see Muchnová (2003) and Muchnová (2011) 90–151, esp. 108–11. Incidentally, because the two passages with which we shall be most concerned – Od. 12.27–141 and Parmenides’ frs. 1.29–8.49 – are both instances of embedded narration, there is an important blurring of boundaries between the representational, presentational, and interactional levels that Muchnová (2003) uses (or, similarly, Sweetser’s semantic, epistemic, and pragmatic levels, as found in Muchnová (2011)); see also Bonifazi (2012) 192–96.

\textsuperscript{38} On the Homeric use of gar, Bakker (1997) 112–15 is an important corrective to e.g. Denniston 158 and van Groningen (1960) 19. For gar in later authors, see e.g. Slings (1997) (Herodotus); Goldhill (2012) 56–80 (Sophocles’ Antigone); Bakker (2009) (Plato); Sicking and van Ophuisen (1993) 22–25 (Lyssias).

\textsuperscript{39} See Sammons (2010) 4–8 for the history of scholarship on the topic. Kirk (1985) 169–70 provides a supplementary discussion; the mammoth Visser (1997) is comprehensive. See also n. 46 below. Finally, see also discussion of the term ‘suprasyntax’ in Bakker (1997) 121–22.

\textsuperscript{40} See the schema at Powell (1978) 255–56; see also Kirk (1985) 170–77.

\textsuperscript{41} Edwards (1980) 92–96, esp. 92.
Catalogue of Ships) with biographical information, while ‘contextual information’ offers ‘what is relevant to the context’ in which the list occurs.\footnote{Beye (1964) 346. See also Fenik (1968) 16–17; Visser (1987) 44–57; Bakker (1997) 116–19. This relationship is taken up by Sammons (2010).}

Somewhat more recently, Egbert Bakker has suggested that the so-called A-B-C pattern detailed above is the product of an oral compositional technique that operates through a process of ‘framing’ and ‘goal-setting’:\footnote{Bakker (1997) 115–22. See also Minchin (2001) 84–87.} the basic information demarcates the frame of vision and ‘orients’ listeners as to the future direction of the text.\footnote{See Bakker (1997) 86–122, esp. 119–22; quotes from pp. 89, 88, and 87, respectively.} Detail ‘added’ to the ‘frame’ ‘lends depth and significance’ to the goal, which is the event presented.\footnote{Bakker (1997) 119.} By means of this repeated pattern of elements, the epic narrator opens up narrative space, provides direction, and intensifies the experience of listeners.\footnote{Bakker (1997) 119, 122. See also the comments at Sammons (2010) 12–14. Here we verge upon contact with the large body of scholarship on ‘type-scenes’ (see e.g. Fenik (1968), Edwards (1975), and esp. Edwards (1992) 290–98, Foley (1999), and Foley (2010)). As traditionally understood (e.g. Edwards (1992) 285), type-scenes seem to operate at the level of dependence insofar as they consist of a lexicon of possible elements recombined within one narrative ‘episode’ or ‘event’ (e.g. an arming scene, or the slaying of a warrior); crucially, it is not clear that there is clearly defined mechanism for stringing these together in a sequence (not to mention a systematic, or ordered sequence) in the way that a catalogue such as a genealogy – or, as we shall see, the itinerary of a hodos – allows for.}

I shall argue in Section 3.2 below and in Chapter 4 that the rhetorical schema governed by the figure of the hodos makes available a framework of relationships between discursive units (i.e. its own distinctive ‘type of dependence’) that operates in a manner closely paralleling the A-B-C pattern and Bakker’s elaborations on it.\footnote{Unlike the Catalogue of Ships or type-scenes, however, no claim to exceptional antiquity need be made regarding the two hodoi detailed by Circe; rather, the narrative mechanics and demands of storytelling are such that this pattern is the outcome.} This framework need not be exploited but is available to be activated any time the figure of the hodos is mobilized, as Circe’s two long speeches in Odyssey 10 and 12 make clear.

\subsection*{3.1.4 Catalogues}

Discussion of the A-B-C pattern brings us to one final topic of Homeric scholarship that needs to be addressed: the notion of

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\item[44] See Bakker (1997) 86–122, esp. 119–22; quotes from pp. 89, 88, and 87, respectively.
\item[45] Bakker (1997) 119.
\item[46] Bakker (1997) 119, 122. See also the comments at Sammons (2010) 12–14. Here we verge upon contact with the large body of scholarship on ‘type-scenes’ (see e.g. Fenik (1968), Edwards (1975), and esp. Edwards (1992) 290–98, Foley (1999), and Foley (2010)). As traditionally understood (e.g. Edwards (1992) 285), type-scenes seem to operate at the level of dependence insofar as they consist of a lexicon of possible elements recombined within one narrative ‘episode’ or ‘event’ (e.g. an arming scene, or the slaying of a warrior); crucially, it is not clear that there is clearly defined mechanism for stringing these together in a sequence (not to mention a systematic, or ordered sequence) in the way that a catalogue such as a genealogy – or, as we shall see, the itinerary of a hodos – allows for.
\item[47] Unlike the Catalogue of Ships or type-scenes, however, no claim to exceptional antiquity need be made regarding the two hodoi detailed by Circe; rather, the narrative mechanics and demands of storytelling are such that this pattern is the outcome.
\end{itemize}
catalogic discourse. A great deal has been said about this topic, its relationship to oral composition, the development of epic narrative forms, and its cognitive functions and their place in a society that is either preliterate or largely so.\textsuperscript{48} Scholars have discussed three principles of catalogic discourse that are pertinent in this setting: that there is some kind of underlying classificatory rubric according to which catalogued items merit inclusion in the catalogue;\textsuperscript{49} that these items form the entries – often specifically delimited by ‘entry headings’ – that make up the catalogue;\textsuperscript{50} and that these entries are enumerated sequentially.\textsuperscript{51}

It is this final point that will prove the most crucial for the remainder of this chapter, and indeed much of the remainder of this book. How are the entries to be ordered? There may seem to be two extremes. On the one hand is the list: ‘a list presents items that are more than one in number … and have something to do with each other; but quite unlike narrative, the order of its items may be reversible or subject to free transpositions … the actual order of entries need not follow


\textsuperscript{49} A well-known point, thanks partly to the famous preface to Foucault (1970). For recent, Greek-oriented scholarship on this point, see Sammons (2010) 9; Calame (2006) 24–26; Couloubaritsis (2006a) 256.

\textsuperscript{50} See Sammons (2010) 9; its importance comes into sharper focus when one attempts to delimit the catalogic from the non-catalogic.

3.2 How the *hodos* Organizes Homeric Discourse

any scheme or have any obvious significance.\footnote{Sammons (2010): 15; the fortuitous use of the word ‘scheme’ in this definition points towards the relationship between the notion of a ‘rhetorical schema’ and a ‘catalogue’. My use of the word ‘list’ differs from the use to which it is put by Minchin (2001) 74–76, which parallels the distinction in Beye (1964) 345 between ‘bare’ lists (e.g. II. 18.38–49) and ‘expanded’ lists (e.g. the Catalogue of Ships).} On the other hand is what we might call a series, where the order of the items catalogued is *not* reversible or subject to free transpositions but is strictly determined according to some rule or principle. An example of a Homeric list would be the catalogue of Nereids at II. 18.38–49; is there any sense that it matters whether or not Glauke comes first, Amatheia last, and Doto and Proto in the middle? By contrast, an archetypal epic series can be found at lines 133–53 of Hesiod’s *Theogony* (or even the parthenogenic portion at lines 126–32). There is simply no question of Gaia coming *after*, say, Cronus or the Cyclopes (or even the mountains or Pontus): because she begets them, she must plainly precede them.

3.2 How the *hodos* Organizes Homeric Discourse: Forms of Succession

Ulysses’ journey, like that of Oedipus, is an itinerary. And it is a discourse, the prefix of which I can now understand. It is not at all the discourse (*discours*) of an itinerary (*parcours*), but, radically, the itinerary (*parcours*) of a discourse (*discours*), the course, cursus, route, path that passes through the original disjunction.\footnote{Couloubaritsis (2006a) 255: ‘Dans l’*Odyssée*, les successions dans la narration sont régulées par le schème du chemin, préservant ainsi la primauté du discours catalogique.’ By elevating this observation to the status of an epigraph, I hope to flag up the inspiration I have drawn from Couloubaritsis (2006a) and Couloubaritsis (2006b). Though what are now chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 were already well underway when I first encountered them, they nevertheless proved valuable, not least in providing a clear way to link Foucault’s ‘rhetorical schemata’ more precisely with aspects of classical scholarship, especially discussions of catalogic discourse. Given the many evocative remarks concerning ‘le schème du chemin’ in the *Odyssey*, I found my encounter with Couloubaritsis (1990) puzzling, particularly the extent to which it did not seem to pursue potential implications for the relationship between the *Odyssey* and Parmenides’ ‘Route to Truth’.}

In the *Odyssey*, the successions in the narration are regulated by the scheme of the path, thus preserving the primacy of catalogic discourse.\footnote{Serres (1982) 48–49.}
The *hodos* in Homer

It is time to put these distinctions to work. My fundamental claim comprises the following components. The *hodos*, understood as a kind of catalogic discourse, structures the discursive architecture of portions of a text according to its own distinctive rhetorical schema; it yields a series, that is, by providing a set of rules or principles according to which items that form entries enumerated in the catalogue can be linked (articulating these rules or principles will be one of the main objectives of this chapter). This rhetorical schema in turn dictates its own distinctive manner of relating one to another the internal components that make up individual entries; this pattern will be examined in terms of a specific ‘type of dependence’. Finally, the base unit I shall consider for examination is the unit of the text that is defined by text-type or discourse mode, be it narration, description, or argument (see Figure 3.1).

In chapters 5 and 6, I shall show how Parmenides reappropriates this framework for his own ends. More specifically, by retaining the rhetorical schema of the figure of the *hodos* but substituting claims about the nature of what-is in place of toponyms and place descriptions as the items that make up entries in the catalogic discourse of the *hodos*, he produced the first recorded sequence of extended deductive argumentation. Parmenides’ new creation

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**Figure 3.1** Summary of the framework: The *hodos* and forms of succession
3.2 How the *hodos* Organizes Homeric Discourse

will thus have the rigorous and clearly defined rules for sequential ordering of narration, as opposed to the ‘inherent unorderliness’ of description; it will also be made up of statements that address the statics of the world and its enduring properties, as opposed to actions and events. What we shall find, that is to say, is narrativity without narration and description without descriptivity – or, as we would call it, an extended deductive argument.

### 3.2.1 Catalogues: Constituting the Field of Statements

Understanding the discursive architecture governed by the figure of the *hodos* as a kind of catalogic discourse requires us to address three features of catalogues. First, catalogic discourse both demarcates the boundaries of a kind of closed set and structures the field of statements it encompasses in such a way as to facilitate the process of classification. By grouping together a bundle of discrete entities – be they places, individuals, objects – within a single, unifying framework, catalogic discourse organizes the terrain of the field of statements in such a way as to suggest (or, from another perspective, presuppose) a kind of underlying conceptual unity that encompasses the items enumerated. Second, the catalogic form can articulate the individual items it enumerates as *discrete items* by framing each entity as an ‘entry’ (with, furthermore, a particular quality that grants it membership in the catalogic set). Third, by unifying in a single set the discrete entities it enumerates, the catalogic mode of discourse in general makes it possible to indicate the entire set and its component entities in a single shorthand.

An example may help illuminate these points. Unlike the later routes that traverse the fabulous spaces of the *Apologoi*, the journey Athena maps out in *Odyssey* 1 remains squarely within the bounds of the ordinary Greek world and is therefore perhaps

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55 See nn. 49–50 above.
56 On the other hand, at the same time as it groups together some items, it excludes others; see n. 59 below.
57 Sammons (2010) 23; he continues: ‘by *entry* I mean the component or field which is marked off by anaphora or connective and includes the specification of an item; by *item* I mean that person, thing, place, etc., which is specified in the entry and whose specification is sufficient to render the entry intelligible’.
The *hodos* in Homer

the simplest, least elaborate journey spelled out in the *Odyssey*.\(^{58}\) We discussed above (Section 1.2) the moment Athena sets the plot of books 1–4 in motion by proposing to Telemachus that he (*Od.* 1.284–91):

> πρῶτα μὲν ἐς Πύλον ἐλθὲ καὶ εἰρεο Νέστορα δίον,
> κεῖθεν δὲ Σπάρτην ἔλθε παρὰ ξαυθὸν Μενέλαον
> ὃς γὰρ δεύτατος ἠλθεν Ἀχαιῶν χαλκοχιτῶνων . . .
> εἰ δὲ κε τεθνώτος ἀκούσῃς μηδ’ ἐτ’ ἔντος,
> νοστήσας δὴ ἕπειτα φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν
> σῆμα τέ οἱ χεῦσι.

First go to Pylos and question godly Nestor,
And from there go to Sparta to see fair-haired Menelaus,
For he came home last of all the bronze-armoured Achaeans . . .
But if you should hear that he has perished and no longer lives,
Then indeed, having returned home to your beloved native land,
Heap up a burial mound for him.

The sequential enumeration of the items – Pylos, Sparta, native land (Ithaca) – is evident. The lexical items that demarcate the entries and articulate the specific items, the pair ἐς and -δε (discussed above in Section 1.2), are equally clear. The underlying conceptual unity established across these items is a more complex question.\(^{59}\)

Third, the itinerary, with its clear point of origin (where we are now: in this case, Ithaca) and its precisely identified final destination (*νοστήσας . . . ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν*), determines the boundary markers of a closed set, one that encompasses Ithaca, Pylos, Sparta (and Ithaca again). As a result of being fused into a single unit, the

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\(^{58}\) See schemes of other journeys presented in e.g. Hartog (1996) and Montiglio (2005).

\(^{59}\) Tangentially, it is an interesting exercise to consider why, of all the possible cities in Greece (or elsewhere), Pylos and Sparta are singled out for inclusion in the set of places Telemachus should visit to seek news of his father. Though the plot of the *Odyssey* makes the link this itinerary constructs between Pylos and Sparta, Nestor and Menelaus, seem obvious, even inevitable, any number of other possible Greek sites pile up the paradigmatic axis: why not, say, Argos and Sparta? Like Nestor, Diomedes, too, was said to have undertaken a quick and painless *nostos*. Or why not Pylos and Epirus? How might the juxtaposition between Telemachus and Neoptolemus, instead of Peisistratus, have changed the story? Or why not Delphi and Dodona instead of Pylos and Sparta – how different the implications there for the relationship between man and god, the nature of inter*polis* aristocratic relations. Or why not further afield, to more marginal zones like Crete. So Athena’s catalogue reveals that catalogues (always?) conceal what they leave out.
entire ordered sequence of places can be intensively summarized by the single word *hodos* (instead of requiring that each destination be listed extensively). Here the scene in book 1 proves particularly illustrative: two hundred lines and an afternoon’s worth of arguments with the suitors after Athena set the Telemachy into motion, we find Telemachus in his private chambers (*Od.* 1.443–44):

> ἔνθ’ ὃ γε πανύχιος, κεκαλυμμένος οἶος ἀώτως,
> βούλευε φρεσίν ἕστιν ὄδοι τὴν πέφρας Ἀθήνη.

There, wrapped in a soft fleece, throughout the night
He pondered in his mind the *hodos* that Athena had indicated.

As a kind of catalogue, the *hodos*-itinerary marks out the boundaries of a category or the limits of a set. In the course of doing so it creates a distinct unit, the constituent elements of which can be summarized or indexed as a unit or as a bundle of different elements.

### 3.2.2a Rhetorical Schemata: The *hodos* Orders Places

The kind of discursive architecture organized by the figure of the *hodos*, then, is fundamentally catalogic in nature insofar as it enumerates items sequentially within a larger set susceptible to conceptual unification; in addition, it articulates the members in its set as discrete items through the catalogue’s system of ‘entries’. But what kinds of items fill entries in a catalogue, and what principles govern the order of the sequence in which they are enumerated? These are the two parameters that define the different species in the family of catalogues.

Some catalogues take as items the warriors of an army, and the principle according to which entries are sequenced is that of spatial contiguity.60 Others take the trees in an old man’s garden sequenced according to a similar principle.61 Yet others take living creatures as their items and order entries according to a principle


of genesis or begetting: this is, of course, the genealogy. The genealogy is sometimes coupled with the hodos-itinerary as a complementary kind of catalogue, the former operating ‘temporally’, the latter ‘spatially’.\footnote{As in e.g. Gehrke (1998) and Clay (2011a) 96–109.} One can understand why (Od. 1.284–85, 291):

\begin{verbatim}
πρώτα μὲν ἐσ Πύλων ἐλθὲ καὶ εἱρεο Νέστορα δίον,
κεῖθεν δὲ Σπάρτην ἐλθὼν Μενέλαον...
νοστήσας δὴ ἐπείτα φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν.
\end{verbatim}

The items enumerated in this catalogue are toponyms (and therefore refer to places), and their position as an entry is demarcated by the spatially oriented lexical items (ἐς, -δὲ) that highlight them as such.\footnote{See Section 1.2 above.}

3.2.2b Rhetorical Schemata: The hodos Orders Places

Further consideration of the sequence according to which items in this mini-catalogue are enumerated, however, clearly reveals this simple binary between a ‘spatial’ and a ‘temporal’ conception of catalogic discourse to be incomplete. It is vital to appreciate here that the temporal dimension also plays an important role in configuring the rhetorical schema of the hodos; the figure of the hodos orders spatial relationships according to movement through space \textit{in time}, with its linear, sequential flow. So, in the same example (Od. 1.284–85, 291):

\begin{verbatim}
πρώτα μὲν ἐς Πύλων ἐλθὲ καὶ εἱρεο Νέστορα δίον,
κεῖθεν δὲ Σπάρτην ἐλθὼν Μενέλαον...
νοστήσας δὴ ἐπείτα φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν.
\end{verbatim}

This is where the distinction between a list and an ordered series becomes relevant: if the Catalogue of Ships orders men according to a principle of geographical (spatial) contiguity, we might imagine a Catalogue of Places that simply takes the toponyms, rather than the names of the warriors who dwell there, as the items in its entries.\footnote{This is in fact nearer the form Edwards thinks this catalogue originally took; see e.g. Edwards (1980).} Like the hodos spelled out by Athena, it, too, would

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\textit{The hodos in Homer}

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\footnotesize
\textit{The hodos in Homer}

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be formed of items united by their underlying spatial nature. What we find above, of course, is something radically different: as the sequence of particles and adverbs πρῶτα μὲν ... κείθεν δὲ ... δὴ ἔπειτα makes explicit, the order in which these place items occur is not reversible or, as Sammons puts it, ‘subject to free transpositions’; rather, their sequence seems determined by an underlying principle or pattern. The hypothetical Catalogue of Places would, as a catalogue at least (and a repository of information), be the same whether it began with the poleis of Thessaly or Boeotia, whether the islands of the eastern Aegean led to those of western Greece or the other way around; the Catalogue of Ships (or hypothetical Catalogue of Places) shares important features, that is, with the list. By contrast, Telemachus’ itinerary would by no means be the same were he to begin with Sparta and return to Ithaca by way of Pylos – for a variety of reasons, logistical and narrative. The order of the sequence matters: the rhetorical schema of the hodos structures the items that form entries in a series. More specifically, it orders a series of spatial items (places) according to a temporal progression.

3.2.2c Rhetorical Schemata: Narrativity of the hodos-Itinerary

But what dictates the order of this progression? What principle or set of rules determines the order of the sequence by which may be enumerated the items that make up the hodos announced by Athena? We may note that closely tied up with the temporal dimension that is constitutive of the hodos-itinerary is the implicit

65 Although the function of the catalogue in the larger poem in which it might be embedded may differ; see Sammons (2010) 137 and n. 10. For a possible critique of the claim made here, see Osborne (2005a).

66 See n. 48 above for the ‘archival’ function of the catalogue, and n. 51 for the question of putting a list with no inherent order into the linear form of language. It might also be possible to understand the relationship between a list and a series as a scalar, spanning a spectrum of possibilities; this would allow us to say that the catalogue of Nereids in II. 18.38–49 is perhaps more list-like than the Catalogue of Ships.

67 It is tempting to consider this phenomenon, with its spatio-temporal configuration, in terms of Bakhtin’s notion of the ‘chronotope’. This is especially true in light of his comments, made rather in passing, regarding ‘the chronotope of the road’: ‘the factor of the journey itself, the itinerary ... imparts to the temporal sequence a real and essential organizing center ... human movement through space is precisely what provides the basic indices for measuring space and time in the Greek romance, which is to say, for its chronotope’ (Bakhtin (1981) 104–05).
need to move – in time – from one place-item to another. This element of action is another of the main aspects distinguishing the *hodos* from the hypothetical Catalogue of Places. Another look at the same passage reveals this activity-based dimension:

πρῶτα μὲν ἐς Πύλον ἔλθε ...<br>κεῖθεν δὲ Σπάρτην ἐλθὼν Μενέλαον ...<br>νοστήσας δὴ ἐπείτα φιλὴν ἐς πατρίδα γαίην.

Above, we defined narration as ‘the representation of an event or sequence of events’, a sequence where, furthermore, ‘the order in which events happens is significant’. Even stripped to its essentials, it is clear that the skeleton ‘[f]irst to Pylos, then to Sparta, finally home’ implicitly contains the ‘events’ ‘[f]irst [go] to Pylos, then [go] to Sparta, finally [go] home’. The progression of the text tracks this significance and marks it out explicitly with the string of temporal adverbs πρῶτα, κεῖθεν, ἐπείτα. Events are likewise presented in the aorist and/or imperative, features closely associated with the discourse mode of narration. It is thus the narrativity of this portion of text (as a result of which the ordering of events is significant) that imparts a necessary order to the sequential enumeration of places that make up entries in Athena’s *hodos*-catalogue.

3.2.3 Rhetorical Schemata and Types of Dependence: A Temporally Ordered Sequence of Places as a Framework for Description

That is not all, however. The story is more complex. So, too, is the first *hodos* that Circe delineates for Odysseus, the one we find in *Odyssey* 10. It may take no special knowledge to sign out the path from Ithaca to the mansions of Nestor and Menelaus on the familiar terrain of the Peloponnese; what emerges there is the significance of the sequence in which these visits are ordered. The same is not true of the route from Aeaea to the Underworld – for, as Odysseus laments, ‘no man has ever yet travelled to Hades in a black ship’

68 See n. 21 above.
3.2 How the **hodos** Organizes Homeric Discourse

*(Od. 10.502)*. Circe gives the following set of directions in response *(Od. 10.505–16)*:

*Let no need for a guide on your ship trouble you,*
*But set up your mast pole, spread the white sails upon it,*
*And sit still; the breezes of the north wind will carry the ship for you.*
*But when you have crossed with your ship through the Ocean,*
*Where there is a fertile shore, and the groves of Persephone,*
*And tall black poplars, and fruit-perishing willows,*
*There beach your ship on by the deep-eddying Ocean,*
*And yourself go forward into the mouldering home of Hades.*
*There flow into Acheron Pyriphlegethon*  
*And Cocytus, which is an off-break from the water of the Styx,*
*There is a rock there, and the junction of two thunderous rivers.*
*But there, hero, go close in and do as I tell you...*

In this passage, we see on display the hallmarks of the discursive structure governed by the **hodos**: a bounded range of places ordered sequentially (the end of Ocean and the fertile shore; the hinterlands of Hades; the confluence of Pyriphlegethon and Cocytus into Acheron and rock) in a unified set. This sequence is dictated by a narrative framework, one in which movement through space in time imparts a specific order to the sequences: *(first, depart from here), then, when *(optote) you have crossed the ocean you will find a thickly wooded shore, then from there go to the rock/confluence of Pyriphlegethon and Cocytus; then ... etc.*

We may, however, note two important points, one concerning the level of rhetorical schemata, the other the level of types of

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69 For the role played by the two *men ... de ...* pairs, see esp. Bakker (1997) 100-05.
dependence. At the level of rhetorical schemata, we have seen that it is movement through space in time that imparts the specific shape to the order of the items sequenced by the hodos as catalogic discourse. But this example urges us to take proper account of the fact that this is movement through space in time, and to pinpoint the ways this spatial dimension exerts its own influence on the possibilities for ordering the items that make up the catalogue of a hodos-itinerary. In the hodos to the Underworld, the scarcity of any temporal indicators imposing a temporal sequence on the catalogue at the level of the text brings out the underlying order inherent in the enumerated items themselves. Not only are both the spatial and the temporal dimensions of the pattern by which the hodos orders its sequence distinct and irreducible one to the other, but this spatial dimension is topological: that is, we understand space here from the perspective of the spatially contiguous, rather than absolute Cartesian space.\(^70\)

Let us consolidate observations made so far at the level of rhetorical schemata. Crucially, the rhetorical schema of the hodos has a fundamental narrativity insofar as what it depicts are events or actions, and, characteristically, the sequence of these actions or events is significant. The order in which these events or actions are sequenced in turn depends on two parameters. The underlying geography of the space traversed – specifically, the contiguity of the places where events or actions occur – determines the matrix of possible combinations this sequence can take. Movement through this space in time in turn determines one sequence or imposes a clear shape and form on the set of possibilities determined by the underlying geography of the space traversed. That is, the hodos dictates a series insofar as, by adding a dimension of ordered temporal sequentiality, it generates what we might strategically call spatio-temporal con-sequence out of spatial contiguity.

At the surface level of discourse these features are reflected in a number of characteristic ways in the Homeric examples so far examined. First, the verbs linking the units ordered by the rhetorical schema of the hodos are in some combination of the aorist tense-aspect (as one would expect with events and actions), the

\(^70\) Some scholars have employed the term ‘hodological’ to describe this non-Cartesian perspective of space; see esp. Janni (1984), also Minchin (2001) and Purves (2010), esp. 45–47. Clay (2011a) 97–116, esp. 97, is again excellent.
imperative mood, and the second person. Second, the combinations of adverbs and particles indicate the progression of the text according to a sequential pattern (and, especially in the *hodos* described in *Odyssey* 1, a largely temporally determined sequence). But this is because, third, the progression of the text tracks the sequence of the underlying story, which is itself ordered according to a temporal progression through spatially contiguous locations.

The second major point, pertaining to the level of the ‘types of dependence’, is as follows. There is a subtle but significant shift between the items enumerated by Athena to Telemachus and those enumerated by Circe to Odysseus. In the first case, we found a series of place names – ‘Pylos’, ‘Sparta’ – marked out as entries by the lexical tags ἔς or ὑδε. In the *hodos* to Hades a similar tag, ἔνθα, designates ‘entries’ in the catalogue, too. This is quite important, given that toponyms seem hard to come by in the Underworld. In this wilderness bereft of proper names, some other means of designating a place must be found: a rock, a confluence of rivers, a grove.

Somewhere between the thickly wooded shore and Persephone’s grove (*and* the tall poplars, *and* the fruit-perishing willows), between the rock and Pyriplegethon and Cocytus, we find ourselves edging away from narrative discourse towards descriptive discourse. This is not only because of the highly conspicuous substitution of the sequence of temporal adverbs πρῶτα, κεῖθεν, ἔπειτα by the tripartite anaphora of the primarily spatial adverb ἔνθα at lines 509, 513, 515;\(^71\) the passage is equally rich with verbs in the omnitemporal present (ῥέουσιν, 513; ἐστιν, 514; along with unexpressed existential predicates at 509–10 and 515).

The second entry in Circe’s *hodos*-catalogue thus blossoms into a discursive mode fully marked by ‘high descriptivity’ characteristics. We find a series of pieces of information about what the story-world is like, a set of attributions that constitute subtheme-like items in relation to themes (theme ‘Cocytus’, subtheme ‘which is an off-break from the water of the Styx’), a listing of

\(^{71}\) One thinks of the much-debated description of Tartarus in Hesiod’s *Theogony* (lines 726–819), for which see e.g. West (1966) 356–59, or, for a contrarian view, Miller (2001). Most scholars see this as classic description, one that brings the narrative progression entirely to a halt; see the stimulating Purves (2004) for further discussion.
states of affairs that is the stock in trade of description and all the grammatical features that attend this function discussed above.

To recapitulate: even without any express signalling of the temporal dimension ordering the items sequenced by a *hodos*, the discursive mode governed by this *hodos* is still marked by a kind of narrativity thanks to the inherent significance of the temporal sequence of the events it encompasses. Second, it is not only this temporal dimension that defines the order in which the *hodos* sequences its items: the inherent geography and topology of the spatial items it enumerates plays a fundamental role in dictating the set of possible combinations that form the series of the ordered sequence of the *hodos*. Third, at the level of ‘types of dependence’, the ‘entry’ component of the catalogic framework creates a regular (in the sense of both ‘orderly’ and ‘repeated’) opportunity for interludes of descriptive discourse that present states of affairs, introduce objects and places and attribute qualities to them, and are marked by the linguistic features characteristic of description (spatial adverbs and verbs in the omnitemporal present, perfect, etc.).

### 3.2.4 Types of Dependence: Narrative Episodes Tied to Places

One final point must be addressed before moving to the more consequential of Circe’s two *hdoi*. Continuing with the passage above, we find (*Od. 10.513–20*):

> ἔνθα μὲν εἰς Ἀχέροντα Πυριφλεγέθων τε ἱέουσιν
> Κώκυτος θ’, ὃς δὴ Στυγός ὑδατός ἐστιν ἀπορρόξ,  
> πέτρη τε ἐξύνεσίς τε δύω ποταμῶν ἐρίδοισπώνę
> ἔνθα δ’ ἐπειθ’, ἡρως, χρυσφθείς πέλαις, ὡς σε κελεύω,  
> βόθρον ὀρύζαι, ὡς σὺ πυγοῦσιν ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα,  
> ἀμφ’ αὐτῷ δὲ χοὴν χεῖσθαι πᾶσιν νεκύεσιν,  
> πρῶτα μελικρήτω, μετέπειτα δὲ ἢδει οἶνω,  
> τὸ τρίτον αὐθ’ ὑδατ’ ἐπὶ δ’ ἀλφίτα λευκὰ παλύνειν.

There flow into Acheron Pyriphlegethon  
And Cocytus, which is an off-break from the water of the Styx.  
There is a rock there, and the junction of two thunderous rivers.  
But there, hero, go close in and do as I tell you:  
Dig a pit, about a cubit in each direction,
3.3 Conclusions

And pour around it drink offerings for the dead:
First, honey mixed with milk, and then sweet wine,
And in the third place, water, and over this sprinkle white barley.

While it is interesting to note how the ‘tag’ ἔνθα is used at line 515 to make the pivot from description-oriented discourse to narratively oriented discourse, the temporal adverb (μετέπειτα) and ordinal language (πρῶτα, τὸ τρίτον) clearly indicate the inherent significance of the ordering of events that is the hallmark of high-narrativity discourse. As we shall discuss at much greater length in the next chapter, the imperative mood here expresses the sequence of actions that constitute the narrative; this highly narrative level nested within a highly descriptive one, which is itself nested in the narratively sequenced catalogue of the hodos, often takes this verbal form in the Odyssey. Furthermore, as the use of the imperative mood (in dashed underline), the use of the vocative, and the second person markers suggests, this level of discourse is used to convey instructions specifically pegged to the places that make up the catalogue entry and are described in the ensuing description section: we may therefore be more specific and call this level of dependence: ‘instruction’ (see Figure 3.2).

3.3 Conclusions

The apparatus developed in the first section of this chapter (3.1) provided us with a toolkit to analyse key portions of the Odyssey where the figure of the hodos plays a key role in dictating the discursive architecture of a portion of the poem. As a form of catalogic discourse, the rhetorical schema of the hodos orders the entries that form it according to a distinctive sequence. The parameters governing the order of this sequence include both

72 Cf. here Menelaus’ interview with Eidōthea and Proteus in Odyssey 4, and Athena’s instructions to Telemachus in Odyssey 1 cited above. More generally, the enumeration of a hodos in the fashion analysed in this chapter is nearly always a proleptic narration, often delivered by a female goddess (see e.g. Nagler (1996)) – and always delivered by a figure with privileged access to knowledge, for which, see Ch. 5 below – to a mortal figure. This form – a monologue delivered by one party of a two-person conversation – yields a dramatic situation requiring that the narrated instructions be delivered in second person imperatives: the same set-up we find in Parmenides’ poem, with the same grammatical consequences (and much more important ones for the history of thought; see both chapters 5 and 6 below).
a spatial and a temporal dimension. Because the items that form entries in a *hodos*-catalogue are places (Section 3.2.2a), the spatial configuration of the places to be catalogued dictates the possible sequence in which they can be arranged on the basis of their geographical contiguity (Section 3.2.2b); on the other hand, in the *hodoi* we have seen enumerated in *Odyssey* 1 and *Odyssey* 10, the fundamentally narrative dimension of the human movement from place to place imparts a clear temporal order to the sequence of places catalogued; it configures what we have termed spatio-temporal con-sequence from spatial contiguity (Section 3.2.2c). This narrativity also gave the catalogue produced by the rhetorical schema of the *hodos* the quality of a series: the order of the places matters.

The example of the *hodos* through the Underworld enumerated by Circe in *Odyssey* 10 also reveals key features of a possible type of dependence governed by the rhetorical schema of the *hodos*. As
we have seen, much as in the A-B-C pattern scholars have dis-cerned in the Catalogue of Ships, the narrative frame of the catalogue provides an opportunity for portions of description to depend from each entry (3.2.3), and for portions of narrativity (in this case, instructions) to further depend from these descriptions (3.2.4).

With this basic structure of the rhetorical schema of the *hodos* and the types of dependence it can dictate in mind, it is now time to examine the second *hodos* that Circe spells out for Odysseus: the itinerary in *Odyssey* 12 that runs from her island of Aeaea and goes to Thrinacia, where the Sun pastures his cattle.
4.1 Odyssey 12: Rhetorical Schema of the hodos

4.1.1 Rhetorical Schema of the hodos

What does the analysis set out in the previous chapter mean for Circe’s second hodos, the one she details in Odyssey 12? The overarching task of this chapter will be to analyse Od. 12.39–141 using the tools introduced and the framework developed in the Chapter 3.

The dramatic scenario in which Circe spells out this hodos is well-known. Odysseus has returned from the Underworld to attend to the bones of the hapless Elpenor. But he is also, from a narrative perspective, still empty-handed; Tiresias has not in fact provided the directions home that Odysseus needs, and it therefore falls to Circe to designate the actual itinerary of his journey home.\(^1\) She greets the returning voyagers with characteristic hospitality, and then, dispatching the ship’s crew, pledges to Odysseus: ‘I shall indicate the hodos and sign out each [of the road-marks]’ (αὐτὰρ ἔγὼ δεῖξω ὅδε ἄδε ἐκαστά σημανέω, Od. 12.25–26).\(^2\) With a minimum of preliminaries, she then launches into the business of doing just this.

In fact, in the catalogic discourse that follows (Od. 12.27–141), we find precisely what our study of the hodos enumerated by Athena to Telemachus in Odyssey 1 would lead us to

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\(^1\) As discussed by e.g. Nagler (1980), Peradotto (1990), and de Jong (2001). For the implications of this point in respect to the best way to analyse the structure of the Apologoi, see Ch. 6 below.

\(^2\) See Ch. 6 below for the link between its usage here and the use of the word sēma by Parmenides’ goddess in Fr. 8.
expect. There, we saw that: (a) the temporal adverbs and particle combinations πρώτα μὲν ... κείθεν δὲ ... δὴ ἔπειτα enumerated entries in the catalogue of the hodos-itinerary; (b) the sequence of this discursive enumeration tracked the underlying movement in the story-world from destination to destination to be undertaken in the future by Telemachus; (c) the destinations themselves were marked by the lexical items -δὲ and εἰς; and (d) the events that made up the core of the narrative were expressed in verbs in the aorist, often in the imperative mood (and in the second person). What we find in Odyssey 12 is fundamentally the same constellation of features, though with a few small modifications; for example, the second person imperatives have been replaced by second person futures. Circe begins (Od. 12.39):

Σειρήνας μὲν πρῶτον ἀφίξει.

First you will come to the Sirens.

And introduces the Cattle of the Sun (Od. 12.127):

Θρινακίην δ᾽ ἐς νῆσον ἀφίξει.

But then you will come to the island of Thrinacia.

Between these moments, a section introduced by the following lines intervenes immediately after the Sirens episode ends (Od. 12.55–58):

αὐτὰρ ἔπην δὴ τὰς γε παρεῖς ἐλάσσωσιν ἔταξιοι,
Εὔβα τοίς οὐκέτι ἔπειτα διηνεκέως ἄγορεύσω,
ὀπποτέρη δὴ τοῖς ὀδὸς ἱσσεται, ἄλλα καὶ αὐτὸς
θυμῷ βουλεύειν ἔρεω δὲ τοῖς ἀμφιτέρῳθεν.

But then indeed after your companions have passed by the Sirens, What follows there I shall no longer narrate piece by piece Which of two possibilities will in fact be your hodos, but Consider this carefully yourself: I shall tell you both from this point.

Here, too, the textual progression along temporal lines is marked through the cluster αὐτάρ ἔπην δὴ. The sequence of the textual progression and the sequence of places to be visited in the voyage
are correlated with the story-world that Circe narrates to Odysseus: the ‘what place comes next on the hodos’ (ἐνθα) is coordinated with the ‘what comes next in the narration’ (ἐπειτα δηνεκέως ἀγορεύσω).

This is as we would expect from the rhetorical schema governed by the figure of the hodos. We will in due course be able to examine the portion where Circe presents the choice. First, however, and by way of clarifying the patterns that define the other two discursive units (which will then give us a framework for examining the portion where the choice can be found), we will move to the level of types of dependence to examine how the discursive units marked out by this constellation of adverb and particle clusters, tense-aspect-mood-person configurations, and the relationship between narrated movement through space and discursive patterning are organized internally: that is, at the level of dependence.

### 4.1.2 Levels of Dependence

#### 4.1.2.1 The Sirens and Thrinacia

As expected, a brief narrative link (Od. 12.39a, 12.127a) connecting catalogue entries creates a frame from which

| Table 4.1 Preliminary division of Od. 12.39–141 by discourse-units
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sirens</td>
<td>Choice: Two Roads (and Two Rocks)</td>
<td>Cattle of the Sun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lines</td>
<td>Lines</td>
<td>Lines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39–54</td>
<td>55–126</td>
<td>127–41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 See Section 4.2.1 below, where this term will be discussed further. As a preliminary point, it will be seen that my analysis diverges from de Jong (2001) 297–98. I am interested inter alia in the relationship between discursive units, narrative units, and story units, a relationship that de Jong’s discussion precludes by taking the ‘episode’ (never defined) as the unquestioned base unit of analysis.
4.1 *Odyssey* 12: Rhetorical Schema of the *hodos*

first description (*Od. 12.39b–46, 127b–36*), then further narration (in the form of instruction – *Od. 12.47–54, 137–41*) depend (see Table 4.1). It is these relations we will now examine at further length.

The first and last of these discourse-units are as follows (*Od. 12.39–54, 127–41*):

Σειρήνος μὲν πρῶτον ἀφίσεια,

αι ῥα τε πάντας ἀνθρώπους θέλγουσιν, ὅτις σφεάς εἰσαφίκηται.

ἠς τις ἀδρείη πελάσῃ καὶ φθόγγον ἀκούσῃ

Σειρήνων, τῷ δ᾽ οὐ τι γυνῆ καὶ νήπια τέκνα

οίκας νοστήσαντα παρίσταται οὐδὲ γάνυνται,

ἀλλὰ τὰ Σειρήνες λιγυρῆ θέλγουσιν ἀοιδή

ἡμεναι ἐν λειμῶνι, πολὺς δ᾽ ἀμφ᾽ ὅστε ὁπιν θεῖς ἀνδρῶν πυθομένων, περὶ δὲ ρινοὶ μιμοῦσας.

ἀλλὰ παρεξελάαν, ἐπὶ δ᾽ οὔστ᾽ ἀλέξεια ἐτάρων

κηρὸν δεσμὸς μεληθείς, μὴ τις ἀκούσῃ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀτάρ αὐτοὶ ἀκουέμεν αἰ κ᾽ ἐθελήσαν,

δησάντων σ᾽ ἐν νη ὅθ᾽ ἐχείρας τε πόδας τε ὦρθὸν ἐν ἠστοπέδῃ, ἐκ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ πείρατ᾽ ἀνήφθοι,

ὅφη σὲ τερτόμενος ὅπτ᾽ ἀκούσῃς

Σειρήνωιν.

εἶ δὲ κε λισσάῃ ἐτάρους λῦσαὶ τε κελεύῃς,

οἶ δὲ σ᾽ ἐτί πλεόνεσα τοῦ ἐν δεσμοῖς διδέντων.

Θρινακίνη δ᾽ ἐς νήσον ἀφίσεια:

ἐνθὰ δὲ πολλαὶ βόσκοντ᾽ Ἡλίοιο βόες καὶ ἱφια μῆλα,

ἐπτὰ βαῦν ἄγελαι, τόσα δ᾽ ὀιῶν πόεα καλά,

πεντῆκοντα δ᾽ ἐκαστα. γόνος δ᾽ οὐ γίγνεται αὐτῶν,

οὐδὲ ποτὲ φθινῶσας. θεὰ δ᾽ ἐπιποιμένες εἰσὶν,

νῦμφαι ἐυπλόκαμοι, Φαεθοσά τε Λαμπετίη τε

ἂς τίνες λιγυροῖς θέλγουσιν καὶ ἐλικας βοῦς.

τὰς ἐν μὲν ἀρὰ βρέσσασα τεκοῦσά τε πότνην μῆπη

Θρινακίνη ἐς νήσον ἀπώκισε τηλόθι ναίειν,

μῆλα φυλασσόμεναι πατρώια καὶ ἐλικας βοῦς.

τὰς εὶ μὲν κ᾽ ἀσινεάς ἄρας νόστου τε μέδησαι,

ἡ γὰρ ἐντέκι ἢ ἴθ᾽ ἄκακα περ πάσχοντες

κακά περ πάσχοντες

τοῦ ἄκακον δ᾽ ἵππα τοι τεκμαίρομεν.

εἰ δὲ κε σίνηαι, τότε τοι τεκμαίρομεν· ὄλεθρον,

μη ὅπις νᾶς πάντοτε ἄτο χρόνος ζωή καὶ

όφει κακῶς νείαι, ὀδές ὑπὲρ πάντας ἐτάρους.
First you will reach the Sirens, 
who charm all
Men, whoever happens to approach them.
And whosoever draws near to them in ignorance and hears the voice
Of the Sirens, neither this man’s wife nor his little children
Will be at hand, delighted, as he returns home;
But the Sirens, enchanting him with their clear song,
Wait in their meadow, and there is a great heap of men
Rotting on their bones⁴ as the skin withers around them.

But give a wide berth as you sail past, and anoint the ears of your crewmates
With beeswax kneaded soft, in order that none
Of them hear the singing. But should you yourself wish to hear it,
Let them bind you hand and foot upright on the mast
Of the swift ship, the ropes made fast to the beam,
So that you may delight in hearing the voice of the Sirens.
And if you plead with your men, command them to untie you,
Let them bind you yet tighter still.

Then you will reach the island Thrinacia: 
and there the many
Cattle and sleek sheep of Helios pasture.
Seven herds of oxen, and as many fine flocks of sheep,
With fifty creatures in each herd. There is no begetting among them,
Nor do they ever perish. Their shepherds are goddesses,
Nymphs with beautiful braids, Phaëthousa and Lampetie,
Whom heavenly Neaera bore to Helios Hyperion.
Having given birth to them and raised them, their lordly mother
Sent them to the island Thrinacia to dwell far away
And guard their father’s sheep and cattle with curved horns.

If you leave the cattle unharmed and keep your nostos in mind,
You may all yet make it to Ithaca, despite suffering ills.
But if you harm them, in that case I foresee destruction
For ship and crew; and even if you yourself survive,
You will return late and in bad condition, having destroyed all your companions.

As expected, textual features characteristic of description are on abundant display in *Od. 12.39b–46 and 127b–36*: verbs are in the timeless/omnitemporal present indicative and in the third person

⁴ See again Stanford (1959) ad loc.
4.1 *Odyssey* 12: Rhetorical Schema of the *hodos*

(θέλγουσιν at 40 and 44, μινύθουσι at 46, βόσκοντο at 128, γίγνεται at 130, φθινύθουσι and εἰσίν at 131) or (stative) perfect (ἡμενεῖ at 45); the spatial adverb ἔνθα opens the descriptive portion at *Od.* 12.127; motion through the story-world (i.e. the future motion through it that Circe foretells) ‘stops’; the ‘statics of the world’ – states of affairs and enduring properties – are presented, and qualities and properties attributed to objects and places.

Similarly, in lines 12.47–54 and 12.137–41, we find again what we would expect to find at this level of dependence; just as in *Odyssey* 10, Circe follows descriptions of the places that form the *hodos* with instructions about what to do there. Accordingly, we find several verbs in the imperative or (especially where conditional clauses are concerned) in the subjunctive or optative; similarly, these instruction sections feature verbs in the second person, rather than the third person of description sections.

In order to analyse these sections better, it will be useful to proceed by way of a very brief detour through scholarship concerning Homeric deliberation. In a major study of this and related topics, Christopher Gill highlights three features that are characteristic of Homeric deliberation.\(^5\) First, Homeric deliberation often involves ‘working out the implications of different courses of action’.\(^6\) Second, this working out of implications involves a process by which an actor ‘first entertains and then rejects a certain course of action; and the rejection is a crucial preliminary to the reaching of a conclusion’.\(^7\) Third, these courses of action are often ‘evaluate[d] . . . in light of explicit or implied goals’ or in relation to a general rule;\(^8\) so the thought pattern often adheres to the following form: ‘if I do \(x\), then \(y\) will happen, and this involves \(z\), which is bad or good.’\(^9\) Rachel Knudsen has identified two further features of Homeric deliberation: first, the conclusion of a chain of inferences often takes the form of an imperative or some other kind of instruction (something concerning actions, that is, rather than states of affairs); and, second, these

\(^{5}\) Gill (1998) esp. 41–60, Knudsen (2014); see also Section 3.1.2 and, also in Ch. 3, nn. 33–35.


\(^{7}\) Gill (1998) 50.


\(^{9}\) Gill (1998) 54.
conclusions often come first and are linked to the supporting premises, which come after, by *gar* or *epei*.\(^1\)

Returning to the Sirens, two points may be established. First, that Circe does not merely provide a set of detailed instructions for Odysseus (in the form of the imperatives); instead, she persistently justifies them by embedding them in a purposive or explanatory framework. The means by which she does so are grammatical: the purpose clause and the conditional construction.\(^2\) Thus Circe’s imperative: *οὔτε ἀλείψαι ἑταῖρον* (*Od. 12.47*) is not expressed as some kind of divine injunction imposed from above; rather, she supplies a rationale in the form of the negative purpose clause: *μὴ τὶς ἀκούσῃ τὸν ἄλλον* (*Od. 12.48–49*). As Knudsen suggests, it is the conclusion, expressed in the form of an imperative to an action, which comes first; as Gill leads us to expect, it is by virtue of thinking through (a) the implications of a course of action (b) in reference to a particular goal or end that each imperative is justified. So, too, her final instructions for Odysseus’ encounter with the Sirens – *οἱ δὲ σ’ ἔτι πλεόνεσσι τὸτ’ ἐν δεσμοῖς διδέντω* (*Od. 12.54*) – forms the apodosis of a conditional clause: *if* you plead with your companions to release you, *then* let them bind you tighter still. In the first instance, Circe establishes the explanatory relationship between her instructions and the rationale behind them in the form of a purpose clause: her instructions (anointing the ears of Odysseus’ crew) represent a good way to achieve a particular outcome (preventing them from hearing the Sirens’ song and, ultimately, being seduced by it). In the second, she uses a conditional clause to articulate something akin to a causal relationship: an effect to be triggered in the event that a given condition is met. We even see a chain of explanatory argument evolve in

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\(^{1}\) Knudsen (2014) 41–76, esp. e.g. 48–49, 42–43 for the respective points. For the role played by *epei*, see Ch. 3, n. 37 above. The position of the ‘conclusion’ first, and its justification or support second has been much noted; see Ch. 3, nn. 37 and 38 above for bibliography.

\(^{2}\) For a contemporary analysis of the place of the purpose clause in action theory, see e.g. Thompson (2008) 85–88, esp. 87–88. Particularly interesting is the importance of the question ‘Why?’ (see Ch. 3, n. 34 above) in tracing out the rationale behind the performance of (or, in Circe’s case, imperative to) certain actions. This ‘Why?’ question is what we find in *Odyssey* 12’s third level of ‘types of dependence’ (but not its sister passage in the *hodos* of *Odyssey* 10) and what we will find in Parmenides’ fragments 2 and 8 (though not, so far as we can discern, in the Milesian cosmologists – see discussion in Section 6.1, ‘*Sēma* I’ below).
the linkage between the two (12.49–52): Circe locates her instruction in the apodosis of a conditional clause, and this apodosis triggers its own purpose clause – if what you want is to hear the Sirens, have your men bind you to the mast in order to hear the song of the Sirens and take delight in it (without being fatally waylaid by their seductive song).

The second point is that if it seems natural, even obvious, that Circe should account for her instructions to Odysseus, the first hodos she details (in Odyssey 10) suggests otherwise. There she outlines a series of places Odysseus will need to pass through en route to Hades, giving a detailed series of instructions about what to do when he has arrived at the rock where Acheron receives its tributaries. Those instructions, however, are simply instructions (Od. 10.516–25):

şı δ’ ἐπειθ’, ἤρως, χρυμμυθεὶς πέλας, ὡς σε κελέω,
βόθρον ὀρύξαι, ὅσον τε πυγμοῦσιν ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα,
ἄμφ’ αὐτῷ δὲ χολὴ τισθαι πᾶσιν νεκύσσαι,
πρῶτα μελικρήτῳ, μετέπειτα δὲ ἢδει οὖν,
τὸ τρίτον αὐθ’ ὑδατι’ ἐπὶ δ’ ἀλλιτα λευκὰ παλύνειν.

But there, hero, go close in and do as I tell you:
Dig a pit, about a cubit in each direction,
And pour around it drink offerings for the dead:
First, honey mixed with milk, and then sweet wine,
And in the third place, water, and over this sprinkle white barley.
And promise many times to the strengthless heads of the dead
That when you return to Ithaca, a barren cow, whichever is your best,
You will slaughter in your palace, and pile the pyre with fine gifts,
And sacrifice just for Tiresias an all-black
Ram, the one conspicuous in your flocks.

Indicators, syntactical or semantic, articulating explanatory, pur-
posive, or intentional relationships justifying these instructions are completely absent: Odysseus is simply supposed to do the things she tells him to do. The contrast between these two ‘instruction’ segments depending from the ‘description’ sections

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(the first bare instructions, the second embedded within a framework of inferential justification) suggests we might do well to call this section not only ‘instruction’ (as does de Jong), but even ‘justified instruction’ – or even, according to the terminology set out in Section 3.1.2, ‘argument’.

The Thrinacia episode develops this penchant for examination and explanation. Recall Gill’s observation that in Homeric deliberation, the deliberating character often ‘entertains and then rejects a certain course of action; and the rejection is a crucial preliminary to the reaching of a conclusion’. Common to Od. 12.47–54 and 12.137–41 is the use of conditional clauses, though the differences between them in the Sirens episode and those related to Thrinacia are striking. In the first case, the conditional sentences are geared towards attaining a certain set of outcomes – to hear the Sirens and not be destroyed by doing so. By contrast, the three conditional clauses in the Thrinacia episode examine the terms and consequences of a single choice. Two mutually exclusive possibilities are presented: either Odysseus and his men can leave the cattle unharmed, or they can harm the cattle – plainly they cannot both harm and not harm the same cattle (the point is driven home by the binary pair ἀσινέας/σίνηαι, 12.137, 139). What is more, these choices are presented as exhaustive: these two options are plainly the only two conceivable options. In the first case the outcome is clear: nostos for all. Not so the second case; again deploying the framework of the conditional clause, Circe examines two possible consequences resulting from the second course of action. That Odysseus’ men will perish and his ship will be destroyed is expressed unequivoically (τεκμαίρομαι), but ‘even if’ (εἰ . . . κεν . . .) Odysseus happens to survive, he will be much delayed and will return in grievous circumstances (139–41). And although Circe does not explicitly reject one of the two courses of action, the way in which she establishes the implications of each strongly suggests the undesirability of one – ‘a crucial preliminary to the reaching of a conclusion’.

13 Discussed by Benardete (1997). See e.g. Wakker (1994) 120–25, 400–12 for much more general comments on the disjunctive nature of the Greek conditional clause.
Levels of Dependence in *Odyssey 12*: The Relationship between ‘Description’ and ‘Instruction’/’Argument’

We see, then, that the two ‘description’ passages fulfil two of the basic roles the study of narrative has typically assigned to description: to introduce the places, objects, characters, and so forth that are to feature in a given narrative segment, and to make this world and its components vivid. This pair of functions is particularly vital at this stage in the narrative, located as we are in the fantasy world of the *Apologoi*. Since Pylos and Sparta, Nestor and Menelaus need rather a different introduction from, say, the Sirens, the scenario is quite different from what we saw in *Odyssey 1*; in the fantasy world of the *Apologoi*, a world must be formed anew each time the next island-episode appears on the horizon, its story-universe invented and peopled with characters, filled with objects. The two ‘instruction’ or ‘argument’ subsets of the Siren and Thrinacia episodes, meanwhile, reveal a persistent tendency on the part of the goddess to justify or provide explanations for the instructions she offers, and an interest in examining the relationship between action and outcome, decision and consequence.

With this in mind, we may propose the following relationship between *Od.* 12.39b–46 and 12.47–54, and 12.127b–36 and 12.137–41, respectively. The descriptive passages each (a) introduce the setting and *dramatis personae*, then (b) hone in

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16 See Bal (2009) 31–47, esp. 36; also Hamon and Baudoin (1981), de Jong (2011b), and Koopman (2018) 32–38. Nor are these modern considerations out of place in the world of Homeric poetics. As Scodel (2002) 91–92 puts it, descriptions of the sort in question here ‘do not provide information irrelevant now but useful later, as modern exposition does, nor do they compensate for possible ignorance in the audience. Instead they create the so-called reality effect, locating the action precisely in a landscape’. See also Minchin (2001) 101.

17 Especially if we wish to tap into the specifically Greek conception of *enargeia*, for which see e.g. Bakker (1997) and Bakker (1993a).

18 Though see e.g. Foley (1999) and Foley (2010) for the general question concerning the degree to which episodes in the *Apologoi* represent traditional material, well-known to the audience, that is merely reworked in the poem we have; likewise Reinhardt (1996), Kirk (1962), Hopman (2012), Burgess (2012); for a comprehensive bibliography of this question from the perspective of Analytic/Unitarian polemics, see Heubeck (1989) 4–7; for bibliography and excellent analysis regarding the Sirens specifically, see Heubeck and Hoekstra (1989) ad 39–54. See also Scodel (2002) 120.

19 Which is ‘an archipelago: built of a string of island episodes, each with its own closed internal topography, and cut off from communication with its neighbors by a sundering sea . . . a place without human landmarks’, as Lowe (2000) 135 aptly puts it.
The hodos in Odyssey 12

immediately on the most pertinent details, which (c) are examined through a kind of embedded narrative that directly or indirectly sets up the ‘instruction/argument’ passages that follow.\(^20\)

Particularly deft in this last respect is the failed nostos Circe presents in miniature in the Sirens episode. She does this through the syntactical resource of the indefinite general relative clause (hos tis, Od. 12.41–43), which allows her to set out one of the two key considerations to be negotiated in the following ‘instruction’: that the Sirens’ song is so seductive that it prevents passing sailors from fulfilling their nostoi and rejoining their wives and children.

In the Thrinacia episode, this means introducing the cattle, adumbrating their number,\(^21\) their extraordinary qualities (Od. 12.130–32), and the degree to which the Sun god cares about them (Od. 12.132–36).

This judicious dispensation of details laying the groundwork for narration to come might simply be thought a mark of good story-telling. Richardson writes: ‘Homer is not interested so much in the object of the description as he is in its effect on the particular scene, and he therefore feels no need to describe the setting for its own sake but only on those occasions when it matters.’\(^22\) But this narrative strategy should not be taken for granted. As we saw in the case of Circe’s first hodos, instructions issued by the goddess, however vital, need not necessarily be preceded by much in the way of preparatory description; just because a place or object ‘matters’, that is, does not guarantee that it will be presented to the audience prior to ‘mattering’. In the episodes that bookend Circe’s second hodos, however, her instructions and the justification she provides for them are scrupulously anticipated by details introduced in the preceding descriptive sections.

\(^20\) It may also lay the groundwork for elements of Odysseus’ actual encounters with the creatures and places described; see Heubeck and Hoekstra (1989) ad 39–54, ad 47; the introduction of Lampetia provides a narrative ‘seed’ – after the cattle are consumed, it is she who conveys this news to her father (Od. 12.374–75). See also Benardete (1997) 101.

\(^21\) In which critics since at least Aristotle have seen an important symbolic charge; see e.g. Bakker (2013) 101–08; Garcia (2013) 240–42; Buchan (2004) 155–61.

\(^22\) S. Richardson (1990) 50; see 50–69 for ‘setting description’. This now seems to represent the scholarly consensus. In addition to n. 16 above, see e.g. de Jong (2011a) 21; de Jong (2011b) 33; Minchin (2001) 101, 119; Minchin (1999). For the Iliad, see also Clay (2011a) 101 n. 17.
4.2 Krisis

If details that matter need not necessarily be introduced but are in *Od.* 12.39–46 and 12.127–36, Richardson’s general formulation does only partial justice to the sophisticated use to which the details that ‘matter’ are put in the instruction/argument sections of *Od.* 12.47–54 and 12.137–41. Details are not introduced in the first sections merely to make a brief cameo in the second before Circe moves on; rather, they are carefully placed in an intentional and purposive framework, or examined in terms of their modality and the matrix of possible consequences that can issue from them. Circe does not simply say ‘put wax in your men’s ears and have them tie you to the mast’ as she does ‘dig a pit of so many cubits, perform this ritual in this sequence, make such and such a vow’ (*Od.* 10.516–25). Instead, in her instructions to act a certain way, Circe explicitly addresses the question, ‘Why?’, and her discourse, teeming with purpose and conditional clauses, bears the mark of this rationalization.23

We may summarize the type of dependence between the description and instruction/argument sections in the following way. In the episode of the Sirens and of Thrinacia, Circe’s descriptive sections serve both to create a world within which the narrative actions are located and to anchor this world in a sense of reality; they also hone in on specific elements of this world that are often of direct significance for the instructions that follow on from them; and, finally, these details serve as the evidence that provides a basis for the instructions issued, and upon which they are justified (or create a consequential framework surrounding the different stances Odysseus and his men might take in relation to them). These observations will also provide a useful starting point for an examination of the intervening passages, in which the Planctae, Scylla, and Charybdis feature.

4.2 Krisis

4.2.1 Rhetorical Schemata

If analysing *Od.* 12.39–54 and 12.127–41 can be done rather neatly, how best to analyse the different units that make up *Od.*

23 See Ch. 3, n. 34 above.
12.55–126 is more challenging. De Jong’s commentary, generally a reliable starting point, is misleading or inaccurate in a number of ways when it comes to this passage. For example, lines 12.108–10 and 124–26 are inexplicably assigned to Charybdis, not Scylla; the first half of line 12.73 addresses not only Scylla, but both Scylla and Charybdis; lines 12.81b–82 are plainly not descriptive. One suspects that these uncharacteristic inaccuracies stem from de Jong’s decision to use the individual characters or places – viz. the Sirens, the Planctae, Scylla, Charybdis, Thrinacia – as the base units (‘episodes’) of her analysis. While this is appropriate for the Sirens (12.39–54) and Thrinacia (12.127–41), where the segmentation of the text (that is, of the narrative or plot) corresponds to the discrete places where Odysseus will arrive, in lines 12.55–126 something else is going on.

As noted, *Od.* 12.55–58 fits the model of ‘prior narration’, the top unit in the levels of dependence:

\[\text{αὐτάρ ἔπην δὴ τάς γε παρέξ ἠλάσωσιν ἐτοῖροι, ἑνθὰ τοι οὐκέτι ἐπείτα διηνεκέως ἁγορεύσω, ὁπποτέρερ δὴ τοι ὁδὸς ἔσσεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἑμὺν ψυκεον ἔρεω δὲ τοι ἁμφοτέρωθεν.}\]

But then indeed after your companions have passed by the Sirens, What follows there I shall no longer narrate piece by piece Which of two possibilities will in fact be your *hodos*, but Consider this carefully yourself: I shall tell you both from this point.

Two recent studies on *autar* and *autar + epei/epeita/epēn* have made clear how these clusters of what are traditionally classed as particles and conjunctions are better understood as discourse markers that help speakers organize their discourse by parcelling it into distinct units.\(^{25}\) Applying their findings to this portion of the *Odyssey*, we may say that αὐτάρ ἔπην would here mark the beginning of a new narration section. Similarly, we find typical markers of narrative activity, including three verbs in the future indicative ἁγορεύσω, ἔρεω, and ἔσσεται.\(^{26}\) The cluster ἐπείτα διηνεκέως also marks the progression of the text along temporal lines. All the features of narration discussed above are in play here.

By contrast, very few of these narrative elements are found in 12.59–126. Instead, we find extensive stretches of description (to be examined shortly) introduced by the portentous phrase (*Od.* 12.57–58):

\[\text{ὁπποτέρη δὴ τοι ὁδὸς ἔσσεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἑμὺν ψυκεον ἔρεω δὲ τοι ἁμφοτέρωθεν.}\]

These two *hodoi*, both of which she promises to enumerate, in fact introduce what amounts to 47.5 lines (12.59–106a) of description; verbs in this portion of the text overwhelmingly take the omni-temporal present, and nearly all the adverbs used are spatial (e.g.

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\(^{25}\) *Bonifazi* (2008) 48; see ibid., pp. 48–51 for *autar* (*epei/epeita/epēn*). See also *Bonifazi* (2012) 234 for *autar*’s role ‘marking ... transitions to entirely new threads of discourse or to new narrative sections’.

\(^{26}\) The first two verbs function at the pragmatic level of the plot and discourse organization, rather than the story narrated (the ‘presentational’ level in Bonifazi’s typology; see also Ch. 3, n. 37 above).
enthen at 12.59; entha at 12.85; tēi [‘past there’] at 12.62, 12.66; tōi [‘in that place’] at 12.103, 12.104). The text proceeds along largely spatial lines, with little movement in ‘story’ time (barring one important exception, which we shall note shortly). The function of these portions is clearly to introduce elements of the story-world and attribute qualities and attributes to them.

One major exception is a curiously ambiguous line and a half of plainly narrative language occurring at 12.81b–82, just after the first of the ‘two rocks’ (viz. Scylla’s rock) is introduced (Od. 12.80–82):

μέσσῳ δ’ ἐν σκοπέλῳ ἔστι σπέος ἡμοιδές,
πρὸς χόφον εἰς Ἐρέβως τετραμένον, ἢ περ ἄν ύμεῖς
νῆα παρὰ γλαφυρῆν ἱθὺτε, φαίδιμ’ Ὅδυσσεῦ.

About halfway up [the first rock] there is a misty cave,
Turned towards the dark, towards Erebus, past which you
Shall steer your hollow ship, shining Odysseus.

As the commentators note, ἱθὺτε is an aorist subjunctive; when combined with the ὁν in the environment of a prophecy, this has the force of something approaching a command.

What are we to make of this? Lines 81b–82 (Ἦ ... Ὅδυσσεῦ) plainly cannot be designated as descriptive (as de Jong would have it): the textual features are not those of description, neither establishing features of the narrative world nor attributing qualities to the characters that populate it. Depending on how one interprets the force of the subjunctive + an construction in the context of a prophecy, this could either be a prior narration section, which would introduce a new unit, or an instruction section, which would close off an old unit, according to the analysis we have been undertaking so far (see Figure 4.2 below). Perhaps in this setting, however, the ambiguity is useful. We might do well to see the clause that spans the two lines as doing double duty: as instruction, it closes off the section that, as

27 It is worth clarifying that ‘story time’ as I use it here refers to the future moment of Odysseus’ journey through the story space described, not the progress of time during the conversation between Circe and Odysseus on Aeaea – nor the progress of time in the Phaeacian court as Odysseus narrates.
28 As Stanford ad 12.80–82 makes clear; see also ‘Circe is indirectly advising Odysseus to choose this second route’ (Heubeck and Hoekstra (1989) ad 12.81–82), and Heubeck and Hoekstra (1989) ad 12.108, Chantraine (1963) 210–11.
we shall see, details a choice between the two ‘routes’, while as prior narration it opens a new kind of textual or discursive unit in which the two creatures, Scylla and Charybdis, are presented in high-descriptivity passages followed by instruction/argument (12.106b–110) concerning how best to address them.

A version of de Jong’s schema modified to take these points into account might look like Table 4.2. On this reading, we can identify three possible units of analysis. The first would be discursive units, units of discourse parcelled out or marked off as discrete items by discourse markers on the surface of the text (clusters of adverbs and particles, here in combination with prior narration introducing the new unit and following a section of instruction closing the old units); these would be distinctions made at the level of discourse and would here be coextensive with entries in the catalogue of Circe’s hodos-itinerary (capitalized in Table 4.2). These units we may contrast with what we may still, following convention, call episodes, which would correspond to all the locations Circe mentions, regardless of whether

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30 Specifically, the ‘presentational level’ (see Ch. 3, n. 37 above).
she actually instructs Odysseus to visit them; these episodes may revolve around particular characters (e.g. the Sirens) but they are ultimately tied to specific places (which number five, underlined in Table 4.2, and would include the Planctae and Charybdis (rejected by Circe)). Finally, we can identify a third category between these two, what we might call a ‘hodos-unit’, which marks out a distinct node in the itinerary (based on the analysis of the level of dependence undertaken so far) that makes up the hodos enumerated in the catalogic discourse of Circe’s prophecy. This level may be seen to bridge the underlying story-world and the level of discourse by capturing the way elements in the story-world are organized by discourse (these number four, in boldface in Table 4.2).

Table 4.2 Preliminary analysis of Od. 12.39–141

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Discourse mode</th>
<th>Lines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIRENS</td>
<td>Prior Narration (PN)</td>
<td>39a (‘you will first come to’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>39b–46 (epic te in 39 and 44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Argument</td>
<td>47–54 (imperatival infinitives in 47, bis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHOICE</td>
<td>PN</td>
<td>55–57a (‘I cannot tell you what your way will be’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice 1</td>
<td>Instruction</td>
<td>57b–58 (imperatival infinitive in 58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planctae</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>59–72 (epic te in 62, 64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Rocks</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>73a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scylla</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>73b–81a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice 2/Scylla</td>
<td>Instruction(PN)</td>
<td>81b–82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scylla</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>83–100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charybdis</td>
<td>PN</td>
<td>101 (‘you will see’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>101–06a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Rocks</td>
<td>Argument</td>
<td>106b–110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Scylla 2)</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>118–20 (epic te in 90, 93, 99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Argument/PN</td>
<td>121–26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THRINACIA</td>
<td>PN</td>
<td>127a (‘you will come to’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>127b–136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Argument + PN</td>
<td>137–41 (‘if you do A, then you might/will . . .’)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All caps = discourse-unit; bold = hodos-unit; underlined = episode.

31 Or, following the schema in Ch. 3, n. 37 above, the ‘representational level’.
It is this level of analysis, the hodos-unit (see Table 4.3), that will provide the basis for the following discussion; breaking things down in this fashion allows us to glean a better insight into the two passages where choices are presented (12.57–82; 81–110, 115–26) and, by helping us better discern the shape of Circe’s hodos, help us better analyse the discursive dynamics through which it is expressed. How, then, does this work in practice?

As we have seen, Circe disclaims the ability to instruct Odysseus, telling him she will present two options between which he must choose (12.57–58):

οἰ πποτέρητοι οὐς ἔσσεται, ἄλλα καὶ αὐτὸς θυμῷ βουλεύειν· ἐρέωδέτοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν.

The first of these two (and both ὁ πποτέρητοι and ἀμφοτέρωθεν underscore the duality of the choice) is presented by lines beginning ἔνθεν μὲν γὰρ ἐπηρεφέες (‘There on the one hand [are] steep rocks’, 12.59). Notable is the spatial preposition enthen and the particle men, which open the door to an extended description of these steep rocks (12.59–72). The men is matched by the corresponding οἱ δὲ δύω σκόπελοι (‘And on the other [are] the two rocks’, 12.73), which in turn heads another portion of description (12.73–81a) where the first of these rocks is presented.

32 See analysis of gar in Slings (1997) under the heading ‘PUSH’ and Bakker (1997) 112–15 in terms of a ‘syntax of movement’ where an item in the path is singled out for a ‘close-up’ (89). Although Slings addresses later texts, the notion of a ‘PUSH’ expresses perfectly the shift from one level of dependence to another below it: in this case, from narration to description.
Scrupulous symmetries characterize the two items presented in the harmonized balance of the \textit{men} \ldots \textit{de} \ldots clauses, as Hopman puts it:

Circe’s prophecy clearly constructs the Planctae and the straits of Scylla and Charybdis as parallel dangers. Both involve a narrow path located between cliffs made of smooth stone (\textit{petrai}, 12.59, \textit{lis petrē}, 12.64 [Planctae]; \textit{petrē} \ldots \textit{lis}, 12.79 [Scylla]). Amphitrite, who otherwise appears only twice in the \textit{Odyssey} (3.91 and 5.422), is mentioned in relation to both the Planctae and Scylla (12.60 and 97). Finally \ldots a similar ‘description by negation technique’ is used to describe both hazards. Just as no dove would be able to go through the Planctae, not even a great archer could reach Scylla’s cave with his arrows (12.62–4 and 12.83–84) \ldots in Circe’s speech, therefore, the Planctae are structurally and thematically comparable to the Straits of Scylla and Charybdis.\footnote{Hopman (2012) 26–27. See also Danek (2002) 23.}

In Bakker’s view, as a general matter in Homer, the use of \textit{men} ensures that the option introduced by the \textit{de} clause is ‘framed’ in relation to the option in the \textit{men} clause.\footnote{Bakker (1997) 79–85, 100–08. See Bakker (1997) 103–04 for the \textit{men} \ldots \textit{de} \ldots clauses at \textit{Od}. 12.73–75, 101–02. For the more general point, see also Bakker (1993a) 12–15; Bakker (1993b) esp. 298–302.} This ‘framing’ need not set up an antithetical relationship: ‘[a] speaker using \textit{men}, looking forward to an upcoming statement with \textit{de}, does not so much \textit{presuppose} a common basis for conducting discourse as \textit{establish} one’.\footnote{Bakker (1997) 81, emphasis original.}

Whereas units of discourse are mapped onto places one-to-one in the Sirens and Thrinacia episodes, in the course of the \textit{hodos}-unit formed by the narration-description-instruction section spanning lines 12.57–82 we find two different geographic units, the Planctae and the Two Rocks. They are not introduced at the level of the narrative frame (the top level of dependence), but rather form two different entries placed in parallel at the second level of dependence, that of description.

Precisely the same dynamics are to be found in the course of lines \textit{Od}. 12.73–106a, which relate Scylla and Charybdis to each other and describe them. The two are presented through a \textit{men} \ldots \textit{de} \ldots framing device (for Scylla’s rock: ὁ μὲν οὐρανὸν ἔφυρν ἱκάνει | ὃ ἐξειτεῖ \κορυφῆ at 12.73–74; for Charybdis: τὸν Ὁ ἔτερον σκόπελον...
at the level of description rather than narration. What follows (Od. 12.73b–81a, 12.83–106a) is an extended description addressing the first option and then the second, the details of which are closely coordinated. There is also one final point: an advantage of this line of analysis is that the hodos-units do not map one-to-one onto ‘episodes’; as the confusion surrounding lines 73–81a make clear, it is entirely possible for one discrete place or character – Scylla and her rock, in this case – to be split across two different hodos-units in a way that analysing by episode does not allow for.

By way of linking the foregoing discussion to existing scholarship on ancient Greek thought, and also to pinpointing what makes this portion of the Odyssey distinctive, it is helpful to discuss these points in light of the Homeric phenomenon that Geoffrey Lloyd termed ‘polar expressions’, with which the relationship between the Planctae and the Two Rocks, and between Scylla and Charybdis, may seem to have much in common. As Lloyd emphasizes, however, the unit that forms one half of a ‘polar expression’ can also often be paired with other units to form a ‘polar expression’ along a different axis; so, for example, ‘openly’ can be contrasted with either ‘secretly’ (ἠ ἀμφαδόν ἂν κρυφηδόν, Od. 14.330) or ‘by trickery’ (ἠ ἔδλῳ ἂν ἀμφαδόν, Od. 1.296). Furthermore, these polar opposites often admit of a third, intermediate option (or even a gradation of intermediate options): so soldiers need not be only either brave or cowardly, but can also be somewhere in between (μεσήεις, Il. 12.269). By contrast, however, and very importantly, neither hodos of the two paired

36 See Bakker (1997) 103–04 for direct discussion of this men ... de ... pairing; see the works cited in n. 34 above for further discussion.
37 Regarding Charybdis, strictly speaking she is introduced in line 12.101: τὸν δ’ ἐτερον σκόπελον χθαμαλώτερον ἔμει, Ὄδυσσει. This has a narrative element (ἔμει) which can be seen as parallel with the narrative element at lines 12.81–82. On the either/or relationship between Scylla and Charybdis, see esp. Reinhardt (1996) 99–104, also Said (2011) 170–71.
38 Aspects of the language and ‘zooming-in’ technique of Scylla’s presentation (12.73–100) have been seen to resemble the description of Tartarus in Hesiod’s Theogony 720–819, a locus classicus for the spatially organized sequencing of descriptive passages arrayed in sequence; see e.g. Hopman (2012) 16–18.
39 See Lloyd (1966) 90–94 for such expressions in Homer.
41 Lloyd (1966) 93; he also cites Od. 15.70ff.
by Circe admit of another contrary to be substituted, as with ‘openly/hidden’ and ‘openly/secretly’. No ‘third hodos’ is presented – nor does the possibility seem conceivable, unless one can rewrite the geography of the story-world. It is not only that one cannot travel both routes at the same time; it is also simply that, as presented, there do not exist any other possible routes if one wants to get from the Sirens’ Meadow to Thrinacia. That the two hodoi are part of the physical space of the story-world is central not only to their mutual exclusiveness but also, that is, to the exhaustive nature of the dichotomy they form; as a convenient shorthand, we may also refer to this phenomenon of the exclusive exhaustive disjunction (where one cannot choose both options, or neither, but must choose one) between the two paths of a forked road as a *krisis*. The *krisis* will be a feature of enormous importance in Parmenides’ poem.

With this analysis in hand, we can now identify a second kind of operation in the syntax of the *hodos* as a form of catalogic discourse. The focus has been on the ordered sequentiality according to which items form entries in the series of the catalogic discourse organized by the figure of the *hodos* (see Table 4.4a, b, c). In the exclusive disjunction or *krisis*, we see a second possible relationship that can obtain between two items of a *hodos*-itinerary within one unit of *hodos*-discourse, one that relates these two items in the story-world at the level of description, not narration.

### 4.2.2 Types of Dependence: Description and Argument in the *krisis* Section

This has implications at the level of types of dependence for sections of text that depend from the entries that make up the catalogue of the *hodos*. Compared to *Od*. 12.39–54 and 12.127–41, however, the dynamics of lines *Od*. 12.55–126 are subtly but critically distinct. Since in lines 12.55–126 it is the places themselves – as opposed to actions (e.g. to kill or not to kill the Cattle of the Sun) – that form the possible choices in question, in the scenario of the *krisis* it is the nature of the places themselves (as opposed to the actions one can or cannot perform there) that now commands the narrator’s attention. The places themselves must be
Table 4.4a *Organization by (possible) episodes (after de Jong)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sirens</th>
<th>Planctae</th>
<th>Scylla</th>
<th>Charybdis</th>
<th>Thrinacia</th>
<th>?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prior Narration</strong></td>
<td>39a</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>127a</td>
<td>55–57a, 81b–82?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Description</strong></td>
<td>39b–46</td>
<td>59–72</td>
<td>73b–81a, 83–100, 118–20</td>
<td>101–106a</td>
<td>127b–136</td>
<td>73a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Instruction/Argument</strong></td>
<td>47–54</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>106b–110, 121–26</td>
<td>137–41</td>
<td>57b–58?, 81b–82?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 4.4b Organization by discourse-units/episodes visited

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIRENS</th>
<th>CHOICE</th>
<th>THR.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Two Roads)</td>
<td>Planet: Two Rocks</td>
<td>(Two Rocks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PN</td>
<td>39a</td>
<td>55–57a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All caps = discourse-unit; bold = *hodos*-unit; underlined = place visited; strike through = place not visited.
Table 4.4c *Organization by hodos-units*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sirens</th>
<th>Two Roads</th>
<th>(Planct.)</th>
<th>(Two Rocks)</th>
<th>Two Rocks</th>
<th>(Scylla)</th>
<th>(Ch.)</th>
<th>Thrin.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PN</td>
<td>39a</td>
<td>55–57a</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>81b–82</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>127a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
adequately described in order that a choice between them may be made. As a result, in lines *Od. 59–126*, description predominates to a far greater extent than in other sections: in the Sirens episode the portions are virtually even (7.5 lines of description to 8 lines of argument), while in the Thrinacia episode we find a description to argument ratio of nearly 2:1 (9.5 lines to 5) – between lines 12.59 and 126, however, the ratio stands at nearly 6:1 (52 lines of description to 9 of instruction/argument).  

This is significant, especially given the view that oral poetry is good at, and its linguistic resources designed for, ‘describ[ing] the acts of persons and the happening of events’, but offers few means of examining the world beyond ‘verbs of doing and acting and happening’. On this view, even when the language of oral poetry is mobilized to gain purchase on ‘the nature of the outside world’, its orientation towards the expression of actions and events inclines it strongly towards doing so ‘in diachronic terms, as history rather than as philosophy or science’.

The encounter with the Sirens and the passage by way of Thrinacia are, for geographical reasons, simply givens. Circe flatly declares that Odysseus ‘will first reach the Sirens’ (12.39). This certainty lets Circe get on straight away to ‘what matters’, which is what these Sirens do: they enchant (12.40). There is simply no need to further explore their underlying nature, their ontological status, their genealogy, their form (even their number).

Regarding Thrinacia, whether or not Odysseus and his men make land there is partly what is at stake in Tiresias’ prophecy in book 11. Circe elides the question, however, simply listing it as the next place Odysseus ‘will reach’ in the sequence of his travels; what ‘matters’ for Circe is the question of the cattle. The element of choice in this section perhaps accounts for the increased

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42 This excludes lines 12.111–15, Odysseus’ sole interjection during Circe’s speech (12.111–14) and the narrator’s (i.e. Odysseus’) framing of Circe’s response (12.115).
43 Havelock (1983) 13–14 and Havelock (1978) 233–34. These claims can still be seen as a substrate shaping the views of some contemporary scholars; see, for example, the reflections found in Ford (1992) 1–12 and Minchin (1999) 58 n. 25. For further discussion on this topic, see Section 6.2 below.
45 Much to the chagrin of commentators ancient and modern; see, for example, the lengthy entry in Heubeck and Hoekstra (1989).
proportion of description relative to instruction: because what matters is the cattle (concerning whose fate there is to be a kind of choice), information about them – about their nature and their histories – is important. Not only is it what the cattle do that ‘matters’ here; what they are becomes more important.

This relationship between the introduction of a choice and the proliferation of description comes dramatically into view in the portion of Circe’s hodos presented by lines 12.59–126. Without the simple givenness that defines the encounters with the Sirens and Thrinacia (viz. that there would be an encounter with the Sirens or the Cattle of the Sun), the nature of the possible destinations in the hodos-itinerary are ‘what matter’. Accordingly, what we find is something akin to ‘describing the setting for its own sake’ here: what ‘matters’ is the very nature of the potential items making up Odysseus’ itinerary, and what will form the ‘argument’ sections is, in part, an argument about which of the two exclusive, exhaustive alternatives forming the krisis to select, and why. It is to some notable aspects of these description and argument sections, and to the relationship between the two, that we shall now turn.

4.2.2.1 Three Features: einai, Negation, epei and gar

4.2.2.1.1 Einai

As Chatman puts it, ‘if we were asked for the typical verb representing description, we would cite the copula’. Today, this makes intuitive sense: if description is generally thought to deal with states of affairs rather than events (which would properly be the domain of narrative), one might expect the verb einai to be the key resource in addressing states of affairs. But this runs contrary to one influential understanding of the nature of oral poetics generally and Homeric strategies of description more specifically. The Sirens episode provides a nice case in point. These seven lines of description, arguably among the most vivid and memorable in the Odyssey, pass by

46 Chatman (1990) 16.
47 See Havelock (1978) and Havelock (1983), endorsed by Kirk (1983) 86; see also Becker (1995) 13 and de Jong (2011C) 12 n. 5; see also Section 6.2.1.1 below.
without a single appearance of the verb. Likewise, the eleven-line description of Thrinacia has only a single use of the verb \(\text{einai}\) (the shepherdesses of the Sun’s flock are goddesses: \(\text{θεαι δ’ ἐπιπομένες ἔσιν}, \ 12.131\)). As noted, the verbs in these passages emphasize doing and acting, not existing or being something or other.

It is entirely otherwise, however, in the interval between Circe’s treatments of the Sirens and Thrinacia. The third-person form of the verb \(\text{einai}\) occurs ten times in the course of sixty-three lines (eleven if we count an infinitive that would be in the third person were it in direct speech). What is more, six of these take the form of the third person singular indicative – all in forty-one lines. This represents among the densest concentration of such uses of \(\text{esti}\) in Homer (or indeed anywhere in the epic corpus). We observed above that scholars have identified two major functions of description, namely introducing objects, items, and characters, and attributing qualities to them. As it happens, these functions correspond very neatly to two of the major grammatical functions that scholars have assigned to the verb \(\text{einai}\) in Greek. Scylla’s cave, for example, is introduced by an ‘existential’ \(\text{esti}\) (\(\text{Od. 12.80}\)): 51

48 Another useful point of comparison is the celebrated description of Alcinous’ palace (\(\text{Od. 7.81–132}\)). Although its fifty-one lines make up one of the longest, most elaborate descriptive passages in the \textit{Odyssey}, we find only two uses of the verb \(\text{einai}\), both in the third person plural indicative; see de Jong (2001) 176–77 for observations concerning this other passage of description formed from ‘a combination of a spatial organization … and a list’, which also features ‘description-by-negation’. See further the illuminating discussion of other notable description-heavy passages in Homer in Koopman (2018) 41–67.

49 The closest we find is three such uses in the course of \(\text{Od. 4.485–486}\) (1 per 14 lines). In \(\text{Od. 4.695–846}\) we have four uses (1 per 38 lines), in \(\text{Od. 4.569–846}\) five (1 per 55 lines); in \(\text{Od. 12.79–120}\) the figure is roughly one per seven lines. The description of the Cave of the Nymphs (\(\text{Od. 13.96–113}\)) has five instances of the third person indicative of \(\text{einai}\) in these eighteen lines; three of these are in the plural, however.

50 The grammar and semantics of \(\text{einai}\) in ancient Greek are the subject of a notorious controversy; see Ch. 5, n. 41 below. The current analysis is indebted to Kahn (1973), and especially his recent rearticulations of the syntax and semantics of \(\text{einai}\) in Kahn (2009b).

51 Likewise the fig tree above Charybdis (\(\text{Od. 12.103}\)).
μέσσω δ’ ἐν σκοτέλω ἔστι σπέος ἡρωείδες.

At the midpoint of the crag there is a dim cave.

By contrast, a number of uses of *einai* in the third person indicative are predicative and attribute qualities to various objects. So Circe says of the first of two rocks, πέτρηγαρ λίς ἔστι (‘For the rock is smooth’, *Od*. 12.79). Furthermore, this predicative use of *einai* ultimately takes on an evaluative dimension, as when Circe makes the following assertion (*Od*. 12.109–10):

... ἐπεὶ ἦ πολὺ φέρτερόν ἔστιν
ἐξ ἐτάρους ἐν νη ποθήμεναι ἦ δμα πάντας.

... since it is far better
To mourn six men from your ship than all of them together.

In this section of Circe’s *hodos*, then, the verb *einai* is frequently used to perform both roles of description – introducing story elements with existential uses of *einai*, and attributing qualities to them with predicative uses – as well as helping to justify the imperatives that make up the ‘argument’ sections. In this passage of unusually lengthy and extensive description, and in the arguments that follow from these descriptions, we may simply observe that the verb *einai* appears with unusual, indeed almost unprecedented, frequency, and that a full range of semantic facets offered by the verb *einai* is exploited at key steps in the description and argument sections.

4.2.2.1.2 Negation

If this is all merely suggestive in light of Parmenides’ subsequent use of *einai*, more immediately pertinent is the prevalence of the so-called ‘description-by-negation’ technique in the course of *Od*. 12.59–126. Of Odysseus’ introduction to the Cyclopes episode, one scholar has seen fit to write the following:

The passage ... is remarkable for its sustained rhetorical discourse on the subject of nothing. It would be difficult to find in Homer, or indeed anywhere else in Greek, a passage of comparable length so richly sown with negatives as *Od*. 9.106–48. Perhaps only Plato’s *Parmenides* can equal it.\(^5^2\)

\(^5^2\) Austin (1983) 22.
However true this may be for a passage a few dozen lines long, there is no portion of the passage cited by Austin that can compete with the description of Scylla’s rock provided at *Od*. 12.75–78 for sheer density of negatives. In these four lines we find seven negatives, while the final lines (*Od*. 12.117–23) devoted to describing Scylla boast a further five negatives.53

De Jong writes of the description-by-negation technique that it ‘is employed to define things or conditions which are the reverse of normal, mortal existence’, and this is certainly true of the case at hand.54 The introduction of Scylla’s rock is itself a sustained rhetorical discourse on what does not happen (but normally would) (*Od*. 12.73–76):

... the one [rock] reaches to the broad sky
With a pointed peak, and a dark cloud surrounds
It: nor does it ever draw away, nor does sunlight ever
Reach that peak, neither in the peak of summer nor in late summer.

This meditation on what *does not* occur then gives way to a further discourse on what *cannot* occur (*Od*. 12.76–78):

Nor could any mortal man scale it, nor could he set foot on it,
Not if he had twenty hands and twenty feet,
For the rock is smooth, as if it were polished.

Two points stand out. One is the increasing relevance to the story setting of the qualities attributed to Scylla’s rock through the

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53 De Jong calls *Od*. 9.116–41 the ‘longest Homeric instance of the “description by negation technique”’ but then goes on to cite longer passages, such as ‘*Od*. 12.66–107’: de Jong (2001) ad loc. The eponymous figure of the Platonic dialogue cited by Austin above is more than a rival in this respect as well: note the seven negatives in Fr. 2.3–8, counting both *ou* and *mē*, and the twenty-six instances in Fr. 8.5–49, excluding privative lexical items. For negation of this sort, see Moorhouse (1959) 138 and for the use of negatives in Parmenides see esp. Austin (1986) 11–43.

‘descriptions-by-negation’. The relationship between the rock’s peak and the clouds of summer paint a vivid picture; nor are the details irrelevant, since we will later learn that Scylla’s cave is about halfway up the crag. More germane to the dramatic situation than the height of the rock, however, is what a man who happens to pass by would or would not be able to do with or on it. Another way of making the point is that although they echo the famous invocation of the Muses in *Iliad* 2, the lines do not claim privileged access to knowledge guaranteeing the authority of what follows (as we have seen, such a claim would be otiose for Circe anyway), but rather serve to rule out, emphatically, the possibility of the action presented via negation being accomplished successfully. In *Iliad* 2, the negations emphasize the extraordinary nature of what will happen; here, they make precisely the opposite point, underscoring with absolute certainty what will not, indeed cannot, happen.

The second feature of interest is the introduction of a modal valence to the description-by-negation, primarily through the modal particle *ken* (and emphasized with the counterfactual conditional ‘even if he had twenty hands and twenty feet’). The emphatic ‘even if’ technique occurs four times in the course of this phase in Circe’s *hodos* and – looking ahead to Parmenides’ commitment to description through an explicitly modally oriented examination of the possible (or rather, a declaration of the impossible) – is particularly striking.55

Circe’s descriptions-by-negation grow ever more sharply pointed. Having introduced Scylla’s cave, she says (*Od*. 12.83–84):

> οὐδέ κεν ἐκ νησός γλαφυρῆς αἰζῆσος ἀνήρ
tóξῳ διστεύσας κολύον στέος εἰσαφύκειτο.

Nor from a hollow ship could a vigorous man
Shooting a bow reach the mouth of the cave.

This is a comment that will have a direct bearing on her exchange with Odysseus a few lines later (to be examined below). The *κεν* +

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optative construction is not her only way of investing her descriptions with a kind of modal charge, however. Before moving on to Charybdis, Circe’s description of Scylla culminates in an even more pointed, indeed poignant, set of descriptive negations. These, too will have an important bearing on the instructions Circe gives at 12.106–10 (Od. 12.98–99):

\[\text{τῇ δ’ οὐ πῶ ποτε ναῦται ἄκηροι εὐχετώνται παρφυγέειν σὺν νηί.}\]

No sailors yet may boast
That they passed this way by ship unharmed.

Here, Circe’s ‘descriptions-by-negation’ come via a categorical statement; the lines just examined have the force of ‘all who have passed by’, but the matter is framed empirically, and the general force – ‘all who [have ever passed or will ever] pass’ – left implicit.

Most striking of all, however, is Circe’s description of the route that goes via the Planctae (Od. 12.62–63, 66):

\[\text{τῇ μὲν τ’ οὐδὲ ποτητὰ παρέρχεται οὐδὲ πέλειαι τρήρωνες ταῖ τ’ ἀμβροσίῃν Διὸ πατρὶ φέρουσιν . . . τῇ δ’ οὐ πῶ τις νῆς φύγεν ἀνδρῶν, ἢ τις ἴκηται.}\]

By this way no flying thing can pass, not even the timid
Doves, who bear ambrosia to Father Zeus . . .
And no ship of men, whichever comes, has yet passed through this way.

We are now in a position to see how much more is at stake in the negative descriptions Circe provides here: the force of this final pair of descriptions plainly lies not in the abnormality of these rocks, but in what their qualities and nature imply for the feasibility of the routes Odysseus can select (recalling that Circe frames this section as a choice Odysseus must make between two ἥδοι, Od. 12.57–58). In effect, this description-by-negation – no ship of men has yet made it through, and even things that fly, Zeus’s own bartenders, cannot – amounts to an implicit proscription by negation. Circe’s description effectively rejects this route as a viable option. We shall examine this point further below.
4.2 Krisis

4.2.2.1.3 Gar and epei

But had not the Argo sailed between just these rocks?56 Yes, but there were special circumstances in that case, Circe is careful to point out. So, having noted the Argo’s successful passage through this strait, she ends with the following counterfactual observation (Od. 12.71–72):

καὶ νῦ κε τήν ἔνθ’ ὅκα βόλευ μεγάλας ποτὶ πέτρας,
ἀλλ’ Ἡρη παρέπεμψεν, ἐτεί φίλος ἔν ἦσσων.

And even in that instance the ship would quickly have been cast upon the great rocks,
But Hera escorted them through, since Jason was dear to her.

Here we find the third notable textual feature of the passage Od. 12.55–126: the explicit use of logically potent connectors such as epei and the particle gar to articulate a series of causal, inferential, explanatory, or justificatory relationships (relationships expressed by syntactical means in the other two episodes examined).57 The clause filling out the second half of the line after the caesura (ἐπεὶ φίλος ἔν ἦσσων) is of great importance, both for Circe’s description of the Planctae and its implications for Odysseus. It emphasizes that the successful passage of the Argo through the Wandering Rocks says everything about the Argo (or rather its captain) and very little about the Wandering Rocks: the ship made it through, not because ships sometimes do, but because the queen of the gods went to exceptional lengths on account of philia. Epei introduces an implicit paradigm or analogy (not unlike the general relative clause in the description of the Sirens) that also operates by negation; the lines prompt the question, ‘Are we, too, dear to Hera’? If this term in the analogy does not fit, Jason’s paradigm is inapplicable: the Planctae are impassable for anyone not granted special favours by Hera – and this includes Odysseus, of course.

Epei is here deployed in its most prototypically causal sense (establishing a ‘real-world’ causal relationship between two states

56 See Heubeck and Hoekstra (1989) for extensive bibliography, Hopman (2012) 26–31 for a more recent examination of the question (with further bibliography).
57 On epei and gar, see above Ch. 3, nn. 37, 38, respectively.
of affairs, viz. Hera’s love caused the Argo not to be smashed)\textsuperscript{58} with the third person singular indicative form of \textit{einai} used in its predicative sense.\textsuperscript{59} This would extend the explanatory tendencies noted in the instruction section of the Sirens (and of Thrinacia). As we saw, in the \textit{hodos} she narrated in \textit{Odyssey} 10, Circe does not develop her instructions through any additional explanatory or justificatory support or elaboration; instead, she simply dictates them to her mortal ward. In the Sirens and Thrinacia portions of the \textit{hodos} in \textit{Odyssey} 12, Circe raises questions of cause, effect, and consequentiality. Here, however, she goes even further: she highlights the causal relations in play by using \textit{epei}; does so by linking two assertions concerning states of affairs (the smashing of the Argo, Hera’s love for Jason), rather than linking an illocutionary utterance like an instruction, suggestion, or command; and, moreover, anchors her claim in a fundamental fact of ‘what is’ in the world.\textsuperscript{60}

With this in mind, consider again \textit{Od.} 12.77–79:

\begin{quote}
οὐδὲ κεν ἄμβατη βροτὸς ἀνήρ οὐδ᾽ ἐπιβαίν,  
οὐδ᾽ εἰ οἱ χεῖρες τε ἐείκοσι καὶ πόδες ἔξεν  
πέτρην γὰρ λίς ἐστι.
\end{quote}

Nor could any mortal man scale it, nor could he set foot on it,  
Not if he had twenty hands and twenty feet,  
For the rock is smooth.

With a glance forward to Parmenides, we should observe how the modally oriented examination of what would or would not be

\textsuperscript{58} See esp. Sweetser (1990) 76–86 for the theory underlying Muchnová’s analysis of the Greek typology of uses.

\textsuperscript{59} This fulfills in textbook fashion the predicative use of \textit{einai} (viz. ‘\textit{N} is Noun/Adjective’). See Kahn (2009a) for the importance of these ‘first-order’ uses; these will play an important role in Parmenides’ Fragment 8, of course.

\textsuperscript{60} By comparison, consider the frequent collocation of \textit{epei} and \textit{esti} in several speeches in the \textit{Iliad}, for example the \textit{agon} between Agamemnon and Achilles in \textit{Iliad} 1, Agamemnon’s catastrophic speech to the Argive army in \textit{Iliad} 2, and Achilles’ response to the embassy in \textit{Iliad} 9. Muchnová (2011) 119–24, 134–40 examines many of these instances in respect to two subcategories of illocutionary acts, \textit{directifs} and the assertion, respectively. \textit{Iliad} 1 is also Havelock’s sample text for his examination of the verb \textit{einai} (Havelock (1978)). Significantly, regarding several of the uses of \textit{epei} + \textit{esti/esi} categorized by Muchnová as ‘directifs’ or ‘assertions’, Havelock comes as near as he can to conceding ‘that \textit{einai}, used in these . . . contexts to connect neuter subjects to neuter predicates . . . has assumed the role of a true copula’ (Havelock (1978) 242).
possible (under not only the present circumstances but also hypothetically posited variations) is expressly causally linked, via the particle gar, to the underlying attributes of the object in question (the smoothness of the rock), expressed through the predicative use of esti (in Kahn’s first-order ‘Noun is Adjective’ form). That is, a modally charged claim about the possibility of an action (one carefully tailored to the possible future activity of the interlocutor) is justified by a statement of fact about the world expressed through a predicative einai.

Two further portions of Circe’s treatment of Scylla and Charybdis display this constellation of textual features and patterns of thought. After finally describing Charybdis, Circe concludes (Od. 12.106–110):

\[\ldots \mu\hbox{'}\sigma\upsilon \gamma\epsilon\kappa\tau\iota\varsigma \tau\iota\kappa\omega\iota\varsigma, \delta\tau\epsilon \rho\omega\iota\beta\delta\eta\varsigma\varepsilon\iota\nu\epsilon \gamma\alpha \rho\upsilon \kappa\epsilon\iota\varsigma\tau\iota\kappa\iota\varsigma\upsilon\delta\iota\nu\iota\varsigma\nu\delta\varsigma\epsilon\tau\iota\upsilon\iota\varsigma \sigma\kappa\iota\nu\pi\nu\lambda\iota\varsigma\upsilon\iota\alpha\iota\varsigma\upsilon\iota\kappa\epsilon\iota\nu\varsigma.\]

\[\ldots \text{May you not chance to be present there when Charybdis sucks down,}\]
\[\text{For no one could rescue you from out of that ill, not even Poseidon}\]
\[\text{But driving your ship hard by Scylla’s rock}\]
\[\text{Sail on swiftly, since it is far better}\]
\[\text{To mourn six men from your ship than all of them together.}\]

Here the entirety of Gill’s and Knudsen’s deliberative programmes are condensed into five lines. As with the Sirens episode, the conclusion comes first, in the imperative-like optative: ‘do not happen to be present there’ (106b). Then immediately we have the premise, linked by the gar in line 107: ‘for nobody could rescue you out from out of that ill, not even Poseidon.’ In a move that Gill suggests is typical, Circe teases out the implications of the first course of action before moving on to the second, her rejection a ‘crucial preliminary to the reaching of a conclusion’, which is expressed in another imperative (lines 108–09) that concludes the chain of inferences linked to the premises (109–10), as Knudsen suggests is common, by the word epei (109).\textsuperscript{61} This premise is stated with a normative colouring of the sort pinpointed by Gill’s

formulation ‘if I do $x$, then $y$ will happen, and this involves $z$, which is bad or good’: πολὺ φέρτερόν ἐστιν (‘it is better by far’) to lose six men than all of them.

This line of argument is further elaborated thanks to Odysseus’ only interjection during Circe’s exposition. He tests the validity of the premise that yields her second conclusion: is it really necessary, he asks, to lose even six men? Circe’s response is unsparing (Od. 12.117–23):

... οὐδὲ θεοίσιν ὑπείξεις ἄθανάτουσιν;
hydrate τὰ ἄργαλέον τε καὶ ἀγρίον οὐδὲ μαχητέον

οὐδὲ τις ἔστ’ ἁλκή’ φυγεῖν κάρτιστον ἀπ’ αὐτῆς.

ἡν γὰρ δηθύνησα κορυσσόμενον παρὰ πέτρῃ,

dειδώ, μὴ σ’ ἔξαυτίς ἐφορμηθέεσσα κίχσαι
tόσσησιν κεφαλῆς, τόσουσ δ’ ἐκ φῶτας ἔλησε.

... Will you not yield to the immortal gods?
For she is no mortal, but an immortal bane,
Terrible and grievous, wild and not able to be fought:
No defence of any kind is possible: to flee from her is best.
For if you should tarry, arming yourself alongside the rock,
I fear she will dart out and attack you again
With all six heads and seize six more men.

In this reaffirmation of the premise that six men will be lost if Odysseus travels via Scylla, one sees most clearly the role of the unusually lengthy description section (12.73–81a, 83–100), continued briefly here (12.118–120a), in which Scylla is presented: a bane, immortal, terrible, grievous, not to be fought. The use of the classic form of description – verbs in the omnitemporal present (and especially the predicative use of einai), textual ordering on the basis of a non-temporal underlying pattern – establishes basic facts about what the world is like by attributing qualities to the individual in question, and these basic facts in turn serve as the key evidence supporting larger claims (notably also expressed in negative modal terms) – οὐδὲ τις ἔστ’ ἁλκή’ φυγεῖν κάρτιστον ἀπ’ αὐτῆς – which lead to or logically require a particular conclusion, expressed in the form of the advice that Circe gives. At the bottom of this complexly woven chain of argument, then, one which culminates in the necessary selection of one item in an exclusive disjunction by virtue of a modally mandated
rejection of the other, is a series of facts about the world being traversed: what-there-is, what what-there-is is like in such-and-such a way, and what what-there-is in such-and-such a way makes or does not make possible.

4.2 Krisis

What we see, then, is a remarkable coalescence of (a) the three linguistic features we have so far been discussing within (b) the framework of the type of dependence we have so far sketched out (see Section 4.2.2) involving (c) one of the two possibilities of the rhetorical schema of the hodos (viz. an exclusive, exhaustive disjunction, or krisis). Key features (often expressed through a predicative esti and/or a modally charged negation) of characters introduced (often with an existential esti) in the course of extraordinarily lengthy, well-developed description sections establish basic states of affairs; these in turn go on to serve as the evidence on the basis of which (a relationship articulated, as suggested by Knudsen, by gar or epei) Circe’s instruction (which is thus also the conclusion of an inferential process) is supported in the instruction/argument section that follows. This process in turn proceeds according to Gill’s pattern of working through the implications of a course (no longer only of action, but now a physical course in the sense of cursus). What is more, this plays out within the context of the exclusive, exhaustive disjunction formed by a fork in the physical hodos and, paired with the modally charged negations introduced in the description sections, amounts to a ‘proscription-by-negation’ rendering one option strictly impassable and impossible, which thus forces, implicitly or explicitly, her male mortal charge to choose the alternative path.

What does this mean for Parmenides? Much in the preceding paragraph should sound arrestingly familiar to scholars of Parmenides’ poem. Evaluating the nature and significance of the overlaps between the features of Odyssey 12.55–126 explored in this last section and Parmenides’ poem (to be explored in Chapter 5 below) is a delicate task, however – and not least because these involve similarities of different kinds and at different scales, and these in turn differ considerably in their degree of closeness or
markedness. In some cases, we may feel we can advance claims with considerable confidence; in others, definitive answers will be in short supply. There can be no debating the extremely high degree of commonality between the scenario described in preceding paragraph and, as we shall explore in the next chapter, in parts of Parmenides’ ‘Route to Truth’. By contrast, regarding the use of *esti*, or *gar* and *epei*, we might be content to note the striking similarities without feeling compelled to make firmer, or unduly grandiose, claims.

Three factors should be considered when assessing these aspects of the relationship between Parmenides and *Od. 12.55–126*. The first concerns how distinctive the features in question are to *Od. 12.55–126*. The second concerns how close or precise the overlaps between *Odyssey 12* and Parmenides’ ‘Route to Truth’ are. The third concerns the Parmenidean side of the ledger: to what extent is Parmenides’ own intellectual agenda likely to be the driving force behind the specificities of his usage, rather than the particular features of the Homeric text he inherited?

62 Here we find ourselves on ground familiar to other analysts of archaic poetry; these two qualities, particularly the first, might seem to comprise, or at least roughly map onto, the condition of ‘markedness’ described by Currie (2016) 33–34, which in turn is similar in important ways to, for example, Kelly (2015), esp. 22–24. Perhaps even more useful is the discussion at Bakker (2013) 157–69, for two reasons. First, Bakker’s framework—which, in keeping with his concern for the relationship between two oral poems, develops the concept of ‘interformularity’—allows for a more open-ended conception of how poems interact than Currie’s ‘allusion’ in a way that better fits the notion of discursive architecture in play here. Second, Bakker’s graduated notion of higher or lower ‘interformularity’ might also be seen as a useful parallel to the spectrum-oriented framework that will be gestured towards below.

63 The connection between this idea and the second condition discussed by Currie, ‘meaningfulness’ (emphasized particularly in Kelly (2015)) is less straightforward than might appear. At the level of discursive architecture, the point is not really that Parmenides performs any ‘pointed or systematic reversals’ of *Odyssey 12* (as per Currie (2016) 34), nor do I want to suggest that Parmenides’ primary benefit from reworking Homer is best cashed out in terms of ‘what the supposed interaction asks the audience to invoke about the Homeric poems’ or whether ‘the audience . . . seem[s] required to do very much, intertextually or interpretatively, with the Homeric passage’ (Kelly (2015) 24) — or, for that matter, ‘what is for . . . his [the epic poet’s] audience the specificity of the similarity of scenes to each other’ (Bakker (2013) 159). That is because, for Bakker, as well as for Kelly and Currie, the point of the exercise is inextricably tied to a question concerning the problem of ‘seeing literary significance in repetitions across the boundary of work or poet’ (Bakker (2013) 157; ‘literary’ should of course be understood here in the broad sense of Bakker’s ‘text’: the idea is not to differentiate between oral and written poetry, but between a concern for meaning-making processes that centre on pointed reworkings and those that do not). Whether observing the interaction between Parmenides and Homer at the level of rhetorical schemata or types of dependence (though not necessarily that of dramatic scenario, or other matters discussed in...
remainder of the chapter, I shall consider the first and (more briefly) the third points; the second (and, again rather briefly, the third) will be discussed at length in the following two chapters, particularly Chapter 5.

The second half of this chapter has been devoted to examining how the forks in the *hodos* at *Od.* 12.55–126 play out at the levels of rhetorical schemata and types of dependence. But are these forks really so distinctive? Early archaic Greek poetry furnishes a pair of celebrated instances where a similar image is leveraged to great effect, Hesiod’s *Works and Days* 213–18 and 287–92. Nor was Parmenides alone in making use of this image in the late archaic period; the presumed influence of these two passages from Hesiod on Theognis 911–14 has often been discussed. So is this not simply a stock image?

To this mix some scholars have also been tempted to add the texts inscribed on a dozen or so gold tablets (sometimes dubbed ‘Orphic’) discovered in tombs across Magna Graecia, some of which seem to have suggestive points of overlap with Parmenides’ poem. Do these tablets not also provide directions for travelling

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64 See recently Koning (2010) 144–49, also remarks in Hunter (2014) 141 n. 50.

65 As at e.g. Ranzato (2015) 130–38.


It is not easy to know how to assess the relationship between these tablets and Parmenides. On the one hand, it is certainly striking that a number of the so-called ‘B’ tablets do seem to come from the parts of Italian Magna Graecia not so distant from Parmenides’ hometown of Elea. On the other hand, it seems rather a stretch to characterize these tablets – at least the ones we know about – as ‘coeval’ with Parmenides’ poem (as at e.g. Ferella (2017) 122); the oldest tablet discovered so far, GJ 1 = Edmonds B10, from Hipponion, Italy, is traditionally placed at the very end of the fifth century BC, very likely putting the better part of a century between it and Parmenides’ poem (the remaining tablets come from the fourth, third, or even second century BC. Of course, scholars have often seen a longer tradition standing behind these tablets, but it is difficult
a *hodos* traversing the Beyond – perhaps even one where some sort of a fork in the road must be confronted? Are not the set of religious and eschatological associations conjured by this itinerary no less suggestive, no less potent (and perhaps even more so) than the social or ethical ones conjured by Hesiod’s *hodoi* in *Works and Days*?

To be sure, some of the similarities between parts of Parmenides’ poem and Hesiod’s crossroads or the golden tablets are indeed evocative. And, as will be clear from the *Introduction*, I am strongly in favour of any readings of Parmenides that can help relocate him more firmly in his time, place, and poetic and sociocultural context. Similarly, it is not at all my goal to advocate to say anything concrete about this with respect to specific uses of road imagery. Finally, it is worth noting that those scholars prepared to make a strong case for comparing the gold tablets and Parmenides’ poem do so yet again almost entirely with respect to the proem, and *not*, as I shall discuss below, in relation to the ‘Route to Truth’ (though see also Sassi (1988), Ranzato (2015), and Ferella (2017)).

67 See e.g. Sassi (1988); Cassio (1996); Battezzato (2005); Ranzato (2015) 66–70; Ferella (2017).

68 See on this point esp. Sassi (1988); Ranzato (2015) 66–70; Ferella (2017) 122–24. But this is less clear than might first appear, and it is notable that little of the language in these tablets appears to thematize or articulate expressly the idea of a fork in the road in the way that we find in *Od*. 12. 55–58 or *WD* 213–218 and 287–92; while in both epic texts we find *men ... de ...* clauses (*Od*. 59, 74; *Od*. 74, 1010; *WD* 214–15; *WD* 288), carefully balanced pairs (the Wandering Rocks and the Two Rocks, Scylla and Charybdis; *dikē* and *hybris*, *kakotēs* and *aretē*), and explicit phrases such as *ὀπποτέρη δή τοι οὖν ἑσσέται* (*Od*. 12.57) and *οὖν δ᾽ ἔτερθι παρελθέν* (*WD* 216), we find hardly anything of the sort in the tablets. Only on one extant tablet (GJ 3 = Edmonds A4) do we find something that might be potentially be considered a clearly articulated fork in the *hodos* (see line 5: *δεξιάν ὅδειτρόφρι*, which GJ render ‘journey along the right-hand road’ but Edmonds leaves as simply ‘make your way to the right’). In the other tablets still extant, all we are told is that, for example, at some point or other, ‘on the right-hand side’ (*ἐν τῷ δὲ ἔξω*†) is a spring and a white cypress, ‘where souls of the dead descend (*κατερχόμεναι*) and refresh themselves’ (line 4 GJ 1 = Edmonds B10) or other similar phrases and scenarios. This scenario seems to differ in important ways from what we find with respect to the Wandering Rocks and the Two Rocks, or Scylla and Charybdis. In the tablets, the spring by the white cypress is presented as a diversion, a departure from the path the soul of the initiate seems to be on; note that the instruction is not to head left instead of right, but simply not to veer off the path one is evidently already following. In Circe’s *hodos*, by contrast, there is no default ‘straight on’, a fact that is underscored by the pointed ambivalence of lines *Od*. 12.55–58, discussed above. Circe’s *hodos* thus presents a genuine ‘crossroads’, while the golden tablets seem to depict a possible deviation to be rejected. This fundamentally weakens the comparison with Parmenides’ routes ‘IS’ and ‘IS NOT’, where neither is the default path forward or merely a diversion – which is not, however, to say that these comparisons are without merit or interest.
for a single-mindedly Homeric reading of Parmenides, one that claims for Homer a monopoly on influencing Parmenides to the exclusion of all other forms of archaic poetic, cultural, and religious life. Far from it. But from the perspective of Parmenides’ place in the history of thought, there are nevertheless crucial differences between lines 12.55–126 of the *Odyssey* and the two passages of Hesiod (and archaic epigone) just cited or the texts of the gold tablets recovered from various sites in Magna Graecia. It is to these latter we must now turn.

First, in the golden tablets, unlike in *Odyssey* 12, when the possibility of taking more than one path emerges, there is no interest whatsoever in arguing for—or against—a specific selection. Rather, one simply receives a one-line injunction along the lines of, for example, ‘Do not even go near this spring!’ (ταύτας κράνας μηδὲ σχεδόν ἐν γύθεν ἔλθῃς, G J 1 = Edmonds B10), before the instructions continue on (space is at a premium on a gold tablet, one might think, and the important thing is just to make the right choice, not to prove the merits of choosing one way or the other). Since my interest is in understanding Parmenides’ development of extended deductive argumentation and the constitutive elements of demonstration, this is a very important point.

On the other hand, the diversion towards the lake and the white cypress is, one presumes, a genuine feature of the physical landscape (however this might be understood by initiates). What is more, it is hard to imagine that a deceased mortal, initiated or otherwise, might try to reject the two options available and instead advocate the merits of fashioning some kind of third, alternative route or course of action. In this, some tablets are indeed like *Odyssey* 12.55–126. By contrast, Hesiod’s conceptualization of qualities like *hybris* and *dikē, kakotēs* and *aretē* by mapping them onto an imagined spatial domain, and then figuring a dichotomy between them via the apparently exclusive,

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69 See also line 3 of the Petelia tablet (GJ 2 = Edmonds B1) and line 7 of the Entella table (GJ 8 = Edmonds B11).

70 In what follows, I leave untranslated *dikē* and *hybris, kakotēs* and *aretē* to steer clear of debates concerning their precise meaning; see n. 75 below. On the question of capitalization, see e.g. *West* (1978) 210; in what follows, I have rather arbitrarily used capital letters for the sake of avoiding clumsiness rather than to stake out a position on debates about personification.
exhaustive disjunction of a forked path, does not change the fact that it leaves open an entire terrain of potential responses. As Lloyd pointed out, even in the context of traditional polar expressions, when these involve different ways of addressing a problem or articulating an ethical choice, there is always the possibility of elaborating a third option, be that a middle way or a new axis along which to construct the dichotomy.\textsuperscript{71} Might not a resourceful Perses always have been able to respond that there is a third way between pure \textit{hybris} and pure \textit{dikē}, pure \textit{kakotēs} and pure \textit{aretē}? Or could he not transpose the problem to a different landscape, a pragmatic one, say, rather than an ethical one (or vice versa, depending on how one understands the meaning of \textit{aretē} and \textit{kakotēs})?\textsuperscript{72} Odysseus (and an initiate travelling the route from the golden tablet), however, is stuck in the physical world as it is; there is no option for him to invent some unthought of third way to Thrinacia between Scylla and Charybdis, or to transpose himself to a differently configured map.

Furthermore, it is extremely telling that we see no hint of any kind of modal charge to the negations in either \textit{Works and Days} or the golden tablets. That is precisely because the choices presented in both texts are in fact genuine choices. Indeed, in both \textit{Works and Days} and the golden tablets, the conundrum – and thus the need for advice in the first place – lies in the fact that either route could be, and in fact routinely is, selected. One could very easily divert from one’s path forward by veering right to refresh oneself at the spring by the white cypress (as the imperfective participle suggests – cf. e.g. κατερχόμεναι (GJ 1=Edmonds B10) – the souls of the dead do so regularly). Equally, one could all too easily choose the route to \textit{kakotēs}, to whose dwelling the \textit{hodos} is short and smooth; that it is ever so much more inviting than the long, rough, steep path of \textit{aretē}

\textsuperscript{71} See Section 4.2 above.
\textsuperscript{72} For example: ‘You say the choice is between these two paths, but I say the choice is rather between (say) prosperity and penury, or the rentier’s ease and the sweated brow of the labourer . . .’. Of course, the sense of the possible alternative depends on what we are to understand by \textit{aretē} and \textit{kakotēs}: superior/inferior social standing (West (1978) 229), success/failure (Tandy (1996) 81–82), or virtue/vice (Clay (2003) 43 n. 38; Clay (2009)).
is precisely why one needs to be warned from it. There is no ‘proscription-by-negation’ in either the *Works and Days* or in the golden tablets because there could not be: in each case, the path one is advised against taking is simply the ordinary path that mortals, or their souls, do so often take. As we shall see, this difference between the *hodoi* enumerated by Circe (in which only one of the possibilities is truly viable at each *krasis*) and those we find in Hesiod and on the golden tablets is of the utmost importance for Parmenides and his invention of extended deductive argumentation and key features of demonstration.

There is another important pair of points to be made concerning the relationship between the itinerary Circe sketches out in *Odyssey* 12.55–126 and some similarities this shares with other cultural artefacts of the archaic (or, in the case of the golden tablets, the classical) era, be these the confronting of a crossroads, the navigation of a *hodos* through the Beyond, the use of a pattern of deliberation, or thinking in terms of polar opposites. While there are important points of overlap with Hesiod’s *Works and Days* 216–17 and 287–92, the golden tablets, and the texts analysed by Lloyd, Gill, and Knudsen, it happens that all the features that *Odyssey* 12.55–126 shares with one or another of the texts discussed coalesce in the *hodos* that Circe details in the same book. Just as neither the analyses of Gill and Knudsen nor Lloyd’s discussion of polar opposites implies that there is nothing unique in Circe’s particular use of the general structures that each scholar described, so we may observe that in *Odyssey* 12, it is not only that a *hodos* is presented which helps a mortal navigate the physical geography of some portion of the Beyond, as in the tablets – nor only that the crossroads imagery constructs a choice between two alternatives that come into their own as alternatives, as in *Works and Days*. Likewise, what we find in *Odyssey* 12 is not just another instantiation of a polar expression; nor is it just another instance of a deliberative process that considers alternatives only to eliminate one and select the other; nor is it just another use of road imagery in providing instructions for navigating the physical geography of an Elsewhere; nor is it just another example of the use of a forked path to articulate a dichotomy. Each aspect of *Odyssey* 12.55–126 that overlaps with the different expressions of archaic Greek
The *hodos* in *Odyssey* 12

culture surveyed above in fact reveals just how distinctive this portion of the *Odyssey* is.

Indeed, it is precisely this very confluence of these features in one passage that makes *Odyssey* 12.55–126 so distinctive and so valuable for Parmenides. The whole of this passage of *Odyssey* 12 is incomparably greater than the sum of its archaic Greek parts. That the dichotomous choice between courses of action is quite literally between physical courses (of action) creates an extraordinarily powerful tool – the exclusive, exhaustive disjunction or *krisis* – which, when combined with argumentative support for the route to be chosen (or rather, a modally charged argument strictly ruling out one possibility, and therefore requiring that the other be chosen), simply cannot be found in any of these features individually. As we have seen, Lloyd observes that in very many cases there is the possibility of elaborating a third option in a polar expression. In the golden tablets, there is no interest at all in examining the other route in the fashion described by Gill; it is simply a wrong turn one should avoid on the way to the Lake of Memory, and there is apparently no need to explore the possibility of going to this spring, to think through the consequences of this course (of action), to reject it in favour of another alternative. Nor is there any interest in providing an argumentatively pregnant justification for selecting the one route over the other. If, as we shall see in Chapter 5, what matters to Parmenides is having the ability to leverage a uniquely potent argumentative tool that forces a voyager down one route or the other, this is something that neither a generic ‘polar expression’ nor the topography of the afterlife, nor even the rhetorical device of Hesiod’s two *hodoi*, can offer. Rather, this is a distinctive feature of the exclusive, exhaustive disjunction formed by a choice between two physical routes, and two physical routes alone, when one must press forward (and so cannot take neither), when one has a body that cannot be divided (and so one cannot take both), and when, in the end, only of the routes is actually viable. What we find in Hesiod, the golden tablets, and in most of the examples discussed by Lloyd

73 See here the discussion of ‘markedness’ and also ‘meaningfulness’ in nn. 62 and 63 above.

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and Gill are in fact genuine choices; what we find in Circe’s *hodos*, and what we shall find in Parmenides, is an apparent choice that, upon further descriptive reflection and argumentation, is in fact no choice at all. And for Parmenides, for the emergence of demonstration (which must begin from a point that all accept and cannot be rejected), and for the Western tradition of thought defined by the kind of knowledge demonstration produces, that makes all the difference.

This much concerns largely (though not exclusively) the level of rhetorical schemata. But there are other distinctive features of the *krisis* in Circe’s *hodos* at the level of dependence. An essential part of what we have been building up in the second half of this chapter is an analysis of the discursive framework used to express the options forming this choice – the description of the two alternatives – and the process by which one or the other is to be selected. At the level of types of dependence, the description sections play a vital role in establishing the possible courses (of action) insofar as they provide the raw material for the premises in the ensuing argument sections that, in their turn, ultimately yield a conclusion in the form of an imperative to a certain kind of action. In *Odyssey* 12, Circe is judicious about introducing only those characters and places, and describing only those qualities, that have a direct bearing on the choice to be made and the argument to be supplied in support of her instructions. This in turn means that the description sections become much longer and more extensive than in the other entries in Circe’s *hodos*-catalogue (or in Homer generally) in order to present the information necessary for the argument. By contrast, the role of narration sections is much diminished: what matters is the state of affairs that constitutes the options of the choice. Again, this is something that is entirely different from both the *Works and Days* and the golden tablets.74

Finally, what are we to make of the three textual features discussed above? Functioning as limit cases of a sort, they present

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74 Indeed, what we find in the golden tablets is some respects like what we saw in *Odyssey* 10, both in terms of geography and dramatic scenario; what is radically scaled back, however, is the level of description and instruction (as in *Odyssey* 10, this comes without any argumentative justification). On the similarities in geography, see e.g. Cerri (1995), Battezzato (2005) and Ferarri (2007).
a rather more complex picture. Taken individually, it is hard to say that their appearance in *Od.* 12.55–126 seems terribly distinctive or marked. One finds the verb form *esti* often enough in archaic poetry (though, as noted, almost never with such frequency). Similarly, the practice of negating statements with a modal charge is not only to be found in such passages already discussed as the Invocation to the Muses in *Iliad* 2, but also, *inter alia*, in some of the reworkings it underwent at the hands of other archaic poets, as well as in plenty of other unrelated contexts.75 *Epei* and *gar*, meanwhile, are of course simply basic linguistic items whose use, particularly in the case of *gar*, are an extremely ordinary feature of the syntax of oral poetry.76

These questions take on special importance when we consider the Parmenidean side of the ledger. It would be a great folly, for example, to suggest that *Od.* 12.55–126 is somehow the primary driver motivating Parmenides’ thematization of the question what-is, or that his ground-breaking examination of modality is merely the result of his engagement with this passage, or that his interest in rigorously supporting his claims with arguments is just a minor outgrowth of Homer’s practice in *Odyssey* 12 or elsewhere. Any sensible attempt to address these questions would of course consider Parmenides in relation to a much, much broader array of predecessors, contemporaries, and even successors, and would place his own agenda squarely at the centre of the answers provided.77

Pinning down the exact nature of the relationship between *Od.* 12.55–126 and Parmenides’ ‘Route to Truth’ at this word-by-word level of granularity will always be difficult, and little in my argument hangs on the specific answers one might wish to supply (or even on answers being hazarded at all). Nevertheless, to the extent that they force us to ask other interesting questions, they are worthy of brief consideration

75 See Ch. 2 above.
76 See esp. Bakker (1997), and Ch. 3, n. 38 above.
77 On the other hand, it would seem entirely appropriate to consider: (1) which resources the passage in question offered him in pursuing his agenda; (2) how the shape of the answers he provided might have been influenced by this passage; and (3) how what made it onto his agenda in the first place might be related to this passage of the *Odyssey*.
4.3 Concluding Remarks

here. At just what point do unmarked, not terribly distinctive features become distinctive? How much does it matter that in this passage of the *Odyssey* we encounter with unprecedented frequency the use of modally charged negations or the third person singular *esti*, both of which are, of course, distinctive hallmarks of Parmenides’ poem? Are there ways in which specific combinations of the features identified – for example, the use of *esti* to provide the evidence upon which is based, via a *gar* or an *epei*, an instruction that serves as the conclusion of a practical deliberation; or, similarly, the combination of a modally charged negation and an exclusive, exhaustive disjunction, to form a proscription, and thus a prescription, by negation – can, when taken as unit, form something more marked and less typical, more distinctive and less frequently trafficked? How ought we to weigh this against the importance of these features for Parmenides’ own philosophical agenda? And – to turn this question on its head – to what extent could we imagine that his agenda might have been shaped in part by the fact that it was *this* passage, with its distinctive or marked use of indistinctive and unmarked features of the Greek language, that Parmenides reworked?

This is not the place to attempt to answer these questions, since it is the commonalities at the level of the rhetorical schema and levels of dependence that are central to the points that I want to make. For the moment, one might simply observe that the similarities are there, whatever one is to make of them, and that what is desirable is perhaps a more subtly graded spectrum than a simple declaration that something ‘IS’ or ‘IS NOT’ intertextual,78 rather, we might ideally locate different degrees of intertextual proximity or distance.

4.3 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, we have examined two key aspects of the *hodos* that spans *Odyssey* 12.39–141. As our analysis in Chapter 3 would lead us to expect, at the level of rhetorical schemata we saw that, as a form of catalogic discourse, Circe’s *hodos* formed a catalogue with three entries, *Od*. 12.39–54, 12.55–126, and 12.127–41

78 See nn. 62 above for the appealing aspects of Bakker’s notion of ‘interformularity’.

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(Section 4.1). These were ordered in accordance with the narrative movement in time through a sequence of spatially contiguous places – according to the principle of spatio-temporal consequence, that is, proper to the *hodos* (Section 4.1.1). At the level of types of dependence, meanwhile, we again saw a clear pattern according to which very brief narrative frames introduce portions of description, which were in turn followed by portions of justified instruction or argument (Section 4.1.2.1). Compared to the *hodos* in *Odyssey* 10, the relationship between the description and instruction/argument sections is notably more elaborate and developed in *Odyssey* 12: description sections introduce key characters and places, and then hone in on attributes of the story-world that prove crucial for the argumentatively justified instructions that follow, which explore the details introduced in a remarkably probing, sophisticated manner (Section 4.1.2.2). This analysis will form the basis of the discussion of Fragment 8 in Chapter 6.

Examining *Od*. 12.55–126 revealed further nuances to this basic format (Section 4.2). At the level of rhetorical schemata, the notion of a *hodos*-unit helped accommodate the phenomenon of the *krisis*, or exclusive, exhaustive disjunction between two possible places (each with the potential to form its own episode; Section 4.2.1). Seen through this unit of analysis, Circe’s *hodos* was made of four entries – the Sirens (*Od*. 12.39–54), a choice between the Planctae and the Two Rocks (*Od*. 12.59–71a), a choice between Scylla and Charybdis (*Od*. 12.71b–126), and then Thrinacia (*Od*. 12.127–41; Section 4.2.1).

What is more, there are two major implications at the level of dependence. In the first place, these two *krisis* sections involve very little activity at the top level of narration – the instruction or argument level of the first choice (viz. *Od*. 12.81b–82) in effect usurped, or at least did double duty, as the narration section for the second choice (Section 4.2.1). Second, since the argument sections involve instructions about which place to choose, and not merely how to behave (or not) when arriving there, the amount of description involved in presenting the options of the *krisis* balloons tremendously: when, in Richardson’s terms, the places

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themselves are ‘what matters’, the result is a section of description long enough to rival any other portion of description we find in the surviving Homeric corpus (Section 4.2.2). Third, this also results in an even more sophisticated, and deeply intertwined relationship between the description and instruction/argument sections (‘Three features’, Section 4.2.2.1). Particularly important features of this relationship are the use of esti (in several of its senses: announcing the existence of entities in the story-world, and attributing crucial qualities to them in order to ground the instructions to come and assessing the relative merits of two courses of action); gar and epei (to articulate the inferential and justificatory relationships between premises and conclusions); and descriptions-by-negation, especially with a modal charge. Ultimately, this yielded complex, multilayered chains of argumentation that repeatedly (and, ultimately, recursively) drew on the facts of the world presented in the description section. Of particular significance for the following chapter, this nexus of features – and, in particular, the combination of modally charged negations; the Homeric mode of deliberation explored by Gill; and the exclusive, exhaustive disjunction or krisis formed by a fork in the hodos – offers Parmenides a set of resources he will put to ground-breaking use.

Finally, careful consideration of other texts or traditions, especially Hesiod’s Works and Days and the Orphic gold tablets, often cited as similar to Od. 12.55–126 or as parallels to aspects of Parmenides’ poem, reveal in the end just how distinctive this portion of the Odyssey is (Section 4.2.3, ‘Krisis: Assessments and Cautions’) – and, as we shall see in Chapter 5, just how important it is for Parmenides’ ground-breaking poem, and the history of Western thought. By identifying these similarities explored in sections 4.1 and 4.2 and Parmenides’ poem (especially in chapters 6 and 5, respectively) – and by tracing the differences that emerge in the course of comparing them – we can glean key insights into the discursive strategies deployed by Parmenides as he pieces together his new way of constructing an argument and making it inconvertibly persuasive. To develop a view of the basic outline of the architecture of Circe’s hodos is thus to develop a view of precisely the
framework Parmenides uses to fashion his revolutionary argument, to mediate his new concept of thinking with certainty, knowing with certainty, and proving with certainty – or so I shall argue in chapters 5 and 6. Should this analysis of Circe’s hodos prove compelling, we would have before our eyes the blueprint of the discursive architecture Parmenides used to build the first recorded sequence of extended deductive argumentation in Western thought.
I discussed above, especially in the Introduction and Chapter 2, some of the important links between Homer’s Odyssey – especially the Apologoi and, even more so, Odyssey 12 – and Parmenides’ poem. That analysis only scratched the surface, however, and in the beginning of this chapter I shall examine the relationship between these two poems at much greater length. Fortunately, we can pick up where earlier studies have left off.\(^1\)

If much of the literary analysis performed by scholars of Parmenides has focused on the Proem, this is partly because there is much to say.\(^2\) What is important for our purposes at this stage is the manner in which the proem establishes a progressively more Odyssean ambience, creating a dramatic setting that, as it proceeds towards Fragment 2, evokes the relationship between Odysseus and Circe on Aeaea more and more specifically.

Havelock’s comparison begins with the claim that ‘books ten to twelve of the Odyssey (or a section approximating thereto)’ are Parmenides’ ‘central frame of reference’ in his poem.\(^3\) This case can be made in terms of the proem’s language, imagery, characters, and dramatic scenarios, much of which is reminiscent of these books of the Odyssey.\(^4\) Odysseus’ description of the land of the Laestrygonians is recycled nearly wholesale;\(^5\) similarly, the

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\(^1\) See esp. Introduction, 13–15 above.


\(^3\) Havelock (1958) 138; see also Introduction, 13–14.

\(^4\) On the connections between the proem and the Odyssey more generally, see remarks at Morrison (1955) 60; Diechgräber (1959) 27; Dolin (1962) 96; Pfeiffer (1975) 18–20, 54–56, 78–80; Miller (1979) 14 with notes; Miller (2006) 18; Coxon (2009) [1986] 9–10; Palmer (2009) 56; see also Slaveva-Griffin (2003), Latona (2008), and now Forte and Smith (2016) for parallels between the chariot race in Iliad 23 and the proem. See also nn. 6–9 below.

\(^5\) Homer’s ἐγγὺς γάρ νυκτὸς τε καὶ ἠματός εἰσὶ κέλευθοι (Od. 10.86) becomes ἐνβα πῦλαι νυκτὸς τε καὶ ἠματός εἰσὶ κέλευθοι (Fr. 1.11). See e.g. Havelock (1958) 139; Mourelatos (2008b) [1970] 9, 15; Pfeiffer (1975) 21; Coxon (2009) 9, 275–76; Granger (2008) 12–13; Tor (2017) 345 n. 22.
‘Daughters of the Sun’, the guardians of the Sun’s cattle on Thrinacia (Od. 12.131–36), are ‘converted from herdsmen into outriders’ who lead the chariot bearing the *kouros* (Fr. 1.9–10). Collectively these images and intertextual echoes conjure a setting redolent of the ‘world’s end … a mysterious borne far off the beaten track, a region of mystery and peril but also of revelation’. This in turn figures the *kouros* as a kind of Odysseus. As the latter’s voyage in the *Apologoi* extends ‘beyond normal human latitudes’, so the former’s ‘journey is also an excursion beyond the bounds of accepted experience’ and seems ‘modeled on the bold enterprise of an epic hero, Odysseus’. Odysseus’ encounters in the *Apologoi* have been seen to be patterned on the dynamics of the quest, which involves his arrival at an unknown place followed by a meeting with ‘someone who gives information or acts as a guide’ to help him complete the quest— all of which describes Parmenides’ *kouros* and his situation in Fragment 1 to perfection.

But not just anyone will act as his guide: the ‘foreground of Parmenides’ imagination is occupied by Circe on Aeaea’— Circe, who is, after all, the Daughter of Helios, and Aeaea which is, after all, where ‘Dawn has her dancing floor and the sun rises’ (Od. 12.3–4). The links connecting Circe and the unnamed...

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7 Havelock (1958) 139.


9 See Havelock (1958), esp. 139, and Gallop (1984) 5, respectively.

10 See Bakker (2013) 13–35, esp. 23–27, and Peradotto (1990) 35–41; these mirror Mourelatos (2008b) 20–21. Recall that Tiresias begins his audience with Odysseus by observing: ἥον ἄνω δίζηαι (‘you are questing for a homecoming’, Od. 11.100). On the encounter, see esp. Nagler (1980), and for Parmenides, see Havelock (1958) 139. Parmenides’ *diēzēs*, an apparent neologism, is derived from this verb; see Mourelatos (2008b) 67–68, Curd (1998b) 42–43, 42 n. 55 for discussions of the verb in this passage in Homer, Heraclitus B 22 and B101, and Parmenides. On the other hand, Tor (2017) 265–67 provides a stimulating discussion of the word in respect to the language of oracles. On Aeaea and its relationship to the Sun, see e.g. Page (1973) 60 and West (2005) 43–45; see also n. 5 above.
goddess of Parmenides’ poem are rich and multifaceted. Circe, ‘goddess endowed with dread speech’ (Od. 10.136 = Od. 11.8 = Od. 12.150), has the ability to ‘report verities of the mantic world and thus induce or at least indicate the hero’s’ further travel: ‘her helpful power is to … facilitate for him further stages of his symbolic journey’; Circe helps Odysseus ‘penetrate … to a deeply guarded area of the mythic geography’ where knowledge of incomparable magnitude is to be found. In short, Circe, a female divinity with exceptionally privileged access to knowledge, guides the mortal male hero Odysseus on a journey which includes travel to a place where he will attain a level of profound knowledge: a description that could hardly better fit the dramatic scenario of fragments 1–8.

What is more, Circe has long been recognized as a vital turning point in Odysseus’ wanderings. According to one popular analysis, the Nekuia serves as the pivot around which is wrapped the elaborate series of nested ring compositions that form the episodes of the Apologoi; since it is from Circe’s isle that the trip departs and to Circe’s isle that it returns – and, as we have seen, on Circe’s orders, and only thanks to her guidance, that the trip is successfully undertaken – this makes Circe (in her instruction-giving mode, after her threat to Odysseus has been neutralized) a central figure anchoring the entire Apologoi. There are a number of different facets to this point, and one can tease out at least four implications for Parmenides’ poem.

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13 See Section 2.4, esp. Section 2.4.2 above.
15 See e.g. Gallop (1984) 6; for the more general point, see also Section 2.4.2 above.
17 See e.g. the series of ever-modified charts in Whitman (1958) 288; Niles (1978) 51; Scully (1987) 405; Most (1989) 22; Bakker (2013); Cook (2014) 82, 83.
18 It is worth bearing in mind the sort of double role played by Circe in the Apologoi. As Bakker (2013), esp. 24–25, illuminates, the encounter with Circe in Odyssey 10 resembles the other quest episodes which are concatenated together to form Odyssey 9 and 10 (e.g. the encounter with the Cyclops, or Aeolus, or the Laestrygonians), while in the encounter in Odyssey 12 she is a ‘cornerstone of the Odyssey’s architecture’ insofar as she shifts from ‘from dangerous adversary in the rescue quest to helpful guide’ enabling Odysseus’ successful return or nostos. This has important implications that previous diagrammatic analyses of the Apologoi (see n. 17 above) have not yet taken into account; see Figure 5.1 below.
Most importantly, scholars have noted that the encounter with Circe divides the *Apologoi* into two parts. Before encountering Circe, Odysseus and his men wander; after, they sail with the direction and purposefulness that only her supernatural guidance makes possible.\(^{19}\) Odysseus’ pre-Circean wanderings are epitomized by the calamitous episode bookended by encounters with Aeolus, king of the winds. Having taken their leave of his harmonious kingdom with all the winds but one held at bay for their convenience, Odysseus and his men have very nearly completed their journey in full (ὅδεν ἐκτελέσαντες, *Od.* 10.41) – the hearth fires of home are even in sight! – when Odysseus’ men, mistrustful that the spoils Odysseus has collected along the way will be evenly distributed, open the sack holding the winds; once loosed, these promptly blow the ship all the way back to the shores of Aeolus’ floating island. (As scholars of Parmenides have on occasion noticed, the episode thus embodies the very paradigm of a backward-turning path.)\(^{20}\) By contrast, from the moment they depart Circe’s island up until they reach Thrinacia – the full extent of the itinerary for which Circe gives her instructions – Odysseus and his men make clear, unambiguous, linear progress towards their final destination of Ithaca.

There is another way of putting the matter. Scholars have discerned a number of thematic and compositional patterns characterizing the relationship between different episodes in the *Apologoi*,\(^ {21}\) and careful consideration of these analyses suggests that Circe’s island serves as the mirror across which beckons the second, positive, goal-directed reflection of the first, wandering half of the *Apologoi*. Here, recourse to the graphs of various analysts of the *Apologoi*’s ring compositions are useful. A slightly

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\(^{19}\) See the incisive remarks at Montiglio (2005) 56–58, also 150.


\(^{21}\) Between, for example, episodes where hosts confront Odysseus and his men with two extremes of bad hospitality (Most (1989), esp. 25) or a repeated confrontation with the different variations on the series ‘temptation, physical attack, taboo’ (Niles (1978), esp. 51).
modified form of Most’s graph in Figure 5.1 helps make the point vividly.²²

By choosing to model his *hodos dizēsios* on the portion of the *Apologoi* that begins not at the departure from Troy, but rather from Aeaea – a kind of second point of departure, or a first point of informed departure – Parmenides in effect cuts off half of the *Odyssey*’s ring composition, thereby rendering linear the circular form of the erstwhile ring;²³ as we shall see, the effect is compounded by honing in on the first phase of the second half of the trip (the leg spanning Aeaea, Sirens, Scylla/Charybdis, Thrinacia) where the clearest progress is made anywhere in Odysseus’ journey home. Were one looking to shift from a circular, backward-turning mode of discourse in order to create a sequential, goal-directed mode of discourse, beginning from the very centre

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²² Most (1989) 25, which is itself modelled on Niles (1978) 51.

²³ In this, one may perhaps be tempted to see a transition from the ‘geometrical’ ring composition characteristic of ‘archaic thought’ to the linear, sequential form of argumentation that will come to be increasingly prominent in the classical age and beyond.
of the ring would accomplish this elegantly by shearing off a linear
discursive pattern.

This observation leads to two further points. As noted, scholars
have also discerned in the Circe episode a deeper shift from one
kind of story-type to another; Circe’s island, that is, marks the
point where a quest type becomes a nostos type – or rather, nostos
becomes the mission of the quest.\(^\text{24}\) The narratological correlate of
the unguided wandering of the Apologoi before Odysseus ‘tames’
Circe is a kind of indefinite concatenation of quests, one linked to
the other apparently without end. On the other hand, with Circe’s
instructions in hand, the nostos, with its highly marked sense of
destinationality, becomes the goal of the quest. A plot structure
revolving around arrival at a single, ultimate destination, rather
than in indefinite series of concatenated quests, could hardly
have proved more useful to Parmenides’ notion of a hodos
dizēsios.\(^\text{25}\)

Finally, there is also a geographic dimension to the point. The
near miss with Ithaca after the first sojourn on the island of Aeolus
only underscores how, from the perspective of the telos of Ithaca,
Odysseus’ movement in the first half of the Apologoi is centrifugal.
In certain respects, Circe’s island represents the far apogee of this
centrifugality; not only is it at the end of the earth, near where the
Sun has his dancing field, but it is also the one place where
Odysseus himself forgets Ithaca and must be reminded by his
crew.\(^\text{26}\) Thanks to the goddess’s instructions, Odysseus’ movement
through space, centrifugal up until his arrival on Aeaea, becomes
centripetal.\(^\text{27}\) In short, at the thematic, structural, narratological, and
geographic levels, Parmenides would have found in the Circe
episode elements of enormous value to rework for his own ends.

What does this mean for Parmenides? First, that scholars are
mistaken when they attempt to draw a contrast between the kouros
in Parmenides’ poem and Odysseus. Only if one fails to consider
how the encounter with Circe divides the entire Apologoi into two

\(^{24}\) For this and the next two sentences, see Bakker (2013) 20–26, discussed at greater
length in Part III, Doxai, below.

\(^{25}\) See again Part III, Doxai, below.

\(^{26}\) See Montiglio (2005) 55–56.

\(^{27}\) See again n. 19 above.
parts – pre-Circean wandering, post-Circean journeying – can one claim, for example, that while ‘both protagonists travel far beyond the familiar track into eschatological locations, their journeys diametrically diverge’. In fact, exactly the reverse is true. While it is certainly the case that ‘the kouros’ divine guides escort him directly to his goal . . . and precisely prevent him from undergoing the wandering which the poem associates throughout with error and ignorance’, that ‘Odysseus is repeatedly made to wander astray before his encounter with Circe is irrelevant. What matters is that Odysseus’ divine guide also guides him directly to his goal that he may avoid the wandering which had plagued him earlier in the *Apologoi*. Similarly, it is incorrect to assert that in Parmenides’ poem ‘the meandering Odyssean adventure is . . . reshaped as a linear journey’. Attending to the structure of the *Apologoi* and the decisive role Circe plays in this portion of the *Odyssey*, we see instead that Parmenides leverages with tremendous skill a distinction between wandering and goal-directed journeying that was already clearly demarcated in Homer. By choosing to model his *hodos* on just the point in the *Apologoi* where Odysseus receives instructions from his female divinity with privileged access to knowledge (the guided, directed journeying that forms a true *hodos*, and not the untethered, backward-turning wandering of ignorant mortals), Parmenides plucks the

28 Tor (2017) 264.
29 Tor (2017) 265, 264.
30 This also weakens the ‘pointed divergence’ between the *Odyssey* and Parmenides’ poem that Tor seeks to ‘sharpen’ ([2017] 265). It is true that ‘it is fundamental to the *Odyssey* that, for the narrative of nostos to take place, Odysseus must reject the offers of divinization which are proffered to him by his female host Calypso’, and this does offer a contrast to readings of Parmenides’ poem that posit that the *kouros* must undergo a process of divinization (provided by a female divinity) as a precondition to his attainment of his ultimate goal, knowledge of what-is. But the relevant point of contrast to accepting divinization need not necessarily be ‘the life of the wandering mortal’. Though the *Odyssey* may in general associate the human condition with wandering (see Montiglio (2005)), that is not at all the contrast dramatized by the portion of the *Odyssey* that Parmenides’ selects – book 12 – as his intertext. It is thus hard to see the *kouros* as ‘pointedly outdo[ing] Homer’s Odysseus in willingly accepting divination’ (Tor (2017) 265) when the Odysseus Parmenides chooses as a model accepts the instructions offered to him by a female divinity with privileged access to knowledge as willingly as Parmenides’ *kouros* does. I am grateful to Shaul Tor for his exchanges with me regarding these points.
portion of the *Apologoi* that suits his needs while sanitizing it of Odysseus’ pre-Circean wanderings by relegating them to a separate, distinct *hodos* he emphasizes must be avoided at all costs.\(^{32}\) Instead, it is much more accurate – and much more interesting – to point out that by isolating a portion of the circumference of the Homeric ring composition that forms the *Apologoi*, the circular movement of the thematic and discursive progression of the Homeric text is refashioned as a linear, goal-directed (or at least non-circular) movement – a movement that is paralleled much more macroscopically by the transition Parmenides effects from a myth of *nostos* (of a return to a place of origin) to an extended deductive argument that leads to a conclusion.

This takes us to just the moment in *Odyssey* 12 when Circe promises to give Odysseus the instructions he will need to undertake his journey (*Od*. 12.25–26):

\[... \alphaυτ\' \epsilon\gammaω \deltaειξω \οδ\'ν \ηδε \εκ\'αστα \ς\tauα\eta\epsilon\omega.\]

... But I shall indicate your *hodos* and each thing
Sign out.

Before she narrates the *hodos* to Odysseus, however, she ‘takes him by the hand’ (*η δέ \epsilon\'εμε \χειρ\'ος \ε\'λο\'ου\'ς*, *Od*. 12.32) in order to speak to him alone;\(^{33}\) then she begins the tale of the *hodos*. In Parmenides’ poem, having travelled to a distant place of revelation, a place at land’s end far from the usual haunts of men (*ἀπ’ \ἀνθρωπων \εκ\'τος \πάτου*, Fr. 1.27),\(^{34}\) the male mortal voyager of the

\(^{32}\) The model for both routes described in fragments 6 and 7 is thus presented in the *Apologoi*. See also Chapter 2 above for a discussion of Parmenides’ strategy of drawing rigorous distinctions (between superior, epistemically impeccable claims and mere *doxai*; between journeying and wandering) by mapping them onto the distinct branches of a forked *hodos*. This insight also previews the benefits of assessing the relationship between Parmenides’ poem and the *Odyssey* using the flexible model afforded by Foucault’s analysis of discursive architecture. What we shall see is that Circe’s speech in *Odyssey* 12 provides Parmenides with a framework for constructing discourse, one which allows him to slot in other episodes from elsewhere in the *Odyssey* in a recombinatorial fashion, rather than requiring that we map the *hodos* formed by fragments 2, 6, 7, and 8 onto the *hodos* of *Od*. 12.39–141 in a strictly bijective way.

\(^{33}\) Odysseus, for his part, obliges by telling her everything that has happened (*πάντα κατά \μοιραν \κατ\'\δεξια*, *Od*. 12.35).

\(^{34}\) For the Homeric connotations of the phrase *ἐπ’ \ἀνθρώπων*, see Floyd (1992) 258–60.
proem is greeted by a female divinity with privileged access to knowledge by nothing other than a clasp of the hand – χεῖρα δὲ χειρὶ | δεξιτερὴν ἔλευ (Fr. 1.22–23).\(^{35}\) Then, she, too, begins the tale of the *hodos*.\(^{36}\)

### 5.1 Disjunctions

The tight parallels between Parmenides’ poem and *Odyssey* 12 extend beyond the dramatic scenario and the *dramatis personae*, and – what is much less recognized\(^{37}\) – well beyond the proem. When Parmenides’ goddess speaks, her language, too, echoes the Circe of *Odyssey* 12. So Circe opens her speech (*Od*. 12.37–38):

... σὺ δ’ ἀκούσον,
ὡς τοι ἔγρω ἔρεω, μνήσει δὲ σε καὶ θές αὐτός,

and introduces the choice between the two *hodoi* (*Od*. 12.56–58):

ἐνθὰ τοι οὐκέτ’ ἔπειτα διηνεκέως ἄγορεύσω
ὀπποτέρῃ δὴ τοι ὅδος ἔσσεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτός
θυμὸ βουλεύειν ἔρεω δὲ τοι ἄμφοτέρωθεν.

What follows there I shall no longer narrate piece by piece Which of two possibilities will in fact be your *hodos*, but Consider this carefully yourself: I shall tell you both from this point.

Parmenides’ goddess, meanwhile, begins (Fr. 2.1–2):

εἶ δ’ ἄγ’ ἔγόν ἔρεω, κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον ἀκούσας,
αὕτε ὅδοι μοῦνα διζήσιος εἰσὶ νοῆσαι.

But come now and I shall tell you (and you, having heard it, preserve the account)
Just which *hodoi* of inquiry alone there are to be thought/for thinking.\(^{38}\)

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\(^{35}\) For discussion of the gesture’s Homeric resonances, see Coxon (2009) [1986] 10; Floyd (1992) 254–56; Cordero (2004); Mansfeld (2005). While Homeric aspects of the gesture have been observed since at least Diels (1897) 53, the connection with Circe’s gesture at *Od*. 12.32 does not seem to have been noticed. She, too, will reveal ‘all things’ (πάντα παθισθαίνει, Fr. 1.28); see n. 33 above.

\(^{36}\) See also n. 33 above for another echo of *Od*. 12.25–35 in Fr. 1.27–28.


\(^{38}\) The difference between the verb understood as transitive infinitive (‘to be thought of’) as opposed to a datival infinitive (‘for thinking’) is discussed at greatest length – and with extensive bibliographical citation – in Palmer (2009) 69–73. The parallel with
The linguistic overlap is striking: the goddess in question declares that she will tell her mortal charge (ἐγὼν ἔρεω, Od. 12.38; ἔρεω, Od. 12.58; ἐγὼν ἔρεω, Fr. 2.1) what comes next;\(^39\) underscores the importance of listening to her (σὺ ... ἄκουσον, Od. 12.37; σὺ ... ἀκούσας, Fr. 2.1); mentions a closed set of hodoi that she will present (όπποτερή ... ὁδὸς ... ἀμφοτέρωθεν, Od. 12.57–58; αὕτερ ὁδὸι μοῦναι, Fr. 2.2);\(^40\) and invokes the being of these roads, be it possible or actual, present or future (ὁδὸς ἔσσεται, Od. 12.57; ὁδὸι ... εἰσὶ, Fr. 2.2).

Continuing with these two passages, we find yet another similarity in the use of men ... de ... clauses to introduce the alternatives. In Circe’s hodos telling, men ... de ... clauses play an important role in articulating both pairs of alternatives one finds in the ‘Choice’ discourse-unit of the hodos (Od. 12.55–81, 12.73–110; see Section 4.2.2 above). So, too, Parmenides’ goddess presents the two hodoi as follows (Fr. 2.3–5):

\[\begin{align*}
\text{ἡ μὲν ὀπτωσ ἔστιν τε κοι ὦς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι ...} \\
\text{ἡ δὲ ὦς οὐκ ἔστιν τε κοι ὦς χρεῶν ἔστι μὴ εἶναι ...}
\end{align*}\]

The one, that . . . is ( . . .)\(^41\) and that it is not possible [for] . . . not to be ( . . .) . . .
The other, that . . . is not ( . . .) and that it is right [for] . . . not to be ( . . .) . . .

Furthermore, in both Od. 12.59–81 and Fragment 2 lines 3 and 5, the goddess who expresses the krisis or fork in the road takes great care to present the two alternatives in a highly symmetrical manner. Circe correlates the same words (πέτραι, 12.59; λῖς πέτρη,

Empedocles’ Fr. 3.10 provides striking support for the second option (see e.g. Palmer (2009) 70 and 70 n. 61).


\(^40\) Where ὀπποτερή ... ὁδὸς ... ἀμφοτέρωθεν highlights the mutual exclusiveness of the terms, αὕτερ ὁδὸι μοῦναι would emphasize their exhaustiveness. For more discussion see n. 43 below.

\(^41\) For the semantics of einai, much work on the use of the word in Parmenides before Brown (1994) is out of date (exceptions include Kahn (1973), Furth (1974), Mourelatos (1979b)). Since then, Kahn (2002), Mourelatos (2008b) xx–xxvi, Mourelatos (2008a) all make headway on the sense and function of the word in Parmenides, while Kahn (2009a) articulates a general framework of its syntax and semantics in early Greek. One of the most productive outcomes of this reconsideration has been an emerging consensus that ‘rather than choose between the various senses, we need to acknowledge their interplay’ (Miller (2006) 44). See also Kahn (2002) 88–89; Curd (2011) 19. The rendering here is based on – but freely modified from – the translation given by Miller (2006).
5.1 Disjunctions

12.64 [Planctae]; πέτρη... λίς, 12.79 [Scylla]), the same characters (e.g. Amphitrite (12.60 and 12.97)), and the same technique of ‘description-by-negation’ (12.62–4 and 12.83–84). Likewise, the scrupulous congruities defining the phrasing of Parmenides’ Fragment 2 lines 3 and 5 have been illustrated by the close symmetry marking the pair rendered in propositional form (e.g. ‘to think that A and that B’ and ‘to think that not-A and that not-B’) and in rudimentary logical notation – e.g. ‘A and necessarily ¬(¬A)’ and ‘¬A and necessarily ¬A’.

The similarities between Parmenides’ Fragment 2 and Od. 12.55–126 extend to the level of discourse modes and the types of dependence that define their relationship (Figure 5.2). Recall that the normal discourse-unit in Odyssey 10 and 12 involves a narration portion, followed by description, which in turn provides the raw material for the instruction and/or argument that follows (Section 3.2, Section 4.2); the ‘either-or’ disjunction of the krisis was associated with its own variant of this pattern, with two distinct levels of description used to advocate rejecting and/or selecting one alternative (Section 4.2). The key features of this pattern are replicated in Parmenides’ Fragment 2. A narration section gives a choice between two hodoi (Od. 12.55–58; Parmenides Fr. 2.1–2), introduced via a men... de... clause, with close symmetry between the two terms. In the Odyssey, these terms are immediately subjected to a further qualification; so, of the πέτραι ἐπηρεφέες introduced by men... , Circe says (Od. 12.61):

Πλαγκτάς δή τοι τάς γε θεοί μάκαρες καλέουσι.

But the blessed gods call these the Planctae.

While of οἱ... δῶι σκόπελοι, introduced by de... , Circe says of the first (Od. 12.80):

μέσω δ᾽ ἐν σκοπέλῳ ἔστι σπέος ἡροειδὲς...

And about halfway up it there is a misty cave...

42 See Ch. 4, n. 33 above; the sentence here paraphrases Hopman (2012) 26–27.
Krisis: Fragment 2

In Parmenides, meanwhile, the following qualities are attributed in the *men . . . de . . .* clause (Fr. 2.4, 2.6):

Πειθοὺς ἔστι κέλευθος — Ἀληθεία γάρ ὅτι ἂν . . .

τὴν δὴ τοι φράζω παναπευθέα ἐμμεν ἀταρπόν.

This is the path of Persuasion, for she attends upon Truth . . .

This is a track from which no learning/report\(^{44}\) comes whatsoever, I point out to you.\(^{45}\)

All four lines just presented are classic description, with verbs in the third person present (καλέουσι, ὁπηδεῖ) and predicative uses of *einai* (Πειθοὺς ἔστι κέλευθος, and, in indirect speech, παναπευθέα ἐμμεν ἀταρπόν). If description is ‘oriented to the statics of the world’, then lines 4 and 6 of Parmenides’ Fragment 2 are perfect examples of it, attributing qualities to the two *hodoi* in question.

Fragment 2 then proceeds as follows (Fr. 2.6–8):

τὴν δὴ τοι φράζω παναπευθέα ἐμμεν ἀταρπόν

οὔτε γὰρ ἄν γνώις τὸ γε μὴ ἔδω — οὗ γὰρ άνυστόν —

οὔτε φράσας.

\(^{44}\) See Mourelatos (2008b) 23–24 and Mourelatos (1979b) 359; I shall discuss the meaning of this word elsewhere.

\(^{45}\) See Mourelatos (1965).
5.1 Disjunctions

This is a track from which no learning/report comes whatsoever, I point out to you:

For you could not apprehend *what-is-not* as such\(^{46}\) (for it cannot be accomplished),\(^ {47}\)

Nor could you indicate\(^ {48}\) it.

For their part, lines 7–8 display an ‘argument’ discourse mode comparable to Circe’s instructions at *Od*. 12.106–10:

\[\ldots \text{μὴ} \; \text{σὺ} \; \text{γε} \; \text{κεῖθι} \; \text{τῦχοις}, \; \text{ότε} \; \text{ροιβδήσειν} \]
\[\text{οὺς} \; \text{γάρ} \; \text{κεν} \; \text{δύσαιτο} \; \text{σ’} \; \text{ὑπὲκ} \; \text{kακού} \; \text{ωὔ} \; \text{ἐνοαίχθων}. \]
\[\text{ἀλλὰ} \; \text{μάλα} \; \text{Σκύλλης} \; \text{σκοπέλω} \; \text{πεπλημένος} \; \text{άκα} \]
\[\text{νῆα} \; \text{παρέξ} \; \text{ξλάαν} \; \text{έπει} \; \text{α} \; \text{πολὺ} \; \text{φέρτερόν} \; \text{έστιν} \]
\[\text{ἐξ} \; \text{έτάρους} \; \text{ἐν} \; \text{νη} \; \text{ποθήμεναι} \; \text{ή} \; \text{άμα} \; \text{πάντας}. \]

\[\ldots \text{May you not chance to be present there when Charybdis sucks down,} \]

For no one could rescue you out from out of that ill, not even Poseidon.

But driving your ship hard by Scylla’s rock

Sail on swiftly, since it is far better

To mourn six men from your ship than all of them together.

In both cases we find a conclusion (Fr. 2.6, *Od*. 12.106) justified (*gar*)\(^ {49}\) by a modally charged (*an/ken*) negation (*oul[te]*) (*Od*. 12.107a, Fr. 2.7a, 8).\(^ {50}\)

If Fr. 2.1–6 resembles the first fork in the *hodos* presented by Circe (*Od*. 12.55–81), at the upper levels of dependence – narration followed by description – Fr. 2.6–8 resembles the second (12.82–126) at the lower part of the level of dependence – description followed by argument.

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46 Translation after Miller (2006) 4, whose rendition is one of the few to incorporate the limitative, and also the intensive, forces of the particle *γε*. Indeed, all three categories of ‘forces’ that Denniston (1951) 114–15 attributes to the particle seem apt: the ‘Determinative’ (‘what-is-not’, regardless of any other qualities this ‘what’ may potentially have), the ‘Limitative’ (‘what-is-not, as such’), and the ‘Intensive’ (‘what-absolutely/radically-is-not’). On the ‘Limitative’, see also O’Brien (1987) 18: ‘you could hardly come to know what is not – whatever else you might come to know.’ On *γε* here, see also Cordero (2004) 81 and 81 n. 334.

47 I plan to address this word, especially in light of Homeric usage, in an article; for now, see remarks in Mourelatos (2008b) 23 and n. 36; Coxon (2009) 10–11.

48 For further nuances, see Mourelatos (1965) and Mourelatos (2008b) 20 and n. 28, more generally DELG and LfgκΕ s.v. φράζει.

49 Likewise, *epei* at line 109 resembles the four appearances of *epei* that help articulate the four *sēnata* of Fr. 8 – especially given that it, too, is followed by the predicative *esti* (see Ch. 4). On the role played by *gar* in delineating the argumentative structure of Fr. 2.6–8, see Cordero (2004) 79 and Palmer (2009) 103.

50 For further discussion of the grammar of Fr. 2.7–8, see O’Brien (1987) 17.
The major continuities between Parmenides’ Fragment 2 and *Od.* 12.55–126 thus obtain not only at the level of diction, but also in terms of the discourse modes used and the order of their sequencing: first narration, then description, and finally instruction/argument. But two very striking differences must also be noted. The first is verbal form. The two ‘conclusions’ of the ‘argument’ sections in the *Odyssey* take the form of second person imperative optatives (or infinitives) – μὴ σὺ ... κεῖθι τὺχοις (*Od.* 12.106) and Σκύλλης σκοπέλῳ πεπλημένος ὥκα | νῆα παρέξ ἐλάσσαν (*Od.* 12.108–09) – while the justifying support takes the form of the third person – οὐ ... κεν ῥύσαιτό (*Od.* 12.107) and πολὺ φέρτερόν ἔστιν (*Od.* 12.109). In Parmenides, by contrast, the justifying support takes the form of the second person – οὔτε ... ἄν γνοίης ... οὔτε φράσσαι (Fr. 2.7–8) – while the conclusion takes the form of a third person indicative (in indirect speech) – τὴν ... παναπευθέν ἐμὲν ἀταρπόν (Fr. 2.6).

Second, in Homer the ‘argument’ sections are, as discussed, examples of practical reasoning and arguments insofar as they conclude in an imperative to a particular action. In Parmenides’ Fragment 2, by contrast, the conclusion is a proposition asserting a state of affairs, namely, that a certain object (the second route) has a particular quality (viz., being *panapeuthēs*). And, strikingly, the support for this claim now encompasses two actions – *gignōskein* and *phrazein* (Fr. 2.7–8) – as opposed to the Homeric patterns of deliberation, where the argumentative support is often anchored in basic facts about the world (e.g. the evil that Scylla is, is immortal – ἀλλ᾽ ἄθανατον κακὸν ἔστι [*Od.* 12.118] – because of the six heads *that she has* – τῆς ἦ τοι πόδες εἰσὶ δυώδεκα πάντες ἀωροι | ἕξ δὲ τέ οί δειραὶ περιμήκεες [*Od.* 12.89–90]).

These transformations bring to the fore two developments of major import. In Homer, facts about the world, expressed in the third person indicative (sometimes negated with a modal charge) serve as the basis for (or provide the raw material for premises of) a kind of practical argument yielding a second person imperative pertaining to some action. In Parmenides, by contrast, second person actions (now negated with the modal charge of the...
5.1 Disjunctions

Homeric description sections serve as the basis supporting and justifying the assertions that play the role of description, stating facts about the world and attributing qualities to entities that have been introduced (in this case, via the predicative esti, that the second route is ‘entirely without report’, Fr. 2.6). The underlying relationship or ‘type of dependence’ between these two discourse modes has been reversed: the ‘argument’, in both cases centring on actions that can or cannot be taken by the interlocutor, in Parmenides’ poem ultimately supports the assertions made about the world (i.e. descriptions). If Parmenides is one of the first to defend, justify, or argue for his conclusions about the nature of the world, identifying the manner in which he adopts this traditional form of deliberation but reverses the relationship between description and action is of decisive importance (see Table 5.1, Figure 5.3).

Second, the reversal of person between the verbs of conclusion and premise in Homer and Parmenides spotlights the crucial importance of one of Parmenides’ argumentative strategies: his argument’s dialectical nature. This dialectical nature is invaluable for securing the foundations of his argument because Parmenides’ assertion at Fr. 2.7–8 ‘is axiomatic within a dialectical context’. This manoeuvre responds to the problem of what strategy a thinker whose goal is to ‘cut free from inherited premises’ can devise to accomplish this goal. If one can no longer make arguments on the basis of facts established by description (and even if one wants to do just the reverse, and establish facts through the arguments one presents) how should

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51 Strictly speaking, a statement concerning the impossibility of performing certain actions (such as we find in e.g. Fr. 2.7–8) is a statement of a fact that concerns an action.

52 As emphasized by e.g. Furth (1974) 250–51 and Mackenzie (1982); see also Robbiano (2006) 61–88. It is infelicitous that the word ‘dialectic’ should be used to mean both a ‘process of discourse . . . carried on by more than one person’ (Mackenzie (1982) 9 n. 8 on Parmenides) and a particular pattern of generating claims and pursuing arguments – also vitally important to Parmenides’ thought – centring on position, negation, and denial of negation (see the series of studies: Austin (1986), S. Austin (2002), Austin (2007), Austin (2011), Austin (2013), Austin (2014)). It is plainly the first sense in play here; see n. 65 below.

53 Mackenzie (1982) 1, and see generally the excellent analysis at Mackenzie (1982) 1–2. Interpretations of Fr. 2.7–8 along similar lines include Owen (1960); Tugwell (1964); Hussey (1972) 85–86; Hintikka (1980); and the powerful O’Brien (2000), esp. 30–34. Owen (1960) 95. It is for this reason, of course, that references to Descartes’s cogito are so common: see e.g. Owen (1960) 95, followed by Tugwell (1964), Guthrie (1965) 15 (see discussion at Mourelatos (2008b) 271); Hintikka (1980) explores this question at length (see esp. Hintikka (1980) 12–13, 12 n. 16).
one proceed? What else could one do other than ‘start from an assumption whose denial is particularly self-refuting’?55

These are not the only elements from Od. 12.55–126 to feature prominently in Parmenides’ Fr. 2. Of course, third person singular indicative forms of εἰναι continue to be very important beyond the beguiling but portentous names given to the ἁδοί at Fragment 2 lines 3 and 5. Similarly, predicative uses of esti attribute qualities to these ἁδοί, as at Fragment 2 lines 4 and 6. Finally, the particle γὰρ links the conclusion (stated first) to its argumentative support. Finally, the modally charged negations important in Od. 12.55–126 remain fundamental to Parmenides’ Fr. 2, serving as the essential premises for

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55 Owen (1960) 95.
56 See the modified Kenny-Vendler chart in Figure 1.1 above.
major conclusions (Od. 12.107 for conclusion at Od. 12.106; Fr. 2.7–8 for conclusion at Fr. 2.6) – and if one accepts the view that the force of Fragment 2.6–8 springs from the self-defeating nature of any attempt to refute it, the persistence of the modally charged negation (combined with the switch from third to second person) acquires momentous significance for the history of thought.57

We have already discussed at great length the arresting confluence of features found where Gill’s Homeric pattern of deliberation – consideration of different courses of action, rejection of one course, conclusion – intersects with a forking of a hodos. In this special case, ‘course of action’ and ‘course’ – viz. a cursus, part of the itinerary of a journey through physical space – are perfectly coextensive (Section 4.2.3, ‘Assessments and Cautions’); accordingly, basic dynamics of the use of space, namely, the impossibility of travelling two routes at the same time (a crystalline way of imaging – or indeed imagining, thematizing – the abstract notion of mutually exclusive, exhaustive alternatives), or the impossibility of getting from point A to point C except by way of some point B, shapes the nature of the choice. As a result, when Homeric deliberation about what courses of action to take is deliberation about courses, the matrix of possible decisions is concretized in the form of two mutually incompatible, exhaustive alternatives: in other words, a krisis, or exclusive disjunction (see Figures 5.4a, b, c).58

In the ‘Choice’ hodos-units of Odyssey 12, we saw that the rejection of one option as a crucial preliminary to a conclusion can take various forms (see Figure 5.5a, b, c). In the case of the Two Roads, the rejection is merely implicit, and emerges from an extended series of ‘descriptions-by-negation’ which are in fact tantamount to a ‘proscription-by-negation’ (Section 4.2.2). In the case of the Two Rocks, the rejection and selection of the other alternative are explicit (Od. 12.106–08). This rejection takes on a special kind of potency within the framework of the mutually exclusive, exhaustive alternatives of the forking hodos. Circe lays bare the power of the either/or choice when noting that Scylla is to be selected not because she represents a desirable option (six men

57 See n. 63 below.
58 See on this point Mansfeld (1964) 56–62, though also with the cautions of Kahn (1970); see also Kahn (2009c) 150–51, and the remarks at Cordero (2004) 66, with footnotes.
will die); rather, given that nobody would survive the alternative, she is in practice the *only* option (*Od*. 12.106–10).\(^{59}\)

Finally, modally charged negation plays *the* crucial role in eliminating one of the alternatives in the case of the Two Rocks choice (12.107), in effect *forcing* Odysseus to choose the other term, no matter how grim the prospect (*Section 4.2.2.1*, ‘Three Features’). Framed in terms of modally inflected impossibility – *nobody* would be able to save Odysseus, not even Poseidon,

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Figure 5.4a Circe’s exclusive disjunction (routes), *Od*. 12.55–83

Figure 5.4b Circe’s exclusive disjunction (rocks), *Od*. 12.73–126

Figure 5.4c Parmenides’ goddess’s exclusive disjunction, Fr. 2.2–5
5.1 Disjunctions

master of the sea (Od. 12.107) – this rejection takes on a kind of
general, theoretical force, expressing something like a categorical
claim. What we see in Fragment 2, then, is a very powerful
synthesis of features common in Homeric language and thought –
the pattern of Homeric deliberation deemed typical by Gill,
amodified ‘description-by-negation’ technique (with a modal
charge) – that, when applied to a specific kind of choice (between
bifurcating paths denoting physical movement through space),
combine to require the selection of one possibility by virtue of
the necessary rejection of the other.\footnote{There are many possible ways of expressing this, and here is one point where the
 distinction between observers’ categories and actors’ categories becomes particularly
loaded; O’Brien (2000) 32, for example, aptly describes the matter in terms of a strategy
for ‘ensuring that we make the right choice’.}

60
out the observations in Section 4.2.3 of the previous chapter. Seen from this perspective, Parmenides’ krisis, or ‘exclusive disjunction’, at Fr. 2 loses its novelty and becomes an argumentative device taken over ready-made; it is the use to which this argumentative strategy is put that is transformative and revolutionary.

5.2 Opening Moves

The majority of the transformations effected by Parmenides that we have examined so far come at the level of ‘types of dependence’; there is also, however, one vitally important change undertaken by Parmenides at the level of rhetorical schemata. In Homer, the ‘Choice’ hodos-unit comes in the middle of the journey, after the meadow of the Sirens and before Thrinacia. In Parmenides, by contrast, the krisis portion forms the very first hodos-unit we encounter (see Figure 5.6).

Why is this significant? Lloyd noted that ‘the aims of The Way of Truth are clear: Parmenides sets out to establish a set of inescapable conclusions by strict deductive arguments from a starting point that itself has to be accepted. Those are features it shares with later demonstrations.’ 61 The development of interconnected deductive arguments we shall explore in the next chapter; what is at stake here is the notion that, as Parmenides’ successor Diogenes of Apollonia would put it some decades later, ‘anyone beginning an account ought to make the starting point [or principle] indisputable’ (64B1). 62 Fragment 2 plays the definitive role in securing this. 63

To put everything together: Parmenides accomplishes this ground-breaking leap in the structure of rigorous argumentation by reconfiguring and recombining discursive elements found in Homer. At the level of ‘types of dependence’, he reverses the roles between description and argumentation, using the argument section to support an assertion advanced in the description section. This argument in turn can be decoupled from previously established facts and remain free-standing: it is self-supporting or self-verifying, 64 partly as a result of

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62 For discussion of this claim and further bibliography, see Curd (1998a) 1–2, 1 n. 1.
63 See e.g. Lloyd (1979) 69; see also n. 57 above.
64 See formulations at e.g. Owen (1960) 95; Hintikka (1980) 12 n. 16; Miller (2006) 35.
5.2 Opening Moves

the use of the second person, which gives the argument its dialectical
dynamics and force. And this argument section, insofar as it works
in the service of a claim that, in typical Homeric fashion, rules out one
alternative – and does so, following Od. 12.55–126, in the context of
an exclusive disjunction – therefore demands the selection of the

65 See M. Mackenzie (1982) 2: ‘The dialectical context is introduced by the myth of
a dialogue between the goddess and the Kouros... But this conceit recedes into the
background, and Parmenides appears to argue directly with the reader, who becomes his
interlocutor throughout the Alētheia.’ See also Furth (1974) 250–51, Robbiano (2006)
61–88.

66 That frs. 2.3 and 5 articulate what is at this stage an exclusive disjunction is strongly
suggested. See e.g. Cornford (1933), in response Palmer (2009) 64–65. See also
Recent discussions include Crystal (2002) 207–08; Cordero (2004); Mansfeld (2005);
Warren (2007) 83; Lewis (2009); Bredlow (2011) 295; Thanassas (2011) 295–96. This
point is accepted even by those who feel there is no ‘argument’ in Fr. 2.7–8 (e.g. Curd
(1998a) 15–17 and Lesher (1984)). Whether the modal complements of fragments 2.3b
and 2.5b render the terms in question complementary – but not contradictory – has
also been debated: for extended discussion (and comprehensive bibliography), see

Figure 5.6 Shift: Krisis placed at the beginning of the hodos

Fragment 2
Moreover, the modal charge attached to the rejection of the one possibility generates a kind of symmetrical modal valence that is projected onto the other route, which must necessarily be selected if one is to proceed further down any path at all. All this takes place within one *hodos*-unit on the journey spelled out by the female goddess to her male mortal charge. Moving this unit to the front of the itinerary, meanwhile, not only forces the mortal voyager down a particular path, ruling the alternative out, but does so *from the very beginning* of the voyage—before there is any chance of selecting a different starting point, before there is any alternative but to confront this decisive initial *krisis*.

This is where the likes of Curd (1998a) 15–17 part company from e.g. Barnes (1982) 159; see also n. 43 above. For discussion of the word ἔλεγχος (Fr. 7) in this context, see e.g. Lesher (1984); Lesher (2002); Furley (1989) 2; and Mourelatos 2013a.

Herein lies the force of the modal complements at fragments 2.3b and 2.5b. This is the most controversial aspect of the rendition presented here, one in harmony with important aspects of e.g. Cordero (2004); Thanassas (2011); Miller (1979) 22–24; Miller (2006) 28–33.

Here, too, we also have an opportunity to reassess some of the questions raised at the end of the last chapter (Section 4.2.3, ‘Assessments and Cautions’). What we saw there was a quite a high degree of distinctiveness in the Homeric passage, a distinctiveness that is now underscored by the very high degree of overlap these distinctive features share with Parmenides’ Fr. 2. In the choices between travelling by way of the Wandering Rocks or the Two Rocks, between Scylla and Charybdis, we saw a confluence of Gill’s pattern of Homeric deliberation—two courses of action are considered and, one course being rejected on the basis of the consequences implied by selecting it, the other is selected—with the use of opposites observed by Lloyd. What is more, entirely unlike anything we saw in either Hesiod or the gold tablets, passage by one route is rigorously barred via modally charged negation, which is in turn supported, implicitly or explicitly, by argumentation of some kind in the form of clauses introduced by *gar* and/or *epei*; this forces the selection of the other alternative. What we have seen in the exact usage of all these features by Parmenides thus not only underscores the distinctiveness of the Homeric model, but also illuminates point by point the very high degree of overlap with Parmenides.
In both *Odyssey* 12 and Parmenides’ poem, then, a female divinity with privileged access to knowledge, located in a special Beyond, signs out a *hodos* that her male mortal charge must travel in order to reach his destination. In both cases this features a choice between two *hodoi* where one is radically blocked and impassable, and, according to the logic of the exclusive, exhaustive disjunction or *krisis*, the traveller is therefore forced to proceed by way of the other. In both *Odyssey* 12 and Parmenides’ poem, the goddess then provides detailed instructions for travel on the remaining route.¹ We examined

¹ The debt to the formulation at Mourelatos (2008b) 24 n. 38 (see also pp. 24, 92) is clear:

In both cases, we have in this order: (a) an initial choice between two routes; (b) an explanation that one of these invariably leads to *planē* (cf. the very name *Planktai* in the *Odyssey*, the adjective *panapeutic* in Parmenides); (c) a further explanation that the remaining route calls for expert navigation and that most mortals fail at it (Od. 12.73–110; cf. B6, B7); (d) detailed instructions for the correct navigation of this remaining route (Od. 12.115–26; cf. B8).

It will be noted that I have omitted points (b) and (c) in my summary. That is because I think that the parallel between the *hodos* that Circe signs out to Odysseus and the one Parmenides’ goddess signs out to the *kouros* may be even more precise than Mourelatos spells out. In the *Odyssey*, we actually have two successive exclusive, exhaustive disjunctions. The first is between the Wandering Rocks (which, *pace* Mourelatos (2008b) 92, do not somehow lead to or induce wandering, but, as we have seen, themselves ‘wander’ insofar as they move by snapping shut, thereby blocking absolutely any passage through them) and the Two Rocks. Then, as we have seen, we immediately get a second exclusive, exhaustive disjunction or *krisis* – passage by way of either Scylla or Charybdis (note that Circe does not use the word *hodos* to describe this disjunction here, as she does at Od. 12.57). Charybdis is of course no less radically impassable, and so Odysseus is forced to go by way of Scylla (see also Section 6.2.1 for further discussion). The parallel opens up a startlingly evocative vista on the vexed question of how many routes there are in Parmenides’ poem. Scholars sometimes discuss a three-route option as if there were a choice between all three roads at once. But this need not necessarily the case, and it is certainly not the case that Odysseus must decide from the beginning whether to travel by way of the Planctae, Scylla, or Charybdis. Instead, as the text of the *Odyssey* makes very clear (Section 4.2.1), what we see are two consecutive choices between symmetrical, carefully balanced pairs that form an exclusive, exhaustive disjunction; the effect is a successive winnowing of routes available to the traveler rather than a free choice between three routes. Because the analysis I pursue in this book can accommodate a broad range of interpretations of Parmenides’ arguments (see sections 6.3.1–4), I have been careful to remain agnostic on certain questions, such as how many routes are involved, that...
the first part of this parallel in Chapter 5; now it is time to examine
the second.

Putting matters this way underscores another benefit of analysing
the structure of Parmenides’ ‘Route to Truth’ not in terms of a rigid,
one-to-one correlation, but with the greater flexibility afforded by
the notion of the ‘rhetorical schema’ governed by the hodos. Rather
than being forced (as Mourelatos is) to correlate fragments 2, 6, 7,
and 8 with Circe’s hodos as it is ordered in lines Od. 12.55–126,
with the analysis of Chapter 3 in hand, we are now in a position to
examine the possibility that Parmenides exploits the combinatorial
possibilities offered by the entire hodos (Od. 12.39–141) and of the
rhetorical schema of the hodos more generally. This points towards
a core claim: as the catalogic entries ‘Sirens’, ‘Choice/Krisis’, and
‘Thrinacia’ are linked together in Circe’s hodos according to the
relationship we have been calling ‘con-sequence’, so the hodos-
units articulated in fragments 2, 6 and 7, and 8.5–49 are linked
together in the hodos outlined by Parmenides’ goddess according to
the same sequentially ordered pattern.

Before approaching the specifics of this claim, a few prelimi-
nary points should be stated at the outset. In what follows, I shall
adopt several widely agreed-upon tenets concerning the best way
to analyse the constituent elements comprising Fragment 8: 2 that
the four sēmata of lines 8.3–4 announce a programme for the

might commit me to a specific interpretation of Parmenides to the exclusion of others. I intend
to build on the points set out in this footnote in an appropriate setting.

Those who advocate (or at least endorse) the following positions – at least in their
basic outlines – include the seminal Owen (1960), from which a number of
positions either originate or where they received their current form of expression; van Groningen (1960) 226; Guthrie (1965) 26–43; Mansfeld (1964), esp. 93–102;
Mourelatos (2008b) [1970]; Stokes (1971); Lloyd (1979); Lloyd (2000); Barnes
(1986); Curd (1998b); Sedley (1999), with reservations at 122; Robbiano (2006)
Notable dissidents include Tarán (1965) 191 and now McKirahan (2008), discussed
below. Though I do not necessarily share his view of Parmenides’ overarching
project, my understanding of the specific arguments made in the course of Fragment
8, particularly their internal form and structure, is much indebted to Palmer’s tour

2 Of the works listed above, Owen (1960), Guthrie (1965), Mourelatos (2008b) [1970],
consider the argumentation proper to beginning only at Fr. 8.6b; the status of Fr. 8.5–6a
varies in these interpretations.
Con(-)sequence: Fragment 8

remainder of the ‘Route to Truth’,\(^4\) that these sēmata, which name qualities of to eon, fall into four groups: (i) agenēton kai anōlethron, (ii) oulon mounogenes te,\(^5\) (iii) atremes, and (iv) teleston,\(^6\) and that these four qualities of to eon are taken up, and arguments offered in support of them, one by one in the course of lines (i) 8.5/6–21, (ii) 8.22–25, (iii) 8.26–31/33,\(^7\) and (iv) 8.42–49, respectively.\(^8\) Because my interest here lies in the formal principles of arrangement organizing the relationship between Parmenides’ arguments rather than in the substance of the claims they advance, I will not attempt to prove the merits of viewing the structure of argument along these lines, which have been widely accepted since at least Owen’s exegesis undertaken more than sixty years ago.\(^9\) At this stage, we may simply note that the traditional hermeneutic concerns of the poetry critic – attention to the way that repeated words and images help define the structure, and articulate the units, of a poem – are in harmony with analyses that see the repeated use of words like epei as the key to understanding the articulation of the argument\(^10\) (rather than, say, a strategy of combing through the body of Fragment 8 for

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\(^4\) For what constitutes a sēma, see discussion below.


\(^8\) See esp. Palmer (2009) 352–54, who summarizes the argument of Ebert (1989); see also e.g. Thanassas (1997). My own view of 8.34–41 echoes Barnes (1982) 180: ‘I cannot associate them with anything in the prospectus; and I have sympathy with the proposal to place them after line 49. Wherever one places lines 8.34–41, the view taken here is of a continuous argument that spans fragments 2, 6, 7, 8.1–33, and 8.42–49.

\(^9\) Owen 1960. Among those who agree about the four-part structure of Fragment 8, there is also the question of lines 8.32–33; see n. 7 above. For an entirely different analysis of Fragment 8, see e.g. Tarán (1965) and, more radically, McKirahan (2008); I shall discuss McKirahan’s position at some length below.

\(^10\) And this in turn has a bearing – though by no means a decisive one – on such questions as whether 8.5–6a should be considered part of the first sēma proper or an extension of the programme, or whether 8.32–33 should be read as part of the third or the fourth sēma. For an excellent analysis of the use of epei and other such words to structure the argument, see e.g. Palmer (2000) 136–59, esp. 156; see also Barnes (1983) for the more general point. On a similar note, the observations above regarding the role played by the discourse marker autar (and also, surprisingly, the classic epic combination autar epei) can perhaps help us
arguments that seem to line up according to our sense of what makes an argument good).\textsuperscript{11}

Before moving on to the body of Fragment 8, it is worth observing three additional ways in which the analysis undertaken in the preceding chapters can shed new light on aspects of the use of the word \textit{sēma} in the opening movements of the fragment. It begins (Fr. 8.1–3):

\begin{quote}
... Μόνος δὲ ἐτι μῦθος ὠδοῖο
λειπέται, ὡς ἔστιν ταύτῃ δὲ ἐπὶ σήματι ἐσαι
πολλὰ μάλ’ ...
\end{quote}

... As yet an account of a single \textit{hodos}\textsuperscript{12}

Remains, that ... is (...):\textsuperscript{13} and on this \textit{hodos} there are \textit{sēmata},

Very many ... .

The precise meaning of the word here is debated. On one view, the four predicates listed in lines 8.3–4 (or 8.3–6)\textsuperscript{14} constitute the \textit{sēmata};\textsuperscript{15} on another, it is the arguments (i.e. lines 8.5/6–49) themselves to which the word \textit{sēmata} refers.\textsuperscript{16} In the first case, the emphasis falls on the notion of a \textit{sēma} as a physical object
discern the shape and structure of the argumentative pattern in ways not yet appreciated – an issue I hope to explore elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{11} So e.g. Tarán (1965) and McKirahan (2008) begin by formulating the points they think Parmenides attempts to make and work backwards to parcel up Fragment 8 into chunks that would support these, though McKirahan is, admirably, at pains to argue that it is a mistake to judge the quality of Parmenides’ arguments according to contemporary understandings of what makes an argument good; see discussion below in this chapter’s sections 6.3.4, ‘Two Further Options’, and 6.4, ‘Sēma IV: Accomplishments and Completions’.

\textsuperscript{12} For the nuances of these possible translations and the very high stakes tied to the different possibilities, see Cassin (2011), esp. 65–79.

\textsuperscript{13} See Cassin (2011), esp. 65–79.

\textsuperscript{14} See n. 3 above.

\textsuperscript{15} See e.g. Owen (1974); Mourelatos (2008b) 94; Coxon (2009) 312–15.

\textsuperscript{16} See e.g. Cerri (2000) 214; Cordero (2004); Robbiano (2011) 218 and passim; see also McKirahan (2008) 221 n. 9. Against this view, see Mourelatos (2008b) 25 n. 40: ‘the sense of a “signpost” or “marking on the route” seems more apt. The syntax of the passage makes Parmenides’ “signs” into something physical: they are \textit{on (epi)} the route.’ Palmer’s view is sage: ‘the goddess’s catalogue of \textit{sēmata} functions with some degree of ambiguity, in that they can be understood both as markers or “signposts” defining the way to come and also as the attributes under which Parmenides will come to conceive of What Is itself’ (Palmer (2009) 139). See also p. 296 below.
acting as a kind of landmark (as often in Homer);\textsuperscript{17} in the second, the hermeneutic demands embedded in the word \(\text{sēmainō}\) – indicating a message neither immediately intelligible nor entirely opaque, but requiring interpretation – come to the fore.\textsuperscript{18}

The first benefit: whichever construal of \(\text{sēma}\) one favours, we find here yet another benefit of reading Parmenides’ poem against the backdrop of \textit{Odyssey}\textsubscript{12}. Parmenides’ goddess’s choice of words becomes less surprising, and more intelligible, when one recalls that Circe begins her account to Odysseus (\textit{Od}. 12.25–26):

\begin{quote}
\dots αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ δείξω ὅδον ἣδε ἐκαστὰς
σημαίνεω . . .
\end{quote}

\dots But I shall indicate your \textit{hodos} and each thing

\textit{Sign out} . . .

‘Sign out each thing’ is, in fact, precisely what she does in the course of \textit{Od}. 12.39–141, just as Parmenides’ goddess will do in the course of Fragment 8.5–49. Had Circe been moved to provide a synoptic overview of ‘each of the things’ she was to ‘sign out’, perhaps she might have provided just such a summary as we find in Fragment 8.3–4; she might even have referred to each of the things to be signed out as a \textit{sēma}.

Second, the discussion undertaken in Section 1.1 may perhaps help us transcend the division between these two interpretations. Much of this book has proceeded from the premise that one of Parmenides’ main strategies for thinking new thoughts and speaking in new ways is to mobilize and activate the full range of associations between old words – \textit{hodos}, for example – and their physical referents, their semantic range, and their place in the mesh of discursive, sociocultural, and mythical associations. We will see below how Parmenides exploits the ambivalence between

\textsuperscript{17} Owen’s epigrammatic formulation – Parmenides ‘is careful to call these \textit{signs on the way} to [his] conclusion. Destinations do not contain the signs that lead to them, and travelers at their destinations have no use for the signs’ (\textit{Owen} (1974) 276, emphasis original) – is often cited by partisans of this view. Valuable Homeric bibliography includes Prier (1978), Lynn-George (1988), Nagy (1990a), Ford (1992), Foley (1999), also Katz (1991), Bergren (1993), Zeitlin (1995), Henderson (1997), Grethlein (2008), and Latona (2008) 218–19.

\textsuperscript{18} Unsurprisingly, Heraclitus B\textsubscript{93} – \(ό̓̄ ὁ θνεῖς ὡ̓̄ τοῦ μανετεύχει ἔσται ἡ ἐν Δήλοις σύντε λέγει σύντε κρύπτει ἄλλα σημαίνει\) – is often adduced here (e.g. Robbiano (2006) 108–09); for an extended analysis of B\textsubscript{93}, see now\textit{ Tor} (2016).
the object-like and activity-like senses of the word *hodos*. Why should *sēma* and its word family be any different? Section 1.1 provided several fascinating examples of how both senses of the word *sēma* – a physical object that can guide, mark, or otherwise act like a road sign, and something whose significance requires interpretation – can intersect, overlap, or be (literally) coextensive. Consider again the inscription on the Altar of the Twelve Gods:


(The city) set (me) up, a true record (for all) men
To indicate (the length) of the journey . . .

The physical object – a ‘true record’ or ‘truthful monument’ – itself ‘indicates’ or ‘signs out’ a message, but this message is directed to ‘mortals’ and is presented as meaningful in the course of the process of journeying that these mortals will, or at least may wish to, undertake.  

Even more arresting in this respect are Hipparchus’ herms, which literally embody all at once the *sēma* as road sign, a physical object ‘on the route’ signing out the path and its measure (‘you are halfway between the city and the deme of x or y’); the *sēma* as *interpretans*, a maxim verbally communicating an important insight about the world, be it moral (e.g. ‘Do not deceive a friend’) or ontological (e.g. ‘what-is is ungenerable and imperishable’); and the *sēma* as *interpretandum*, something to be interpreted in the course of the journey that follows, be it on the road to the *astu* or the argument supporting the claim about what-is. Here would be one more advantage, then, of reading Parmenides as both a poet and a culturally and physically embedded denizen of the late archaic period, rather than as an analytic philosopher avant la lettre speaking Truth across the void of ages. In the semantic ambiguity of the word *sēma*, we see Parmenides

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19 See discussion in Section 1.1 above.
20 That is to say, it also encompasses the qualities of the second interpretation of Parmenides’ *sēma* that are deemed important by, for example, Robbiano: both an addressee and a sense that the relevance of the message is defined in relation to a journey and the action of undertaking it; Robbiano (2011) 217–19, 227–28.
21 This is closer to the reading offered by e.g. Coxon (2009) 312.
the poet-thinker, having found only old words and old referents, hammering out new meanings and conceptual connections from the crucible of language upon the anvil of sense and reference.

Third, we may observe the relationship between the programmatic announcement of the sēmata in 8.3–4 and the notion of catalogic discourse discussed above (Section 3.1.4). This inventory of sēmata at lines Fr. 8.3–4 returns us to the characteristics of catalogic speech: the sequential enumeration of a set of items that, were they to form a series (rather than a list), would be ordered according to a specifically determined principle.

This brings us to the substance of Fragment 8 and Parmenides’ argument itself. In brief, my interest lies in examining the types of similarities that obtain between the manner in which the four assertions about the nature of to eon are linked to each other and the kris(e)is in fragments 2 and 6/7, and the manner in which the episode of the Sirens is linked to the krisis between the two hodoi or the trip past Scylla is linked to the sojourn on Thrinacia.

How might this work? Examining the possible answers to this question will form the bulk of the discussion in Section 6.3 below. A preview of one possibility, however, is as follows. The hodos, as a rhetorical schema, makes possible the linking of what we have been calling hodos-units according to a regular ordering principle: the hodos, that is, would play a decisive role in ordering the items of a catalogue into a series. On this view, in place of episodes dramatizing narrative encounters with mythological creatures (such as we find in Homer), in Fr. 8, Parmenides makes claims about the nature of to eon. Where in Homer episodes are sequenced partly on the basis of the spatial contiguity of the locations where the episodes take place in the story-world of the Odyssey, on this view, the claims about to eon would be sequenced on the basis of their ‘spatial contiguity’ in the underlying ‘logical geography’ of the story-world of fragments 2, 6, 7, and 8 (the physical dimension expressed in part through the sēma qua road sign, grave marker, or other physical object fixed in a particular place). And

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22 Parmenidean analysts who prefer a one krisis, two-route reading can read ‘Fragment 2’ for ‘fragments 2 and 6/7’ — the underlying point remains the same; see n. 25 below.

23 See again p. 222 and Section 1.1 above for the range of meanings encompassed by the word sēma.
where in Homer the direction of this sequential ordering of episodes in the narrative is fixed by the necessity that Odysseus move in time from location to location within the story-world, in Parmenides the direction of this sequential ordering of claims seems to be dictated by the same consideration in logical space. Narrative time collapses into story time as this *hodos* of inquiry is explained to the *kouros* – and to us. On this reading, the rhetorical schema dictated by the figure of the *hodos* – and the specific mode of discursive organization we have been calling con-sequence – would then provide the basic framework governing the shape of the discursive architecture of fragments 2, 6, 7, and 8.1–49 (see Figures 6.1a–b).

Having thus previewed a ‘strong’ reading of the relationship between *Odyssey* 12 and Parmenides’ ‘Route to Truth’, it will be important to distinguish the relationships between Fragment 2, fragments 6 and 7, and Fragment 8.5–21 at the level of *hodos*-units (two

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Figure 6.1a One possibility. Con-sequence: Ordered sequential linkage of discursive units (= *hodos*-units), frs. 2, 6, 7, and 8.5–21

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24 This will be seen to coincide with the influential reading advanced in Owen (1960).

25 This schema depicts a two-κρίσις rather than one-κρίσις map of Parmenides’ arguments. But my arguments work just as well in either case, and in this book I remain agnostic as to whether there is one κρίσις or two in the course of fragments 2, 6, and 7, just as I remain agnostic here as to whether, for example, Owen’s interpretation of the relationship between the σηματα in Fragment 8 (represented in Figure 6.1b) or Sedley’s interpretation is to be preferred (see further Section 6.3, ‘Σῆμα III. Ηδοποίησις: The ‘Route to Truth’ and Fragment 8’ below). Since my arguments do not hinge on committing to one interpretation or the other and, no less importantly, can accommodate a number of different interpretations, I have refrained from advancing my own views on several specific points of Parmenides’ arguments, which is best done in another setting; I thank my PhD examiners for encouraging me to proceed in this fashion.

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kriseis (or one, if one prefers) and the first sēma down the path ‘IS’ from the relationships between lines 5–21, 22–5, 26–33, and 42–49 of Fragment 8. That the first grouping – fragments 2, 6, and 7 and Fragment 8.5–21 – is organized as a series is not today in serious dispute (see discussion at Section 6.3 below). The specific relationship between each of the different sēmata is, however, somewhat more contentious (again, to be discussed in Section 6.3 below). According to some interpretations26 these, too, form a series; according to others27 they are more list-like (though, as we shall see, even on these interpretations, they do not really comprise a list, strictly speaking). Ultimately, my goal in this book is not to plump for one interpretation or the other. Rather, I want to examine how my overall account of Parmenides’ invention of extended deductive argumentation – with particular emphasis on his mobilization of the associations of the reference of the word hodos, the ambiguities inscribed in its polysemic nature, and, most of all, via the discursive architecture of the hodos – looks when paired with different plausible, internally consistent interpretations of these arguments themselves; it is to these I shall turn in Section 6.3 below. First, however, in sections 6.1 and 6.2, I shall cash out the previous discussions of narration and narrativity, description and descriptivity by examining Parmenides’ tasks

26 E.g. Owen (1960).
27 E.g. Sedley (1999); the interpretations of both Owen and Sedley will be discussed at length below.
and accomplishments in their intellectual and historical context. In Section 6.1, I place Parmenides in his historical and intellectual context and explore particular limitations that his predecessors confronted, thereby revealing the unique set of discursive resources the rhetorical schema of the *hodos* offered him. In Section 6.2, I consider these questions from the perspective of Parmenides’ seminal ontological and epistemological innovations, and also their relationship to another set of narratologically complex manoeuvres he performs.

### 6.1 *Sēma I*: Systematicity and Argumentativeness

The best way to approach the arguments that make up Fragment 8 is to consider them alongside two crucial aspects of the larger intellectual milieu in which Parmenides may be seen to be working. First is the question of what we might call discursive systematicity, an attempt to create a discursive structure in which claims are linked according to a regular pattern or underlying set of principles; second, the development of argumentation to support claims advanced (as opposed to a mere assertion of the claims themselves). This demands a brief discussion of earlier (or, in the case of Heraclitus, potentially contemporary) thinkers.

Scholars have found the Milesians to be the most promising place to look for evidence of discursive systematicity among the immediate precursors of Parmenides. Any evaluation of the discursive structure and argumentation exhibited in the works of the Ionian cosmologists is gravely constrained, of course, by the paucity of *ipsissima verba* coming down to us from Miletus. A charitable reading, however, would see a certain level of discursive systematicity implied by their apparently systematic cosmological theories. The *communis opinio* remains that ‘cosmogony is the heir of theogony’, and that Hesiod’s *Theogony* in particular provides the key model for the Ionians on two levels. In the first

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28 However this should be best understood; see the Introduction and Ch. 2.
29 Regarding this old, vexed question, little is at stake for the argument advanced in this book; for recent bibliography, see Introduction, n. 16.
30 See e.g. Curd (1998a), and overviews such as Algra (1999) or Graham (2006) 1–27.
31 See e.g. Mansfeld (1999) and Runia (2008), also Palmer (2009) 1–45 for discussion and bibliography.
32 Phrase from Kahn (1994) 156.
place, it supplies a conceptual framework for understanding the world as one kosmos; in the second, it supplies a discursive framework for expressing this in a discursive unity (viz. a single, unified whole organized by a systemically applied rhetorical schema, the rhetorical schema of the genealogy).  

A genealogical mode of organizing discursive units does not, however, naturally suggest a role for argumentation that justifies the specific cosmological claims advanced. (Although, again, any assessment of Milesian argumentation remains provisional on account of the lack of original source material.) And although Anaximander is credited with supporting his claims with argumentation rather than merely asserting them in two justly celebrated instances, the scholarly consensus is that even ‘where there is apparently genuine disagreement with a predecessor [and] we might expect specific arguments against’ views previously espoused, a Milesian theory ‘seems to be a matter of assertions with connecting links, rather than a system whose basis is argued for and in which the various elements are supported by demonstrations of their connections with first principles’. A generous view of Milesian thought, then, would grant a kind of systematicity (at both conceptual and, potentially, discursive levels) to their cosmogonies and cosmologies, but detects scant interest in indicating why a particular assertion in this system should be accepted over a rival claim.

Xenophanes and Heraclitus cut rather a different pair of profiles. Here, too, we suffer from the patchy, haphazard manner in which their words have come down to us; in what survives we can catch some glimpses of argumentation, but any evaluation of the discursive architecture of these thinkers’ expressions is necessarily speculative. What seems certain is that the argumentative

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33 In addition to Kahn (1994) [1960], see also the classics Cornford (1952), Vernant (2006g) [1957], Stokes (1962), Stokes (1963), more recent summaries such as Hussey (2006), and newer developments, such as e.g. Graham (2013) 41–80.

34 At the level of types of dependence, it is difficult to imagine how the third level, allowing for instruction which shades into argument in the case of the rhetorical schema dictated by the figure of the hodos, would be occupied by anything but a narration in the case of a genealogical schema.


36 Curd (1998a) 5; the view is not held unanimously – Lloyd (1991a), for example, cuts somewhat against this grain.
support for individual claims advanced by these two thinkers is unquestionably more developed. Xenophanes uses *reductio* arguments, notably in Fragment 15; Heraclitus uses various hypothetical arguments, as in fragments 7 and 23.

Nevertheless, even one of the staunchest defenders of a rationalist Xenophanes admits that, while ‘some fragments contain logical connectives ... and take the form of hypothetical argument, on the whole Xenophanes offers little by way of argument in support of specific conclusions’. Nor do those who would see in his corpus a systematic account of physical phenomena and their causes claim that he supports these daring assertions with much in the way of argumentative justification. Rather, the novelty of the claims lies in their ostensibly systematic nature and scope, not in their being systematically advanced or defended.

It is not easy to assess from Heraclitus’ fragments how systematic his argumentation was, or what the report that Heraclitus wrote a ‘book’ might imply. The view summarized by Barnes three decades ago remains the generally received wisdom:

Heraclitus was an aphorist; he did not produce periodic prose or write in continuous chapters; rather, he unburdened himself in the aphoristic form of instruction, by way of short and allusive sentences. No doubt he wrote ‘a book.’ But his ‘book’ was no treatise; rather, it had the outward look of the Hippocratic *Aphorisms* or of Democritus’ collection of gnomes.

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37 For Fr. 15, see e.g. Lesher (1992) 89–94, 114–19; for Xenophanes’ argumentation, see e.g. Lloyd (1979) 68.
38 See also fragments 99 and 4, and the discussion in Lloyd (1979) 68–69.
39 Lesher (1992) 4–5: ‘in spite of the non-argumentative character of most of the fragments, a philosophy of considerable complexity emerges from the corpus as a whole’. See Tor (2017) for a discussion of different views of Xenophanes, and Lesher’s place on this spectrum.
41 See e.g. Arist. *Rhet.* 1.14.07b, Diog. Laert. 9.1, 5, 6, 7, 12.
42 Barnes (1983) 97. Indeed, the chief dissenter is Barnes himself: see Barnes (1983) 104; but see now also A. Finkelberg (2017) 33–38. Most (1999a) 357 thinks it likely there was a ‘lack of connection among many or all of the sentences that went to make it up’; each is ‘effective more on its own terms than because of its place in a chain of argumentation’. Similarly, Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (2007) 184 opines that: ‘[t]he surviving fragments ... do not resemble extracts from a continuous written work’; see also Hussey (1999), esp. 9, and Granger (2004), reprised at Granger (2008) 1–2. For more recent (and comprehensive) treatments of the topic, see e.g. Johnstone (2014) and A. Finkelberg (2017) 30–40 with up-to-date bibliography.
Even a leading proponent of the view that Heraclitus’ corpus forms a carefully composed unity envisages this formal ordering of the whole ‘on the analogy of the great choral odes, with their fluid but carefully articulated movement from image to aphorism, from myth to riddle to contemporary allusion’; on this view, supporting a presumed ‘central theme, … hen panta einai’, we find ‘a chain of statements linked together not by logical argument but by interlocking ideas, imagery, and verbal echoes’.\(^43\)

Likewise, one of the most recent attempts to ‘protect … the rationalism of Heraclitus’ concedes ‘a lack of intrinsic order among the fragments of Heraclitus’ which may well ‘stand to one another in no particular order or bear no intrinsic relation to one another, logically or syntactically’.\(^44\)

What we find, then, in the case of the Milesians is, most likely, a relatively high degree of discursive systematicity but relatively little argumentation. In Xenophanes and Heraclitus, meanwhile, there are hints of a somewhat more developed level of argumentation, at least at the level of individual claims,\(^45\) but what we do not seem to find is much evidence of discursive systematicity.

By contrast, the rhetorical schema dictated by the figure of the hodos offers a discursive framework that makes possible a single discursive unity that both accommodates a number of different textual units (unlike in Xenophanes and Heraclitus) and the linking together of these units in such a way as to suggest, and build upon, their necessary connection (unlike in the Milesian cosmologies). Studies of Parmenides’ accomplishment emphasize both the systematicity of his discourse and its thoroughly argumentative character;\(^46\) I suggest that it is his use of the figure of the hodos that, by providing a discursive framework that can accommodate both features, makes this combination possible.

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\(^{43}\) All quotations from Kahn (1979) 5–6.

\(^{44}\) Granger (2004) 15, 6, respectively. See e.g. Graham (2008) 182, and 183: ‘Heraclitus cannot provide an extended argument for inferences, but he can sharpen our perceptions … He can invite us to make inductive leaps in place of deductive inferences.’ See also Mansfeld (1990) 20.

\(^{45}\) See Curd’s assessment: ‘Early Presocratic thought remains a series of ad hoc assertions’ (Curd (1998a) 6); she continues: ‘[t]his is true even in Xenophanes and Heraclitus … their cosmological theories … are more assertion than argument.’

Importantly, Parmenides’ use of argumentation operates at what we might deem to be two levels. Just as the decision in the *krisis* in Fragment 2 is supported by (condensed and skeletal) argumentative justification, so each of the four claims advanced in the course of Fragment 8 is defended by argumentative support of varying extensiveness and comprehensiveness (viz. at the level of types of dependence). But these claims – and their supporting argumentation – are also linked to fragments 2, 6, and 7 (viz. at the level of rhetorical schemata) and, on some readings, also to each other, a question to which we shall return in Section 6.3. It is the potential movement along both axes – down the level of dependence and across the level of rhetorical schemata – that helps make Parmenides’ achievement what it is; and it is the *hodos* – which, unlike the genealogy or the stand-alone argument, accommodates and organizes relationships along both axes – that makes this possible.

6.2 *Sêma II*: Discursive Architecture and Temporality

What does this mean in terms of the discourse modes associated with the rhetorical schema of the *hodos* and the types of dependence it dictates? Before examining the specific relationships obtaining between the different fragments and the arguments of Fragment 8, it will be necessary to address aspects of Parmenides’ *hodos* of inquiry in relation to two other dimensions of import for the history of thought. Against the backdrop of the deep continuities between the discursive architecture of the *hodos* in Homer and Parmenides, we may also note some changes of extraordinary significance.

We saw that in the *Odyssey*, the enumeration of an itinerary of a *hodos* is usually a narrative affair (Section 3.2). This is reflected at the textual level insofar as episodes are linked together by temporal adverbs (e.g. *πρῶτα*, *κεῖθεν*, *ἐπείτα*), and by verbs whose features are closely associated with narration: verbs in the aorist, or in the future or historic present tense; and verbs in the imperative mood and/or second person – the language of time-bound activities that unfold in the course of, and themselves constitute, narrative action. These features suggest that the manner in which the text itself progresses has an irreducibly temporal component: the sequence of items as they appear in the text unfold.
along temporal lines (i.e. they are related to the passage of time in the story-world). This in turn is connected to the fact that ‘the temporal order in which events happen’ – the underlying events depicted by the narrative, which in turn unfolds along temporal lines according to the passage of time in the story-world – ‘is significant’.47

Parmenides’ Fragment 8, however, bears little trace of these narrative textual features linking the ‘episodes’ of the sēmata. Instead of the hemistiches πρώτα μὲν ἐς Πύλον ἔλθε (Od. 1.284), κείθεν δὲ Σπάρτην (Od. 1.285), and νοστής δὴ ἔσπειτα (Od. 1.291), or Σειρήνωος μὲν πρῶτον ἀφίξεαι (Od. 12.39), σωτάρ ἐπῆν δὴ (Od. 12.55), and Ὁρινακήν δ’ ἐς νῆσον ἀφίξεαι (Od. 12.127), the opening units of the sēmata in Fragment 8 begin, for example: οὐδὲ ποτ’ ἦν οὐδ’ ἔσται (Fr. 8.5), and οὐδὲ διαιρετόν ἔστιν (Fr. 8.22).48 We do not find the adverbial markers that indicate a temporal progression of text or event, just as we find none of the aorist, imperative, and/or second-person forms of narration or instruction that link the textual units of the hodoi of Odyssey 10 or 12. Although we do find verbs in the past and in future tense in line 8.5, these are both rejected in favour of the third person singular indicative timeless (or even eternal) present (formally akin to what we find at line 8.22): ἔπει νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν | ἐν, συνεχές (Fr. 8.5–6). And at the top level of dependence, we find few actions, and none for which the sequence of events depicted by them is significant. In the hodos detailed by Parmenides’ goddess, the narrative framework that links the various units of the hodos to each other – expressed in Odyssey 12 in the second person future indicative verbs of prophetic utterance – has vanished (a dynamic to be discussed at greater length in Section 6.2.2.1 below; see Figure 6.2).

By contrast, verbs in the third person singular indicative omni-temporal present correspond perfectly to the characteristics attributed to ‘description’ given above (see sections 3.1.2 and 3.2.3). Moreover, the opening hemistiches introducing the first and second sēmata (sēma-qua-‘argumentation proper’) also fulfil the very same functions of description – namely, introducing

47 See above Ch. 3, n. 21.
48 Lines 16 and 26 to be discussed below.
49 See discussion in e.g. Owen (1974), also Mourelatos (2008b) [1970]; Schofield (1970); Tarán (1979).
elements of the story-world and attributing qualities to them – that we have identified (see Section 3.1.2). Not only are these opening hemistiches of sēmata 1 and 2 formally similar to the ‘description’ portions of Circe’s hodos but they also perform the same function of attributing qualities.

These observations regarding description approach a larger nexus of topics which will form much of the remainder of the chapter. They can be examined from two perspectives. The first, to be addressed in the remainder of this section, concerns Parmenides’ place in the history of thought: what is at stake in the deployment of the figure of the hodos at this particular phase of Presocratic thought? What possibilities and resources might it afford to one who exploits it, how do these work, and why might they be useful? Second, to be addressed in Section 6.3, ‘Sēma III’: in what ways might this figure actually operate in the sequence spanning fragments 2, 6, 7, and 8 and in Fragment 8 itself? Finally, in Section 6.4, ‘Sēma IV’, I shall attempt to draw some conclusions and assess their implications for our understanding of Parmenides’ poem.
6.2 Šēma II: Discursive Architecture and Temporality

6.2.1 Ontology, Epistemology, Discourse

6.2.1.1 Ontology: No Time, Like the Present

Eric Havelock considered one challenge facing the early Presocratics to be the following: ‘aside altogether from the coinage of abstract nouns, the conceptual task . . . also required the elimination of verbs of doing and acting and happening, one may even say of living and dying, in favor of a syntax which states permanent relationships between conceptual terms systematically.’\(^{50}\) This syntax, marked by the use of verbs in the third person omnitemporal present indicative, is in fact closely related to the kind we have been trying to capture under the rubric of ‘description’.\(^ {51}\) More specifically: ‘[f]or this purpose the required linguistic mechanism was furnished by the timeless present of the verb to be – the copula of analytic statement. The angles are equal to two right angles. They are not born that way or become or are made so.’\(^ {52}\)

Complementing this claim at the level of individual words and discourse modes are others operative at the level of rhetorical schema. These centre around the benefits that arise from eliminating the narrative frames formed by ‘verbs of doing and acting and happening’ (e.g. ἔλθε, νοστήσας, ἀφίξεαι). Pertinent here are Kirk’s observations concerning certain basic elements of epic and myth evolving out of the oral tradition: ‘it is events, not permanent relationships, that are their currency.’\(^ {53}\) He continues:

when tales concern themselves with the nature of the outside world, they do so in personal and genealogical terms of the kind used by Hesiod and his sources in the Theogony. That is not only because of the inclination of the tales . . . to animate, to anthropomorphize . . . but also because the development of action requires . . . diachronic not synchronic terms . . . history rather than philosophy or science . . . The language of the Theogony is, typically, the language of sequence; aorist rather than present tenses predominate . . . even when Hesiod is trying to set out the conditions of the present world, he is constantly driven back on

\(^{50}\) Havelock (1983) 14.
\(^{51}\) See also Havelock (1978).
\(^{52}\) Havelock (1983) 14. That such a topic has been treated by works as varied as e.g. Kahn (1973), Kahn (2009b), Benveniste (1966), Havelock (1978), and Brown (1994), Heidegger (2000) and Derrida (1982), should give us pause regarding Havelock’s claims concerning the ‘copula of analytic statement’.
\(^{53}\) Kirk (1983) 86.
personification and myth – on personification indeed *because of* the need for myth, not just because he is taking refuge in tradition but rather because he simply does not know how to describe (quite apart from vocabulary matters) a dynamic complex without interrelating its components in a historical manner.\textsuperscript{54}

The verbal and other features of description do not merely provide a useful medium through which to express ‘permanent relations between conceptual terms’, that is; being liberated from presenting the world in terms of temporally pregnant events (which necessarily unfold according to a narrative sequence), it therefore becomes possible to conceptualize a reality not already woven from a temporally charged fabric, a warp of being not already meshed with the weft of becoming.\textsuperscript{55}

Denarrativizing the framework within which an account of reality can be expressed and finding a discursive structure that both accomplishes this and maintains the ability to order its contents systematically (as discussed in the last section) are of obvious importance for a thinker who would abolish change and dynamic activity from reality.\textsuperscript{56} The figure of the *hodos* plays the decisive role here.

First, regarding Havelock’s claims, we may now return to the observations made in Section 4.2.2, concerning the high proportion of description and the frequency with which forms of *einai* (and *esti* in particular) appear in the *krisis* portion of Circe’s *hodos*. In *Od.* 12.55–126, precisely what we *do* find are the ostensibly

\textsuperscript{54} Kirk (1983) 86–87. Cf. in similar fashion: ‘As far as Hesiod is concerned, one cannot speak of an antimony between the genetic myth and the structural arrangement. In mythical thought, any genealogy is also the expression of a structure, *and there is no way to account for a structure other than to present it in the form of a genealogical narrative*’ (Vernant (2006c) 28, emphasis mine); see also 4.10 n. 10. Likewise: ‘What characterizes Hesiod’s thought . . . is the fact that the genetic myth and the structural divisions are not clearly opposed, as they are to our way of thinking, *but indissolubly linked*’ (Vernant (2006b) 59, emphasis mine). Similarly Vernant (2006c) 119–20: ‘This genesis of the world recounted by the Muses . . . does not unfold over a homogenous period . . . This past is punctuated not by any chronology but by genealogies. *Time is included within the relations of filiations*’ (Vernant (2006c) 120, emphasis mine). There is a great deal more to be said on the relationship between discourse structured by the figure of the *hodos* and by genealogy. Likewise, it would be wrong to think that Vernant’s points had settled the matter: see still e.g. Most (1999b).

\textsuperscript{55} See n. 54 above.

\textsuperscript{56} See esp. Nehamas (2002) 63: ‘Reason says that the real does not change’; Popper (1998a) 154, 160 discusses a Parmenidean doctrine that centres on ‘the search for invariants: the search for what does not change during change . . . he equated the real with the invariant, the unchanging’. See also e.g. Hankinson (2002).
permanent relationships whose importance Havelock stressed. Moreover, and evocatively, many of them are expressed via copula or copula-like forms of the third person present indicative form of *einai* (see Section 4.2.2.1.1, ‘Einai’, above); whatever we may make of this fact, we may also observe that if Parmenides needed a model for expressing the kinds of enduring facts about the world discussed by Havelock, in this part of the *Odyssey* he would have found a very useful set of discursive building blocks waiting ready to hand.57

Second, the figure of the *hodos* provides for sections of indefinite length to be pegged onto, or depend from, the narrative framing that linked distinct units of text (Section 3.2.3), sections typically formed of description. These description portions in turn offer the possibility of articulating relationships between objects in the world that would be potentially unbound by temporal considerations; this in turn could also take on a particularly abstract, conceptual colouring (e.g. *Od*. 12.118–19, 12.109–10).58 Parmenides exploits this possibility in the course of Fragment 8 and his *hodos dizēsios*. From a discursive perspective, what we find in Parmenides’ reworking and reconfiguring of the Homeric figure of the *hodos* is (a) an elimination of the narrative frame, and (b) a corresponding expansion of the description sections, with their omnitemporal presents and frequent uses of *einai*, especially in the third person present singular indicative.

This moves us in the direction of Kirk’s point. The language used in *Od*. 12.55–126 in particular suggests that the world Circe’s *hodos* traverses is simply *there*, with stable, unchanging features that are simple *givens*: Scylla’s rock simply *is* smooth (12.79); her cave, like the fig tree above Charybdis, simply *is there* (12.103). It simply is *not possible* to defend against Scylla (12.120); the evil she represents just *is* immortal (12.118). There is no question ‘of verbs of doing or acting or happening’ penetrating this timeless space of the *Apologoi*: the

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57 In saying this, I do not wish somehow to deny Parmenides’ philosophical originality, or suggest that his use of *estι* and other forms of *einai* is not motivated primarily by his own philosophical agenda; see Section 4.3.2, ‘Krisis: Assessments and Cautions’, above.

58 Striking here is the shift in gender in the course of Circe’s description of Scylla: ‘She is not mortal, but rather the evil is immortal’ (ἡ δὲ τοιὸ θνητή, ἄλλ’ ἀθάνατον κακόν ἔστι, *Od*. 12.118). See below for further analysis of this passage.
syntax and diction suggest that this is a topography untouched by change, that its basic features just are.\(^59\)

The point is underscored by Circe’s rebuke to Odysseus when he asks what he can do to defend against Scylla. There is, the goddess makes clear, simply nothing to be done.\(^60\) Circe goes so far as to couch her conclusion through negations and in a modally inflected idiom: \(ο\'υ\delta\varepsilon\ τ\'\ έστι\ άλκη\ (Od. 12.120)\). That in turn stems from the brute fact that not only is Scylla unchanging, immortal, but in an abstract sense, ‘the evil’ itself just is, for it, too, is deathless, unchanging, indefatigable \((Od. 12.118–19)\):

\[
& \quad \eta\; \delta\; \tau\iota\; \omega\; \thetaυ\eta\tau\iota, \; \alpha\lambda\lambda\iota\; \alpha\theta\acute{\alpha}ν\acute{\alpha}\tau\iota\; \kappa\alpha\kappa\o\nu\; \epsilon\acute{\sigma}τι \\
& \quad \deltaειν\o\nu\; \tau\'\; \acute{\alpha}ργαλ\acute{\epsilon}\o\nu\; \tau\iota\; \acute{\alpha}γ\acute{r}ιου\; \o\u\delta\iota\; \mu\acute{\omega}\chi\eta\tau\iota\nu\o.
\]

She is not mortal, but the evil is immortal, Terrible and grievous, wild and not to be fought with.

Would-be champions who want to protect their crew can do what they like, but Odysseus must confront the fact that not only does the landscape through which the two possible \(hodoi\) would take him not change, it appears in this case to be categorically \(unchangeable.\(^61\)

This immutability plays an important role in articulating and establishing the limits of Odysseus’ ability to influence the world around him.\(^62\) But the limits of Odysseus’ own powers are only half of this equation – it is the transcendent fixity, the absolute immunity to change of the world traversed in \(Od. 12.55–126\) that defines these limits by imposing on Odysseus’ powers insurmountable obstacles. The Planctae, Scylla, Charybdis: the landscape and its features not

\(^{59}\) Related here are Betegh’s observations, recorded \(en\; passant\), regarding the ‘journey model’ of the soul-cosmos relationship; as he notes, ‘the cosmic regions’ through which the soul traverses in the afterlife ‘offer a static stage on which the drama of the soul can unfold’ \((Betegh\; (2006)\; 34)\).

\(^{60}\) See n. 62 below.

\(^{61}\) Note again the surprisingly abstract language used here. Just as nothing from the category of ‘flying things’ ‘could make it past \(\o\u\delta\iota\; \pi\o\tau\iota\tau\o\; \pi\acute{r}αδρχ\acute{e}\tau\iota\o\i\tau\iota\) the Planctae’ \((Od. 12.62)\), so Scylla – or rather, the immortal evil that she is – is simply ‘not to be fought’ \((\o\u\delta\iota\; \mu\acute{\omega}\chi\eta\tau\iota\nu\o)\).

\(^{62}\) See e.g. \(Benardete\; (1997)\; 100: \) ‘First, he learns he cannot know; next, he learns he cannot defeat evil; and finally he will learn the limits of persuasion . . . He is being forced to submit to his fate’; cf. also \(Austin\; (1975)\; 135: \) ‘There are, then, a series of mythic representations for the elements or elemental forces . . . Some, like Scylla, cannot be outwitted at all.’
only simply *are as they are*, unchanging, they are, as far as Odysseus is concerned, *unchangeable*.\(^63\)

### 6.2.1.2 Epistemology: *Searching-in-Time and the hodos dizēsios*

There is another side to this point. Although the rhetorical schema of the *hodos* offers a discursive framework that allows for the withdrawal of temporality, change, genesis, and destruction from the constitution of the landscape it traverses, and although the narrative frames linking the textual units that form the itinerary of the *hodoi* in the *Odyssey* have been removed from the *hodos* of Parmenides’ goddess (see Section 6.2, ‘*Sēma II: Discursive Architecture and Temporality*’), we have also seen above (Section 3.2.2c) that an inherent feature of the mechanics of the rhetorical schema of the *hodos* is to order the entries it catalogues in a sequential way – to form a series, not a list.\(^64\) Just how this works

\(^63\) Intriguingly, there is one episode in the *Odyssey* where time *does* intrude, where the landscape through which Odysseus travels, while itself static and unchanging, is not, tragically for Odysseus’ men, simply unchangeable. Moreover, in precisely this episode the questions of time, change, genesis, and destruction are explicitly foregrounded (indeed, thematized in the concrete form deemed a hallmark of Homeric thought; see, e.g. Finley (1965) 165). This is the episode on the island of Thrinacia, where the Sun stables his cattle; of these, Circe says (*Od*. 12.130–31; see here esp. Austin (1975) 134–35):

\[\gammaόνος δ᾿ οὐ γίγνεται αὐτῶν, οὐδὲ ποτε φθινύθουσι. θεαὶ δ᾿ ἐπιποιμένες εἰσίν...\]

But there is no birth of them
Nor do they ever perish. Their shepherds are goddesses...

This final place Circe ‘signs out’ on her *hodos* is a place where, as Havelock long ago observed *vis-à-vis* Parmenides, ‘coming to be and perishing had been banished’ (Havelock (1958) 140); this is of course highly reminiscent of what we find in Fr. 8.5–21. Ironically, this is the only place on Circe’s *hodos* where the passage of Odysseus and his men actually leaves an indelible imprint on the landscape they pass through, where, thanks to their presence, the mark of eventhood – and therefore temporality – is stamped irreversibly into the landscape and its denizens.

Parmenides, we might say, reclaims this lost paradise. Not only does his *hodos* also include in its itinerary a place where there is no perishing and no becoming, it resuscitates the slain cattle, beyond creation and destruction, change and time, and reincarnates them in the form of an absolute law, immortal as Scylla, that no man, however starved or disobedient, could break: by the end of the journey along his *hodos* not only will the cattle who are not born and do not die be restored by a law as beyond time as they are, but all things, or, rather, what-is itself, will have been as purified of flux and change as the cattle were before they were slaughtered.

\(^64\) Lloyd (2013) proceeds along largely parallel axes (although the topic is mathematical deduction and the conceptual apparatus Aristotelian): ‘Narratives ... deal with events that have a chronological sequence, whether or not the narrative itself follows that
and what this means in Parmenides’ poem we shall examine shortly (see Section 6.2.1.3, ‘Discourse’ below); in the meantime, we must observe that the temporal sequentiality, withdrawn from the inner workings and constitution of the story-world, does not, pace Kirk, disappear from the story of Parmenides’ *hodos dizësios*. Instead, what we find with respect to the place of movement and change in time in the *hodos dizësios* is a kind of fascinating double move.

In fact, it is not that temporality disappears from the picture altogether when it is withdrawn from the fabric of the world; rather, this temporal dimension is instead displaced to a different aspect of the story-world. Here we must pivot our attention from ontology to epistemology. Of the pre-Parmenidean epistemological history discussed at length in Chapter 2, scholars of the Presocratics emphasize one particular strand that may be summarized as follows. An old ‘poetic pessimism’, to be found in Homer, Hesiod, and early lyric and expressing a kind of archaic ‘folk epistemology’, had posited a fundamental dichotomy between the severely constrained knowledge independently available to mortals and the comprehensive knowledge possessed by divinities. Divinities could, however, grant privileged access to knowledge to favoured mortals, such as a poet who has made a special appeal to the Muses. This access was to be granted all at once in the form of an instantaneous revelation rather than an incrementally unfolding process of enlightenment. For those who took him seriously, the epistemological critiques advanced by Xenophanes would terminate this possibility by making divinity and the divine perspective – characterized by certain knowledge, *to sequence*. In mathematical reasoning, time in the sense of chronology is not relevant, since the truths revealed are indeed timeless. On the other hand, the reasoning does involve a *sequence of steps* that are essential to reveal . . . the truths that are there . . . . In the sense that the proof depends on a construction or procedures that are carried out at some point after the statement of what is to be shown, in the sense that mathematical reasoning *shares the sequentiality, if not the temporality, of narrative*’ (402–03, emphasis mine). Lloyd’s perspective is Aristotelian; by approaching the question from the other end chronologically, I attempt to show below that extended deductive argument and demonstration (if not necessarily mathematical proof *per se*) not only ‘share the sequentiality of narrative’ but that this sequentiality has its origins in – and is descended from – narrative sequentiality.

65 Such as one finds in e.g. Lesher (1992), Lesher (1994a), Lesher (1999), and now Lesher (2008), developed in Mogyoródi (2006); see also Curd (2011) 10–13 and the works cited in Introduction, n. 15. See also Popper (1998b), esp. 115–19, and Graham (2006) 174–76. For Tor (2017), see Ch. 2 above.
6.2 Sêma II: Discursive Architecture and Temporality

*saphes* – radically inaccessible to mortals. Even in the best of circumstances, all that would remain to the mortals trapped beneath this epistemic ceiling is an inferior level of understanding: that of *dokos*, belief. But though *dokos* is ‘available to all’ (Xenophanes’ Fr. 34), not all *dokos* is created equal (Fr. 18):

Οὔτοι ὑπ’ ἀφχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θυητοίς ύπέδειξαν, ἀλλὰ χρόνῳ ζητούντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον.

Indeed not from the beginning did gods intimate all things to mortals, But as they search in time they discover better.67

Although what precisely ‘searching’ (*ẓēteō*) means here is disputed, the consensus is that the activity denoted has a distinctively empirical cast (akin, perhaps, to *historiē*).68 If this ‘searching’ for knowledge can never exceed or transcend the realm of *dokos*, the possibility for intellectual progress is not ruled out, either: there is better and worse belief, and ‘searching’ in the right way still leads to advances within this domain of *dokos*.69 What is more, this searching yields progress ‘in time’ (χρόνῳ ζητούντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον).

On this understanding, what we find in Xenophanes is: (a) a complete rupture between the domain of mortals and that of the divine, with severely constricting epistemological consequences for man;70 (b) a claim that this rupture can nevertheless be mitigated (though never fully repaired) through ‘searching’; (c) a claim that this searching yields better results gradually and in the course of time; (d) a conception of this ‘searching’ that takes on an empirical (though not necessarily systematic) colouring. Situating

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66 See esp. Mogyoródi (2006) 136–48 for summary of previous work and detailed analysis, also Curd (2011) 11–12. On the other hand, Tor (2017), discussed in Ch. 2 above, advances an important critical reassessment of this view, though not in ways that affect the present discussion.

67 Translation from Lesher (1992) 27; see also Lesher (1992) 149–55, with further bibliography.

68 See esp. Lesher (1992) 154–55 and Kahn (2009c) 147–48 for connections between this verb and *historiē*; Tor (2017) 104–54 is valuable both as a compendium of earlier scholarship and for its development of new ideas of what Xenophanes might mean by the verb *ẓēteō*. Notably, Granger sharply differentiates Parmenides’ *hodos dizēsios* from *historiē*: while both are opposed to instantaneous revelation, the radical a priority intrinsic to the *hodos dizēsios* stands in pointed contrast to the empiricism of *historiē* (Granger (2008) 16–18; see also Mourelatos (2008b) 56–60).

69 See e.g. the classic comments of Dodds (1973) 4–5.

70 See again n. 66 above regarding Tor (2017).
Parmenides against this backdrop reveals the significance of his notion of a *hodos dizēsios* (as opposed to, say, an instantaneous revelation) in a useful light. If ‘the radical archaic division between “full knowledge by divine revelation” and “complete human ignorance without it”’ is inimical to inquiry, then:

So far as Parmenides accepted the human ‘quest’... as our default mode of gaining knowledge, he endorsed an epistemic paradigm [viz. that posited by Xenophanes] that is conceptually in tension with one in which humans might be granted a sudden and complete insight into truth by divine help.71

That is, ‘the central role of the interconnected motifs of “the route” and of “the quest” imply that... he subscribed to the new model of “seeking” knowledge’ through an incremental process that plays out ‘in the course of time’.72

Invoking Mourelatos’s dictum – ‘The image of the route mediates a new concept of the nature of thinking and knowing’ – Mogyoródi suggests that part of this ‘novelty ... might also be found in its temporal (as opposed to some instantaneous) nature’.73 Here we see the second part of the ‘double move’ mentioned above: the figure of the *hodos* allows Parmenides to withdraw temporality and dynamism from the constitution of the world and reality – that is, from the ontological and/or cosmological domain – by offering an outlet for this temporality at the epistemological domain, now conceptualized as a quest for knowledge in the form of the *hodos dizēsios*. For Parmenides, as for Xenophanes, knowledge is no longer something that can fall from the sky in an instant, but instead requires a temporally extended process; unlike Xenophanes’ ‘searching in time’, however, this process does not take on an empirical cast – which Parmenides in fact flatly rejects (cf. fragments 6 and 7) – but operates instead through *logos* and the goddess’s ‘much-contested *elenchus*’ through the form of the *hodos dizēsios*.74 Finally, this *hodos*

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71 Mogyoródi (2006) 151. See also e.g. Sedley (1999) 114. For a view of Parmenides’ relationship to both empirical ‘questing’ and the idea of revelation, see Vlastos (1993), esp. 162.


73 Mogyoródi (2006) 151 n. 90; see also n. 66 above.

74 See e.g. Lesher (2008) 472–76.
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dizēsios repairs the link, severed by Xenophanes’ critiques, between limited human knowledge and the certain knowledge possessed by gods; by travelling it, mortals can attain access to certain knowledge (cf. Fr. 1.28–29 and discussion in Section 2.4 above).

It is also stimulating to consider the matter the other way round. With the temporal dimension inherent to narrative safely displaced to the human movement of the epistemological quest or hodos dizēsios, the story-world itself is able to remain unaffected by the temporality and change inherent in a genealogical narrative of coming-to-be. Liberated from the need to form the narrative backbone of a genealogy, the constituent elements of the world are now left free to be as static and immutable as Scylla is to Odysseus. This in turn opens the door for what we might call, perhaps a bit grandly, a conception of the ontological as such, an understanding of things as things with stable, unchanging, or even potentially timeless qualities. And again, the rhetorical schema of the hodos, which accommodates description sections, even – or especially – long ones, in its levels of dependence, both makes this possible in the first place, and also (as Od. 12.55–126 shows) provides a language and a discursive means for this to be expressed.

6.2.1.3 Discourse: Another Narratological Sleight of Hand

There is a third, vital turn here. We examined above (6.2.1.1, ‘Ontology’) how the temporality inherent to narration functions differently in the story-world when the narrative in question concerns travelling a hodos, rather than expounding a genealogy (be it theo- or cosmo- gonical). The temporality woven into the genealogically based world of becoming is withdrawn from the objects in the world itself, notably the features of the landscape traversed. This temporality does not vanish, though, but is displaced to the human level of travel through the now-static landscape. In Parmenides’ hodos, the temporal dimension of narration is thus channelled to the level of the human inquiry for knowledge, the epistemological story of the hodos dizēsios, leaving behind a static world available for conceptualization in terms of stable, unchanging beings or being (see 6.2.1.2, ‘Epistemology’). But what does this mean for the question of the orderliness of the goddess’s discourse, for its ostensible narrativity (despite its lack of narrative elements; see again
Section 6.2, ‘Sēma II: Discursive Architecture and Temporality’) on account of its use of the rhetorical schema of the hodos, and thus its apparent status as a series rather than a list?

As in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.4, ‘Narrators and Voices’), addressing this question presents us with yet another astonishing narratological sleight of hand by Parmenides, one as discreet as its consequences are momentous. This complex narratological manoeuvre has a number of components that need to be unpacked.

6.2.1.3.1 Plot and Story
Recall that one of the essential features of the rhetorical schema governed by the figure of the hodos is that, at least in some fundamental respects, the movement of the plot tracks movement in the story-world (see Section 3.1.2 above). Though this is also true in a very important way in Odyssey 12, the underlying dynamics there are, in fact, considerably more complex. On the one hand, Circe’s direct speech in Odyssey 12.37–141 looks forward to the journey that Odysseus must (and, as we see in the second half of Odyssey 12, eventually does) take to get back to Ithaca. On the other, this encounter with Circe takes place in the Apologoi, which Odysseus recounts to his Phaeacian hosts some seven-odd years after the events in question occurred.75 Od. 12.37–141 is thus a prospective narration (by Circe) narrated retrospectively (by Odysseus). Finally, because Odysseus is himself a secondary narrator, the tales that make up Odyssey 9–12 are themselves ultimately embedded within the larger tale of the Odyssey narrated by the primary narrator, epic poet.76

Though they are similar in some respects to what we find in Od.12.37–141, in Parmenides’ poem and the ‘Route to Truth’ portion specifically, the narratological dynamics and their attendant levels of temporality are at once both more and less complex. They are similar in that the goddess’s speech in Fragment 2 and following is in some respects also a kind of prospective narration, as the goddess’s remarks in the future tense, such as mathēseai (Fr. 1.31) and ereō (Fr. 2.1), intimate.

75 See Lowe (2000) 132 for a useful table of the chronology of the Apologoi; absent from it, however, is Odysseus’ long spell on Ogygia.

76 See on these dynamics esp. de Jong (2001); also Lowe (2000), esp. the figure on p. 147, offers an insightful analysis of other dizzying narratological complexities one finds in the Odyssey that can also provide a useful model for the dynamics here.
Likewise, thanks to the framing device of the proem, which is rife with classic narrative elements, we also find a retrospective element to the kouros’s narration.\(^\text{77}\) The narratological dynamics of Parmenides’ poem are less complex, meanwhile, in that, unlike in Odyssey 9–12, the mortal first-person narrator is its primary narrator, not a secondary narrator embedded in a larger story told by an epic poet. But the scenario in Parmenides’ poem is also more complex in that, as we noted above (Section 6.2, ‘Sêma II: Discursive Architecture and Temporality’), the narrative frames that introduce the individual hodos-units forming the itinerary of Od. 12.39–141 (12.39a, 12.55a, 12.127a) have been eliminated in Parmenides’ hodos dizēsios. The goddess no longer tells the kouros what he will do, as Circe tells Odysseus what he is to do (and as, thanks to the retrospective quality of his narration, we see that Odysseus actually did); instead, she simply enumerates the items or ‘places’ that make up the itinerary, a series of facts about the story-world itself, rather than about the events to which they will be witness or party.

This shift is as radical as it is subtle. In Odyssey 12, it is the prospective journey of Odysseus that provides the temporal dimension of the rhetorical schema of the hodos.\(^\text{78}\) Ultimately, Odysseus does move through the story-world of the Apologoi in Odyssey 12, a sequence of events of crucial importance for the rest of the story of Odysseus’ return to Ithaca and the successful completion of his nostos. But what is the corresponding movement through the ‘story-world’ in Parmenides’ poem? The goddess gives the kouros a map of the domain through which he must journey, but stating a sequence of facts about the poem’s ‘story-world’ is not the same thing as saying that the kouros will or does actually make this journey in fragments 2–8 – and far less is it the same as hearing about the occasion in the past when he did successfully undertake this journey, as in the second half of Odyssey 12. In Parmenides’ poem there is no clear equivalent to the events of the journey Odysseus needs to make, and does in fact make; the goddess does not mention the kouros’s

\(^{77}\) See e.g. Robbiano (2006) for a good discussion of the ambiguities surrounding the temporality of the proem.

\(^{78}\) Which, qua discourse, was underpinned by both a temporal and a spatial dimension to form spatio-temporal con-sequence, as we have seen (Section 3.2.3).
movement through the story-world whose layout she describes, nor do we ever hear of his moving through it. We saw above (Section 3.2.3) that it is the fact that the order of events is significant that gives narration the order characteristic of narrativity. But in Parmenides’ ‘Route to Truth’, there are simply no events whose order could be significant in the first place.

The rather stunning upshot is that, rather than the movement of the ‘plot’ of Parmenides’ poem tracking or corresponding to movement through the story-world, something close to the opposite happens. Stripped of any underlying movement in the story-world to track, the plot in effect produces such a movement as it progresses and in virtue of its progressing. In the ‘Route to Truth’, that is, it is the sequential, ordered movement of plot or discourse itself that replaces key aspects of the ordered sequentiality usually generated by the underlying actions and events in the story-world.

6.2.1.3.2 The Time of the Story-World and the Time of Narration

Why should this matter? If the last point concerned the relationship between the movement of plot and movement in the story-world, we must also consider the relationship between the story-worlds and the ‘real time’ of the poem’s narration.79 Again, we need to observe a few preliminary points, this time about the story-world of Odyssey 12 and Parmenides’ poem. Unsurprisingly, the hodos we find in Odyssey 12 is defined by a great deal of specificity. The characters are specific – Odysseus, son of Laertes, father to Telemachus, hero and master spokesman and strategist of the Achaean army, is told by Circe, daughter of Helios, dread goddess endowed with speech, of the journey he must take to get back to Ithaca. The places that form the itinerary are also specific, being named and described in the laborious detail we have examined above (Chapter 4); some of them, such as the Wandering Rocks, might even have been well-known from other traditional myths, and whatever classic expositions they may have had.80 And though the time frame of events is slightly less specific,

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79 Which might also be called the time of the poem’s audience; see Hardie (1993) 2 and especially Kennedy (1997) for sophisticated discussion of the relationship between the temporality of plot, the temporality of the story-world, and the temporality of the time of the poet, audience, and/or narration in relation to the genre of epic.

80 For e.g. the story of Jason and the Argo, see West (2005), also Heubeck, Russo, and Fernández-Galiano (1989), Reinhardt (1996), Currie (2016), Scodel (2017).
we know we are roughly one year and two months or so after Odysseus’ departure from the ruins of Troy.\(^81\)

Not so in Parmenides’ poem. There, the specific identities of everything, everywhere, everyone is famously – or infamously – vague. Just who is the unnamed goddess?\(^82\) Just where does one have to go to find her – up? Down? Beyond?\(^83\) Who, really, is the kouros, about whom we know essentially nothing?\(^84\) When is this all supposed to have happened? It is almost as if Parmenides, to much subsequent wailing and gnashing of teeth, had tried to keep matters as vague as possible.\(^85\)

Whatever Parmenides’ intentions may have been, the effects of this comprehensive, indeed almost systematic, vagueness are striking. Important here is the fundamentally dialectical structure of the poem from the moment the kouros makes contact with the goddess.\(^86\) This is also a feature of Circe’s speech to Odysseus, delivered in her own voice,\(^87\) and directly to her interlocutor;\(^88\) deeply embedded in the rest of the Apologoi and the rest of the Odyssey as this is, however, the audience would have had little occasion to forget that it is this specific divine character, Circe, who speaks to this specific mortal hero, Odysseus, and that she does so on her home island of Aeaea. By contrast, the relatively brief twenty-three lines of the proem that precede the speech of Parmenides’ anonymous goddess, however, exert a far flimsier anchoring force than the eleven books of the Odyssey that precede the exchange with Circe; nor is this strengthened by the specific qualities of the Beyond she inhabits (for there are so few), nor by the goddess’s specific qualities (for she has so few), nor by the specific attributes of the kouros to whom she speaks (for what are they?).

Why does this matter? The action narrated in the Apologoi, and indeed the entire Odyssey, took place in the Age of Heroes, not long after the sack of Troy. It is separated from Hesiod’s age, the

\(^{81}\) See Lowe (2000) 132 for helpful table and discussion.

\(^{82}\) See above, esp. sections 2.4.2, ‘Whose Muse?’ and esp. n. 124.

\(^{83}\) See again Ch. 2 above, esp. Section 2.4.1, ‘Contact with the Divine’ and nn. 121, 123.


\(^{85}\) See Ch. 2 above, esp. sections 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 2.4.5 and nn. 122, 125.

\(^{86}\) See Ch. 5, and esp. nn. 52, 53, 65 above.

\(^{87}\) See esp. sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.4 above.

\(^{88}\) See Ch. 3, n. 72, also Ch. 5, esp. n. 65 above.
Age of Iron, by an unbridgeable gulf.\(^8^9\) But what of the world of Parmenides’ *kouros*? Is there any reason to think the world he leaves behind is so different from our own? Much more to the point: is the *kouros* himself so different from us, the audience, that we could not identify with him?\(^9^0\) What, ultimately, separates him and his world from that of the audience? When the goddess speaks in the second person, what is to stop us from asking to whom she is *really* speaking? Without the ballast of nearly half of the *Odyssey* to precede it, untethered by the specificities of names, times, and places, could not her words mean as much to any audience – including ourselves – as they do to the *kouros*? The extreme generality of the dramatic scenario, which in many of its aspects seems so carefully wrought, in fact reduces, blurs, effaces the differences between the world of the story and that of the narrator as much as possible – or rather, thanks to this carefully crafted generality, no such gulf emerges in the first place. With these strategies – (i) the extraordinarily unspecific dramatic scenario and characters; (ii) the brief proem; (iii) the first-person narration unembedded in a poem about the epic past; (iv) the removal of the narrative frames between the episodes; (v) the efforts to encourage the audience to associate with the *kouros*; and, most of all, (vi) the goddess’s use of second person forms in direct speech – Parmenides renders the divide between the story-world and the world of the audience as flimsy, insubstantial, and unobtrusive as possible.

With this in mind, the dialectical qualities of the poem take on a special new power in the portions of extended direct speech where the goddess speaks in the second person.\(^9^1\) Once the opening twenty or so lines of the proem and their narrative frame fade from view, we find ourselves in a discursive scenario where the goddess effectively addresses herself directly to the audience – any audience, at any time – of the poem as much as to the *kouros*. (Indeed, her claim in Fr. 2.7–8 that ‘you could not apprehend or indicate what-is-not as such’\(^9^2\) would necessarily be just as true for you, reader, as for me, for the original audience, or the *kouros* –

\(^8^9\) See e.g. Auerbach (1953), esp. 16; Bakhtin (1981), esp. 13.
\(^9^1\) See nn. 86, 88 above.
\(^9^2\) See Ch. 5, n. 46 for a discussion of the translation.
and this is the very source of its power.)\textsuperscript{93} Taken all together, these manoeuvres produce the appearance of yet another collapse of temporalities, this time involving the reduction of the temporality of the story to the temporality of the moment of narration – or, better yet, a rendering coextensive of the temporality of the story with the temporality of the moment of narration.

6.2.1.3.3 Discourse: Conclusions

To sum up: since, as we have seen, movement in the world of the story is already produced by, and thus coextensive with, the sequential movement of discourse of the poem’s ‘plot’, with the collapse between the time of the story-world and that of the time of the poem’s narration, all three temporalities appear to collapse into each other. It is not just, then, that movement in the quest-story of the \textit{hodos} \textit{dizēsios} is at once produced by, and also constitutes, the level of plot or discourse; astonishingly, each time a listener hears the poem or a reader reads it, the listener or reader travels the same \textit{hodos} \textit{dizēsios} in the very act of proceeding through the ‘plot’ of the poem. In an important sense, the movement through the story-world of Parmenides’ poem occurs any and every time the poem is heard or read.

Three consequences of colossal importance stem from this. The first is that it is the movement of plot in real time – in the time of narration, which is also the same as the time of the plot, and also, in effect, the same as the time of the story-world – that activates or imparts the temporal dimension to the underlying spatial order of the itinerary of the goddess’s \textit{hodos}. Narration-time, plot-time, and story-time become one; the \textit{hodos} \textit{dizēsios} that Parmenides offers in response to Xenophanes, that is, is undertaken in the very act of performing (or reading) the poem itself.\textsuperscript{94}

Second, and related to this, is a more nuanced insight into the dynamics discussed above in Section 6.2.1.1, ‘Ontology’. In embodying a temporally extended process of epistemological quest, Parmenides’ \textit{hodos} \textit{dizēsios} allows the landscape through which it passes to remain static and uninfected by the time,

\textsuperscript{93} See Ch. 5, and nn. 52, 53, 65 above.

\textsuperscript{94} I explore these points further in relation to the emergence of the rationalist tradition in a forthcoming article.
change, and activity intrinsic to narration (see Section 3.1.2). No narration is necessary in fragments 2, 6, 7, or 8, since the temporal aspect inherent in narration is played by the movement of the plot – that is the argument – in the ‘real time’ of its being narrated.

Third, and also a consequence of the first point, in the act of proceeding through the ‘Route to Truth’, any narrator or reader preserves the narrativity of this portion of Parmenides’ poem – its series-like, ordered sequentiality – without requiring any narrative elements (as defined above – see again Section 3.1.2); the ‘temporal’ part of the spatio-temporal con-sequence that we saw above was a defining feature of the rhetorical schema of the hodos (see sections 3.2.2c, 3.2.3) is thus provided by the sequential movement of the plot, not the sequence of events of the story.

6.2.2 Discursive Architecture and Temporality: Conclusions

Putting everything together, we may say the following. With regard to Havelock’s point, in Odyssey 12, the discursive organization dictated by the figure of the hodos offers a kind of syntax that allows for the expression of even quite abstract, ostensibly permanent relations, and not merely the depiction of actions. This is because, unlike a genealogically based conception of reality, the figure of the hodos offers a rhetorical schema that does not intrinsically require that the basic fabric of the world be constituted by time-bound, temporally pregnant entities; as a result, it allows for a kind of withdrawal of narrative dynamism – of agent and action – from a landscape whose fundamental features may be rendered inert, unchanging, fixed, and stable. It is this transition that opens the door to what we might call ontology proper, to a world of being, rather than, at best, genealogy’s world of things-having-once-become. In short, the rhetorical schema of the figure of the hodos offers a discursive framework that preserves the rigorous sequential ordering of items – that is, the formation of a series, not a list – but allows for the elimination of narrative frames while preserving the textual features of description. This is a discursive framework, that is, that allows for narrativity without narration and description without the unordered, list-like quality of descriptivity. It is this that is meant when,
cribbing Mourelatos, one asserts that the rhetorical schema of the *hodos* offers a discursive architecture mediating the transition to a new way of asserting, arguing, persuading.

### 6.3 *Sēma III: Hodopoiēsis* (the ‘Route to Truth’ and Fragment 8)

We have just seen how the movement of plot, not movement in the story-world, provides the temporal dimension of the spatio-temporal con-sequence that dictates the order in which the rhetorical schema of the *hodos* catalogues its entries. But what of the spatial side of that equation? Is there such a thing as spatial contiguity with respect to items in the underlying ‘story-world’ that makes up fragments 2, 6, 7, and 8?

Some readers of Parmenides’ Fragment 5 would suggest not. Karsten, for example, understood the fragment to refer to the different *hodoi* on offer in the course of the poem; as later scholars have pointed out, if one accepts that these number three, or at least that one of them corresponds to the *Doxa* section, this understanding of Fragment 5 ‘asks us to believe that Parmenides could have altered the order in which he examines these three Ways’. There is no reason, then, that *Doxa* need be read after the ‘Route to Truth’, and it is not necessarily clear that Fragment 2 need precede fragments 6 and 7, nor that these in turn precede Fragment 8. The items that make up Parmenides’ ‘Route to Truth’ – and indeed the post-proem poem proper – might well form a list, then, plain and simple. On this view, there would be no underlying geography to Parmenides’ story-world at all.

Scholars of Parmenides rarely find time these days to refute this view, much less to hold it. There are at least three reasons for this. Briefly: first, certain elements of the poem would become difficult to explain; were it not the case that all other possible *hodoi* (whether one or two) had already been ruled out by the time

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95 Karsten (1835) 74–76.
96 Jameson (1958) 17 (see also 16–17).
97 One finds brief rejections in mid-century publications (e.g. Jameson (1958) 16–17; Tarán (1965) 52), but rarely subsequently. For further discussion of Fragment 5, see Appendix below.
Fragment 8 begins, what grounds could there be to declare (Fr. 8.1–2): 98

... Μόνος δ’ ἕτι μύθος ὅδεο
λείπεται ὡς ἕστιν.

... As yet a single account of the hodos 99 an account of a single hodos
Remains, that ... is (...)

Second, parts of Fragment 8 would appear to indicate expressly
that they are to come after the krisis announced either in Fragment
2 or a combination of fragments 2, 6, and 7 (8.15–18):

... ἡ δὲ κρίσις περὶ τούτων ἐν τῷ δ’ ἕστιν ἐστιν ὡς ἕστιν κέκριται δ’ οὖν, ὡσπερ ἀνάγκη,
τὴν μὲν ἔδωκαν ἀννύμως (οὐ γὰρ ἄληθῆς ἕστιν ὅδε), τὴν δ’ ὡστε τέλειον καὶ ἔτητυμον ἔιναι.

... But the krisis about these matters lies in this:
... is (...) or ... is not (...): but it has in fact been decided, just as is necessary,
To leave the one unthought and unnamed (for it is no true
hodos), and that the other is and is genuine.

As the perfect tense (κέκριται) suggests, at this stage in poem, the
decision between the two hodoi has already been made.

Third, as all commentators agree, the argumentation found in
lines 8.5–21 (or 8.6–21), for example, depends entirely on the
points established in these earlier fragments: the two arguments
offered against coming-to-be, a ‘semantic-epistemological’ rejection
of ‘what-is-not’ (Fr. 8.7–8) and the ban on genesis ex nihilo
(Fr. 8.6–7, 9–10) both presuppose passage by way of the first (and
potentially second) kris(es)is.100 It is clear, then, that Fragment 8
must come after fragments 2, 6, and 7.

100 See the virtuoso analysis of Fr. 8.5–21 at Palmer (2009) 144–50; for a discussion of
these points from the perspective of a one-krisis reading, see Mournelatos (2008b)
xxviii–xxx and, originally, 98–102. We may also note that the analysis undertaken in
Chapter 5 concerning the level of dependence could be performed here as well; like
Fr. 2.6–8, description – statements of fact about the world – in the third person (Fr. 8.5–
6) indicative (featuring esti, Fr. 8.5) is supported by argument featuring second-person
verbs of action (Fr. 8.7–9) with a variety of modal inflections (e.g. ‘I shall not permit
you’, Fr. 8.7–8), and the use of negated verbal adjectives with -tos suffix (Fr. 8.8).
What is more, on any interpretation involving a second *krisis* in fragments 6 and 7, it is crucially important that the second *krisis* (fragments 6 and 7) comes after the first (Fragment 2). On many of these interpretations, the mutually implicated revelation of being and not-being in Fragment 2 is a necessary precondition to any consideration of the possibility mooted in Fragment 6; for scholars who advocate such a reading, it is only after having attempted to think or indicate *to ge mê eon* that it becomes possible to conceive of a path that features both ‘IS’ and ‘IS NOT’. On this reading, the three units, Fragment 2, fragments 6 and 7, and Fragment 8.5–21, do proceed according to a regular ordering principle. Put differently, since it seems essential that fragments 2, 6, 7, and 8.1–21 be placed in this order, we may say that there is some kind of a fixed, underlying map of the ‘story-world’ the goddess describes. The catalogue they form, that is, must be deemed a series, not a list.

So far, so good. But what about the relationship between the *sēmata* themselves? A goddess enumerating a *hodos* back home to Ithaca is constrained by the geography of the world this *hodos* traverses. Instead of events tied to places, however, the *hodos* of Parmenides’ goddess orders claims, predicates that can (or, indeed, must) be predicated of *to eon*. But what dictates the placement of these claims in adjacent, contiguous locations in a *hodos dizēsios*? Is there also some underlying, pre-existing logical geography that dictates the sequence according to which these must be ordered? Or is it merely that the figure of the *hodos* imparts – imposes – the appearance of a reified necessity?

As at so many points of Parmenidean analysis, there is little consensus here. Perhaps the most prudent way to proceed is to examine readings that stake out two extreme positions on this question. Those advanced by G. E. L. Owen and David Sedley

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101 As follows from the discussion in the previous paragraphs, whether one settles on a one- or a two-*krisis* reading, that there is a necessary underlying sequence governing the itinerary of at least some components of the ‘Route to Truth’ is not up for debate; in this, the distinction between a one- and two-*krisis* interpretations with respect to the arguments here will resemble the difference between Owen’s and Sedley’s readings with respect to the ordering of the *sēmata* in Fragment 8.

102 See e.g. Miller (2006) and Thanassas (2007).
come as close to forming just such a pair as perhaps can be
found. Furthermore, because these two readings share similar
views of several major features of Parmenides’ argumentative
structure – each regards the argument of Fragment 8 as made of
four distinct arguments corresponding to the four sēmata pre-
sented above (lines 8.5/6–21, 8.22–25, 8.26–33, and 8.42–49,
respectively) – they are especially easy to compare.

It is worth emphasizing here yet again that my chief aim is not to
provide a comprehensive, exhaustive analysis of Parmenides’
specific arguments but to understand the larger shape and structure
of the argumentation. Accordingly, the following discussion of
Parmenides’ arguments will be undertaken with a view to articu-
lating the possible relationships between each of the different
elements that form it – that is, the relationships between each of
the four sēmata, and between different sēmata and the arguments
of fragments 2, 6, and 7.

Sedley, who would rehabilitate the views that Parmenides is
a ‘radical cosmologist’ and that to eon is ‘the sphere that
constitutes ... the world of mortals’, proposes an ‘unashamedly
spatial reading’ of Fragment 8. He extracts ‘two Laws’ from
fragments 2, 6, and 7. The second of these crystallizes the sub-
stance of Fragment 2: ‘No proposition is true if it implies that, for
any x, “x is not” is, was or will be true.’ The first gestures
towards a law of non-contradiction, and also seems to encapsulate
Fragment 6: ‘There are no half-truths. No proposition is both true
and false. No question can be coherently answered “Yes and
no”’. With these ‘Laws’ in hand, Sedley summarizes his view
of the argumentative structure of Fragment 8 thusly:

103 Owen (1960); Sedley (1999).
104 Sedley (1999) 117. Sedley’s justification for his view relies heavily on the distinction
between the literal and the metaphorical: ‘Taken literally, what-is will prove to be an
everlasting, undifferentiated, motionless sphere... To put it another way, how far are
we meant to deliteralize the description of what-is? ... the Way of Truth is full of
arguments. Most commentators are disappointingly silent on their structure and con-
tent. Only if we take them in literally spatial terms, I submit, do they prove to be good
arguments’ (117, emphasis mine); see also Introduction, n. 76.
Once the choice of paths was complete, the goddess took us through a series of largely independent proofs demonstrating each of the predicates of what-is. Only once did the conclusion of one proof serve as the premise for another, and that was (B8.27–28) when (a) the rejection of generation and perishing was invoked among the grounds for (c) denial of motion. Otherwise each proof was self-contained, its premises either presented as self-evident or relying on one or both Laws.  

On Sedley’s interpretation of the arguments in Fragment 8.5–49, then, what we find is a scattering of separate, distinct points – points that, while ‘hard won by argument’, do not necessarily lead onto each other or rely on each other via an intrinsic sequence or pattern. Once one has traversed fragments 2, 6, and 7 in order, the sēmata in 8.3–4 could in theory be visited in any order (provided that sēma 1 is visited before sēma 3).  

Contrast Owen’s assessment of Fragment 8: ‘Parmenides’ train of argument breaks into four main stages which are clearly distinguished and correctly ordered in the programme given at the start, and each succeeding movement is introduced by an epei-clause which ... shows how the argument depends on a proposition already proved. That is, as Lloyd puts it, ‘the fragment forms a carefully articulated whole in which the later sections build on the conclusions of the earlier in an orderly sequence of argumentation’.  

There is in fact less distance between Owen’s view and Sedley’s than may be suggested by Sedley’s characterization of Fragment 8 as consisting of ‘largely independent proofs’, each of which is ‘self-contained’. For Sedley, as for Owen, there is no question that fragments 2, 6, and 7 (captured in his notion of two Parmenidean ‘Laws’) come anywhere but before the four sēmata of Fragment 8. Likewise, if, at least as the argument now stands, sēma 3 would seem to come after sēma 1, this already eliminates a number of the 

108 This nuance will be addressed later (see Section 6.3.3, ‘Back On Track’ in this chapter and Appendix below). But one should not fail to notice the ‘otherwise’ that begins the last sentence quoted above, and that Sedley appears to have no problem whatsoever conceding that sēma 3 takes the conclusion of sēma 1 as its premise, and thus, at least as the argument Parmenides’ elected to make now stands, presupposes it; for further discussion, see the Appendix, which addresses Fragment 5.  
109 Owen (1960) 93.  
possible sequences in which Parmenides might have ordered his sêmata.\textsuperscript{111}

For his part, Owen summarizes his views as follows: ‘in the third movement B 8.27 looks back to B 8.6–21 and especially to line 21’; ‘in the fourth B 8.42 looks back to B 8.26–33 and especially to lines 26 and 30–31’.\textsuperscript{112} Reading line 8.22 as ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἔστιν ὑμοῦσιν (instead of ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἔστιν ὑμοῦσιν) and taking ὑμοῦσιν adverbially (viz. ‘exists without intermission’, rather than ‘is all alike’), Owen sees the proof elaborated in lines 8.22–5 as drawing its premise from the claims established at 8.11 and 8.15–18.\textsuperscript{113} Of lines 8.6–21 he says less, but this is perhaps because the situation is in some respects more clear-cut.\textsuperscript{114} Owen does not address the complexities surrounding the epei clause in lines 8.5–6, but in light of his earlier assertions,\textsuperscript{115} a defender of Owen’s position might say that this is because Parmenides himself so thoroughly stitches the claims of fragments 2, 6, and 7 into the argumentation of lines 8.6–21 (even recapitulating matters at lines 8.15–8.18) that the relationship between the conclusions secured in earlier fragments and the premises of the argument put forward in the first ‘movement’ in Fragment 8 is essentially self-evident.

Owen’s view of the organization of Fragment 8, highly influential over the years but more contested of late, yields a striking vantage on the power the figure of the hodos exerts on the structure of Parmenides’ fragments 2, 6, 7, and 8. This view, that only once one has attained the first sêma – meaning either ‘signpost’ or ‘proof’, or

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{111} See n. 108 above. Of the twenty-four possible configurations theoretically available to Parmenides on this view, the need to make sêma 1 precede sêma 3 eliminates twelve options straight off the bat; for further discussion, see Appendix.
\item\textsuperscript{112} Owen (1960) 93.
\item\textsuperscript{113} See Owen (1960) 92–93 and 92 n. 4 for his discussion of the adverbial reading. For the overall force of the point: ‘the argument for continuity in lines 22–25 depends on the prior elimination of temporal starts and stops in lines 6–21’ (93, emphasis original); see also Owen (1960) 97.
\item\textsuperscript{114} See e.g. p. 250 above.
\item\textsuperscript{115} The complexity is a function partly of the claims that the qualities argued for in lines 8.22–25 take up the ἐν, συνεχῆς of line 6, and partly of the fact that there is no attempt to analyse how the claims encompassed by the epei clause ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὑμοῦσιν πᾶν | ἐν, συνεχῆς (8.5–6a) derive from arguments elaborated earlier in Parmenides’ poem. See here esp. Stokes (1971) 128–30; Austin (1986) 72.
\end{itemize}
both – can one begin to make headway in relation to the second or the third, and only once one has attained the third *sêma* can one set off on the final stage of the itinerary for the fourth, coincides with what above was described as the ‘strong reading’ of Parmenides’ Fragment 8; notably, it presumes a pre-existing underlying logical geography that defines the map of the ‘story-world’ of Fragment 8 in the way that a pre-existing underlying geography is presumed to define the story-world depicted by Circe in *Odyssey* 12. On Owen’s reading, we thus see the *sêmata* concretize, reify, and take root in a domain that claims the same sort of material thickness and free-standing reality as the story-world of the *Odyssey*, with its Sirens’ meadow, smooth cliffs, hardy fig tree, and so forth; now, however, this substantiality stands in the domain of the *hodos dizēsios* and the *sêmata* that mark out its course. Likewise, as the geography of the *Odyssey*’s story-world possesses a pre-determined configuration within the universe of the story (so that Circe can map out the itinerary of Odysseus’ next sequence of adventures, but cannot reconfigure the map), and as the Sirens’ meadow only gives way to the pastures of the Sun’s cattle by way of the Planctae, Scylla, or Charybdis, so on this view one would get to the third point in the itinerary, the third landmark, the third signpost or *sêma*-object, only by way of the first, and to the fourth only by way of the third.

### 6.3.1 A Detour: The Bonds of Necessity and Logical Consequence

Or perhaps *must* get to the third, and then the fourth point in the itinerary. Why so? Odysseus’ journey is made by ship, across the trackless sea. To cross this blank, unmarked space is to be perpetually threatened by the risk of *planē* – as nearly all the Achaean heroes returning from Troy can attest. Where no path is visibly marked, aimless, directionless, backward-turning movement always remains

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116 At least insofar as the lion’s share of the argumentation of the first proof comes in lines 8.6–10 (i.e. before 8.11), which Owen sees as yielding the conclusion serving as the premise for lines 8.22–25.


118 See e.g. Montiglio (2005), esp. 1–10.
But the *kouros* in Parmenides’ proem, as no one will have forgotten, travels by chariot. Furthermore, as is expressly specified in the proem, the chariot (Ἕρμα, Fr. 1.5) travels on a ‘much-famed’ *hodos* (ὄδος πολύφημος, Fr. 1.2) and then, once through the portentous gates, ‘along a road-suitable-for-wheeled-traffic’ (κατ’ ἀμαξίτων, Fr. 1.21). And this, as we saw above (*Section 1.1*), is highly significant.

To unpack this significance most effectively, let us advert once more to Mourelatos’s comments on the topic (discussed under the rubric of ‘the motif of chariotry’). Having examined what he calls the ‘motif of the-journey’ and the ‘theme of Fate-Constraint’, Mourelatos airs the following anxieties:

The danger is that we may be left in the end with configurations of language which, although internally coherent when taken separately, might appear unrelated or even dissonant when compared to one another. Specifically, a combination of the-journey, chariotry, and binding has, at least prima facie, a certain baroque, eclectic, and syncretic quality; and that should make us suspicious. Can we in good conscience project a jumble of motifs into the imagination of a man who made his name in the history of ideas as an uncompromising defender of logic and unity? This impression is misguided, he reassures us: ‘motifs which appear as dissonant or unrelated to us are, to the archaic mentality, strongly linked by ties of analogy and association’. The connection between overland travel by wheeled vehicle and sea travel by ship is indeed no challenge to establish. But Mourelatos struggles to connect the motif of chariotry and the motif of ‘the-journey’ to what he calls the theme of ‘Fate-Constraint’. He cites a few parallels between the language used to describe Odysseus as he is bound to the mast in the Sirens episode, to describe Poseidon’s hobbling his horses’ legs (*Il. 13.37*), and to make the case for the *sēma akinēton* at Parmenides’

119 For an example of the dangers presented by unmarked, pathless space, cf. the travails of the Persians in Scythia in Herodotus 4 (and excellent analysis by Hartog (1988) and Payen (1997)).


121 In light of his distinction between ‘motifs’ and ‘themes’ (Mourelatos (2008b) 11–12), this is perhaps not the title one would have expected for this subsection (see Mourelatos (2008b) 29).

122 Mourelatos (2008b) 29.

123 See the comments at Mourelatos (2008b) 29.
Fragment 8.30–31. This does not ultimately carry him very far, however: ‘I am not suggesting that B8.30–31 envisages a convergence of the three ideas: hobbled horse, sailor strapped to the mast, sailor committed to his destination. My point is rather that the Homeric phrase has a certain suggestiveness and flexibility which allows modulation from one motif to another.’

This, surely, is a weak point in the argument. Mourelatos attempts to bolster his case by examining the etymology and semantics of words derived from telos, which offers a slightly less precarious connection between ‘the-journey’ motif and theme of ‘Fate-Constraint’. Importantly, ‘the result of the deity’s “strapping” and “holding”’ – as expressed through the theme of the ‘Fate-Constraint’ – ‘is summed up, in the climactic section of B8, in the attribute tetelesmenon’. The word may be seen to operate not only on the ontological level (as a description of the nature of to eon) but also on the epistemological level: ‘In the order of knowing or thinking[,] the correct “route” is a “steadfast,” controlled route, “tied” or “committed” to its destination. This is the route that “consummates” the journey and “comes around” to the goal. On this journey the guide is the same Fate who bound what-is in straps.’

Finally, Mourelatos cashes out this analysis in the claim (complementary to the notion that ‘the image of the route mediates a new concept of the nature of thinking and knowing’) that ‘the transformation of the theme of Fate-Constraint is a projection which reaches toward the concept of logical or metaphysical necessity’.

As at several other important junctures, I both agree with Mourelatos on the larger questions (and draw inspiration from his pioneering analysis) and find the specifics of his interpretation unconvincing. By advancing this cluster of assertions – that ‘in the

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125 Mourelatos (2008b) 30.
126 Mourelatos (2008b) 30; for the relevant bibliography, see Mourelatos (2008b) 31 n. 61.
127 Mourelatos (2008b) 30: ‘That is: Justice has bound what-is so that it is “fully accomplished,” “complete,” “consummate,” or “perfect”.’
128 Mourelatos (2008b) 32.
129 Mourelatos (2008b) 40. Likewise: ‘the very concept of knowing was based on an analogy with “questing” and “journeying,” whose concept of logical-metaphysical necessity was in the process of being formulated on the model of the theme of Fate-constraint’ (Mourelatos (2008b) 46). See Tarán (1965) 117, 151; see also: Verdenius (1964) 101; Austin (1986) 96–115; Dueso (2011) 283–84.
order of knowing or thinking, the correct “route” is a “steadfast,” controlled route “tied” or “committed” to its destination; that the notion of being tied to a destination is expressed through the theme of the Fate-Constraint; and that this confluence of imagery (the motif of the-journey, the theme of Fate-Constraint) ‘reaches toward the concept of logical or metaphysical necessity’ – Mourelatos surely identifies a phenomenon of major importance for the development of deductive argumentation and the history of Western thought. But at just the moment Mourelatos isolates the key element establishing the connection between the motif of the-journey and the theme of ‘Fate-Constraint’ – namely, the motif of ‘chariotry’, which threatens to turn the mosaic of imagery into an ‘eclectic’ phantasmagoria – he also fails to capture the precise way this motif actually does forge the link between the other two dominant figures.

It is at this stage that reintroducing insights gleaned from the discussion of the physical nature of archaic Greek roads above (Section 1.1) can move the discussion much further forward. It is, in fact, precisely by shifting the journeying from travel by ship to travel by wheeled vehicle that this web of connections not only becomes possible, but indeed obvious and conceptually potent. Once the physical nature of archaic Greek roads is properly taken into account and the semantic density of the word hodos (encompassing both an activity and an object) acknowledged, the relationship between journeying, chariotry, and the implacable strictures of Fate not only ceases to be eclectic, but their deep unity at the level of both word and image, their mutual dependence and mutually reinforcing qualities, becomes irresistible. It is precisely because (and only because) the motif of the journey has been expressed through the motif of chariotry, precisely because (and only because) the motif of journeying has been transferred from sea to land, from ship to wheeled vehicle, that it not only can be tied to the motif of the Fate-Constraint, of binding, of a ‘steadfast’ route ‘tied’ or ‘committed’ to its destination, but it does so as naturally as if a latter-day Parmenides had made his goddess speak of a ‘rail journey of inquiry’.

See Austin (1986) 96–115, esp. 111–14, for further analysis.
Depending on one’s interpretation of Parmenides’ arguments, the point has implications of a potentially major scale for our understanding of the *hodos dizēsios*. First, imaging the *hodos dizēsios* described by Parmenides’ goddess as a rut road inscribed into the earth underscores the degree to which this road *pre-exists* the travelling to be undertaken upon it. The world traversed by such a *hodos* has stable, fixed features that exist independently of, and prior to, a journey passing through it.\(^{131}\) Such a road must have been constructed already in advance of the travel (and with the express agency of, and according to plans determined by, the constructor).\(^{132}\) Such a route is, that is, *prescribed*: the tracks, so far as the traveller is concerned, are always already *there*.

But such a route is also *prescribed*. This point bears directly on ‘the notion of logical or metaphysical necessity’ that Mourelatos saw emerging from the theme of ‘Fate-Constraint’, and may also help us reconsider yet further the nature of Parmenides’ argumentation as analysed by Owen. The discussion above considered the relationship between the *sēmata* of Fragment 8 as posited by Owen, which is to say, in reverse order. Attaining the fourth *sēma* presupposed attainment of the third; this in turn presupposed attainment of the first, as did attainment of the second *sēma*; and this itself presupposed passage by way of the first *hodos* of Fragment 2 and fragments 6 and 7. Imagining the *hodos dizēsios* as a rut road inscribed into the terrain of inquiry it traverses, however, we find grounds for a stronger, more suggestive understanding of the relationship between journeying, travel by wheeled vehicle, and the notion of binding and constraints, one with even more direct bearing on the notion of metaphysical or logical necessity articulated in Parmenides’ poem. If the *hodos* described in Fragment 8 is seen as a rut road running continuously the length of the fragment (and, indeed, from Fragment 2 to 8 via fragments 6 and 7), this suggests that not only is each new point in the argument premised upon points previously established but also that, once one has arrived at a particular point on this *hodos*, one has *no choice* but to follow this prescribed track. Once one has....

\(^{131}\) See Section 6.2.1, also n. 4 above.

\(^{132}\) This opens a horizon, too sprawling to be addressed here, onto the debate between ‘realism’ and ‘constructivism’. Who is the constructor? How did the *hodos* get there?
been forced onto the first route in Fragment 2,\textsuperscript{133} one has no choice but to arrive at the first sēma; and once one has arrived at the first sēma, if one continues the journey it is not only that one can reach the second sēma but that, locked into a predestined, preordained path, one must follow the track to the second point.\textsuperscript{134} And this is true at every step of the way: having attained the second sēma, if one carries on with the journey one must arrive at the third, and from the third, the fourth. Returning to Mourelatos’s point concerning the metaphysical or logical necessity expressed through the notion of a ‘steadfast’ path that ‘ties’ one who travels upon it to a particular destination, we may see how deeply appropriate, not to mention effective and powerful, is the image of travelling by wheeled vehicle along a rut road. For what route could possibly be more ‘steadfast’, more ‘tied’ or ‘bound’ to its destination – and the rest of the itinerary it encompasses – than a rut road one travels by wheeled vehicle?

So far we have discussed the strictly sequential ordering of discursive units into a series in terms of the phrase ‘consequence’. In the *Odyssey*, units are connected in this manner partly on the basis of their spatial contiguity and partly on the basis of the temporal order in which they are reached in the course of travel, understood as a series of actions in time. In Parmenides’ fragments 2, 6, 7, and 8, we have seen that, on Owen’s reading, the four arguments that make up the hodos-units of Fragment 8’s ‘journey’ are also connected partly on the basis of a kind of underlying logical ‘contiguity’ rooted in the logical geography of Fragment 8’s ‘story-world’; similarly, their being ordered into a sequence stems in part from the journey through them, the hodos (journey-in-totality) dizēsios one travels across this terrain. But, if we take the motif of chariotry seriously and attend to the language of the proem (and especially its reference to a hamaxitos, Fr. 1.21), what we find is a hodos(-journey) whose hodos(-itinerary) moves along a hodos(-object = rut road): along a pre-scribed track whose course allows for no deviation, no wandering, nothing but ordered...
6.3 Sēma III: Hodopoiēsis (the ‘Route to Truth’ and Fr. 8)

movement along a predetermined path, whose inscription into the terrain demands that once one has attained a particular point one must travel to the next in the sequence, and do so unerringly and necessarily. On Owen’s reading, what we see in the convergence of the motifs of journeying, chariotry, and the Fate-Constraint – three images compressed and condensed into, and encompassed by, this hodos dizēstos, a hodos(-journey) whose hodos(-itinerary) is connected by a hodos (rut road) – would thus be the transition from narrative con-sequence to logical consequence.

6.3.2 Other Implications: keleuthos

Appreciating the physical nature of archaic Greek roads and the semantic breadth and density of the word hodos also provides a potentially illuminating insight into another phenomenon identified by Mourelatos. In his analysis of the ‘Fate-Constraint’, he identified three ‘faces’ or ‘hypostases’: Anagke (Constraint), Moira (Fate), and Dike (Justice).135 To these three, he adds a fourth: Peitho. In light of the semantics of the peith- word family in Homer, Hesiod, and Aeschylus and its role in parts of Parmenides’ poem, and alongside the words chrē and chreōn,136 Mourelatos sees peith- terms expressing not the externally imposed force of the other three terms but rather an ‘inner-directed justice’, an ‘attitude of adherence or submission’, a ‘compliance or obedience’ that represents ‘an agreeable submission to the authority of Constraint-Fate-Justice’.137

This interplay of internal and external forces, of obedience and agreeable adherence and compulsion and imposition, makes excellent sense at an ontological level. But yet again, Mourelatos has more difficulty substantiating his epistemologically oriented claims, such as: ‘[t]he four faces of the polymorph deity are aspects of the modality of necessity that controls what-is, and of the same modality as it applies to the route “___ is____”.’138 In his

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137 From Mourelatos (2008b) 152, 155, and 156, respectively.
analysis of the relationship between these ‘faces’ or ‘hypostases’, he discusses the ‘modality of chrē, “it is rightly necessary”’, that pilots the ‘route to reality’ \(^{139}\) and makes good use of his analysis of the peith- family while reminding us that the hodos of Fragment 8 was originally introduced with the phrase Πειθοὺς ἐστὶν κέλευθος (Fr. 2.4). Viewing this hodos(-itinerary) as moving along a hodos(-for-wheeled-vehicles) provides an elegant figuration of this interplay between internal adherence and external constraint at the epistemological level – in terms, that is, of the hodos dizēsios as ‘Route to Truth’. On the one hand, the grooves of the rut road provide an externally imposed force constraining the movement of the wheels of the chariot that journeys along it: it holds them fast in its bounds; on the other, the grooves of the rut road also provide free, agreeable movement to the chariot whose wheels ‘adhere to’ or ‘obey’ the prescribed track. The image of a journey by wheeled vehicle along a rut road expresses a forceful element of imposition, constraint, limitation, binding, while also articulating its own distinctive version of a journey of pistis and persuasion and ‘positive teleology’ (a felicitous phrase here).

Finally, analysis I have undertaken elsewhere and touch on in Chapter 1 can make a further contribution. \(^{140}\) Recall that where the word hodos addressed a journey viewed as a single, unified whole (‘from the outside’) and in relation to its structure, the word keleuthos emphasized the process of journeying (viewed ‘from the inside’) and the series of actions and experiences that formed this process (Section 1.2). How fitting, then, that the process of travelling a hodos along a hodos, wheels locked into the track, should be referred to as a Πειθοὺς κέλευθος (Fr. 2.4): on Owen’s reading of the poem, to be swept along on this hodos is to undertake a κέλευθος, a journeying, that at every step of the way (or at every turn of the wheels) complies with, or adheres or submits to, the ‘positive teleology’ of the hodos-as-journey and the hodos-as-road.

\(^{139}\) Mourelatos (2008b) 154.

\(^{140}\) See Folit-Weinberg (forthcoming, 2022).
6.3 Sēma III: Hodopoiēsis (the ‘Route to Truth’ and Fr. 8)

6.3.3 Back on Track: Towards Conclusions

This, at any rate, is the view that a proponent of Owen’s reading of the poem’s argument would advance. But what would a proponent Sedley’s reading of Fragment 8 have to say? One should not forget that while Sedley sees Melissus’ arguments as forming ‘a single chain, with each predicate inferred directly from the previous one’, he reads each of Parmenides’ proofs as ‘largely independent’ and, with one exception, ‘self-contained, its premises either presented as self-evident or relying on one or both Laws’.  

In fact, his reading also opens a surprising, even provocative, insight into the role played by the figure of the hodos in Parmenides’ poem. In the present discussion, two points should be borne in mind. First, Sedley still places great emphasis on the importance of argument (rather than mere assertion) to the development of Parmenides’ claims, of course.  

Notably, in Sedley’s analysis of the specific argumentation advanced in Fragment 8, none of the four claims are proved independently of the ‘Two Laws’.  

This is to say that, second, the net effect of Sedley’s analysis is to shift the bulk of the argumentative labour being done to the fragments preceding Fragment 8; if the claims of Fragment 8 are not built sequentially one upon the next, they depend even more heavily on fragments 2, 6, and 7. Law Two – ‘No proposition is true if it implies that, for any x, “x is not” is, was, or will be true’ – is, we might think, a crystallization of the principle expressed in Fr. 2.7–8 (and reiterated in 6.1–2). For its part, Law One – ‘there are no half-truths. No proposition is both true and false. No question can be coherently answered “Yes and no”’ – is presented by Sedley as a paraphrase or gloss of 8.15–16, but he acknowledges that this is itself the product of the claims presented in Fr. 2.3–5 combined with those advanced in Fr. 6.4–9 (plus what has been understood as an implicit principle resembling the Law of

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141 Sedley (1999) 125, 122 (though see again n. 108).
143 So lines 6–9 rely on Law Two, as do 11–13 (9–10 rely on the Principle of Sufficient Reason); lines 22–25 rely on both Law One and Law Two; lines 26–33 rely on Law One; and lines 42–49 rely on Law Two (although Sedley does not specify explicitly); see Sedley (1999) 118–21.
Non-Contradiction). In other words, Law Two is the product of the blockage of the second way (viz. the one articulated in Fr. 2.5), while Law One is the result of passing first by way of the first hodos presented in Fragment 2 (2.3–4) and then, possibly, via the further krisis expressed in fragment 6 and 7. The four qualities attributed to to eon come in con-sequence to (and/or are therefore the consequence of) the decisions at the various kris(e)is in fragments 2 and 6 and 7: once one travels by this way, it is inevitable that one arrive at the four conclusions represented by the four sēmata (even if the order in which one arrives at them is no longer very important).

On this view, the Two Laws become a pair of tracks, of preinscribed ruts, into which one finds oneself locked once one has passed through the krisis or successive kriseis of fragments 2 and 6 and 7. What does not (with the exception of the third sēma and its relationship to the first) have any inherent value is the precise order in which these conclusions are presented. Thus, intriguingly enough, if one accepts Sedley’s reading, it is the rhetorical power invested in the figure of the hodos qua ‘rhetorical schema’ that becomes most striking. By using this schema, with its special capacity to systematize discourse and provide description without descriptivity, narrativity without narration, as a means of figuring this sequence of otherwise (potentially) unordered units of argumentation, it is as if Parmenides allows the sequence itself to take on the reified mass of a tomb midden (sēma) installed in the earth, or an altar in the agora, or a stone stele implanted empedon in the ground. Sedley’s Parmenides would thus prove a virtuoso rhetorician, a master of imagery and polyvalent language. By marshalling the resources compressed and contained in the word and image of the hodos, Parmenides would invest the sequence of the claims advanced in Fragment 8 – which, provided they come after fragments 2, 6, and 7, might otherwise be listed in (almost) any order – with the appearance of the same necessity and pre-existing ordering, the same power and authority of the geography of the natural landscape, attached to an itinerary through physical space.

In this case, he may have had a predecessor in no less a figure than Homer himself. For who is it, after all, who determines the order and sequence according to which the episodes following Aeaea appear? See esp. Reinhardt (1996) 103–04.
As noted above, my goal in discussing the competing interpretations of Fragment 8 offered by Owen and Sedley is not to advocate for the superiority of one or the other, but rather to explore two points. The first concerns the scope and applicability of the analysis above; what I hope to have shown is that the links I have constructed between Parmenides’ poem and its physical, linguistic, and poetic context are compatible with each of these two positions that define the mainstream spectrum of views on the proper ordering of the sēmata that form Fragment 8. The second builds on this by exploring more specifically what these links might mean, were one to endorse either Owen’s rigorously linear view of Fragment 8 or Sedley’s view that the sequence in which the sēmata are presented is not intrinsically related to the arguments supporting them.

6.3.4 Two Further Options

If the interpretations of Owen and Sedley define between them a range of widely accepted readings of Fragment 8, there are of course other interpretations that deviate from aspects of their shared orthodoxies. Although it would be excessive to conduct an exhaustive survey of how each of these other approaches might be reconciled with my account of Parmenides’ invention of extended deductive argumentation, briefly addressing two recent, exemplary interpretations of Parmenides’ Fragment 8 is still a valuable exercise; doing so will help illuminate more precisely the nature and scope of this book’s contributions to the study of Parmenides’ poem and our understanding of the history of archaic – and Western – thought more broadly.

The first is the distinctive line of interpretation of Parmenides’ poem pioneered by Scott Austin.\(^{147}\) One of Austin’s most valuable contributions is to delineate a pattern of assertions, negations, positions, and privations whose recombinations underlie – and perhaps even serve as a generating principle behind – Parmenides’ arguments.\(^{148}\) An attractive consequence of

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approaching Parmenides’ arguments via this aspect of their formal construction is the original perspective it opens onto their content. More specifically, Austin’s interest in the triadic pattern of position, negation, and recapitulatory double negation and his observations regarding the creation of dyadic pairings and triadic groupings in Fragment 8 reveal a subtly different way of grouping together the content addressed by the fragment’s four sēmata. On Austin’s view, the arguments in lines 8.6–15 address what-is in terms of time, lines 8.22–31 address being in terms of space or ‘the occupation of place by mass’ and then in lines 8.32 and 8.42–49 ‘the conclusions developed during the considerations of time and of mass/place are recapitulated, combined, and rolled up into a complete statement’.

What most catches the eye in the current setting is the extent to which, seen through the lens of Austin’s interpretation, Parmenides’ arguments advance in a fundamentally sequential, progressive manner. On Austin’s reading, Parmenides’ argumentation is defined by a necessary and inherent directionality; as a consequence, it is hard to imagine a scenario consistent with Austin’s view in which Parmenides could just as easily have swapped the sēmata around or advanced them in a different order had he so desired. As Austin points out, the successive interplay of dyads, triads, and singlets, assertions and negations, positions and privations elaborates ‘the story of a gradual movement away from contrariety and towards unity ... The logic and rhetoric of the “Truth-Section” are cumulative’.

150 As it is put in Austin (2002) 97 and Austin (2007) 57, respectively. Scott Austin does not always spell out where he demarcates the line boundaries between arguments, but at Austin (2007) 57 does specify that the second phase of the argument spans lines 8.22–31.
151 Austin (2007) 57; at Austin (2002) 97, the heading given to this third phase is ‘sphere’.
152 This is particularly true in the case of the recapitulatory fourth sēma, where double negative and affirmative position formulations are ultimately shown to be coextensive; see also discussion in the Appendix below.
153 Austin (2007) 14, emphasis mine. More specifically: ‘The overall picture is, first, that dyadic contrariety is rejected; second, that it is incorporated into harmony; finally, that it is transcended altogether in favor of simplicity’ (Austin (2007) 14). A very schematic version of the point is given in Austin (2002) 97: ‘this sequence ... [is] a story of development in statement from the rejection of dyadic contrariety, to the negation of and inclusion of that contrariety in triples, to the simplest positive and double-negative terms’.

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There are many significant points of non-overlap between Austin’s interests and orientation and those of the account of Parmenides’ invention of extended deductive argumentation provided here. Austin is little concerned with Parmenides’ poetic background, his pervasive use of road imagery, the dramatic setting in which the staging of the enumeration of the routes is embedded, and other ‘poetic’ aspects of Parmenides’ poem; likewise, his extensive discussion of such things as negative predication, modal operators, and Platonic, Trinitarian, or Hegelian dialectics might seem to have little in common with the present book’s concerns. This only makes it all the more striking, however, that Austin’s analysis seems not only highly compatible, but indeed to align in neat congruence, with the analysis I have undertaken above. That the discursive architecture undergirding the *hodos* narrated by Circe to Odysseus should provide the larger organizing framework within which Parmenides could explore, in a manner both systematic and argumentatively rigorous, the complete array of possible combinations of assertion and negation, position and privation is not only plausible, but highly attractive. To put the matter the other way round: if what Austin’s account reveals is a pattern of arguments formed from different combinations of privation and negation, position and assertion, the question remains as to how these different phases or stages in the argument are to be joined together: how to imagin(e) the relationship between them? But this is precisely what the rhetorical schema of the *hodos* and its associated types of dependence provides: a discursive framework to be filled in according to the pattern described by Austin. On this view, the two formal perspectives of Parmenides’ construction of his argument – Austin’s and the one offered here – would not only complement each other but, by triangulating key principles underlying their construction, could also provide an important and potentially guiding insight into what Parmenides’ arguments mean.

Perhaps rather more difficult to reconcile with the historical account I have offered is the line of interpretation recently developed by Richard McKirahan. McKirahan’s presentation has its

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share of important virtues. Re-emphasizing that Parmenides ‘lived before canons of deductive inference had been formalized’, he sagely observes that ‘the interpreter’s job is not to aim for formal validity, but to attempt a reconstruction of Parmenides’ train of thought, showing how he might have supposed that the conclusion follows from the premises he gives’.

While just what it means for a conclusion to ‘follow’ a premise (i.e. how we ought best attempt to ‘reconstruct’ Parmenides’ ‘train of thought’ – or, better, hodos dizēsios) gets to the very heart of what is at stake here, on these points, at least, I find myself in fervent agreement with McKirahan – even as our different approaches, and answers, to this question get to the heart of our disagreement.

At this juncture, however, we part ways. Or nearly at this juncture, for, as with other interpreters, McKirahan also takes the lines following 8.2 to constitute a programme (he opts to include 8.5–6) of points, or clusters of points, that Parmenides will set out to prove. McKirahan’s list differs from Owen’s, Sedley’s, and those of other interpreters in several respects, however. First, McKirahan distinguishes six groups, rather than the usual four sēmata (he styles these ‘Groups A-F’). Second, McKirahan’s groups do not strictly track the sequence in which the sēmata are presented from line 8.3; the items that form the programme are clustered instead according to another organizing principle. Thus, third, McKirahan’s groups cut across the ordinary division of the programme, in some cases resulting in the pairing of qualities that are usually taken as distinct, while in others splitting up familiar pairings. So Group B, for example, is formed by ‘whole’ (σωλων, 8.4), ‘complete’ (τελειον, 8.4), ‘all together’ (ὅμοιοι πᾶν, 8.5; συνεχες, 8.6), thereby collecting under one heading attributes deemed by Owen, Sedley, and most other interpreters to

155 McKirahan (2008) 189–90. Another way of framing my project might be to say that I have been attempting to trace out the principles underlying the tracks or ruts that form this train of thought – not to mention the material from which they are made and which gives them their tensile force. McKirahan continues: ‘This is a matter of sensitivity and sympathy as much as of logic . . .’ – a perspective with which I heartily agree.

156 See n. 3 above.

157 What does determine the groups? This is not stated, but the logic determining the groupings seems to stem from the arguments McKirahan discerns in the body of the argumentation itself, from which he evidently works backwards.
correspond to the second and fourth sēmata in the programme (oulon and teleion/teleston, respectively). On the other hand, mounogenes (8.4), ordinarily read with the grain of the syntax of line 4 as being paired with oulon (and thus one half of the signpost for ou diaireton, viz. sēma 2, lines 8.22–25), is here glossed as ‘unique’ and paired with ‘one’ (ἕν, 8.6), which together form their own distinct cluster, Group F.

Since McKirahan’s approach is geared towards his understanding of the content of the arguments he finds rather than the sequence of their presentation, this ultimately yields a sequence of Categories that does not track the movement of Fragment 8.6–49 any more than it does lines 8.3–6, another major difference between McKirahan’s reading and most others. So, for example, the treatment of members in Category D: ‘changeless, motionless’ are to be found scattered throughout various parts of the poem, including lines 8.26, 38, 41, ‘and possibly 8.29–30’. Finally, another result of McKirahan’s approach is that certain qualities identified in the programme – Group F: ‘unique’ (μουνογενές) and ‘one’ (ἕν) – remain entirely unaddressed in the remainder of Fragment 8, while other portions of the body of Fragment 8, namely lines 42–49, lack any identifiable correlate in the programme.

It is worth emphasizing one final time that this is not the place to assess the merits of specific interpretations of Parmenides’ arguments. Rather, the more pertinent question here would be how a defender of McKirahan’s view, which expressly – and rightly – underscores the need to remain alert to the risks of anachronism and to understand Parmenides’ poem and its arguments in their historical context, would reconcile his or her approach and the results it yields with the historical question of how Parmenides developed his radically new way of speaking and arguing. If the resources offered by the semantics of the word hodos, the real

158 And also, in Fr. 8.5–6 (homou pan suneches), perhaps even the arguments supporting the first sēma, that being is ungenerable and imperishable.
159 McKirahan (2008) 191, see also 208–10.
161 This is also frequently true in more traditional readings of Fragment 8, according to many of which 8.34–41 remains a puzzle (see n. 8 above).
objects to which it referred, and the intertextual dramatic and discursive frameworks it conjures up do indeed play a crucial role in mediating the transition from Homeric narrative to Parmenidean argumentation, what does this mean for interpretations of Fragment 8 that do not see these arguments as formed from a series of distinct segments or phases of the itinerary of the hodos dizēsios, or the programme announcing a catalogue of these phases point by point as they will be asserted and argued for? Conversely, were we to accept an interpretation which did not respect this linear, sequential, cumulative structure, would this imply that an account of Parmenides’ invention of extended deductive argumentation different from the one offered here might be required?

6.4 Sēma IV: Accomplishments and Completions

It is time to bring this pistos logos to a close. The arrangement of words in Chapter 7 (‘Mortal Opinions’), potentially deceptive in its own way, will offer an invitation to reflect on how our own criteria of knowledge, what we count as a valid contribution to it, and the hodos dizēsios of academic research that leads us there, all retain a fundamentally Parmenidean shape – for better and for worse. If part of this shape is defined by what Karl Popper has called the ‘Parmenidean apology’ of the Doxa and the questions it poses about the status of the ‘Route to Truth’, Part III (Doxai) will explore what this implies for the analysis undertaken in this and preceding the three chapters of Part II (Routes). By testing the limits of reading Parmenides alongside Homer, I hope to call attention to some of our own epistemic presuppositions, which are not always fully articulated or acknowledged, and to underscore their relationship to a Parmenidean, and Homeric, desire for certainty and closure – and to the difficulty of attaining it.

For now, however, it remains to ask what all this – this chapter, this Part (Routes), and the primary line of argument in this

162 At least to a certain extent – the debate about the degree to which, and the manner in which, this is true is of course simply another way of viewing the debate between Owen and Sedley.
book – amounts to. The answer to this question will depend quite considerably on the fields, methods, and aims of the scholar who happens to be reading this book; the analysis undertaken above will likely be valuable for different reasons to, and be used in different ways by, scholars working in different fields, or attempting to answer different questions. One way of organizing the range of possible implications of this book’s claims for our understanding of Parmenides’ arguments would be to discuss matters in terms of ‘priority’.

Working on one level, for example, will be scholars whose main approach to philosophical texts begins with an attempt to understand and reconstruct the argumentative moves of a text in relation to what might make a ‘good’ argument by our own standards, regardless of whether these are expressed in ancient Greek, English, or any other language (perhaps including logical notation). In this case, what might be called philosophical analysis of Parmenides’ argumentation will likely remain ‘prior

163 For the ‘accomplishments’ in this section’s title, see Section 1.2, esp. Figure 1.1. For ‘completions’, see e.g. Austin’s translation of tetelesmenon, also Mourelatos (2008b) 125–29.

164 To note that a scholar is committed to seeing in Parmenides’ poem ‘good arguments’ is descriptive, not evaluative. Rather, the point is to mark the fact that this commitment, which is often taken for granted, is a strongly guiding hermeneutic principle which, as discussed above (Introduction, 8–11), plays a major role in shaping and justifying our readings of Parmenides; it is alive and well, and continues to orient much of the top scholarship on Parmenides. This is sometimes expressed in terms of our ability to formulate his arguments in such a way that they ‘go through’ (e.g. Barnes (1982) or, more radically, Wedin (2014); notably, both Barnes and Wedin render their interpretations of Parmenides in formal logical notation). But the impulse can also be expressed through vaguer criteria. Sedley’s stance is exemplary; to justify the core plank of his reading of Parmenides, he says: ‘I offer the following reason for retaining an unashamedly spatial reading. This final stretch [viz. Fragment 8.1–49] of the Way of Truth is full of arguments... Only if we take them in literally spatial terms, I submit, do they prove to be good arguments’ (Sedley (1999) 17, emphasis mine).

If it is not an insult to observe that a scholar is committed to seeing Parmenides’ arguments as good arguments, it need not necessarily be a compliment either. Skinner’s relationship to Boden (Skinner (2002a)) or Hacking’s to Paracelsus (in e.g. Hacking (2002a)) are salutary points of comparison. Discussing the ‘incommensurability between Paracelsus and modern medicine’, Hacking observes: ‘Paracelsus’s system of possibility is quite different from ours. What he had up for grabs as true-or-false does not enter into our grid of possibilities, and vice versa. This is not due to different articulated theories or systems of conscious belief, but because the underlying depth knowledge is incommensurable. This idea lessens the metaphor in the very word: we cannot lay some number of Paracelsus’s possibilities alongside ours and have two sets that match at the end. This is not to say we cannot understand him... One can even go some way towards talking Paracelsan in English, once one has articulated concepts that
to the aspects of Parmenides’ poem discussed here. That is, one expects that such a scholar will likely decide first whether he or she finds, say, Owen’s or Sedley’s assessment of the poem’s argumentation persuasive; then, having settled on one or the other, he or she can use the analysis presented here to explore aspects of his or her preferred interpretation in this new light. The questions that will exercise such a scholar will likely concern determining to what extent, and in which distinctive ways, Parmenides was influenced by the pattern of Circe’s description of the hodos, or up to what point he relies on, and at what point he moves beyond, the physical features of Greek rut roads in developing his own arguments. Did Parmenides conjure consequence from con-sequence, as a disciple of Owen might feel, as he travelled a hodos along a rut road of argument inscribed into a pre-existing logical terrain? Or was Parmenides a master rhetorician, deploying a discursive architecture with a capacity for a temporally unimpregnated systematics and argumentativeness, narrativity without narration and description without descriptivity, as a Sedleian interpreter might have it? Or, rather, are the language and imagery used by Parmenides entirely irrelevant, and his arguments fitted together according to some other set of principles entirely – and, if so, what are those?

Working on another level, scholars more focused on Parmenides’ place in the history of thought might approach his poem with a different set of presuppositions and commitments, especially as far as the relationship between language and the ideas it expresses, between signifier and signified, are concerned. Particularly if they are interested in Parmenides’ role as the decisive figure mediating the transition to a conception of Paracelsus was perhaps unable to. Translation is largely irrelevant. “Charity” and maximizing truth are worse than useless (I don’t believe a word in all seventeen volumes of Paracelsus). “Benefit of the doubt” about what Paracelsus was “referring to” seldom helps. What counts is making a new canvass of possibilities, or rather, restoring one that is now entirely defunct (Hacking (2002a) 97). The aspiration of the present book, and the commitment that guides it, is to try to ‘restore’ the ‘canvas of possibilities’ that Parmenides worked within, and strained to reshape, rather than to provide a reading of Parmenides’ poem that makes his arguments ‘good’ or ‘go through’.

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165 I thank one of the readers from Cambridge University Press for helping me see matters in these terms and for some of the phrasing in this paragraph.
knowledge predicated on extended deductive argumentation and the practice of demonstration, the semantics of the word *hodos*, the imagistic force of the rut road, and, especially, the discursive architecture provided by the *hodos* (and Circe’s *hodos* in *Odyssey* 12 in particular) may well maintain some degree of priority in their interpretation of Parmenides’ arguments; this last component would provide the matrix of discursive possibility available to Parmenides within which to undertake his metaphysical or cosmological endeavours.

For their part, literary critics of the sort who study Pindar, perhaps, or even Homer – with perhaps still other commitments concerning the relationship between words and ideas – might go so far as to advance a form of the stronger claim that in some respects it is Parmenides’ road imagery that plays an active role in driving his discursive structure, just as one might uncontroversially claim the same for either poet.

Finally, working on yet another level, other scholars of ancient poetry might ‘give priority’ neither to the content of Parmenides’ arguments nor to the role played by his imagery in shaping their form; rather, they might be more interested in the analysis undertaken above as a case study in reception theory, one that departs from the usual strategy of dissecting repeated phrases, or type scenes, or cleverly pointed allusions, and moves towards an approach oriented towards archaeological explorations of discourse. Or, similarly, they might perhaps find the above study more useful as another data point to be woven into a larger story about the diverse modes of engaging with, and reworking, Homer that blossomed in the late archaic era.

How best to incorporate the analysis undertaken here into one’s understanding of Parmenides’ poem is a choice that each scholar will make.
depending on his or her own orientations and methods, philosophical commitments, and aims and objectives.

It is also possible, however, that in the final analysis even the dichotomy between the philosophically minded and the history of thought- or poetry-minded analysts of Parmenides will not fully withstand deeper scrutiny. What should a member of the first group who finds McKirahan’s reading of Fragment 8 compelling say to a historian of thought who defends the reading I have advanced here? Surely some account of Parmenides’ invention of extended deductive argumentation and outline of demonstration is required; barring this, we find ourselves back in the Greek Miracle paradigm. And what should future interpreters who attempt to forge their own path, finding satisfactory none of the interpretations of Parmenides’ arguments currently on offer, think of all this? Most crucially: to what factor or set of factors should they give priority as they do so?

This final nexus of questions takes on extra significance in light of the positive reception that McKirahan’s analysis has received.\textsuperscript{170} I noted above McKirahan’s injunction that our interpretations of Parmenides’ arguments should not be imprisoned by an anachronistic understanding of what makes Parmenides’ arguments ‘good’. Like McKirahan, I, too, wholly subscribe to the notion that one consequence of this is that ‘the interpreter’s job is not to aim for formal validity, but to attempt a reconstruction of Parmenides’ train of thought, showing how he might have supposed that the conclusion follows from the premises he gives’. But needing to remain alert to the risks of binding our interpretation of Parmenides’ arguments within the straightjacket of subsequent canons of argumentation does not imply free licence to interpret them without any consideration for the imagery or discursive architecture in which he chose to express himself. Put differently, that the rules governing their order and structure are not those of Aristotelian or Fregan logic does not mean that we can ignore larger questions concerning the ordering, patterning, and overall

\textsuperscript{170} See e.g. Curd (2011) 21, Mourelatos (2013a), who characterizes McKirahan’s article as an ‘excellent analysis of the argument in Truth’.
structure of Parmenides’ arguments in toto. As McKirahan’s own phrase suggests, just what it means for a conclusion to ‘follow’ from a premise is precisely what is at stake in our different understandings of Parmenides’ poem. That the sense of many words and phrases crucial to Parmenides’ arguments in Fragment 8 (such as eon ... eonti pelazei at line 25, for example, or akinēton at line 26) remain obscure and hotly contested is widely acknowledged. And if we peer through so dark a glass at the meaning of so much of Parmenides’ language, one might ask just how comfortable we should be in giving priority to our speculations about the ‘content’ of this language – especially when considering what it meant to Parmenides for a ‘conclusion to follow from a premise’, or how best to reconstruct his ‘train of thought’.

By contrast, what I hope to have shown here is that we have a much better foundation upon which ‘to attempt a reconstruction of Parmenides’ train of thought’ – or, rather, as he himself called it, his hodos dizēsios. This is, of course, to study the nature of the hodos part of the hodos dizēsios. Why might Parmenides have used this term? What resources did it offer him? How might it have exerted its own influenced him in turn? These are the questions I hoped to have answered, or to have begun answering, in this book.

I opened this study by discussing the heavy price scholars have paid for anachronistically treating Parmenides’ poem as if it were nothing more nor less than a sequence of extended deductive arguments as we understand that term.171 Doing so not only cast aspects of Parmenides’ argumentation in an unjustly unflattering light, but also obscured the seminal role he played in forging from the discursive forms he inherited a new and powerful way of speaking persuasively – one that shares decisive features with what Aristotle would later call apodeixis or demonstration (and, indeed, defines and establishes them). But detaching Parmenides from the story of what came after him for (well-intentioned) fear of anachronism is arguably no less dangerous, no less distorting – and no less

anachronistic. Demonstration does have a direct progenitor and distinguished pedigree in the road-thought and road-speech that Parmenides explicitly invokes. And, much more to the point, as I have tried to establish in this book, Parmenides’ road-thought and road-speech is in turn integrally related to the road-thought and road-speech of his predecessors, specifically Homer, especially what we find in *Odyssey* 12.37–141. It is precisely this inherited discursive infrastructure that Parmenides reuses and reworks to craft his own radical new way of thinking and speaking persuasively – and thus precisely what can offer us such a promising basis upon which to reconstruct his ‘train of thought’ and grapple with what it might mean to him for ‘a conclusion to follow from a premise’ in the movement of his *hodos dizesios*.

It is, however, just this road-thought and road-speech, so definitive for the shape and texture of the design of the ‘Route to Truth’, that McKirahan must jettison to get his interpretation of its arguments to stick. One could say – no doubt somewhat idiosyncratically – that it is as if for McKirahan, Parmenides’ arguments are a kind of jigsaw puzzle-baby that must be rescued from the bathwater of their argumentation in order to be assembled properly outside it; by contrast, I would contend that Parmenides’ argument-baby has in fact been developed exactly to fit the bath.\(^{172}\) It does not follow from this, incidentally, that the philosopher’s, or historian of philosophy’s, concerns must be rigorously secondary to those of the historian of thought or the literary critic. Rather, adequate attention to the structure of Parmenides’ argumentation (thanks to the efforts of the latter) can be an invaluable guide in helping the former grapple with his or her quandaries. Likewise, insights divined by the former can help the latter to refine and improve his or her analysis – which can in turn help guide further study by the philosophers, and so on. By considering questions of form and content as deeply – inextricably – interrelated, we can better understand the shape of this bath and the nature of the philosophy-child that it holds, which is both the scion of

\(^{172}\) Thanks to one of the readers for Cambridge University Press for encouraging me to think along these lines, and for some language in the previous two sentences.
Homer’s line and the founding dynasty of Western philosophical and scientific thinking.

Taking several steps back, we may also observe that trying to square the historical account offered here with the interpretive accounts offered by Owen, Sedley, Austin, and especially McKirahan is a valuable exercise in its own right. This enterprise highlights just how complex is the web of hermeneutic assumptions and interpretative priorities that any reader of Parmenides’ poem brings to bear on his or her reading. When it comes to the Presocratics, to whom we are so indebted for the modes of thought with which we investigate them\(^{173}\) and yet whom we still so little understand, the truism that what we get out of the hermeneutic circle depends on where we enter it is even more vertiginously true than usual. Are we invested in locating Parmenides in his physical time and linguistic context, or was his brilliance such that this is unimportant, that whatever the nature of his intellectual or discursive milieu might have been, he would not have been constrained – or perhaps even influenced – by it? If we do want to discuss language and imagery, is this to be done in relation to the Homer (or Hesiod) of Parmenides’ past, say, or to the Plato (or Democritus, or Empedocles) standing in his future, or to Orphic or other religious – or legal, or what have you – language that may have been current in the Elea of his present? If we want to gain purchase on just what, precisely, Parmenides was arguing for, how much should we emphasize those against whom he might have been arguing (and should that be an Ionian cosmologist, or Heraclitus, or members of a competing mystery cult or religious sect, or some other under explored or still-unexplored possibility?), the specific language of the arguments themselves, their form, the way that Parmenides’ different successors understood them – or the degree to which any of these factors might still have a bearing on our own contemporary issues, in philosophy or elsewhere? How important is it that Parmenides be understood to argue as we do today? If it is important, how powerful is our commitment to the soundness or validity of Parmenides’ arguments? How much do we feel the need to ‘salvage’ them if we wish to

\(^{173}\) See Introduction, 6–10 and n. 30 above, and esp. Part III, Doxai, below.
preserve Parmenides’ standing among the giants in the history of thought?

These are important questions, each of which can be answered in a number of legitimate ways – and in each case we are likely to see a subtly or profoundly different Parmenides emerge. Ultimately, of course, how we answer will likely tell us more about our own theories of language, of the history of conceptual change, and of the process by which new modes of thought emerge than about Parmenides himself. For my part, I would urge that we spend at least some time viewing Parmenides as we would any other archaic Greek poet, taking care to historicize his use of language, its sense and reference; to re-embed him not only within his intellectual tradition, but also, especially, his poetic tradition; and to attend to the manner in which the form, imagery, and content of his poem are interrelated. Even for those interpreters who insist on giving hermeneutic priority strictly to content independent of form (on the premise that the one could be strictly independent of the other), these considerations must remain a powerful criterion in assessing the strength, persuasiveness, and credibility of philosophically oriented interpretations of Parmenides’ arguments. Ideally, however, the historical question of how Parmenides came to argue as he did will become a top-tier consideration in its own right, assuming a well-earned place alongside questions such as against whom, or in favour of what, he might have been arguing. It should ascend, that is, to the status of a premier consideration orienting our hermeneutic stance to Parmenides’ poem, and especially the arguments he advances in the ‘Route to Truth’.
PART III
DOXAI
7.1 End of the Line

How far have we come? Or, given that a *hodos*, as we saw in Section 1.2, is durative but telic: what have we accomplished? To what destination have we arrived on this *hodos dizēsios*?

Throughout this project we have set our sights on Parmenides’ invention of extended deductive argumentation and the way that he established the basic conceptual footprint of what would be called demonstration: (i) proceeding from a starting point that has to be accepted (ii) by strict deductive arguments (iii) to establish an inescapable conclusion. All three components, we have seen, are made possible by, and develop under the deep influence of, the network of meanings compressed into, and emanating out from, the figure of the *hodos*.

To begin at the beginning (i), Parmenides inherited a pattern of Homeric deliberation that involved the thinking through of two alternatives and the rejection of one to lead to a conclusion. In the Homeric figure of the *hodos* and the discourse modes organized by its characteristic types of dependence, he inherited a specific discursive organization: narration, followed by description, followed by instruction (which was often – at least in the *hodos* spanning *Od*. 12.37–141 – justified by argument). Even more specifically, in lines 12.55–126 he would have encountered a number of textual elements that feature with unusual frequency: a modally charged version of description-by-negation, description made up of existential and predicative forms of *eιnai* (and *esτi* in particular), and the use of *gar* and *epei* to articulate the relationship between premises and the imperatives to action that formed Circe’s conclusions. The audience of the Homeric poem encounters in this segment of Circe’s *hodos* a special kind of choice, one between two courses in physical space: a choice between two mutually incompatible, exhaustive alternatives (viz. a *krisis* or...
exclusive disjunction). Thanks to Parmenides’ reversal of the relationship between argument and description, second and third person, action and state of affairs, the Homeric pattern of deliberation, applied to this special *krasis* forming an exclusive disjunction, converged to form an exceptionally powerful nexus by which the rejection of one term – in typical Homeric fashion – now enforced with a modal power, *mandated* the selection of the other. The terms of the choice were no longer actions, however, but descriptions of what-is; and the argumentative support was not previously established descriptions, but actions whose impossibility of being performed – by any ‘you’ who should hear or read the verse – served as the self-founding basis for an entirely new sequence of argument. Homer’s *krasis* came in the middle of the *hodos*; Parmenides moved it to the very beginning of his own to force all who would listen to his goddess down the path ‘IS’: to proceed, that is to say, from a starting point that, because it cannot *not* be accepted, must therefore be accepted by all comers.

Point (ii) encompasses no more and no less than the invention of extended deductive argumentation. The rhetorical schema of the *hodos* governs a form of catalogic discourse that orders a series of items enumerated on the basis of their contiguity in space and the movement of a voyager in time, a combination we termed *con-sequence*. The discursive architecture structured by the *hodos* is thus systematic, linking each item within the same catalogue and organizing their interrelationships on the basis of this principle of *con-sequence*; insofar as its types of dependence accommodate argumentative support justifying claims made in the timeless present (and with the predicative *esti*) of description, it also provides a framework that makes possible more than mere assertion. By transforming the items his *hodos* catalogues from nodes on the itinerary of a journey through physical space – and in many cases, narrative episodes tied to places – to claims about the nature of what-is; by converting previous claims into supporting premises at lower levels of dependence for items later in the catalogue; by exploiting the polysemy of the word *hodos* (which signifies both object and action); and by harnessing the power of word and world, of the image of the physical rut road engraved in the earth, Parmenides thus transforms spatio-temporal *con-sequence* into logical consequence. Put schematically: the *hodos*, as a figure
governing its own rhetorical schema, mediates a new discursive architecture that orders discourse-units and *hodos*-units in a systematic, cumulative way. The *hodos*, as a figure governing its own rhetorical schema with its own types of dependence, mediates a new discursive architecture that makes these units argumentatively justified claims about the nature of what-is. The *hodos*, as a signifier with a physical referent, mediates a new concept of necessary movement from point to point, unit to unit, assertion to assertion, premise to conclusion. The *hodos*, as a signifier whose signified intrinsically involves purposeful movement towards a destination, mediates a new concept of movement towards a final and terminal conclusion (iii). Taken together: movement towards a destination by wheeled vehicle along a graven track, through space and in time, has been transformed into a ‘metaphysical’ necessity, a *hodos*-(journey) whose *hodos*-(itinerary) moves along a *hodos* (rut road) in such a way that no deviation, no wandering, no swerving, no erring is possible. From *sēma* to *sēma* to *sēma* to *sēma* to...

To what?

7.2 *Epi*/Apologoi: ‘Here I End My pistos logos . . .’?

The poem has clearly thought hard about, and finally rejected, a role for Laertes in the palace situation . . . His withdrawal not only disencumbers the game of a morally and strategically uncomfortable complication, but cleverly locates the zenith of emotion in the reunion with Penelope, with Laertes held in judicious reserve for an epilogue.1

Almost as soon as they were conceived . . . these truly portentous ideas of Parmenides suffered a kind of breakdown, leading to what I call a Parmenidean apology, and this breakdown was portentous too.2

We saw above (Section 1.2) that, being durative and telic, in Homer a *hodos* is intrinsically oriented towards an ultimate, purpose-laden destination.3 In short, a *hodos* should conclude (lest it be ὀτέλεστος, ἄλη, τηύση) – finally and absolutely.

2 Popper (1998a) 146–47.
3 Contra Montiglio (2005), who does not provide a thorough semantic analysis of her key terms; see again Folit-Weinberg (forthcoming, 2022).
Mortal Opinions

In addressing Lloyd’s point (iii), one final set of comparisons between the *Odyssey* and Parmenides’ ‘Route to Truth’ can prove illuminating – and provocative. In the *Odyssey*, the end, the climax, the culmination, the terminal point is, as everyone since the Alexandrians has known, the great olive-root bed of Odysseus, *empeeldon sêma*.\(^4\) One can understand why Aristarchus and Aristophanes – like so many subsequent readers of the *Odyssey* – purportedly felt that the ‘real’ end/telos of the *Odyssey* was at 23.296.\(^5\) From at least three perspectives, the conclusion, climax, culmination of Odysseus’ *hodos* is the olive-root bed and his reattainment of it.

### 7.2.1 Space, Symbol, Plot

What Hestia, the hearth, does for the ordering of space in archaic and classical Greek constructions of the *oikos* generally (at least on Vernant’s construction) the olive-root bed does for the *oikos* of Odysseus.\(^6\) Vernant highlights three aspects of Hestia: fixity and permanence, centrality, and seclusion.\(^7\) The bed famously embodies the first pair of characteristics: as Odysseus describes at great length and with bewildering specificity (*Od.* 23.190–91), he fashioned it from a living olive tree; he goes on to refer to it as ἔμπεδον (\(Od\). 23.203)\(^8\) and marvels at the extreme difficulty – if not

\(^4\) This exaggerates the matter, of course; for a detailed treatment of the Alexandrians (and the more recent, largely Germanophone, analytic tradition), see Heubeck, Russo, and Fernández-Galiano (1989) 342–45. The meaning of the phrase *empeeldon sêma* will be discussed at length; for *empeeldon*, see n. 8 below.

\(^5\) In addition to n. 4 above, see esp. discussions at Page (1955) 101–36; Kirk (1962) 244–52; Moulton (1974); Goldhill (1991) 18 n. 34 with bibliography; Foley (1999) 157–67.

\(^6\) See Katz (1991) 180, the only piece I have encountered that explicitly links the bed to Vernant (2006d). This could be developed much further; many of the comments made by e.g. Bergren (1993) 19 could apply equally to the olive-root bed or Hestia.

\(^7\) See e.g. Vernant (2006d) 161, and 163, 193, 174: to ‘represent at the heart of the house . . . values of fixity, permanence, seclusion’; ‘spatial values associated with a center, immobile and withdrawn’; ‘polarity between the static and the immobile, the open and the enclosed, the interior and the exterior’.

\(^8\) A strikingly well-chosen word, one that, instantiates – better, reifies – its (etymological) root. It is a compound composed of the spatial item ἐν (‘in’) and πέδον, which Chantraine translates literally as ‘ce sur quoi repose le pied, “sol”’ (*DELG* 867); Chantraine gives the primary meaning ‘solidement planté dans le sol’. To refer to a tree stump as ἔμπεδον is thus quite a different matter from so describing other physical objects with a concrete presence, like an army of men massed on the battlefield (*Il.* 5.527, 15.405, 15.622), or a man tied to a mast on a moving ship, as in Cassin (1987) and Cassin (2011). See below for further discussion.
impossibility – of uprooting it from the ground (Od. 23.184–86). In the course of his description, the bed’s central position emerges: it was the orienting point which, thick as a pillar (πάχετος δ’ ἦν ἡὕτε κίων, Od. 23.191), dictated the construction of the entire bedchamber (23.190–94). The bed is also uniquely secluded: Odysseus fashioned ‘an enclosure within an enclosure; the image drawn here is that of a concentric structure, of a sealed place, of a protected inside’. Penelope, the ever-vigilant guardian of the bed and bedchamber (Od. 23.226–29), has ensured that not a soul except for the loyal handmaid, the absent husband, and the faithful wife have ever entered the chamber or know of the bed. And like Vernant’s Hestia, which ‘centres’ and ‘organizes’ space and helps ‘constitute the framework within which . . . the experience of spatiality took place’, the position of Odysseus’ oikos is the central gravitational pole in the story space of the Odyssey; forever pulling back its wide-ranging master. Tiresias’ prophecy suggests that, even after Odysseus’ final journey inland to the people without oars, he is to return back ὀἴκαδε, where the ritual must be performed (Od. 11.132–33).

If the bed stands like a magnet at the heart of the story space, the space it organizes is not uniform and homogenous. Several generations of scholarship après Lévi-Strauss have helped us see the manner in which the various codes that form the symbolic economy of the Odyssey work in concert to map the terrain of human life, society, and the house in a way that makes the bed the

9 What could better exemplify Vernant’s description of the hearth: ‘Fixed in the ground, the circular hearth is the navel that ties the house to the earth . . .’ (Vernant (2006d) 158, emphasis mine)?
11 See Section 7.2.3 below.
12 Starobinski and Brown (1975) 350, emphasis original; see also Katz (1991) 181–82.
14 Vernant (2006d) 161.
17 Landmarks and other fruitful studies include Segal (1962); Vidal-Naquet (1996); Vernant (1990b) 62–64; Vernant (1991); Detienne (1994) 15–36; Most (1989); Hartog (1996); Dougherty (2001); Montiglio (2005).
18 Note that e.g. Goldhill (1991) 1–68 cites Bourdieu, rather than, say, Lévi-Strauss or Lévy-Bruhl; see also Hölkeskamp (2002).
19 Largely a subset of nn. 17, 18 above; if n. 17 contains studies that anthropologize, and n. 18 works that sociologize the Odyssey, the slippage here between an oiko-nomy and
apex crowning its contour gradient. Insofar as the plot of the *Odyssey* tracks a progression to – and therefore articulates a definition of – normal human relations, social order, and household organization, the bed therefore represents the climactic item, the terminal point of the sequence. As a craft item fusing nature and culture in its unique way (*Od*. 23.180–203, discussed below), apotheosis and emblem *par excellence* of the ‘wild outdoors present within’ which ‘the “cultural” ... holds captive in the very centre of its artifice’, the bed constitutes the ultimate taming of the wild by the civilized. Similarly, insofar as ‘the ties which link Penelope, through the conjugal bed, to royalty’ mean that, ‘in the vacuum left ... at the center of his kingdom by the disappearance of the king’, then ‘to be taken into Odysseus’ bed’ is to ‘step directly into the former master’s place both in the palace and the land’; the bed of the absent ruler’s wife thus represents the decisive site of sociopolitical power. Thirdly, the marriage bed, as true and proper location from which the legitimate bearer of name and line is produced, becomes the rooted place where the male seed is made to bear fruit, and establishes (in the etymological sense of the word) the family line of the house of Odysseus.

Third comes plot. The *Odyssey*’s mapping of plot to space has often been observed: from a spread that encompasses the no-place of Ogygia, ‘omphalos of the sea’ (*Od*. 1.50), and the halfway world of Scheria, the plot is ‘purposefully funneled in an eco-nomy is felicitous considering the fusion of nature and culture, tree and craft represented by the bed; see esp. Starobinski and Brown (1975).


22 Vernant (1990b) 76, 74, 75. See Dougherty (2001) 44 for a similar point about Nausicaa (likewise Vernant (1990b) 72). One thinks here of Oedipus and Jocasta.

23 Vernant (2006d) 171–72: ‘The landed property of the oikos, the patria, which through the rise and fall of succeeding generations maintains the bond between the family line and its native soil ... the royal scion born of the hearth and rooted at the center of its domain ... transforms [the sovereign domain] into a domestic enclosure, a place of security’; see also Nagler (1996) 158. See also Detienne’s remarks on the description of the bed as a λέκτροιο παλαιοῦ θεμιστός (*Od*. 23.296), Detienne (1998) 157; likewise Burkert (1983) 62 n. 16; Heubeck, Russo, and Fernández-Galiano (1989) ad loc.

24 Segal (1962).
a consistent spatial direction’, its ‘aperture’ closed, until all the lines – the destiny of the house of Odysseus, the Return of the Hero – converge on a single focal point: the κιων (Od. 23.191) that forms the omphalos of the oikos. This is because, as discussed, ‘house, household, property, mistress, kingship: the five objects of the suitors’ aspiration, five challenges to Odysseus’ hold on his identity, are all assimilated’ in the single space of the bed. The bed is thus the decisive, climactic site of plot resolution, the great node where the major threads of the poem – What will become of the house of Odysseus? Will the hero successfully return? – are to be tied up and thus where, paradoxically, dénouements occur.

7.2.2 Penelope’s peira

But before he can attain this ultimate destination, the symbolic epicentre, and climactic site of plot resolution, Odysseus must pass a test (Od. 23.114, 181). A peira is precisely what we would expect at this point of the ‘quest’ pattern; it is also precisely what we would expect in an Odyssean ‘recognition scene’ (although here the roles are reversed, and Odysseus the one tested). This particular peira is notable for two reasons, however: unlike the peira of the Cyclops, Eumaeus, or the stringing of the bow, this is a test of knowledge, not of respect for xenia, or loyalty, or brawn. What is more, following the shift in narrative structure, begun with the departure from Circe’s island, which brought about the ‘coalescence of a quest and a return pattern’ in such a way that ‘consecutive quests are interlocking’

25 Lowe (2000) 137; see also Fowler (1997b) for the language of closure of apertures.
26 Lowe (2000) 136, building on Goldhill (1991) 1–24 (see esp. 27). Surprisingly, Lowe identifies the megaron as the climactic site of plot resolution – a claim that is hard to justify given his analysis. ‘Mistress’ can certainly be lost in the megaron, but not won until the bed. Similarly, as we have seen, kingship and house run through the bed, too – and with them household and property. A more serious challenge to the bed’s status as the decisive locus of plot resolution comes in the form of Laertes; see discussion below.
rather than merely consecutive, ‘the return [nóstos] is part and ultimate object of the quest’;31 this means that just as the bed therefore becomes the ultimate destination of the hodos, the interview with Penelope becomes the ultimate peira (see Figure 7.1). The scene thus recapitulates in miniature the dynamics of the larger nostos-as-quest: a journey that culminates in a peira, which, when passed, grants access to the absolutely fixed, stable point at the secluded core of the oikos.

About the second point we have said much already: the bed, as a tree root, is literally empedon – etymology and image, sign and referent converge at the root, the archetypally fixed, hidden, unchanging sēma which is both what stands at the end of the journey and that to which one gains access by virtue of the peira. Although critics have excavated an exceptional range of meaning out of this test,32 the degree to which the rooted bed functions as the hub of a knowledge-based oikō-nomy – where knowledge input is converted or exchanged into knowledge output – has been little discussed.33

The test is a test of knowledge firstly insofar as a special kind of knowledge is the precondition to its operations; as Odysseus is careful to point out, the craftsmanship required to make such an empedon sēma requires one who works εὖ ... ἐπισταμένως

31 Bakker (2013) 19–20, 30, emphasis original.
32 Much of which focuses on the interrelationship between his identity and her fidelity in the neat summation of Zeitlin (1995); Pucci (1987) 82–93.
7.2 Epi-/Apologoi: ‘Here I End My pistos logos . . .’?

\[\text{Nostos-as-quest: \hspace{3em} Journey \hspace{3em} Test} \begin{array}{c}
\text{of knowledge/} \\
\text{produces knowledge}
\end{array} \hspace{2em} \text{Arrival at destination} \\
\text{(empedon sēma)}\]

Figure 7.2 Nostos-as-quest (à la Bakker): Final episode (interview with Penelope)

(Od. 23.197).\(^{34}\) In addition to this knowledge-how that acts as a condition of possibility for the test, what the peira tests for is knowledge-that (viz. knowledge that a certain object has a certain quality): ‘If he knows the bed, he is (her) Odysseus.’\(^{35}\) But, thirdly, even more than this: if he knows the bed, she knows that he is (her) Odysseus. With the introduction of his knowledge, the bed in turn generates, bears, produces knowledge for her – knowledge, what is more, of an especially certain, absolute, fixed kind (see Figure 7.2).

7.2.3 The Fixity of the Sign Signs Fixity (Fixedly)

It is well known that Odysseus first refers to the bed itself as a sēma (Od. 23.188) and then characterizes his knowledge of the bed’s manufacture as a sēma that he ‘makes manifest’ (Od. 23.202) to Penelope. In this second use, Odysseus echoes Penelope’s rebuke to Telemachus that she and Odysseus share ‘secret’ or ‘hidden’ (κεκρυμμένα) sēmata (Od. 23.110; used again by Penelope to confirm his passage of the peira at Od. 23.225: σήματ᾽ ἀφιφραδέα κατέλεξα). Likewise, we have seen that Odysseus refers to the bed’s physically ‘in-rooted’ quality with the word empedon (Od. 23.203). This semantic dance attains its climax immediately thereafter in the narrator’s virtually untranslatable description of Penelope’s acceptance that the beggar is Odysseus (Od. 23.206):

\[\text{σήματ᾽ ἀναγνούσῃ τά οἱ ἐμπέδα πέφραδ᾽ Ὄδυσσεύς . . .}
\]

[Since] she recognized the empeda sēmata which Odysseus declared/indicated . . .

\(^{34}\) Cf. also Od. 23.184–85: it would be ‘difficult even for someone very epistamenos’ (χαλεπὸν δὲ κεν εἶναι μάλ᾽ ἐπισταμένῳ) to move the bed; see here Starobinski and Brown (1975) 351; Dougherty (2001); Nagler (1996); Katz (1991); Austin (1975).

\(^{35}\) Bergren (1993) 19.
Through this dazzling jeu de mot, ‘the sēma that is empedon (i.e. the bed rooted in the earth) emerges as a sēma empedon (i.e. a valid sign).’

A valid sign of ‘Odysseus’ identity and Penelope’s fidelity’ that works as a sign precisely because it ‘entwine[s]’ these two components ‘like the infinite turnings of a Möbius strip’. The relationship between the sēma that is empedon that emerges as an empedon sēma obtains at an even deeper level, however, and the two are more tightly entwined than simply by a metonymy wrought in the text by the artful narrator. Once we acknowledge (as too few critics seem to have done) the degree to which the sēma really and truly is empedon (i.e. the sign is valid as a proof), we have what the Aristotelian typology would classify as a recognition ek syllogismou (Poet. 14.1455a4–13). (Were one so inclined, one could even formalize it into a logically valid deductive argument – a strange exercise, but one that is illustrative simply because it is possible.)

The conclusion of the knowledge provided by the peira and the empedon sēma (valid proof) is indeed empedon: fixed, certain, stable, ‘inconvertible’. And not because a god revealed it, or a prophet foretold it; the security of Penelope’s conclusion is fixed by nothing more nor less than the series of deductive inferences that the strict conditions of her peira make possible (see Figure 7.3).

Also useful, however, is what such an exercise reveals about the basic structure of the test. The peira hinges on the rigorous and absolute seclusion of the bed: only its secure enclosure allows the disclosure of its secret to bring true, lasting, stable ultimate closure. This in turn, however, requires that the bed be absolutely and permanently secluded, which in turn can only be guaranteed if the bed is impossible to remove from its place of secrecy. It is

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37 Zeitlin (1995) 14; each point is made separately: see e.g. Newton (1987), esp. 17–20 for fidelity; Pucci (1998) 82–93, where further bibliography can be found.
38 See now Zerba (2009) 315 for comments made in passing.
40 See esp. Lesher (1999) and Lesher (2008) for the importance of divinity for the achievement of certain knowledge in Homer (see also sections 2.1 and 2.3 above). See also Lesher (1981).
41 See e.g. Bergren (1993) 19; Austin (1975) 283. In a poem where so much of what is said is deceptive, the great sēma of anagnōrisis, the one that is truly empedon, is the one of which no one has spoken of at all, until the very final moment.
therefore the very quality of the bed – its fixity – that constitutes the secret in question which makes this secret possible in the first place, and that makes knowledge of its secret an *empedon sêma*. Had the great *sêma* of their marriage lay in a mark inscribed upon a free-standing bed – or a bow in a storeroom, or, say, a ring – something mobile that, in one form or another, could be exposed or put into free circulation, how could one police the secrecy of the secret, how ensure that the *sêma* had not been covertly smuggled out, where anyone might come to see it and know it? It is only because the very nature of the *sêma* (bed) – that it is *empedon* – intrinsically precludes its being put into open circulation that it can remain *empedon* as a *sêma* (proof), can properly *ground* the proof (*sêma*), and the certain knowledge it provides. Returning to the question of the *semantic* play between (that which is a) *sêma* and (that which is) *empedon*, it is not only that the words *empedon* and *sêma* are transferred metonymically from the bed to the proof (that results from the *peira* which grants access to the bed). Logically, the test is only as valid as the bed-tree is fixed; the *sêma* is *empedon* (a valid proof) *because* the *sêma* is *empedon* (the bed is fixed).  

Except, of course, there is no word for ‘deduction’ at this point (and as Lloyd reminds us, there will be none in Parmenides) – nor for ‘logic’, nor ‘inference’, nor ‘proof’ – nor is there any conceptual apparatus within which they would make sense. That of course, does not (and perhaps cannot) happen until after Parmenides establishes the practice the concept would name. In the absence of any technical vocabulary or conceptual apparatus, then, how does one figure the notion of certainty derived from rigorous in-ference? How imag(in)e it? In the articulation of what

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42 A point underexplored, despite the enormous scholarship on this scene; see the neglected Bergren (1993), also Zerba (2009) 315.

43 Lloyd (2000) 244–45; see also pp. 10–11, 31–32 above.
it means for a sēma (as proof) to be valid, what we see is a complex and powerful semantic trans-fer of meaning, one whose journey trans-scends (from) the physical to the conceptual, the sensible to the intelligible, the concrete to the abstract, the etymologically primary to the derivative.\(^{44}\) The first use of the word empédon at line 23.203 to describe the bed brings us (at just the moment it allows Odysseus himself) back to the (etymological) root (/ of the) ‘in-grounded’. The signified of the signifier sēma having thus been sufficiently established in this unique\(^{45}\) – and uniquely fixed – signified, it is then immediately put into circulation in the text. We have seen that this circulation operates metonymically: the proof is fixed and certain next to (in language of the text) and before (in the plot) the in-grounded tree root. We have also seen that this transfer of signifieds is grounded or authorized by the logical relationship between the empédon sēma (fixed object), which stands as a premise in the empédon sēma (fixed proof): the proof is fixed and certain because the in-grounded tree root is. What it means, though, for the conclusion produced by this inference – an abstract, conceptual, intelligible notion (one that, through its position in the plot happens to be an in-ference, in physical, concrete, sensible terms: a ‘bearing-into’ a fixed, terminal, stable [place of] conclusion) – can only be expressed in language and imagery anchored to, rooted in, grounded by the arresting concrete, physical, sensible image of the in-grounded root: the proof is (as) fixed and certain as or like the in-grounded tree root is. What it means for a conclusion to be absolutely certain, then, for a proof-by-inference to be absolutely secure and trustworthy requires this figuration: this semantic transfer draws its power from the strength of the (image of the) in-grounded root.

There is, finally, one last figuration derived from this root. The sēma that cannot be put into circulation (and thus works like a signature), that is untransferable, whose absolute se-clusion and fixity are the condition of possibility for the peira and the absolute fixity of the conclusion it produces, has not quite finished stabilizing, establishing, certifying. For the absolutely certain

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\(^{44}\) For important complications in making these distinctions in the Homeric milieu, however, see Stevens (2003).

\(^{45}\) Starobinski and Brown (1975).
conclusion is itself about the absolute stability and fixedness of identity, about the invariable reality beneath the shimmering, *poikilia* world of appearances (where a beggar can be a king and a stranger one’s husband). This underlying reality (as secluded and closely guarded as the impenetrable bedroom, one which can only be accessed by a test of knowledge, a certain proof) is as fixed, stable, certain, immobile, invariant as the proof that guarantees it and gives access to it, as fixed, stable, certain, immobile, invariant as/because the tree root is in-grounded. If he knows the (fixed, certain, unmoving) bed, she knows (certainly, fixedly, unerringly, unchangingly) he is her (fixed, unmovingly, unchangingly same) Odysseus. Bed, proof, underlying reality: all *empedon*, all (as) in-grounded (as/because the tree root is).

7.2.4 ‘And on This hodos There Are Many sēmata . . . That (*What-Is* Is/Are) Indivisible, Immobile, Perfectly Completed . . .’

Where does all this leave us vis-à-vis Parmenides? Briefly, four possibilities. First, what (of the Odyssean *sēma*) is em-bedded in Parmenides’ what-is? Or, to reverse the question, does his ‘what-is’ spring from this same (tree) root? The bed stands *empedon* (*Od.* 23.203); so, too, does *to eon*: being ἀκίνητον (*Fr.* 8.26), it χοῦτως ἐμπεδον αὕτη μένει (*Fr.* 8.30).\(^{46}\) The bed is *empedon*, as we

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\(^{46}\) This line repeats *Od.* 12.161 (and other words and images from Fr. 8.26–33 echo *Od.* 12.158–64): see esp. Mourelatos (2008b) 115–16, 116 n. 2 and Cassin (1987) and Cassin (2011) ‘and thus empedon there it remains’. A passage which provides even closer parallels – one that does not seem to have been noticed in this context – is the description of the trap Hephaestus sets in his own bed to ‘bind fast’ his unfaithful wife and her adulterous lover. (For the extensive parallels between Odysseus’ master craft product and Hephaestus’ anti-Penelopean bed, see Newton (1987).) For some examples of linguistic echoes and other similarities, cf. the following passages (*Od.* 8.274–78):

ἐν δ’ ἔθετ’ ἀκμοθέτῳ μέγαν ἄκμονα, κόπτε δὲ δεσμούς ἀφῆκτους ἀλύτους [cf. *Fr.* 8.26–27], δρρ’ ἐμπεδον αὕτη μένοιεν

[cf. *Fr.* 8.30]

σὺνὰρ ἔτει δὴ τεῦξε δόλων κεχωλόμενος "Ἀρεί, βῆ γ’ ἤμεν ἐς θάλαμον, δῆτ’ οἱ φίλα δέμνι’ ἐκεῖνο, ἀμφι δ’ ἀρ’ ἐμρίσιν ἂν ἔδεσμα κύκλῳ ἀπάντη [cf. *Fr.* 8.43–44].

Of further Parmenidean interest in this episode at *Od.* 8.296–98:

... ἀμφὶ δὲ δεσμοῖ [cf. *Fr.* 8.26, 31]
saw, because it is virtually impossible – even for a god (Od. 23.184–86) – to sever it, cut it, divide it (ὑποτέμενεν, as Odysseus puts it at Od. 23.204); so, too, is Parmenides’ being – οὐδὲ διαιρετόν as it is declared to be (Fr. 8.22). The bed is indivisible in turn because of the perfect way in which it has been formed, this great sign; as Odysseus notes, he cut the branches (Od. 23.195), trimmed the trunk from the root up and planed it smooth all around (ἀμφέξεσα, Od. 23.196) with a bronze adze well and cunningly, truing it to the line...

I bored it with the augur...

beginning with this, I made smooth the timbers of my bed, until I completed it (ὄφρ’ ἐτέλεσσα, Od. 23.199; 23.196–99 for the passage). But not before first encasing the tree in the cocoon of a protective, hidden seclusion, an outermost bound that establishes an inviolate inner space (Od. 23.192–93):

τῷ Δ’ ἐγὼ ἀμφιβαλῶν θάλαμον δέμον, ὑφ’ ἐτέλεσσα, πυκνήσων λιθάδεσσι, καὶ εὖ καθύπερθην ἔρεψα.

All around [the tree stump] I built my chamber, until I had finished it,

tεχνήνετες ἐχυντο πολύφρονος Ἡφαίστοιο, οὐδέ τι κινήσα [cf. Fr. 8.26] μελέων ἦν οὐδ’ ἀναείραι.

Od. 8.336–37:

ἣ ρὰ κεν ἐν δεσμοῖς ἐθέλοις κρατεροίς πιεσθεὶς εὐδεῖν ἐν λέκτροισι παρὰ χρυσῆ Ἀφροδίτῃ;

Od. 8.340:

desmoi μὲν τρις τόσσοι ἀπείρονοι ἀμφὶς ἔχοιεν.

Od. 8.352–53, and 8.353–56, where the exchange between Hephaestus and Poseidon connects the notion of compulsion, necessity, and loosing bonds:

πῶς ἂν ἐγὼ σε δέομι μετ’ ἀθανάτοις θεοῖσιν, εἰ κεν Ἄρης οἴχοντο χρέος καὶ δεσμὸν ἀλώξας;

"Ἡφαίστ’", εἰ περ γάρ κεν Ἄρης χρείος ὑπαλώξας οἰχήσατε πεύγων, αὐτὸς τοι ἐγὼ τάδε τίσω.

Hephaestus ultimately consents (Od. 23.359–61):

ὡς εἰπτῶν δεσμὸν ἄνιει μένος Ἡφαίστοιο.

tῷ Δ’ ἐπεὶ ἐκ δεσμοῦ λύθεν, κρατεροῦ περ ἑόντος, αὐτίκ’ ἀναίξαντε...
With close-set stones, and I covered it over well with a roof.

So, too, Parmenides’ being is τετελεσμένον (Fr. 8.42), τελεστόν (Fr. 8.4), and presses out on all sides, inviolate, like a sphere.\(^{47}\) Is this all just coincidence?

Second, in Parmenides’ hodos dizēsios there is the fusion, reconstitution, or recombination of the three dynamics discussed above: (i) a quest that, through a test, leads to liquidation of the lack; (ii) a recognition that, through a test, reveals a true, underlying identity beneath a potentially deceptive or uncertain world of appearances; and (iii) a nostos that leads to a final destination. As we have seen, the fractal logic of oral composition integrates this final episode into the nostos in such a way that the last quest simultaneously replicates the whole nostos even as it completes it, both a ‘nostos-as-quest’ and a ‘quest-for-nostos’ (as Tiresias puts it in his address to Odysseus [νόστον δίζημεν, Od. 11.100]; in Odysseus’ words: νόστον ... διςῆμενος Od. 23.253): in this case, that is, the liquidation of the lack is itself equivalent to arrival at the final destination. The endpoint in this nostos is distinctively fixed. This test is distinctive insofar as it is a test of knowledge and, vitally, a test that, via a series of deductive reasoning, produces knowledge of an unusually certain, definitive, and absolute kind. And, finally, as a test that leads to recognition, this certain, definitive knowledge is knowledge of the true, certain, stable underlying reality, the reality here of identity, that is obscured by the deceptive surface appearances of the outside world (a king who appears as a beggar, a husband who appears as a stranger). It is precisely this syntagm of nostos-as-quest-leading-to-a-fixed-stable-endpoint-through-a-deductive-test-which-reveals-the-fixed-underlying-reality that we find in Odyssey 23.

\(^{47}\) If we accept Karsten’s emendation (see here esp. Palmer (2009) 383).

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7.2 *Epi-/Apologoi*: ‘Here I End My pistos logos . . .’?

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**Figure 7.4** Parmenides’ ‘Route to Truth’ (frs. 2–8)
Odysseus’ ‘quest pattern’ first becomes a true nostos at the point where he departs Circe’s island, with her instructions – none other than the passage spanning *Odyssey* 12.39–141 – to return home.\(^{48}\) Between the instructions of the divinity and the fixed conclusion of the *empedon sēma* of the bed (which reveals the fixed reality underlying the world of appearances) lies the *hodos*; but one attains the *empedon sēma* at the other end only after a rigorously deductive test yields an *empedon sēma*. In this we see the précis of the basic architecture of Parmenides’ *hodos dizēsios* – and the third element of Parmenides’ ‘demonstration’ (iii). We noted above that scholars of Parmenides were divided about the meaning of *sēmata* at Fr. 8.2: some rendered it as ‘signposts’, others ‘proofs’. Mourelatos’s discussion about the meaning of *epi* is convincing,\(^ {49}\) but the dazzling linguistic *pas-de-deux* performed during the course of the bed-test in *Odyssey* 23 should allow us to see how both meanings can exert their force in a way which is not only not mutually exclusive, but is indeed profoundly mutually reinforcing.

### 7.3 An End That Is No End

Except, of course, this is not the end. Neither of the *Odyssey* – which goes on to tell of the suitors’ descent to Hades, Odysseus’ reunion with Laertes, and the aftermath of the *mnēstērophonia* – nor of Odysseus’ *hodos*, for, as Tiresias had told him and as he tells Penelope, ‘still after this there will be a measureless toil, long and difficult, which I must fulfil to the end’ (τὸν ἐμὲ χρὴ πάντα τελέσσαι, *Od*. 23.249–50). In fact, this isn’t even the final *sēma*: as Tiresias had told him, when his journey carries on so far that, once again, his observer’s categories fail to match the categories of the local actors, this itself will be a σῆμα ἀριφραδές (*Od*. 23.273) for him to perform the proper rituals to appease Poseidon.\(^ {50}\) (Even within the plot of the

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\(^{48}\) See Ch. 5 above.

\(^{49}\) See Ch. 6, n. 16 above. One thinks yet again of the Altar of the Twelve Gods, the herms, and the Thasian stele (Section 1.1).

\(^{50}\) On this *sēma* and the episode of the winnowing fan, see Lynn-George (1988); Peradotto (1990); Goldhill (1991); Nagy 1990a 202–22; Segal (1994); Henderson (1997); Purves (2010).
7.3 An End That Is No End

*Odyssey*’s twenty-four books, the bed is not even the final *empe-don sēma*, the last tree root: cf. *Od.* 24.346.51 And so, once the stories are told, the two halves of the *Odyssey* recounted by Odysseus to Penelope and vice versa, Athena hits ‘time-in’, Dawn is back over the Ocean ‘straightaway’ (*Od.* 23.347), and Odysseus is all business, scheming to recoup his losses, his depleted flocks, preserve his possessions (*Od.* 23.355–56). There are angry kinsman with debts to settle, questions of paternity and patrimony to square: the world’s complexities are too great to be so swiftly, so neatly resolved.52

Nor, of course, does Parmenides’ poem end with the ‘Route to Truth’. What else could one do after spelling out the perfect completion of the perfectly completed sphere that what-is is (like)?53 What else is there to say, except, perhaps (Fr. 8.50–51):

Ἐν τῷ σοι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἡδὲ νόημα ὀμφὶς ἀληθείης . . .

At this point I cease for you my *pistos logos* and meditation Concerning *alētheia* . . .

and move on to a deceptive *kosmos* of words (Fr. 8.52). The question of the relationship between the ‘Route to Truth’ and *Doxa* is perhaps the most notorious of all Parmenidean cruces (no mean feat).54 But it would seem, at any rate, that Parmenides’ world, too, is too complex to be fully captured, encompassed in the single spare route whose itinerary forms Fr. 8.3–49: ‘almost as soon as they were conceived . . . these truly portentous ideas of Parmenides suffered a kind of breakdown, leading to what I call

51 Henderson (1997) 89.
53 See on this point e.g. Austin (2002), Austin (2007), Austin (2013), and Austin (2014) for excellent discussion of the ways in which the fourth *sēma* represents the culmination of a certain manner of constructing arguments.
54 See Introduction, n. 86 for most up-to-date treatments.
a Parmenidean apology, and this this breakdown was portentous too’.  

7.4 Another K/Crisis, More Con(-)sequences?

And where does this leave us here, on this book’s *hodos dizēsios*, especially now that it is addressing the – and attempting to find a – conclusion (iii)? Claiming as it does to make a significant and original contribution to scholarship, it, too, is heir to Parmenides’ *hodos*; is it also heir to Odysseus’ *hodos*, to the *peira* of knowledge, to the *sēma* that is *empedon*?  

To put the question another way: What is the status of the parallel between the two *hodoi* that should end but does not seem able to? Or, to get to the heart of the matter: What is the nature of the relationship between the root of what-is and the root-bed?

These questions are provocative for the following reason: it is not clear that it allows for the kind of definitive answer a true journey along Parmenides’ *hodos* would seem to yield; certainly it is less conclusive, less absolute, than the fixity of the knowledge yielded by Penelope’s *peira*, the unchanging fixity of the identity, the layer of underlying reality revealed by the test, or the utterly fixed, stable, unchanging endpoint. This is pertinent for two reasons: in the first place, because there is no equivalent of Penelope’s *peira* that we could hope to supply in this setting; all we can do is note the linguistic resonances, the structural similarities in terms of language, structure, form, plot, dramatic scenario, *dramatis personae*. But there is no proof. This is no demonstration.

On the other hand, however, this failure to constitute a proper *peira*, the absence of a properly *empedon sēma* (fixed proof) yielding a proper *empedon sēma* (certain conclusion), shows us simply how close the patterns of *Odyssey 12* and *Odyssey 23* are to fragments 2, 6, 7, and 8 (see Figure 7.4 above). In both poems, travel down the proper *hodos* leads to (or indeed *is*) a rigorous proof that affords access to the fixed, certain end and insight into

55 Popper (1998a) 146–47.
56 See in this vein the evocative opening remarks at Bergren (1993) 7.
the true, invariant, permanent reality beneath appearances. Paradoxically, by failing to meet the rigorous threshold of the Parmenidean test in support of the claim that this evolves out of the Odyssean model, we manage more than anything else to deepen and draw into stark relief the breadth and specificity of the parallel.

There is a fork, then: to reject or to accept the parallels, and if to accept, to accept to a greater or lesser extent. A familiar pattern. But with a twist: to be unpersuaded by the parallel between *Odyssey* 12 and 23 and the ‘Route to Truth’ is, paradoxically, to confirm nothing else but the strength of the parallel. Our own *hodos dizēsios* must lead to a more *tetelesmenon telos*, our *sēmata* must be more *empeda* to claim the *atremēs* heart of truth. But we are hardly better off if the parallel persuades us – in that case, would we not have to accept the rest of the parallel, the one that runs from *apologoi* to epilogue and beyond to apology. Should we not accept, in other words, that there is more, that this end is not an end either? To answer ‘yes’ – to suggest that the reading adumbrated in the last two sections of this chapter, patchy, impressionistic, hardly rigorous as it is, adheres to an acceptable *hodos* – has an implication for the conclusion, the status of the *point* at which a good book ought to arrive (otherwise what was the point?): the conclusion is a true accomplishment, a *sēma* sufficiently *empedon*. But in that case, it also has an implication for ‘the conclusion’ (iii) as such: how could we ever end here? What *telos* could ever be *tetelesmenon*, what *sēma empedon* enough to meet the Parmenidean standards, standards that would be residues of an inheritance from Homer? Standards that neither Homer nor Parmenides could themselves adequately meet, it seems, from the very beginning? What, then, about Pindar? And what about Heraclitus, after all? Orphic texts and rituals? The Pythagoreans? Is it even possible to answer these questions: in practice, given how little we know about the interaction between Parmenides and the first two, how little remains of the second two, or in theory, given the impossibility of demonstrating – conclusively, incontrovertibly, inescapably, in a properly *empedon* way – the relationship between one poem and another, one image and another, one word and another?
At stake in all this is our conception of ‘method’: its past and (the) present *hodos dizēsios*, both *muthoi hodoio*: the tale of the transition from *hodos* to ‘method’, the tale we tell ourselves about the epistemology of travelling a *(met)hodos*. That, however, is a *muthos hodoio* not properly told until Sophocles and the *Oedipus Tyrannus*. 
APPENDIX FRAGMENT 5

So far I have only glancingly confronted the question of Fragment 5, which at first blush would seem to be in clear tension with the linear, sequential discursive architecture I have suggested that Parmenides’ use of hodos imagery helps give to his poem.¹ The fragment, which comes to us from Proclus, runs as follows:²

\[\ldots \varepsilon\upiota\nu\nu\omicron\nu\ delta\ \muoi\ \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota,\]
\[\omicron\pi\pi\omicron\omicron\theta\theta\varepsilon\nu\ \alpha\rho\xi\omega\mu\ai\ t\omicron\thetai\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \pi\alpha\lambda\iota\nu\ \iota\xi\omega\mu\ai\ \alpha\upsilon\theta\iota.\]

The translations and interpretations that scholars have provided differ on two key points: (i) how to render xunon, and (ii) whether to take hoppothen . . . tothi as correlative. In what follows, I shall survey different possible interpretations, assess their merits and demerits, and finally consider how well each interpretation squares with the account of Parmenides’ poem I have provided above.

Point (i) has yielded the following alternatives. One school renders the first two clauses as ‘it is indifferent to me | from where I begin’.³ The second, which has commanded the lion’s share of favour in recent decades, offers a more diverse array of interpretations; so we find ‘it is common for me | that where I begin . . .’,⁴ ‘it is a common point | from which I start . . .’,⁵

¹ See e.g. C. Osborne (1997) 33–35.
² See e.g. Tarán (1965) 51; Coxon (2009) 55.
³ E.g. Jameson (1958); Tarán (1965) 51; Barnes (1982) 177; Coxon (2009) 54; McKirahan (2010) 146; one finds minor variations of word order across these sources. Similarly, one finds ‘it is all one to me’ (Gallop (1984) 59; Thanassas (2007) 93; ‘it is all the same to me’ (O’Brien (1987) 23 [= ‘Où que je commence, cela m’est indifferent’], likewise Sedley (1999) 122); ‘gleichviel ist mir’s aber, wo ich beginne’ (Diels (1897) 33).
⁴ Cordero (2004) 123; he continues ‘. . . there I shall return again’; see also ‘Il est commun pour moi où je commence’ (Cordero (1984) 37).
⁵ Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (2007) 244; see also ‘it is a common point for me, from which I shall begin’ (Palmer (2009) 85 n. 104, 365).
Appendix Fragment 5

‘commonly present it is, | wherever I start from . . .’, 6 and ‘in common, for me, is the point from which I shall begin . . .’. 7

Regarding point (ii), the widely accepted view, at least before Bodnár’s important article on Fragment 5, was that these clauses were correlative (viz. ‘wherever I start from, to that place I shall return again’). As Bodnár points out, however, there is no need to interpret hoppothen and tothi as correlative; hoppothen and tothi, that is, can refer to two different things. 8

This yields a four-part grid of possibilities.

Appendix 1: Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlated</th>
<th>Uncorrelated (‘Focal Image’)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Indifferent’</td>
<td>1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Common’ (etc.)</td>
<td>2a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Refining the set of possible translations accordingly, we have:

1a: ‘It is indifferent to me | where I begin, for there I shall come back again . . .’;
1b: ‘It is indifferent to me | where I begin, for to [x] I shall come back again . . .’;
2a: ‘It is a common point | from which I begin, for there again and again I shall return . . .’;
2b: ‘It is a common point | from which I start, for to [x] I shall come back again . . .’.

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7 LM 36–37. See also Löw (1935) 9; Meijer (1969) 104; Hölscher (1969) 77, 118.
8 Bodnár (1985) 59.
9 Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (2007) 244. See also LM 36–37, and also, it would seem, Mourelatos (2008b) 193.
10 Bodnár (1985) 61 offers: ‘Commonly present it is, | wherever I start from, for there I will return again’; in light of his observation that hoppothen arxómai is to be a subordinate conditional clause rather than an indirect question, for the sake of clarity, if not elegance, we might offer: ‘Commonly present it is, | wheresoever I start from, for there I will return again.’
11 Bodnár (1985) 59, with helpful diagram.
Each rendition presents its own interpretative challenges. In the case of (1a), the two main questions are, first, why the starting point should be ‘indifferent’; if the starting point will determine the end point, it should presumably be of great importance. Second, there is also the question of just what kind of thing might qualify as a reference for hoppothen and tothi: an(y) object of inquiry? A key principle? One of the four sēmata in Fragment 8?

Proponents of (2a), meanwhile, must answer the question of just what the goddess’s starting point is, and in what sense this could be understood to be ‘common’. For their part, proponents of (2b) must not only answer these two questions – what is the starting point, and in what way is it ‘common’ – but must also fill in the ‘[x]’: to what, precisely, does tothi refer? Similarly, proponents of (1b) must also answer this last question – to what, precisely, does tothi refer – as well as the second question posed to proponents of (1a). What kind of thing might be an appropriate candidate for the reference of both (i) hoppothen and (ii) tothi, and (iii) in what way should it be ‘indifferent’ to the goddess where she begins? These concerns can be summarized in the following way:

To which, or to what kind of, ‘starting point’ does hoppothen refer? (1a, 1b, 2a, 2b)
In what sense does the goddess ‘come back again’ to that to which tothi refers? (1a, 1b, 2a, 2b)
Why, or in what sense, is the starting point ‘indifferent’? (1a, 1b)
Why, or in what sense, is the starting point ‘common’? (2a, 2b)
To which, or to what kind of, point of return does tothi refer? (1b, 2b)

As the list above suggests, one of the central challenges for any interpreter of Fragment 5 is to find a reference (or, in the case of 1b and 2b, references plural) for hoppothen and tothi. One of the primary ways to grapple with these questions is to consider where in the sequence of Parmenides’ ‘Route to Truth’ Fragment 5 might have been located,\(^\text{12}\) to the extent that this

\(^{12}\) The notion that this fragment might have been located in the Doxa has not been seriously entertained since Karsten (1835), and for good reason; see discussion in e.g. Jameson (1958) 16–17; Tarán (1965) 52.

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reference or references might be contained in an adjacent fragment, the question of location takes on a particular importance, especially for interpretations 1b, 2a, and 2b, where at least one relative pronoun needs a specific reference that is not merely ‘indifferent’. Two proposals are commonly found:

2: vicinity of Fragment 2 (viz. immediately before or after Fragment 2)\(^{13}\)
8: vicinity of Fragment 8\(^{14}\) (e.g. as Fragment 5)\(^{15}\)

Before deploying this framework to survey possible interpretations of Fragment 5, it will be useful to frame what follows with the remarks of two scholars who have written on this fragment. More than half a century ago, Tarán suggested that many discussions of Fragment 5 are occupied with ‘conjectural interpretations’ that go well ‘beyond the evidence’; responding to this some decades later, Bodnár insisted that whether or not this is true, nevertheless ‘we are able to contrast and rank different interpretations of this fragment’.\(^{16}\)

Both points remain valid. Fragment 5 is so cryptic and denuded of context that any interpretation of it must be deemed considerably more speculative than most other aspects of interpreting Parmenides’ fragments; it can therefore provide only feeble grounds for supporting or militating against a particular interpretation of Parmenides’ poem as a whole. On the other hand, certain interpretations are in and of themselves stronger than others according to such criteria as how well they address the questions listed two paragraphs above, how well their central claims are reflected or borne out in the existing fragments of Parmenides’ poem and the arguments they make, and what new

\(^{13}\) This position could be described already in 1985 as a ‘growing new orthodoxy’ (Bodnár (1985) 59 and 62 n. 17). It is placed there in the sequence of Parmenides’ fragments by e.g. Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (2007), Coxon (2009), and LM; see also e.g. Mourelatos (2008b) [1970] 193, Sedley (1999) 122, Cordero (2004) 122–24, Palmer (2009) 85 n. 104. The view is in fact much older; Diels originally placed this fragment directly before Fr. 2 (Diels (1897) 32), and Reinhardt persisted in calling this Fragment 3 (see Reinhardt (1916) 60).

\(^{14}\) The lone source for the fragment, Proclus, quotes it alongside portions of Fr. 8.25 and Fr. 8.44 (Procl. in Parm. 708.16–17).

\(^{15}\) I count Fragment 5 as close to Fragment 8 since scholars such as Curd both take the reference of the relevant indefinite pronouns to be parts of Fragment 8 (viz. the xēnata), even though they do not relocate Fragment 5 so that it sits adjacent to Fragment 8; see likewise remarks at Barnes (1982) 177.

\(^{16}\) Tarán (1965) 51; Bodnár (1985) 57, emphasis original.
light they shed on other fragments or long-standing cruces in the interpretation of Parmenides.

Finally, it is also true that the scantiness of the evidence at our disposal makes it difficult to rule out any interpretation of Fragment 5 conclusively. Rather, the exercise of trying to make sense of Fragment 5 also invites us to reflect on the many different kinds of hermeneutic circularity inherent in the act of making sense of the fragments of Parmenides’ poem that remain. How are we to understand any given individual fragment in relation to the larger sense of what it was Parmenides was trying to accomplish? If we introduce the question of Parmenides’ larger project – is he a neo-Ionian cosmologist? A metaphysician critical of earlier cosmological projects? A mystic? Something else entirely? – earlier or later into the process of reading Parmenides, how does this guide our subsequent interpretations of individual fragments like Fragment 5? When we encounter a word like xunon – or indeed, more generally – should we prioritize the semantic parallels and intertextual linkages with Homer or, say, Heraclitus? Do we give free reign to a ‘creative genius not much in debt to anyone’,\(^\text{17}\) or ought we to try to re-embed Parmenides’ concerns and arguments within their cultural, intellectual, or discursive contexts? How hard should we try? How much do our answers depend on our own (often unacknowledged) presuppositions and commitments concerning the development of ideas and the process by which conceptual and intellectual change occurs?

**Some Interpretations**

Many proponents of 1b, 2a, and 2b have found it desirable to locate Fragment 5 in the vicinity of Fragment 2. We may begin with one of Bodnár’s proposals, a form of 1b\(_2\) that can be rendered: ‘It is indifferent from where [viz. from which object of inquiry] I start, for there [viz. “the outcome of Fragment 2”, or “that it exists”] I will return again.’\(^\text{18}\) To the question of to what point of return tothi refers, the answer would be: ‘the procedure described in Fragment 2’.\(^\text{19}\)

The ‘starting point’, meanwhile, would be ‘objects of inquiry’, and


the meaning of ‘indifferent’ would be that no matter the specific object of inquiry with which one started, one would still apply the procedure described in Fragment 2 just the same – and would thus ultimately arrive in each case at the same conclusion (viz. ‘that the object of inquiry in question exists’). On this interpretation, Fragment 5 would introduce (if before Fragment 2), or emphasize (if after), the enormous importance of Fragment 2 in Parmenides’ subsequent arguments – a plausible, indeed valuable, function. What is more, Bodnár’s interpretation has the additional benefit of justifying the notorious absence of a subject in Fragment 2, which, following Barnes, he supposes to be the subauditur subject ‘the object of inquiry’. Since any object of inquiry would be just as suitable a starting point as any other (hence the ‘indifference’ of the goddess), Fragment 5 would suggest that there is no need to specify any subject in Fragment 2.

Versions of 2a, meanwhile, have their own respectable pedigree, notably in the discussions of Reinhardt, Hölscher, and Bicknell. The traditional objection to this view has been that it is incompatible with the meaning of the word xunon. This is only true, however, if one insists that xunon can only rightly be construed to mean ‘indifferent’. As Bodnár points out, however, this meaning is otherwise unattested beyond Heraclitus 103, and the interpretation of that fragment is itself much disputed. (In fact, one finds advocates of both ‘indifferent’ and ‘common’ who adduce the parallel in support of their reading of Parmenides.) By contrast, in Homer the word ‘common’ is clearly the primary

20 Bodnár (1985) 60.
23 For a slightly different version of 1b₂, see Sedley (1999) 122 n. 15, who allies himself with Bodnár’s reading; as he sees it, isοθι refers ‘not to the arbitrarily chosen starting point, but to what-is. [The goddess] would then mean that all arguments, wherever they may start from, will bring you back to being, because ultimately that is the only possible subject of rational discourse’.
24 See e.g. Reinhardt (1916) 60, and discussion in Bodnár (1985) 58; Hölscher (1969) 77, 118; Bicknell (1979) 9–11.
25 E.g. Gallop’s criticism of Bicknell (Gallop (1984) 37 n. 57), or Bodnár’s of Hölscher (Bodnár (1985) 58).
meaning;\textsuperscript{27} whichever rendering of \textit{xunon} one prefers, that is, it does not seem possible entirely to rule out ‘common’. Furthermore, one might feel that had Parmenides wanted to convey the notion of indifference, he had many other hexameter-friendly words with a venerable Homeric pedigree.\textsuperscript{28} In short, the primary argument against interpretation 2a has been largely defanged.

If nothing stands in the way of pursuing 2a\textsubscript{2}, what might it mean? A particularly attractive expression of this position has recently been advanced by John Palmer, who stakes out what we might call a ‘recursive’ version of 2a\textsubscript{2}. On this view, Fragment 5 underscores that Fragment 2 announces the foundational point or ‘fundamental principle’ (e.g. ‘that it is and cannot not be’)\textsuperscript{29} anchoring the goddess’s argumentation, a point or principle to which she will recur again in the course of the arguments of Fragment 8.\textsuperscript{30} Of course, as nearly all contemporary interpreters agree, at various points – most explicitly in Fr. 8.15–18 – Parmenides’ arguments do recur back to just this point or principle. Whether it introduced or immediately followed Fragment 2, Fragment 5 would thus underscore the paramount importance of Fragment 2 and serve ‘as a comment by the goddess on the recursive character of her argumentation’.\textsuperscript{31} The notion of recursiveness thus provides the meaning of \textit{xunon}, ‘common’, insofar as the principle of Fragment 2 is not only the point from which Parmenides’ goddess will begin (\textit{ἄξωματα}), but is also that to which she will recur time and again in the course of her subsequent argumentation (\textit{πόλιν ἣξωματα αὐτίς}).\textsuperscript{32}

If there is no ban on translating \textit{xunon} as ‘common’, reading 2b\textsubscript{2} is also fair game. This interpretation works in a similar way to 1a\textsubscript{2}. As Bodnár, who presents this view, observes, both \textit{xunon} and \textit{tothi}

\textsuperscript{27} See Bormann (1971) 180.

\textsuperscript{28} See Bodnár (1985) 61, 63 n. 26, where other arguments for ‘common’ can be found; likewise Cordero (2004) 123.

\textsuperscript{29} See Palmer (2009) 85 n. 104 for both quotations and lucid summary of the ‘recursive’ position’s merits.


\textsuperscript{31} Palmer (2009) 85 n. 104.

\textsuperscript{32} There is also what we might call a ‘dialectical’ reading of Fragment 5 that is best classified as a version of 2a\textsubscript{2}. Cordero (1984) 172–73 and (2004) 123, building on Meijer (1969) and Meijer (1997) 123–24, is the most prominent spokesman for this view.
would here refer to the outcome of Fragment 2;\(^{33}\) the idea is again that no matter the object of inquiry with which one starts, one will again be funnelled through the ‘procedure’ of Fragment 2 and forced to the conclusion ‘it [viz. the object of inquiry] exists’.

Reading 1\(\alpha\) remains to be addressed. Despite a rather chequered critical reception, there are still proponents of the view advanced by Kirk and Raven (what we might term 1\(\alpha\)\(_8\)),\(^{34}\) namely that ‘every attribute of reality can be deduced from every other’.\(^{35}\) A recent presentation of this view has been assayed by Patricia Curd; she asserts that ‘the goddess’s remarks in B5 should be taken, not as a description of the route [of inquiry presented in Fragment 8], but as an account of the various characteristics of what-is . . . Whatever aspect of what-is that we begin with, we will eventually reach the others.\(^{36}\)

This interpretation has the virtue of making excellent sense of the notion of indifference, and also of providing a clear answer to the question of what category of thing would qualify as a reference for *hoppothen* (viz. a *sēma* addressing the nature of what-is). On the other hand, just what might be meant by the clause introduced by *gar* becomes mysterious, since it is not clear in what sense the mutual deducibility of the *sēmata* could be captured by the phrase τόθι γάρ πάλιν ἔξομαι αὐθίς. More specifically, to what would *tothi* refer on this interpretation? Surely not to a *sēma*, or to something in the *sēma*-like category, for the idea is not that the goddess provides a proof of the same attribute more than once. It is hard to think of how one could answer the question in a way that would produce the sense: ‘whatever aspect of what-is that we begin with, we will eventually reach the others.’\(^{37}\)

\(^{33}\) Bodnár (1985) 63 n. 27.

\(^{34}\) See n. 15 above.

\(^{35}\) Kirk and Raven (1957) 268, see also 278; endorsed also by Guthrie (1965) 97 n. 1. Bodnár (1985) 59 called the view ‘fanciful’ (and see also excellent analysis in ibid., 62 n. 14), though others (e.g. Gallop (1984) 19) have been more enthusiastic.

\(^{36}\) Curd (1998b) 69. Strikingly, Curd continues in a footnote: ‘This is the case even if some of the attributes of what-is depend on others; for instance, it seems that the discussions of the characteristics “unshaking” and “complete” depend on proofs of ungenerability and cohesiveness. Were we to begin with the completeness of what-is, we would have to pause to consider whether anything else could come to be in order to complete it, or whether it is divisible and so could lack a part of itself.’

This interpretation faces another set of difficulties. Is the claim that no matter with which aspect of what-is we begin, we will eventually reach all the others borne out by the actual argumentation of Fragment 8 that Parmenides chose to make, especially in fragments 2 and 8? As Curd herself notes, Parmenides has expressly chosen to base his argument for *akinēton* (Fr. 8.26–28) on the results of his first *sēma*:

Αὐτὸς ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πεῖρασι δεσμῶν
ἐστὶν ἀναρχὸν ἀπαύστων, ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ὀλέθρος
τῆλε μᾶλ’. ἐπιλάχθησαν, ἀπόσει δὲ πίστις ἀληθῆς.

And also ἀκίνητον within the limits of great bonds
It is unbeginning, unending, since generation and destruction
Have wandered far off, and genuine conviction expelled them.

It is by no means clear that the concern can be waved aside by observing that ‘were we to begin with the completeness of what-is, we would have to pause to consider whether anything else could come to be in order to complete it, or whether it is divisible and so could lack a part of itself’.

Such an assertion misses the point, and the possible objection it would address is not one we might easily imagine arising. If, say, with either Owen or Austin, one sees the sequence of argumentation in Fragment 8 to be cumulative in that aspects of later points build on earlier ones (or even if one considers it, with Sedley, to be cumulative in some respects, since, for example, *sēma* 3 builds on *sēma* 1), then it stands to reason that ‘were we to begin’ with arguments for the third or fourth attributes of *to eon*, we should of course be able to unfold

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38 Curd (1998) 69 n. 16; see n. 36 above. Since Parmenides rarely deviates from the present tense aspect elsewhere in the poem (see especially Chapter 6 above), the use of the aorists ἐπιλάχθησαν and ἀπόσει is especially noteworthy and arresting. (Notably, we also saw the perfect in 8.15–18, another instance in which the strict sequencing of the argumentation was centrally important. Here we find a rare but striking *return* to narrativity, now at the ‘argument’ level of dependence: a key signal of the ordering power of *he hodos* and the importance of the sequence of the *sēmata*.)


40 Similarly revealing is the use of the phrase ‘each attribute follows directly or indirectly from the *krisis* or decision between is and is not’ (Curd (1998) 69, emphasis added). The caveat ‘indirectly’ is precisely the point: as the argument now stands, one may go *directly* from the *krisis* between is and is not to the argument for the attribute ‘ungenerable and imperishable’, but most go *indirectly* – that is, by way of *sēma* 1, ‘ungenerable and imperishable’ – from the *krisis* to get to the attribute ‘immobile and unshaking’.
from them arguments for earlier attributes. Rather, the real difficulty, obscured by the phrase ‘were we to begin’, comes from the other direction: for how, precisely, could one ‘begin’ by proving that to eon is akinēton had one not already delivered the proof for the attributes ‘imperishable and ungenerable’? The charitable verdict on this question is well summarized by Barnes: ‘I do not think that this interpretation of [Fragment 5] can be ruled out; and it is possible to invent arguments, similar to those of B8, which would support the thesis it ascribes to Parmenides. But as it stands B8 does not attempt to establish the mutual implication of all the “signposts”’.\(^{41}\) A more critical interpreter might ask what is to be gained by interpreting Fragment 5 in this way, especially when one is required to invent hypothetical (and in some cases potentially quite controversial) arguments that Parmenides gives no indication of having made.\(^{42}\)

Finally, one might observe further infelicities implied by this interpretation. It would seem quite unsatisfactory, for example, to think that what is currently the fourth and final sēma, teleston/ tetelesmenon, usually glossed as ‘completeness’ or ‘perfected-ness’, might come at some point other than the end of the argumentative sequence. Are we to imagine that, rather than forming the climax or culmination of Parmenides’ previous claims about the nature of what-is, the argument for completeness might come at an arbitrary point in the middle of the ‘Route to Truth’, or was to have been followed by some other attribute (such as, say, the indivisibility of what-is)?

Reviewing the four ways of construing Fragment 5 on their own merits, then, provides the following picture. The examples of interpretations 1b\(_2\) and 2b\(_2\) surveyed above make strong sense on their own terms, fit neatly with the existing fragments of Parmenides’ poem as they stand, and even have the added benefit of illuminating a notoriously vexing aspect of Fragment 2. Interpretation 2a\(_2\), freed from the unjust charge that it is incompatible with the semantics of xunon (and perhaps capitalizing on

\(^{41}\) Barnes (1982) 177.

\(^{42}\) Incidentally, it is not clear that Curd’s innovative and important notion of ‘predicational monism’ would be harmed at all by accepting interpretation 1b, 2a, or 2b of Fragment 5 – nor that it necessarily benefits from the version of 1a\(_8\) that she espouses.
Appendix Fragment 5

a better-attested sense of the word), likewise makes excellent sense of the Greek and provides clear and persuasive answers to the central questions that confront interpreters of Fragment 5; what is more, the ‘recursive’ reading in particular captures a vitally important phenomenon of the argumentation as we actually find it in Fragment 8. For its part, the Raven–Curd view of 1α makes excellent sense of the first half of Fragment 5, but struggles to make good sense of the Greek in the clause introduced by gar. In addition, it seems to introduce unnecessary, and potentially controversial, hypotheses about arguments Parmenides might have made but apparently did not. What is more, it is far from clear what new, valuable insights into the nature of Parmenides’ arguments it delivers. In sum, interpretations 1β₂, 2α₂, and 2β₂ offer coherent accounts of the Greek of Fragment 5 that are also strongly consistent with what we find in the rest of Parmenides’ poem; each also offers the added benefit of illuminating otherwise obscure portions of the ‘Route to Truth’. By contrast, interpretation 1α₈ relies on a controversial construal of the semantics of Fragment 5, is not well supported by the arguments as we now find them, and, finally, does not seem to illuminate other aspects of Parmenides’ poem (while raising more difficult questions in its own right).

Squaring the Circle with the hodos of Inquiry?

As the previous section made clear, despite the fact that Fragment 5 is so obscure and decontextualized, we can nevertheless attempt to evaluate relative strengths or weaknesses of different interpretations based on the information that we now have. I also suggested, however, that its ambiguity and deracination makes this fragment a weak basis for contesting or supporting a more holistic interpretation of Parmenides. Still, it is worth seeing how my account of the structure of Parmenides’ poem squares with the foregoing interpretations of Fragment 5.

43 See nn. 26, 27 above.
44 It is also worth reflecting on the fact that at no other point does Parmenides state, otherwise indicate, or even suggest that he might have made the arguments another way but declined to do so.
Despite the alarming first impression, interpretations 1b, 2a, and 2b are fully consistent – and, indeed, even elegantly consonant – with my analysis above. In readings 1b₂ and 2b₂, what matters is that wherever one begins one’s inquiry, one will inevitably be funnelled into the krisis expressed in Fragment 2 (tothi), and from there, inevitably and necessarily along the (logical or rhetorical) rut road of fragments 6, 7, and 8. The ‘recursive’ 2a₂ is perhaps even more intuitively attractive. On this interpretation, Fragment 5 would express the fundamental importance of the sequentiality of the argumentation in the ‘Route to Truth’: only by passing via the krisis in Fragment 2 could one proceed to the sēmata in Fragment 8⁴⁵ (or even: once one has passed via the krisis in Fragment 2 – and perhaps another krisis in fragments 6 and 7 – one must proceed along the path formed by the sēmata of Fragment 8).

By contrast, the Raven–Curd version of 1a₈ may seem at first glance to fit rather less neatly with the account I have provided above; the linear, sequential, goal-oriented aspects of the word hodos and the discursive architecture distinctive to it that I have outlined may seem difficult to reconcile with the apparently circular qualities often attributed to reading 1a.

In response to this, one can record two observations. The first is that, as noted above – and asserted by both Sedley⁴⁶ and Curd – in the poem that we now have, Parmenides chose to express his arguments with at least some sense of order, and it is by no means clear that his claims about the nature of to eon are ‘mutually implicative’. At the least, the onus seems to be on those who wish to assert such a position to prove its possibility, or at least provide a clearer picture of how this might work – and why this view is attractive in the first place.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ And, perhaps, a second krisis in fragments 6 and 7 in between. I intend to address this question in a future publication.
⁴⁶ It is worth recalling once more that Sedley associates himself with a version of 1b₂; see n. 23 above.
⁴⁷ Even those who find this interpretation ‘intriguing, if unprovable, speculation’ admit that ‘[t]his goes far beyond the available evidence . . . . No such pattern of circular reasoning has ever been traced’ (Gallop (1984) 19). Bodnár (1985) 62 n. 14 offers one version before dismissing it as implausible; McKirahan (2008), for his part, expressly states that the ‘notionally equivalent’ characteristics, of, ‘[f]or example, “whole” and “all together” are not synonyms, and do not as a rule entail one another’ (189).
Second, one might ask just how damaging this interpretation of Fragment 5 ultimately is to the argument I have advanced above. Even were one to accept Curd’s interpretation, for example, the implications for the argument I have presented in this book would be little different from those explored in Chapter 6 in relation to Sedley’s reading of Fragment 8. Even if Parmenides had ordered his arguments differently, and expressly asserted as much in Fragment 5, the fact remains that he needed some kind of discursive architecture in which to express his ideas. In this context, what I have asserted in this book amounts to this: Parmenides thinks, speaks, and, most importantly, argues through roads. What I termed in passing hodopoiēsis – creation or composition via the road, road-poetry, poetry about hodoi – emphasizes the degree to which the word and image of the hodos and the discursive architecture it triggers via Odyssey 12 organize the structure and progress of Parmenides’ discourse in a distinctive way, both at the level of rhetorical schemata and types of dependence. It is this distinctive way that I claim mediates the transition from Homeric narration to Parmenidean deductive argumentation (as we would call it); that would remain true whether or not the ‘underlying geography’ of the ‘story-world’ – be it the Sirens’ meadow, the Wandering Rocks, Scylla, Charybdis, and Thrinacia, or the krisis between ‘IS’ and ‘IS NOT’, the krisis between ‘IS’ and ‘IS and IS NOT’ (perhaps), and each of the four sēmata – were anchored in a fixed map. Put another way, we can observe that Homer might have elected to put Thrinacia first and the Sirens’ meadow last; in that case, he would have told a different poem, but would this have changed the need for his character Odysseus to travel from one point to another via a hodos, and the manner in which his goddess, Circe, narrates the points in a sequence, and then describes each item and advises Odysseus’ about how to navigate each one? Even in the event that Parmenides put the argument for ‘completeness’ in middle of his argument and, say, the argument for ungenerability and imperishability last, (1) he would still have had to order them in a sequence, and (2) this sequence would still necessarily come after Fragment 2 (and, potentially, 6 and 7).
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