and access to oil. Yasser Gadallah describes how Beijing funded a US$20 million administrative services centre in Cairo to help Chinese investors overcome Egypt’s Byzantine bureaucracy. Horesh discusses how Israeli defence sales – including perhaps the design for China’s J-10 fighter jets – paved the way for a Chinese state owned enterprise’s purchase of a majority stake in Israel’s largest dairy company, Tnuva. Neil Quilliam examines whether Beijing can develop its currently transactional regional relationships focused on oil into strategic partnerships.

Among the most valuable contributions in the volume are the chapters by (Washington Institute colleague) Michael Singh, and John Garver. Singh provides a useful overview of Chinese and US interests in the Middle East, and a thoughtful discussion of the challenges and opportunities of China’s foray into the region. Garver’s chapter on Iran is comprehensive, making a compelling argument that the Sino-Iran bilateral relationship is about “two ambitious emerging powers” that see one another as “potential and important partners in…a forthcoming era in which the US role in the world is much reduced” (p. 180). Of particular interest is Garver’s treatment of how China “split the difference” on Iranian nukes, satisfying both Washington and Tehran through the sanctions era en route to the nuclear agreement.

Today, even as China’s interest and influence in the Middle East is growing, the state remains a “free rider,” benefitting from the ongoing albeit diminished US security umbrella in the Gulf. For the time being, with limited ability to project power, this volume suggests that Beijing is likely to cooperate with Washington. Indeed, the book concludes optimistically – and without much substantiation – that “[f]aced with growing threat of radicalization, China has tacitly shown more willingness to help the US combat ISIS in the Middle East, thereby upping the ante for a new type [of] Sino-American partnership” (p. 224). To be sure, China is increasingly concerned with Islamic radicalism, but with the exception of the chapter on Uyghurs and a passing assertion that Beijing views Turkish Islam as a “bulwark against extremism” (p. 26) this book largely avoids the topic of China and ISIS/al Qaida. While the study would have benefitted from a more comprehensive discussion of Beijing’s views and responses to radical Islam in the region, the volume provides a solid overview of the key issues emerging from China’s expanding Middle East presence.

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China’s Second Continent: How a Million Migrants Are Building a New Empire in Africa
HOWARD W. FRENCH
xi + 285 pp. $16.95

Within the sea of literature on Chinese engagements across African countries, Howard French offers an informative reading revealing many aspects of the complex Sino-African relationship. Through personal stories, French shows the dimensions of the “migration decision” as well as the co-existence – with all its contrasts – of different cultures, in particular, work cultures. Many Chinese who decide to move to Africa leave China “because of the pressures of life back home” (p. 132), including marriage, finding a job, earning as much as to provide financial support for parents.
and grandparents, and buying a house and car. French’s book can help us not only learn about African transformations through Chinese eyes, but also about China’s transformations through the eyes of Chinese emigrants to Africa. It is a fascinating piece, written in a confident language, using dozens of real-life cases, based upon substantial travel and assignments in Africa and China as a journalist over 40 years.

In ten chapters, numerous Chinese migrant stories are provided for consideration in larger national and regional contexts. First, Mozambique, then Zambia, Senegal, Liberia, Guinea Conakry, Sierra Leone, Mali, Ghana, Tanzania and finally Namibia, and their Chinese migrant populations, are analysed. The first Chinese character, a farmer in south-central Mozambique, explains how long-term planning is part of any of these recent Chinese migration decisions: “Within the next ten or so years we need to raise enough money, and then if my son has a lot of offspring […] the children will be Mozambicans. […] It will be my clan” (p. 21).

It is, however, not that simple to think about intermarriages. Skin colour, for instance, does matter. “The women here are too black. Actually they are different colours, different shades of black, but to us they are all dark” (p. 36), continues the Mozambican Chinese entrepreneur. Other aspects are also presented about how negative Chinese people are about Africans, for example, when giving their opinion about the future of African development: “these people are impossible to teach […] They just don’t learn” (p. 74). And at the same time, many Chinese migrants think that it is much easier to make money in Africa than in China.

Howard French’s account shows African realism and Chinese pragmatism together. He intends to go against the often-depicted over-reduced view of the “China in Africa” dynamics. His chapter on Zambia states what China’s migrants consider when making their decisions to travel to Africa: “This is a good time to be in Africa” because of the “fabulous new markets […] a lot of new mouths to be fed, lots more people to be clothed, devices and appliances and goods of all kinds to be sold” (p. 44). This is a period of abundant opportunities, especially for many Chinese of the “lost generation” of the Cultural Revolution.

With a firm knowledge of Chinese culture and the Mandarin language, French has the capacity to reveal deep understanding of Chinese way of thinking about Africa and the Africans. This obviously cannot be a homogenous picture, mainly as a result of generational differences. The “generational contrast was strong evidence of the progress China was making in its global push,” (p. 119) underlines French. It seems to be rather similar, however, to how Chinese in general, regardless of the age group, try to keep close contact with their cultural heritage, staying connected to Mainland China on a daily basis. In the Mali chapter, the chief engineer of a Chinese textile factory explains that all Chinese spend the weekends playing cards with other Chinese, “or surfing the Internet” and watching “Chinese satellite channels” on TV (p. 179). These African examples also seem to confirm a commonly-held view of the Chinese diaspora being relatively isolated, with little intention to integrate with majority societies.

China’s Second Continent explores some major consequences of China’s intensified engagement with African countries on the policy level, including issues that have still not been extensively discussed in mainstream literature. Among these, the migration of Africans to China has to be mentioned. Attention should be paid to this parallel process, which derives from China’s Africa policy and the changing global scene, and which gives opportunities for Africans to start businesses, launch ventures in the sector of commerce and trade, or study at Chinese universities. When talking about the potential of building a “new empire” for China, French is right in saying that: “The processes of empire are almost always bi-directional, and in this sense
the recently formed Guangzhou community [with more than 100,000 Africans] is classic” (p. 84).

French also touches the spot with arguments why China has taken the lead in front of other actors in the African continent, even the US, stressing that “American diplomats had been slow to understand the scope of the change being driven by Chinese migration to Africa” (p. 75). The image of China’s “unconditional” non-interference stance has to be rethought, too. Quoting former Zambian finance minister, Fred Mutesa, French points out that with its packages of infrastructure development, “stadium diplomacy,” government scholarships and “many friendly gestures,” China expects that African governments – in this case the government of Zambia – do not “enforce such strict immigration controls” on Chinese citizens (ibid). Although using a different style from the Western paternalistic tone, China also sets certain conditions in its relationships.

Yet another issue seems to be occurring more frequently in the last couple of years than in the more distant past. This is the quality of infrastructure projects, such as the building of roads. French’s chapter on Ghana refers to a senior policy officer of the Association of Ghana Industries, who explains that the Chinese win all the projects, but that the final “quality is very low.” He gives the example of the Kumasi road, built by the China Railway Corporation: a “good example of a widespread problem” (p. 201). Today, it is not only about the scale of the bid, which is set very low and therefore means constant pressure for the company, but also the time frame. Several recent cases reveal that some Chinese companies cannot comply with the time requirements set by African governments, and as a result of this, can lose tenders or projects they had started after a successful bid.

At the end of his narration, French closes his book with a neat Epilogue, in which he questions whether or not we can identify Chinese behaviour that is truly distinct from other global actors towards Africa. As for the diaspora now growing within the African continent, we may agree with French that “the Chinese have arguably developed the concept of diaspora more fully than any other people” (p. 263), which then can naturally contribute to building a stable, influential and lasting presence in Africa – if not a “new empire.”

Howard French has written an intriguing volume full of authentic observations and discussions about one of the most important aspects of China–Africa relations. It is a substantial source for anybody in the field, from both the African and the Chinese angles.

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Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World
JEREMY FRIEDMAN
x + 291 pp. $32.95

Everyone who studies either Russia or China, or both, is familiar with the split that cleaved these two communist giants apart. It was not a clean break, nor did it happen overnight. The seeds of the split were contained in the main conclusions from the USSR’s 20th Party Congress, which, in hindsight, was riven with unintended