P.HERC. 1384: A BOOK OF CHRYSIPPUS’ ON WAYS OF LIFE?

P.Herc. 1384 preserves an ethical work focusing on the wise man's lifestyle. This work, which had formerly been attributed to the Epicurean Philodemus, has recently been proven to be Stoic instead, and has been assigned to either an early or a second-century BC Cynicising Stoic philosopher. This article, while confirming the Stoic authorship of P.Herc. 1384, shows that it can only belong to Chrysippus or one of his immediate successors and brings forward new evidence in favour of Chrysippus himself. In particular, several arguments allow us to advance an identification with book 1 of his lost Peri biōn.

papyrus, confirmed the Stoic inspiration of the work contained in it, which she identified as an ethical-political treatisewhose fil rouge would be the education of morally promising youths by the wise manby either an early Stoic thinker such as Chrysippus or a second-century BC Cynicising Stoic philosopher, or otherwise someone standing halfway between the two. 13 However, in this last contribution, Antoni's former confidence in assigning P. Herc. 1384 to Chrysippus himself appears mitigated and, surprisingly, Dorival's hypothesis of its identification as a specific work by this philosopher is not taken up or even mentioned. We shall see below why. Now, the arguments which, according to Antoni, would lead us to exclude an Epicurean and a Philodemean authorship for P.Herc. 1384 can be summarised as follows: (a) in the book there is no trace of the structure typical of an anti-commentary, namely a summary and rebuttal of one's opponents' views, of the sort characteristic of Philodemus' and other Epicureans' doctrinal treatises; 14 (b) there is no polemical approach or reference to opponents or opposing doctrines. As is widely known, the Epicureans were considered inveterate polemicists and philosophical polemic was seen as typical of their school. 15 In particular, the systematic refutation of the views of one's opponents as a dialectical means to build one's own philosophical position had been a well-known tool of the Epicurean argumentative method ever since Epicurus' On Nature; 16 (c) the only exception to point (b) is represented by the polemical allusion to 'those who [regard] pleasure as the end ' (col. 32.8-9). If these philosophers are to be identified as Epicureans, as seems likely, then the author of the book cannot be an Epicurean philosopher himself; 17 (d) there is no reference at all to any Epicurean authorities or doctrines, whereas in Philodemus the opposite is normally the case; 18 (e) the philosophical vocabulary is not specifically Epicurean or Philodemean, with the exception of certain words and expressions belonging to the Hellenistic philosophical lingua franca; 19 (f) the extensive use and range of the poetic authors quoted appear to be distant from the Epicurean and Philodemean usage; 20 (g) from a stylistic point of view, the author would not appear to be concerned with avoiding hiatus, in contrast to Philodemus, who notoriously makes a systematic effort to avoid it. 21 Conversely, among those features which, according to Antoni, hint at a Stoic and Chrysippean authorship for P.Herc. 1384, we may cite the following: (i) the technical philosophical vocabulary, which appears to be Stoic and, more specifically, Chrysippean. Among the relevant lexemes, Antoni mentions ὁ νουν ἔχων (col. 24.3), one of the Stoic designations of the wise man, περιστάσεις or 'circumstances' (col. 1.5-6), 22 ἐπιστροwή or 'attention' (col. 3.5-6), 23 ἀναστροwή or 'conduct ' (col. 4.2), 24 προκόπτοντες or 'those making moral progress' (col. 24.6-7), 25 καθήκουσα or 'appropriate' (col. 25.5), 26 κοινὸς λόγος or 'common reason' (col. 27.9), 27 ἀκολουθητικοί or 'capable of following ' (col. 42.4-5), 28 ὀρθὸς νόμος or 'right law' (col. 42.4-5for Antoni a possible combination of κοινὸς νόμος 'universal law' and ὀρθὸς λόγος 'right reason'), 29 πρόνοια or 'providence ' (col. 42.6) 30 and ἀwιλοτίμως or 'without ambition ' (col. 46.2). 31 (ii) the extensive use and specific choice of the literary authors quoted (from Hesiod to Euripides via Solon and Ibycus), which fit in particularly well with Chrysippus' literary usage. According to our sources, this philosopher's works, differently from Epicurus', were full of poetic quotations, particularly from Euripides, an author who played a distinctive role in the works of early Stoic thinkers, and especially of Chrysippus himself; 32 quotations, are no exception to this rule because they represent paraphrases and/or quotations from authors of a completely different philosophical inspiration (Cynic and Stoic in the former case, probably Stoic in the latter). See Ranocchia (2007b) and Ranocchia (2007a). 21 See Antoni (2012b) 21-3. On Philodemus' systematic avoidance of hiatus see Strathmann (1892) and McOsker (2017). 22 See, on the Stoic doctrine of circumstances, Ioppolo (1980) 188-207. 23 See Plut. Stoic. repugn. 1039b and chs. 22 and 28;Sext. Emp. Math. 11.194; Script. Stoic. Anon. (P.Herc. 1020) col.  According to von Arnim (1890) 492, ἐπιστροwή understood in this sense was 'ein Lieblingswort des Chrysippos'. The presence of ἐπιστρ[ε|wομέ]νων immediately before (lines 4-5) produces a figura etymologica, which reinforces the concept. 24 See e.g. fr. 3.414 SVF. 25 On Stoic moral progress see e.g. frr. 3.217, 220, 226, 510, 530, 532, 534-6, 539, 543 SVF, and Ioppolo (1980) 137-41; Inwood and Donini (1999); Roskam (2005). 26 On the Stoic concept of καθηκον or 'appropriate action' see e.g. frr. 1.  Panaet. frr. 92-103 Alesse; Cic. Off. 3.51-5.91; Diog. Laert. 7.124 and 129;and Sedley (1999).  (1999). 31 In fact, neither ἀwιλοτίμως nor the corresponding adjective ἀwιλότιμος or otherwise the noun ἀwιλοτιμία is attested in Stoic authors. See Antoni and Dorival (2007) 106 and Antoni (2012b) 21-3. 32 See ; Antoni and Dorival (2007) 106;Antoni (2010)  (iv) the reference to mythical exempla such as Odysseus and Philoctetestwo Stoic 'heroes' -(cols. 31-2) and, above all, the moral idealisation of Heracles, the patron saint of the Cynics, who also played a central role in early Stoicism (col. 30); 34 (v) the exaltation of πόνος (cols. 6.3, 32.3, 34.2) 35 and the praise of ἔρως as an element of social cohesion (col. A), which are typical of Stoicism; 36 (vi) some stylistic features such as the frequent use of the syntagm τὰ παραπλήσια governing a demonstrative pronoun in the dative (cols. (ix) the occurrence of a Chrysippean chreia concerning the refusal to engage in politics, also reported by Stobaeus (Flor. 4.4.29 Hense = Chrysippus fr. 3.694 SVF) and mentioned above (col. 38.1-5); 40 (x) the presence in the Herculanean collection of a small nucleus of Stoic and specifically Chrysippean papyri such as P. Herc. 1020Herc. , 307, 1421Herc. , 1038Herc. and 1380 From the above arguments Antoni draws a first, provisional, conclusion (1): 'Since there are undoubtedly Stoic elements in P.Herc. 1384 which are proper to Chrysippus, it now seems much more plausible that the author of the roll was an adherent of the Stoa, who was contemporary with, or later than, Chrysippus.' 42 To that effect, she resumes as a main poets by Chrysippus to support his own views, frr. 2.890, 904-8, 911 SVF and Puglia (1993) Antoni (2012b) 23-4 andPuglia (1993). In particular, the topic of the self-sacrifice for the fatherland detectable in some fragments of this papyrus recalls, for Antoni, the wise man's strenuous engagement in politics for the state's sake, inferable from cols. 31-3 of P.Herc. 1384. Among the stylistic similarities between these two papyri, Antoni underlines the common presence of a great number of citations from poetic authors. 40 See Antoni and Dorival (2007) 107-8 andAntoni (2012b) 24-5. 41 See Antoni andDorival (2007) 109 and Antoni (2012b) 24-5. argument point (ix) above, viz. the presence in the papyrus of a Chrysippean chreia (col. 38). However, given the rejection later in the text of physics and dialectics as useless (col. 44)an assertion which is patently incompatible with Chrysippus' teaching 43 -Antoni immediately reconsiders her initial conclusion by suggesting (2) that 'a similar refusal would fit better with second-century BC Stoicism, which recovered the Cynic heritage and maybe also the criticism of "encyclopaedic" culture and those disciplines not directly related to the moral good'. 44 For Antoni, second-century BC Stoic thinkers rediscovered Cynic moral teaching (and, in particular, the praise of πόνος it entailed), taking it as the most authentic foundation of Stoic ethics. 45 Finally, in order to fit (1) with (2), she advances the hybrid conclusion (3) that 'the author of the treatise preserved by P.Herc. 1384 might be a Stoic author . . ., who by retrieving Chrysippean elements, incorporated therein elements of Socratic and Cynic inspiration'. 46 Antoni's argumentation, as summarised above, is intriguing and challenging. To be sure, some arguments (points a-b, d-f and iv-vi above) are not as compelling as others. Besides, other points could have been argued better. 47 Finally, further evidence can possibly be added to points (i) and (vi). 48 Instead, what is almost completely missing in Antoni's account (except for the exaltation of πόνος and the praise of ἔρως as an element of social cohesiontwo typically Stoic commonplaces highlighted at point v) is a philosophical comparison between P.Herc. 1384 and the Stoic sources concerning the wise man's behaviour and lifestyle. 49 But, in principle, points (c) (the critical allusion to 'those who [regard] pleasure as the end'col. 32.8-9and who must be identified as 43    24. 47 At point (ii), for instance, it would have been useful to stress that early Stoics' and Chrysippus' well-known systematic exploitation of literary quotations from earlier poetscherished as a treasure trove of ancient wisdom and often interpreted in an allegorical wayshould be regarded not just as a literary or stylistic phenomenon, but as a coherent argumentative method used to support one's own philosophical views, which was typical of early Stoicism. See e.g. Puglia (1993)  hedonistic philosophers) 50 , (i) (the philosophical vocabulary) and (iii) (the laudatory quotation from Zeno of Citium, which closes the bookcol. 50) alone are enough to exclude an Epicurean authorship for P. Herc. 1384. Yet even points (i) and (iii) on their own are sufficient to prove a Stoic authorship. As far as the former is concerned, maybe none of the philosophically significant lexemes detectable in the papyrus, taken alone, can stricto sensu be regarded as exclusively Stoic, even though several of them were mostly used by Stoic authors with a technical meaning, while others (for instance, ἀκολουθητικός + dative and ἀξίωμα) were only employed among philosophers by Aristotle and the Stoics. However, their mutual combination in an intrinsically coherent lexical system identifies a well-defined language which can only be Stoic. So, there can be no doubt about the Stoic authorship of P.Herc. 1384. As for Antoni's conclusions, these are questionable for a number of reasons. First, the presence in the papyrus of a chreia explicitly attributed to Chrysippus by Stobaeus (col. 38.1-5) 51 is not sufficient per se to argue that P.Herc. 1384 was authored precisely by this Stoic philosopher. The surviving text of the column does not allow us to say with certainty whether the chreia is here advanced in the first person by the author himself, or whether it is a quotation from Chrysippus. In the latter case, the author obviously cannot be Chrysippus himself. Conversely, the rejection in the papyrus of physics and dialectics as useless (col. 44.1-14) 52a claim rightly regarded by Antoni as contrasting with Chrysippus' philosophy 53is not advanced by the author in his own voice, as Antoni seems to believe, but is ascribed by him to another person. The presence of ἔγρα̣ ẉ ε̣ 'he wrote' immediately before (in line 3) and of the optative οὐδ' ἂν γέν[οι]το χρή|σιμα (lines 6-7), whose grammatical subject is δι[α]λε|κτικὰ . . . κα[ὶ] wυσικά (lines 4-5), clearly reveals that the author is here reporting, instead of his own position, that of another philosopher. So, this cannot be taken as a proof against Chrysippus' authorship of P.Herc. 1384, which remains perfectly possible. 50 The author contends polemically that politicians can endure difficult tasks (πόνους) better than hedonist philosophers. This sounds like a biased philosophical argument against the well-known Epicurean refusal to engage in politics. This is grounded, for the author, in the hedonistic principle, which makes Epicureans unable to undertake any difficult tasks. This is also the reason why other kinds of hedonistic philosophers ( The above shows that Antoni's conclusions (2) and (3) are not logically compelling. As far as (2) is concerned, even assuming that the rejection of dialectic and physics was advanced by the author himself, this would not necessarily make him an exponent of second-century BC Cynicising Stoicism, as Antoni suggests. It is well known that, within the Stoa, such a rejection was advocated for the first time as early as the morally rigorist philosopher Aristo of Chios (died post-230 BC), a pupil of Zeno, who excluded physics and logic (whereof dialectic was considered a part) 54 from philosophy and confined the latter to ethics. 55 Besides, second-century BC Stoicism was obviously not restricted to this Cynicising and morally rigorist position, as Antoni surprisingly assumes. This was indeed the position of Zenodotus and Apollodorus of Seleucia, two disciples of Diogenes of Babylon, who in the latter half of the same century fostered a return to 'the most manly Stoic philosophy' or a 'shortcut to virtue', which they identified with Cynicism and Zeno's earlier philosophical reflection and traced back to Antisthenes through the socalled Cynic-Stoic succession. 56 But this was just one of the two main and mutually conflicting positions attested within the school in this period, 57 and certainly not the most authoritative one. As is well known, one of the most prominent exponents of socalled 'Middle Stoicism', 58 Panaetius, who revised Stoic teaching in several respects 59 and was considered open to Platonic and Aristotelian influences, 60 was, on the contrary, hostile to Cynicising Stoicism and, in particular, Cynic ἀναίδεια. While promoting a morally moderate and universally accessible kind of Stoicism, 61 he did his best to 54 (2000) 55-61. 58 The controversial expression 'Middle Stoa' or 'Middle Stoicism'to be distinguished from early and Imperial Stoicismis used to designate a phase in the school's history inaugurated by Panaetius and marked by receptiveness towards Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines. The expression was introduced by Schmekel (1892), who was followed by Zeller andNestle (1928) 303-4 andTatakis (1931). But against this historiographical paradigm, see the strong reservations formerly expressed by Pohlenz (1959) 387-8 and, nowadays, by Frede (1999 and Tieleman (2003)  distance himself philosophically from this rigorist tendency and, historically speaking, from the original κυνισμός of the school. 62 For the same reasons another prominent 'Middle-Stoic' philosopher, Posidonius, seems to have dismissed Zeno himself as unworthy. 63 Likewise, even if Antoni's conclusion (3) were true, it would make no sense from a historico-philosophical point of view. Historically speaking, early Stoics after Chrysippus could never have adopted such a syncretistic position. Philosophers such as Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes of Babylon and Antipater, while developing Stoic teaching in several ways, 64 essentially followed in Chrysippus' footsteps. 65 At the same time, they were anything but Cynicising or morally rigorist Stoics. 66 Conversely, those Stoics, such as Zenodotus and Apollodorus, who after Antipater tried to recover Cynic and early Zenonian moral rigorism could only do so in contrast to Chrysippus, the one philosopher, within early Stoicism, who by confuting Aristo's morally rigorist position tried to eliminate this original Zenonian standpoint from within the school. 67 Finally, 'Middle Stoics', such as Panaetius and Posidonius but also Mnesarchus and Boethus, who developed or, in some respects, even rethought Chrysippean Stoicism 68 were, for this very reason, neither stricto sensu Chrysippean nor by any means Cynicising or morally rigorist 62 See e.g. Cic. Off. 1. 128;Ioppolo (1980) 54; Alesse (2000) (1982) 93. 64 The most striking case in this sense is that represented by Diogenes of Babylon, who is credited by ancient sources with having performed an extensive revision of Stoic doctrine in several fields, such as linguistics, moral psychology, ethics, political philosophy, rhetoric and musical theory, and with having acknowledged Plato and Aristotle as important philosophical authorities. See Schäfer (1936); Barth and Goedeckemeyer (1941) 107ff.; Obbink and Vander Waerdt (1991) (2) and (3) are unfounded, then only conclusion (1) remains valid: 'Since there are undoubtedly Stoic elements in P.Herc. 1384 which are proper to Chrysippus, . . . the author of the roll was an adherent of the Stoa, who was contemporary with, or later than, Chrysippus.' Here too some observations are called for. If, as Antoni suggests, P.Herc. 1384 contains Chrysippean elements and if its author is a contemporary of Chrysippus (281/277-208/204 BC), 70 then the most reasonable solution is to conclude that he is Chrysippus himself. That this author is a Chrysippean Stoic philosopher contemporary with Chrysippus but different from him is only theoretically possible, but it is historically fairly unlikely. 71 If, instead, he is to be identified as a Chrysippean philosopher later than Chrysippus, he could be one of the prominent early Stoics who followed him and remainedthough with some differences 72essentially faithful to his thought, that is Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes of Babylon or Antipater. After all, as we have seen, 'Middle Stoics' such as Panaetius and Posidonius, on the one hand, and Cynicising Stoics such as Zenodotus and Apollodorus, on the other, were not strictly Chrysippean and can even be thought of as anti-Chrysippean Stoic thinkers. But even in the case of the 'faithful' Chrysippeans certain restrictions are probably to be applied. 73 Be that as it may, it is difficult to imagine that the author of P.Herc. 1384 is a Stoic philosopher prior 69 On Panaetius see above; on the similar case of Posidonius, Mnesarchus and Boethus, suffice it to say that Cynicising Stoicism represented for themjust as for Panaetiusthe diametrically opposite side of the philosophical spectrum (with Chrysippus in between) and, from a historical point of view, the very target of the debate which had emerged within the school in the second half of second century BC. See above and Alesse (2000)  to Chrysippus, becauseas far as we knowsome terms found in this text are not attested before Chrysippus, or were probably introduced into Stoic philosophy by him. 74 In summary, the range of possibilities is quite narrow. We must be dealing here with either Chrysippus himself or one of his immediate successors: Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes of Babylon orless likely -Antipater. 75 Now, two of Antoni's arguments (points vii and x above), if improved, can help us narrow the focus down on the possibility of a specifically Chrysippean authorship for P.Herc. 1384. As far as point (x) is concerned, we know that, beside this papyrus, another six Stoic papyri have survived in the Herculanean library, a collection which is otherwise mostly devoted to Epicurean authors and topics. 76 Four of them, which still bear the corresponding end-title (subscriptio) with the name of the author (Chrysippus), preserve works precisely by this Stoic philosopher. They are P.Herc. 1421 and 1038, which contain the first and the second book of his On Providence; 77 P.Herc. 307, which preserves his Logical Enquiries; 78 and P.Herc. 1380, which preserves a logical-linguistic work, On the Elements of Speech. 79 To these, another two papyri are to be added, namely P.Herc. 1158 and 1020, which, just like P.Herc. 1384, do not preserve any subscriptio but contain works of Stoic and at least in the latter casemost probably Chrysippean authorship. 80 Now, the existence in the library of a nucleus of Stoic papyri, 81 of which most are certainly, and another one is likely to be, by Chrysippus, suggests, for reasons of coherence, that all of themincluding P.Herc. 1384are by the same Stoic author and that, in reality, this surviving cluster of Stoic papyri belonged to a specifically Chrysippean section of Philodemus' library. 82 The importance of Chrysippus as the most renowned representative of the Epicureans' rival school and, hence, as their philosophical opponent par excellence, whose thought must be properly known in order to be refutedor, as in Philodemus' case, even appropriatedhas already been highlighted by scholars. In particular, the presence of some Chrysippean treatises in the Herculanean library might have served as 74 This is the case with ἀξίωμ[α (col. 3.2), here to be understood as 'proposition', as the logical-cognitive context (lines 4-6 ἐπιστρ[ε|wομέ]νων ἐπιστρο|[wήν) seems to confirm. As mentioned above, this concept was apparently introduced into Stoic logic, and was extensively used, by Chrysippus. See Chrysippus frr. 2.193-220 SVF and Alessandrelli (2013) Puglia (1993), who has proven with good arguments the distance of this text from Epicureanism and its closeness to Stoicism, and, on P.Herc. 1020, below. 81 The presence of Stoic works at Herculaneum has usually been explained as providing documentary evidence for Philodemus' comparison between Epicurean and Stoic teaching and as a source and a target for, respectively, his 'historico-philosophical' (History of the Stoa) and polemical (On Stoics) works concerning the Stoics. This would also explain why so many of his treatises are full of quotations from Stoic sources. See Marrone (1988)  an authoritative textual basis for the composition of some of Philodemus' works. 83 This also explains why several treatises by Chrysippus are either amply quoted or paraphrased or otherwise circumstantially alluded to by Philodemus in treatises such as On Stoics and On Anger. 84 As for Antoni's point (vii), the hand of P.Herc. 1384a unicum in the Herculanean collection, 85 which has escaped Guglielmo Cavallo's classification 86 and has been dated by Antoni to the second quarter of first century BCbears a close likeness to that of another graphically atypical Stoic papyrus, viz. P.Herc. 1020, 87 which has been assigned by Cavallo to his 'Gruppo H' (post mid-first century BC). 88 This similarity strongly suggests that these two books belong to the same editorial project. 89 Now, P.Herc. 1020 contains not a generically Stoic workas Antoni contends 90but an early Stoic text on the wise man's cognitive, moral and dialectical virtues, 91 which has been attributed on solid grounds by its editor princeps, Hans von Arnim, to either Chrysippus or, possibly, one of his immediate successors, Diogenes of Babylon and Antipater. 92 The assigning of P.Herc.  86 See Cavallo (1983). 87 See Antoni and Dorival (2007) 103-4 and Antoni (2012b) 23 and 28-30. In particular, Antoni has shown that in P.Herc. 1020 all letterswith very few exceptions and despite the larger spacing, the smaller number of ligatures and the more open writing anglehave the same shape as the ones we find in P. Herc. 1384. 88 See Cavallo (1983 34-5 and 52. Significantly enough, this graphic typology is rarely witnessed in the Herculaneum collection and some of its elements show divergency from the scribal hands of which it is composed. Note also that P.Herc. 1020 is the only non-Philodemean papyrus included in 'Gruppo H' and that its only relationship to this group is represented, according to Cavallo, by its generic graphic similarity only to P.Herc.1428 (Philodemus, On Piety). 89 An editorial project is an ancient edition of a single work by an author executed by the same hand, or very similar ones, and written in typologically similar graphic forms. In this sense, a single work may have come down to us through either one or more editorial projects, i.e. different copies of the same work (or parts of it) which are graphically uniform within themselves and have been written by the same hand or very similar ones. This is often the case within the Herculaneum collection. See Cavallo (1983)  Bruno Keil 94 on the basis of a passage from Isidorus of Pelusium 95which escaped von Arnimwhere Chrysippus is explicitly credited with a definition of philosophy as 'the exercise of the correctness of logos', coinciding with that provided by the author of P.Herc. 1020 at col. 108.12-15 (ἐπ̣ ι̣ |τήδε̣ υσις λόγου ὀρ[θ]ό|τητο̣ ς). Moreover, in more recent years Michele Alessandrelli and myself, in the framework of a re-edition of von Arnim's text (= cols. 104-112 Alessandrelli-Ranocchia) based on our personal inspection of the original papyrus and propaedeutic to its first comprehensive edition, 96 have offered a new set of further arguments in favour of a specifically Chrysippean authorship for it. 97 So, even though in principle cases like this are always open to doubt (as mentioned, in P.Herc. 1020 no title survives), there remains no or very little room for acceptable alternatives to Chrysippus. 98 Now, if P.Herc. 1020 is by Chrysippus and if P.Herc. 1384 probably belongs to the same editorial project or work, it is reasonable to conclude that the latter is by the same author, that is, again, Chrysippus.
Another argument in favour of Chrysippus must be added to this picture. Diogenes Laertius tells us that 'while Chrysippus holds that virtue can be lost, Cleanthes maintains that it cannot. According to the former it may be lost in consequence of drunkenness or melancholy; the latter takes it to be inalienable owing to the certainty of our mental apprehension.' 99 For Chrysippus, differently from Cleanthes, in order to avoid losing virtue and, hence, wisdomwhether permanently or temporarily we do not knowthe wise man must pay 'special attention' (πλείων ἐπιστροwή) or 'rational attention' (λογικὴ ἐπιστροwή) to his assents 'so that they take place, not randomly, but with understanding'. 100 So, for instance, he must avoid giving his assent to the representation 94 See Keil (1905) 155-8. 95 Ep. 5.558 (PG 78.1637 = FDS 2b). 96 See Alessandrelli and Ranocchia (2017 'drinking a lot is enjoyable' if he wants to avoid getting drunk and keep his selfconsciousness and his inner rationality; or, he should avoid granting his assent to the representation 'having much sex is exciting' if he wishes to avoid falling desperately in love and to maintain his self-control and his inner consistency. By doing so, he will maintain his hegemonikon unaltered and firm and will keep on being virtuous and wise. In the opposite case, he will undermine his reasoning faculty and will lose both virtue and wisdom. Now, in P.Herc. 1384 we find, right within the section of the book devoted to madness, drunkenness, dream delirium and unregulated love (cols. 15)all irrational states which imply losing one's reasonthe construction ἐπιστρ[ε|wομέ]νων ἐπιστρο|[wὴν δ]έχεσθαι 'to receive attention from people who are attentive to (something)' (col. 3.4-6), a figura etymologica whose subjectgiven the context 101cannot but be the wise man. 102 This expression, when taken together with the main assumption of the section, according to which 'the wise man neither abandons himself to madness . . . nor other states of this kind' (col. 1.1-4), and the claims according to which drunkenness is an extremely alien state (col. 4.2-3) and 'makes one a fool ' (col. 5.4-6), suggests that in order to avoid alienating himself from his own nature, losing his reason and becoming a fool, the wise man will have to make sure not to abandon himself to excessive drinking, orto put it differentlynot to grant his assent to the representation 'drinking a lot is enjoyable'. But alienating oneself from one's own nature, losing one's reason and becoming a fool means losing one's virtue, and this corresponds exactly to the position typical of Chrysippus that was briefly discussed above. In other words, in our papyrus the concrete risk that the wise man may lose his virtue seems to represent the conceptual framework which justifies the special care he must exercise in the case of situations, or false representations, of this sort. 103 So, it is reasonable to conclude that, just like P.Herc. 1020, P.Herc. 1384 is by Chrysippus himself. But, if so, to which of his works could it belong? To try to answer this question, it is necessary to refer again to P.Herc. 1020. In our new edition of the last eight columns of it (cols. 104-12 Alessandrelli-Ranocchia), Michele Alessandrelli and I have proposed on several grounds that we identify this papyrus as a book of Chrysippus' On Ways of Life (Περὶ βίων), a lost treatise in four books attested by both Diogenes Laertius 104 and moral infallibility. On the technical meaning of ἐπιστροwή, a term which, among the early Stoics, is only found in Chrysippus, see, besides the passage just mentioned from P. Herc. 1020, Gal. PHP 4.6.149, p. 383 Müller (fr. 3.475 SVF), where the reference is to excessive love: οἵας μάλιστα wορὰς καὶ οἱ ἐρώμενοι ἀξιουσι πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ἐραστάς, ἀπερισκεπτότερον καὶ ἄνευ ἐπιστροwης λογικης ἱσταμένους κτλ., and, with a generic meaning, Sext. Emp. Math. 11.194 (fr. 3.752 SVF); Plut. Stoic. repugn. 1039b (fr. 3.724 SVF) and 1045a (fr. 3.754 SVF). 101 As we know, the protagonist of the book is the wise man, who is also the subject of this section (cols. 1-5), as is proven by e.g. col. Plutarch. 105 This possibility should be taken into serious consideration for a number of reasons. The first reason is the occurrence, in one of Plutarch's direct quotations from this work, 106 of the very rare Chrysippean term εὐαπόσειστος 'so as to be easily shaken off', 107 which is attested in Greek literature only here and in P.Herc. 1020, col. 104.8. The second is provided by the frequent allusions to the Stoic wise man detectable in Plutarch's and Diogenes Laertius' direct quotations from this work. 108 They are descriptions of the lifestyle typical of the wise man in all the various public and private spheres, which appear very similar to those contained in P.Herc. 1020. 109 Interestinglyand independently of the case of P.Herc. 1020in 2007 Gilles Dorival proposed to identify P.Herc. 1384 too as a book of Chrysippus' On Ways of Life on the basis of some supposed thematic analogies between the two texts concerning the wise man's political (in)activity. 110 But what would a work On Ways of Life have looked like? As I have shown in a recent contribution, 111 the philosophical genre Περὶ βίων was essentially different from the 'biographical' or anecdotal one. 112 It was mostly cultivated by Epicureans and Stoics, but alsoat least from the late Hellenistic period onwards, and under the influence of Stoicismby Academic and Peripatetic philosophers. By cross-analysing the information inferable from other sources 113 and the surviving fragments of Epicurus' and Chrysippus' On Ways of Lifethe most famous and most representative examples of this genrewe may conclude with a fair degree of confidence that philosophical works Περὶ βίων had the following characteristics: (a) they were moral pieces of writing belonging to the practical or applied section of ethics, rather than proper doctrinal treatises; (b) their protagonist was the wise man; (c) their subject matter consisted in issues related to the wise man's way of life in the most diverse fields of his individual and social action; this included both general lifestyles, which were described and contrasted, and more specific topics or courses of action such as whether the wise man will engage in politics or rhetoric, live together with kings and obey the laws, marry, do business and make money, play the Cynic and beg, fall in love, get drunk or commit suicide, how he will behave with pupils, and whether he will be knowledgeable or a good dialectician or orator; (d) their target was generally (but not always) the non-wise who, in this way, were furnished with an exemplary code of conduct to which to conform their lives, so as to make progress towards (or preserve) wisdom; (e) their purpose was to supply principles enabling the pursuit (or preservation) of the end, however this may have been understood.
In particular, we know from Plutarch that Chrysippus' On Ways of Life, while comprising different books and covering a wide range of topics, was a 'unitary treatise' (μία σύνταξις), which is probably to say an uninterrupted exposition having the same protagonist and preserving the same narrative scheme. 114 In particular, the first book focused on the possibility for the wise man to be, or live with, a king, to fight for a sovereign 115 and make profit by being in power, cultivating friendships and engaging in politics. 116 It also discussed the wise man's relationship with his pupils with respect to teaching and its remuneration, 117 the possibility for him to pay for doctors when ill and to commit suicide once deprived of his senses, 118 the issues of whether he will suffer injustice 119 and of whetherand with whomhe will fall in love, 120 and his political activity for the moral elevation of his fellow citizens. 121 The second book dealt again with his concern about profit-making. 122 We know nothing about the third book. The fourth book dwelt on the philosopher's life in the school, which was critically equated with an existence full of pleasures and free from political distress, 123  on the wise man's doing nothing or little or what is proper to him, 125 but also on epistemological and dialectical issues, especially his use of anti-logical arguments and how to tackle the questions raised by Megarics and other insidious opponents in dialectical discussions. 126 This picture clearly shows that the main characteristic of the work was to describe the wise man's behaviour in every life situation. In any case, Chrysippus' Περὶ βίωνthe only work with this title to have been written by a Stoic philosophermust have enjoyed considerable popularity in antiquity, since a specific section Περὶ βίων is includedand described with Stoic terms and examplesin the Stoic-influenced divisions of practical ethics by Eudorus of Alexandria and Philo of Larissa reported in the ethical doxography conventionally attributed to Arius Didymus. 127 Now, already in 2004, when she still believed in a Philodemean authorship for P.Herc. 1384, Antoni noticed that its text, while having the same protagonist, was arranged into different thematic sections. 128 This fact led Antoni to propose a possible identification of the papyrus as a book of Philodemus' On Ways of Life (Περὶ ἠθῶν καὶ βίων), a treatise which includes at least On Frank Speech (P.Herc. 1471). 129 As mentioned, in 2007 Dorivalin the study co-authored by Antonitentatively proposed that we identify it, once again, with a work On Ways of Life, but this time by Chrysippus. In particular, our papyrus would correspond to book 4 of this treatise because here the author, as in P.Herc. 1384, maintains that the wise man does not engage in politics, concerns himself with few things and only minds his own business. 130 Although Dorival's argument for this kind of identification is different from Antoni's, 131 and is essentially flawed, 132 his intuition that P.Herc. 1384 may belong to this Chrysippean work, together with Antoni's suspicion that it may fall into the philosophical genre Περὶ βίων, seems to go in the right direction.
Like any other work Περὶ βίων and like Chrysippus' treatise by the same title, P.Herc. 1384 is not a real doctrinal treatise, but looks like a text on descriptive ethics with a prescriptive goal in the background. As we have seen above, its protagonist is the wise man, and the subjects it deals with are topics related to the wise man's mode of life in the various fields of his individual and social action. Its target are those who are receptive towards the teaching of a proficient master (col. 50), namely those progressing towards virtue or, to put it otherwise, the philosopher's pupils in the school. 133 From the above points it follows that its purpose, albeit not directly discernible, must deal with moral progress (col. 24) and the pursuit of wisdom. Just like Chrysippus' Περὶ βίων, P.Herc. 1384 is an uninterrupted exposition arranged into different thematic sections. Worth noting is the fact that three of the main topics it presentsthose concerning the erotic, the political and the educational activity of the wise manrecur in the latter text as well, and in a similar fashion. In particular, in col. 24 of P.Herc. 1384 the wise man is said to cultivate love for moral progressors (τοῖς τε προκεκοwόσιν ἐπιβαλ{λ}εῖν τουτο [sc. ἔρως]), just as in Chrysippus' Περὶ βίων (book 1) he is said 'to love those youths who show a natural disposition to virtue (τὴν πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὐwυΐαν) in their outward appearance'. 134 In cols. 31-41, the wise man's active political engagement for the sake of future generations is described, just as in Περὶ βίων (book 1) he is said to engage in politics to stop vice and incite to virtue, 135 to the point that, if possible, he will become a king or live together with a ruler and fight on his side. 136 These claims are only apparently contradicted by the aforementioned chreia reported in P. Herc (1980) 118-20. In particular, the evidence available to us on both early Stoics in general and each of them taken individually political and scientific), which are either equally worthy of being chosen by the wise man or are hierarchically ordered so that the kingly and the political life generally take precedence over the scientific one. So, for Stoicism every wise man is free to choose for himself which of these three different lifestyles is best suited to him, according to his own inclinations and the different circumstances of his life. In particular, if he is not a king himself or if it is impossible for him to engage in politics, he will gladly choose the scientific life (to be identified with the scholastic one), being aware that, whichever way of life he adopts, only the rational life or life according to virtue is preferable in itself. 141 So, this chreia does not entail any contradiction whatsoever with the Stoic wise man's primary engagement in politics, 142 as described in both P.Herc. 1384 and Chrysippus' Περὶ βίων, and in other ancient sources. 143 Finally, in cols. 42-9 of our papyrus, the wise man's educational mission and the philosophical training of his disciples are illustrated, just as in Chrysippus' On Ways of Life (possibly, again, book 1) his teaching activity and relationship with his pupils are discussed. 144 In both cases, a reference to the profit deriving from this kind of activity is made: in P.Herc. 1384, the author speaks of a share of profits and benefits, which given the context must refer to the relationship between master and pupils (col. 45.1-11); 145 in the Περὶ βίων, Chrysippus discusses whether the wise man/ master will expect to be paid for his lectures in advance or later on, on the basis of a specific agreement. 146 What cannot escape the reader is that these three claims all come from the same book of Chrysippus' On Ways of Life, namely book 1 (although this is only a hypothesis in the case of the third claim). 147 Bearing in mind all the analogies between P.Herc. 1384 and both the philosophical genre Περὶ βίων and Chrysippus' work by this title briefly discussed above (i.e. the fact that they share the same practical-ethical character, protagonist, range of topics, narrative scheme, target readership and purpose, along with very similar claims), the presence of some major topics and statements concerning the erotic, political and educational activity of the wise man in both P.Herc. 1384 and book 1 of Chrysippus' Περὶ βίων is sufficient evidence to propose a possible identification of our papyrus with this very book. One may wonder why these conceptual analogies are not supported by any textual overlap between the fragments of that book and P. Herc. 1384. But, in the first case, Diogenes Laertius' testimony cannot by any means be regarded as a proper quotation from Chrysippus' Περὶ βίων, because it is simultaneously ascribed by him to Zeno's Republic and Apollodorus' Ethics. 148 The second and the third Chrysippean testimonies, by contrast, do contain some direct quotations from book 1 of Περὶ βίων. However, given the small extent of the surviving text in P.Herc. 1384between one and two tenths of the original text, according to Antoni 149a possible textual match between Chrysippus' Περὶ βίων and this piece of writing should be regarded, statistically speaking, as a very fortunate coincidence. 150 A possible identification of P.Herc. 1384 with book 1 of Chrysippus' On Ways of Life is reinforced by its comparison with P.Herc. 1020, which, as we know, probably belongs to the same editorial project and has recently been ascribed, on several grounds, to book 4 of the same treatise. 151 Without once again entering into the discussion of why this should be the case, suffice it here to say that its genre, protagonist, thematic variety and narrative scheme are the same as in the philosophical genre Περὶ βίων, Chrysippus' work by the same title and P.Herc. 1384. In particular, the main topics inferable from the portion of P.Herc. 1020 edited so far (cols. 104-12 Alessandrelli-Ranocchia) 152 the wise man's cognitive, moral and dialectical virtuesfit in well with what we know about book 4 of Chrysippus' On Ways of Life. Just as in the latter the author addresses epistemological and dialectical issues, such as the use of anti-logical arguments and how to tackle the questions raised by Megarics and other opponents in dialectical discussions, 153 so in P.Herc. 1020 the author dwells on epistemology (cols. 104-8 and 112), dialectic and, in particular, on how to dialectically engage with formidable adversaries (cols. . In addition, just as in Περὶ βίων book 4, where Chrysippus discusses philosophy in general and its parts, 154 so in P.Herc. 1020 the author provides a masterly definition of philosophy by contrasting it with one of its sub-sections, viz., again, dialectic (col. 108.12-27). 155 So, if P.Herc. 1384 and 1020 both belong to this Chrysippean treatise, they must coincide with books 1 and 4 respectively.
To be sure, here we are not dealing with strictly deductive pieces of proof, but with various kinds of arguments, whose synergistic combination points in the same direction, by corroborating this attribution hypothesis from different sides (philosophical, thematic, lexical, literary, stylistic and palaeographical). One only wonders where the two remaining books (books 2 and 3) of Chrysippus' Περὶ βίων may have ended up and why they have not yet been identified in the Herculanean collection. As in the case of Epicurus' 37-book On Nature and several multi-volume works by Philodemusof which several books, albeit not all, have been preservedtheir loss must be considered merely accidental. However, as experience suggests, nothing rules out the possibility that they will be identified in the future. 156 If this argumentation is correct, the Stoic or, better, Chrysippean section of Philodemus' library also included, among the various works mentioned above, a complete copy of Chrysippus' famous treatise On Ways of Life.