

THE SOVIET AIR FORCE SINCE 1918. By *Alexander Boyd*. Foreword by *John Erickson*. New York: Stein and Day, 1977. xx, 259 pp. + 12 pp. photographs. \$10.00.

Alexander Boyd's study is an important contribution to Soviet military history. Books on the Soviet air force are not rare. The Western studies tend to concentrate on technical aspects while those published in Russia cover technical as well as historical and operational matters. Soviet books addressed to the latter questions, however, are unreliable and are guilty above all of omitting unpleasant facts about the air force, particularly the damage caused by Stalin and the *Luftwaffe*. Using a large number of Soviet and Western sources, Boyd has done a remarkable job of writing a detailed history of the Soviet air force covering such fascinating subjects as the Russo-German cooperation in the twenties; early Soviet theories about the deployment of air powers; employment of imprisoned designers by the NKVD; the use of the air force in campaigns in the Far East, Spain, and Finland; the failures in the first two years of the Great Patriotic War; and finally victory and postwar rebirth. Also interesting and informative is the author's description of such pioneer figures as P. I. Baranov, Ia. I. Alksnis, and V. V. Khripin, as well as a host of aircraft designers.

Despite its general excellence, the book suffers from one major fault. The author uses footnotes to amplify information given in the text rather than indicating the source, which seriously hinders further reading and research on the part of the reader (even though the volume does include an extensive bibliography). Also, scant attention is given to party political work, with no mention of such wartime commissars as N. K. Bulganin, P. S. Stepanov, and N. S. Shimanov, who were keeping a watchful eye on the commanders. In his coverage of the role of the Soviet air force in the Spanish Civil War, Boyd relies heavily on a subjective study by M. Sanchis written at the height of Franco's power, and fails to balance it with memoirs of the pro-Communist commander of the Republican air force, Ignacio Hidalgo de Cisneros. The extensive bibliography does not include the memoirs of Marshal F. Ia. Falaleev, Marshal A. E. Golovanov, and Minister of Aviation Construction A. I. Shakhurin, nor does it contain the best biography of Ia. V. Smushkevich by D. Ia. Zil'manovich, biographies of such air force leaders as S. A. Chernykh and N. A. Ostriakov, or a fair number of relevant articles, mostly from *Voenna-istoricheskii zhurnal* and *Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopediia*.

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SOVIET NAVAL INFLUENCE: DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN DIMENSIONS.

Edited by *Michael MccGwire* and *John McDonnell*. Published for the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Department of Political Science, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia. New York and London: Praeger Publishers, 1977. xxxvi, 660 pp.

Western awareness of rising Soviet sea power in the 1960s and 1970s has generated an impressive number of articles and books describing this phenomenon and analyzing the nature of the perceived threat to Western, and especially American, naval objectives. Leading scholars and researchers of the subject have been meeting periodically at Dalhousie University, in Halifax, Nova Scotia, under the auspices of the Canadian Maritime Warfare School and the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies of the University. Studies resulting from the first two sessions appeared under the titles *Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context* (1973) and *Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints* (1975).

The contributions of twenty-eight members of the third seminar that met in September 1974 are arranged under eight headings: aspects of Soviet foreign policy, the place of the navy in the policy process, warfighting capability, projection capability, some analytical material, East-West naval interaction, the Soviet navy and Third World influence building, and future prospects. Some of the articles, such as the lead-off "Detente and the Strategic Balance," by Vernon Aspaturian, contain nothing directly relating to the navy, while others treat it only peripherally (fishing fleet, merchant fleet, airborne troops, organization of Soviet defense, and military procurement). Several soundly researched and historical chapters, for example, those by Oles Smolansky (aircraft carriers), Jacob Kipp (naval aviation), and Charles Pritchard (amphibious forces), examine topics that have little direct connection with the subtitle but were apparently included to cover items omitted from the previous volumes. Still more of the contributions are technical and factual in nature. What was meant to be the main focus of the book is encountered in chapter 24, "Warships and Political Influence," by Ken Booth and in those that follow by Anne Kelly (port visits), and Michael L. Squires and Ann Patterson (transfers to developing countries). Inevitably there is much repetition, especially in the tendency of the authors to cite their own and each other's previous works and to pay homage to Gorshkov's writings.

This book might easily have been dedicated to Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, commander in chief of the Soviet navy since 1956 and author of a series of articles that appeared in the Soviet naval journal *Morskoi sbornik* in 1972-73. *The United States Naval Institute Proceedings* printed translations and commentaries that were subsequently collected under the dramatic title *Red Star Rising at Sea* (1974), and the Soviet admiral provided additional fuel for Western naval analysts in 1976 with *Morskaiia moshch' gosudarstva*. The obsession with Gorshkov's pronouncements is such that they probably have received more attention than those of any other active Soviet official, except of course for Brezhnev.

Gorshkov's advocacy of an expanded Soviet naval mission with possession of modern ocean surface fleets is mentioned in nearly every chapter and is the principal subject of the longest one. Though disagreeing over whether Gorshkov was stating doctrine that had already been adopted or was advocating a case for a new emphasis on naval construction, Western analysts tend to accept most of his gospel and enjoy citing him as evidence of present and future Soviet naval growth.

The general tone of the book is, therefore, positive in terms of the capabilities of the Soviet navy as an instrument of foreign policy, despite the fact that accomplishments in the recent past are difficult to substantiate. The discussion concentrates on potentials rather than limitations. Port visits, for example, appear impressive at first glance, when listed in tables. Upon closer look, they are found to have been made mostly to neighboring, friendly countries such as Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Finland, and even Hungary and Austria! Ships transferred to other countries are also substantial in number but need a clearer assessment of their age and capability. And could exercise "Sever," which was staged in the North Atlantic in July 1968 and which must have been planned months in advance, have been "part of a larger effort to deter Western intervention . . . in Czechoslovakia" (p. 419)? Just as Gorshkov, in his historical reflections, stresses the particular Russian naval successes and strengths and omits the disasters and weaknesses, so also do Western observers seem awe-struck by the idea that Russians can sail. The notable exception to the emphasis on Soviet naval influence in the book is the concluding chapter by Michael MccGwire, "The Soviet Navy in the Seventies," which hints at the possibility of future setbacks and reductions, and raises the pertinent question of how much expensive naval power the USSR can economically use.

One real problem of the publication is the contemporary nature of the seminar presentations and conclusions. Though many of the chapters have been supplemented with material covering 1975, and even into 1976, the great bulk of the research pertains to the sixties and early seventies. Published as part of the Praeger Special Studies program that "makes available to the academic, government, and business communities significant, timely research," the book appears too late for the nature of the contents. "Speed" printing may be responsible for the many typographical and other errors (battle of Sinope 1855, death of Stalin March 1963), at least three different styles of transliteration, and the absence of a bibliography and index, but it still failed to accomplish the stated goal, especially since a number of the chapters appeared elsewhere earlier and a summary of the seminar was available immediately afterward (Ken Booth, *Soviet Naval Developments—III: Summary of Proceedings of the 1974 Seminar*, Halifax, 1974). The book has value, however, in providing additional details in convenient form and in recording the Western perception of Soviet naval intentions in a particular time frame.

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L'URSS ET LA RÉVOLUTION CUBAINE. By Jacques Lévesque. Travaux et recherches de science politique, no. 42. Montreal: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1976. viii, 222 pp. \$15.00, paper.

Lévesque's monograph is an interesting and scholarly contribution to a growing literature concerned with Soviet relations with various regions of the Third World. Specifically, it represents an effort to paint an overview of the sequential stages of Soviet policy toward Cuba between 1959 and 1975, within the context of Communist influence in Latin America. Lévesque develops a narrative of this bilateral relationship by focusing mostly on the changing nature of Soviet policy scenarios created by the vigorous and revolutionary environment of the Cuban polity. For factual material the author draws extensively on Soviet newspapers and periodicals; he relies on sound, albeit standard, Western investigations of Soviet-Latin American relations for background information.

Initially, it took an unusual amount of juggling for theoreticians to come up with a proper abstraction of Castro's position within the socialist universe. The originality of the Cuban revolutionary process led the Soviet leadership toward a less rigid approach vis-à-vis the evolution of socialism in nontraditional areas of the world. With occasional pain, yet ultimate success, the Cuban revolution made the transition from "national democracy" to "revolutionary democracy," and in the end was the only state to adapt fully to socialism over the past twenty years.

Yet, even with a high degree of tolerance, the Cuban experience has been a costly proposition for the USSR. This is true not only from a material standpoint but also, as Lévesque cogently points out, in terms of the considerable diversity of potential strategic dangers which the situation posed for the USSR. Not until 1969 did the Soviet leadership finally face a more manageable Cuban outlook and a stabilized Cuban internal polity. This monograph makes a strong effort to detail the dual nature of the Cuban experience—Cuban brashness coupled with Soviet flexibility resulting in the fairly positive consequences of the Cuban revolution.

Cuban policy toward Africa, however, a new and very consequential development of Cuban foreign policy (which the author cannot be faulted for not covering since it is post-1975), underlines the continuing revolutionary nature of Cuban foreign policy and the nature of its Soviet counterpart. What this research effort highlights,