take very much to get Democratic voters to turn against women and candidates of color” (p. 205). Even briefly raising doubts about the potential negative electoral impact of identity politics easily steered primary voters toward candidates more insulated from such criticisms.

Biden’s nomination was obviously overdetermined. His status as Obama’s vice president alone might have been sufficient to ensure his nomination, but Biden also allayed the party’s anxieties about electability as a white male who had been fixture in the Democratic Party for decades. In this sense, Biden’s victory was not a product of chance, as portrayed by journalists Jonathan Allen and Amie Parnes in their 2021 book, Lucky: How Joe Biden Barely Won the Presidency. Masket’s analysis shows that Biden was always ahead in the “invisible primary,” even though he did not emerge as the party’s dominant choice until after the South Carolina primary. From a low baseline, Biden always led in endorsements by elected Democrats, in contributions from campaign donors loyal to the Democratic Party, and among polls of Democratic primary voters.

Even though Biden’s selection was overdetermined, Masket makes a persuasive case that his perceived “electability” was a dominant consideration for Democrats of all stripes in 2020 and that it likely undermined women and minority candidates. My one complaint with the book is that I would have liked to see more account taken of interest groups allied with the party. If one views parties as networks of “intense demanders,” those networks of Democratic Party-allied interest groups do not receive systematic attention. The book considers the party from many angles: among elected Democrats, as a formal organization, as networks of donors and activists, and among voters generally. No doubt, the activists surveyed for the book overlap with many of these Democratic groups. But the book does not contain explicit analysis of interest group behavior, endorsements, and preferences per se.

Taken all in all, Learning from Loss offers a compelling, highly readable account of recent Democratic Party history. But it provides far more than that. It also yields deeper insights by setting recent developments in historical context. In a terrific chapter titled “When Parties Try to Fix Themselves,” Masket identifies a representation versus reform schism on internal party rules and organization that has long divided racial minority groups from white party reformers in Democratic Party politics. Of the 1970s party reforms, Masket quotes McGovern-Fraser commissioner Sam Beer recalling, “I went to Massachusetts, Philadelphia, Chicago, St. Louis and Atlanta. I was impressed, at these meetings, by the fact that Negroes and the people in the cities were not the slightest bit interested in this whole thing. [Party reform] was really a suburban, white, middle-class movement” (pp. 126–27). Masket then details how a similar schism played out in the Unity Reform Commission convened after 2016. Supporters of Bernie Sanders wanted to move decision-making power toward rank-and-file voters, including independents, and away from party insiders (superdelegates). Supporters of Hillary Clinton viewed all those reforms skeptically, like the party regulars of the 1970s. Closed primaries and the role of the Congressional Black Caucus as superdelegates give African Americans a large voice in the Democratic Party. “While I’m all for growth and expanding our party,” said a Clinton-aligned DNC member, “I am not for diluting the voting power of the most reliable voting bloc in the Democratic Party” (p. 136). Readers will come away from Masket’s analysis with a deeper understanding of long-standing fault lines within the Democratic Party.

Learning from Loss bridges multiple audiences. As one of political science’s most insightful scholars of party nomination politics, Masket exhibits all the subject matter mastery that scholarly audiences would expect. At the same time, the book will be accessible to readers with no background on the topic. The narrative offers sufficient but not excessive detail, pressing its analysis without oversimplification. Sophisticated survey experiments are explained clearly and concisely. Packed with pithy quotations, the book will appeal to general-interest audiences beyond academia.

Although its title may sound narrow and topical—an investigation of one political party during one moment in time—Learning from Loss will continue to interest scholars and students for many years to come. In the meantime, and if the author is willing, I would love to read a sequel analyzing the post-2020 GOP.


The authors of this ambitious book, Allan Colbern and S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, pursue three related tasks. Their driving concern is to delineate how and why we should see state citizenship in the United States as too autonomous to subsume under national citizenship. Instead, we should recognize that US citizenship must be analyzed as a system of federalism in which both citizenships matter.

Because the academic scholarship on citizenship displays numerous, not obviously compatible conceptions of citizenship, however, the authors first seek to offer an appropriate definition of citizenship. They prefer one arising from historical institutionalist approaches to American political development. Because those approaches also display
numerous, not obviously compatible theoretical frameworks, they seek also to lay out what an historical institutionalist analysis of citizenship should involve and to trace its applications throughout the whole history of the United States and in more depth in regard to African Americans and Californians. Though it is tempting to suggest they are chewing more than they have really bitten off, their arguments rest on a truly impressive mastery of pertinent scholarship. More importantly, they end up making the strong case for the great significance of state citizenship in America today that they had set out to do.

Their execution of their two preliminary tasks is both sensible and stimulating, if perhaps inevitably less definitive. After canvassing how citizenship is sometimes treated as a legal status, sometimes as a psychological sense of belonging, and sometimes as a set of participatory activities, among other variations, they worry that these usages fall into what Giovanni Sartori famously criticized as “conceptual stretching,” making a concept do more than it was fashioned to do. They prefer to define citizenship simply as “the provision of rights by a political jurisdiction to its members” (p. 35). They specify that the rights in question are of five kinds: rights to free movement; rights to due process and legal protection; rights to develop human capital through education, health care, and work, among other means; rights to participate in and be represented in a society’s political institutions; and rights to have one’s identity and belonging, including one’s ethnic and (presumably) religious identity, recognized by those institutions (p. 41).

This is a reasonable definition and highly serviceable for their purposes, and that is all it really needs to be. Although the dangers of “conceptual stretching” are real, especially in scholarly analyses, there are counterpart dangers to what we might call “conceptual Bogarting”: insisting that one’s preferred definition of a concept is THE definition of that concept, other understandings be damned. Though the authors do not quite step into that pitfall, at times they tread near it. There is, however, no good reason to tell Diogenes that he cannot call himself a “citizen of the world,” or St. Augustine that the “City of God” does not have “citizens,” or the many contemporary scholars of “lived citizenship” that they cannot use that term for people to whom no political jurisdiction accords the pertinent legal rights. It is sufficient to explain, as Colbern and Ramakrishnan do, why a particular definition of citizenship is the right one for the project they are undertaking. To show that legal citizenship in the American states merits study alongside and in relationship to legal citizenship in the United States, it makes sense to define citizenship in terms of the legal rights that a political jurisdiction accords its members.

To put this definition to work, the authors offer an historical institutionalist “explanatory framework specific to the US context” that maps developments in the nation’s federal system of national and state citizenships in terms of three factors. First are the constitutional opportunities for developments in citizenship statuses, shaped by the Constitution’s text and prevailing judicial interpretations of it. Second are legislative actions on those opportunities, usually driven by the activities of political parties and social movements. Third are executive actions that either implement legislated policies or are undertaken unilaterally (p. 72).

The authors use this framework to delineate three major eras in the development of American federalism and citizenship: the period of “the framers’ Constitution,” up to the Civil War; the “separate and unequal” period following the defeat of Reconstruction; and the modern “civil rights” period (p. 82). After briefly sketching major developments in each of these periods, the authors devote one chapter to a closer look at the development of African American state and national citizenships, and another to the development of state citizenship (still in relation to national citizenship) in California. The Golden State is revealing because of how it moved from highly restrictive, white-privileging citizenship policies right up through the 1990s to, especially since 2015, highly progressive state conceptions that define their five rights of citizenship expansively and inclusively. Colbern and Ramakrishnan next consider state citizenship policies, in California and other states, specifically in relation to national immigration policies, particularly in the modern, third period of federalism and citizenship. Then, building especially on this and the California chapter, they conclude with a brief chapter arguing that there is the potential now for advocacy groups in many more states to organize and win progressive citizenship policies in ways that may eventually work to transform national policies.

This is the punchline toward which the book has been building, and it is persuasive—all the more so because the authors recognize that, in many states, parties, social movements, legislatures, and executives are all choosing simply to mirror and reinforce national immigration policies, whereas in others they are resisting them, partly through regressive, exclusionary citizenship policies. The takeaway message—that the politics of contestation over citizenship in America today cannot be understood without grasping the battles over citizenship within states and between states and the nation—is a tremendously important one. If it does not quite amount to citizenship radically “reimagined,” it certainly represents citizenship significantly “refocused.”

Some caveats are, however, in order. Though the authors say their framework of “constitutional opportunities/legislative actions/executive actions” is “explanatory,” it really simply identifies pertinent political structures and actors. By itself, it does not explain why those actors do what they do. The authors’ subsequent applications of this framework do occasionally invoke ideas like “White
supremacist views” (p. 158) and economic interests like those stirred by the end of gold mining and an ensuing recession (p. 226). However, they make no real effort to theorize the drivers of either state or national citizenship policies. Theirs is far more an endeavor of descriptive mapping than causal inquiry. Overall, they provide very useful maps based on commendable syntheses of an exceptional range of sources. Nonetheless, their original contributions come chiefly in the final three chapters, which draw more extensively on their own primary research on recent issues of state citizenship and immigration.

The preliminary chapters do, however, provide much food for thought on how to think about federated state and national citizenships in general and specifically in the United States. And again, the final chapters emphatically show that we must attend to both forms of citizenship, and their interactions, to understand citizenship in the United States today. That is a worthwhile and commendable achievement, valuable for scholars, students, and citizens alike.

**Racial Stasis: The Millennial Generation and the Stagnation of Racial Attitudes in American Politics.**


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In *Racial Stasis*, Christopher DeSante and Candis Watts Smith convincingly make the argument that generational replacement will not bring racial change. Using both qualitative and quantitative evidence, the authors make it clear that white millennials are not the promised generation that will advance racial attitudes in the United States and in some ways are more entrenched in their racial attitudes than their older counterparts. Not only do DeSante and Smith bring a wealth of evidence to bear on white millennial racial attitudes but they also do the important work of creating a measure that they argue better captures racial attitudes for this group.

This work is not just impressive because of the evidence that the authors bring to bear, however. DeSante and Smith present a masterclass on how to think about the white racial attitudes literature. They consider work from political science from about the last 40 years, as well as integrating important work from other fields that has advanced the conversation on how people talk about race today. This is no small task given that there are different theories on what composes white racial attitudes and differing measurement strategies to best capture these attitudes. At the heart of this book is the idea that the way white millennials are socialized to think about race matters for their beliefs about politics and policy.

What becomes clear in the narrative of this work is that white millennials are not their parents and that the ways in which this group has been conditioned to consider race is complicated. For this reason, the interviews that the authors include are crucial. They allow the reader to draw conclusions about what white millennials tend to believe. This is a generation that largely associates racism with the past, a belief that has implications for their attitudes toward other groups and for how they perceive the economic, political, and social condition of their counterparts of color. Although some may value diversity insofar as it means the physical representation of other groups in the room, many are unwilling to engage with white privilege and the racialized power structures that preserve and perpetuate gaps between white people and communities of color in the United States. Indeed, some white millennials even believe that it is whites who are disadvantaged when society does enact policies to address those gaps.

The qualitative analysis is eye-opening. The white millennial self-understanding is in some ways distinct from how scholars have theoretically and empirically described the attitudes of older generations. This is not to say that DeSante and Smith or I believe these older measures are obsolete, but that the authors call us to question to whom they apply. For instance, many of the white millennials included in the study could recognize the inherent inequality embedded in policies like “stop and frisk,” but their recognition did not necessarily mean that they could empathize with how people of color experience these policies. In fact, some of these white millennials used stereotypes about Black men as criminals to justify its use. Although all the respondents could not find empathy for their minoritized counterparts, many could find empathy for themselves in that they perceived a disadvantage toward whites in the use of affirmative action.

Because DeSante and Smith push the reader to consider the components of white millennial racial attitudes, they also make us question how these attitudes are measured. It is not enough to consider how white millennials think about Black people in the United States, because the racial landscape has changed. The racialized nature of American politics very much includes Latinx, Indigenous, Asian American, and Muslim communities. The authors do not leave the reader disappointed on this front. Just as they considered literature on white racial attitudes over time and across fields, they also consider multiple measures of white racial attitudes while also taking generational cohorts into account. I think this analysis is the most compelling. Because the authors use multiple measurement constructs, the reader can see how well each of these measures fit white millennials. This measurement exercise...