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István Friedrich and the Hungarian Coup d'État of 1919: A Reevaluation

On August 6, 1919, a bloodless coup d'état occurred in Budapest, forcing the Socialist "trade union" government to resign, and bringing Hungary's radical phase to an abrupt end. Hungary's revolutionary experiments had been resounding failures, and the majority of the population was relieved. The first revolution of October 31, 1918 had promised democracy, independence, and unimpaired territorial integrity but had brought instead only disappointments—political instability and foreign occupation. The second revolution, which declared Hungary a Soviet republic on March 21, 1919, was no more successful than the first. The proletarian dictatorship, originally welcomed as a remedy for the discredited democratic institutions, rapidly lost its appeal, and the world revolution, initially held out as an answer to Hungary's territorial mutilation, failed to become a reality. By the end of July, the Rumanian army was at the gates of Budapest and internal dissatisfaction had assumed threatening proportions. On August 1, 1919, Gyula Peidl, a moderate, formed an all-Social Democratic government; but if the first revolution had managed to discredit liberal democracy, the second had ruined the reputation of the Social Democratic Party whose leadership, with few exceptions, had actively participated in Béla Kun's Soviet regime. With the disintegration of the Hungarian Red Army, Peidl's government was at the mercy of its enemies. The Rumanian army, unopposed, entered the capital on August 4, 1919, and the internal opposition, which had been plotting against the "trade union" government ever since its formation, struck two days later.

The men who engineered the coup d'état were not politicians. They were professional men—university professors, physicians, dentists, civil servants, and army officers—without party affiliation or political experience. In ideological terms, the group showed every sign of right radical tendencies: they were anti-Semitic, antidemocratic, and anti-Habsburg in sentiment. Yet the government which was formed after the coup manifested none of the ideological traits of the conspirators. The provisional cabinet was comprised largely of men who had served under Mihály Károlyi in the first revolutionary government, and the new provisional governor was the Archduke Joseph, a Magyarized Habsburg.

The obvious discrepancy between the aspirations of the right radical conspirators and the immediate political results of the coup cannot be explained

without a reappraisal of István Friedrich, the controversial prime minister of Hungary between August and November 1919. Once a member of Károlyi's closest circle, he joined hands with the insurgents a few days before the take-over, and with their success he became a dominant force in Hungarian political life. But who was this man who would shape Hungary's future?

About István Friedrich one can make only a single unqualified judgment: that he was, and still is, everybody's enemy. His former political friends, the liberal supporters of the Károlyi regime, regarded him as a traitor who had strayed into reactionary waters, abandoning the cause of Hungarian democracy.¹ The conservatives, especially the circle of István Bethlen, prime minister of Hungary between 1921 and 1931, made him indirectly responsible for the white terror raging in the countryside by accusing him of an "ostrich-like attitude" toward the extreme right.² At the same time, the exponents of right radicalism, toward whom he was supposedly sympathetic, looked upon him as a dangerous liberal conspiring against the Christian, national ideal. Admiral Miklós Horthy, one of his chief adversaries, believed that Friedrich's government was tainted with bolshevism,³ and men in his closest entourage were ready "to do away with Friedrich" (and in 1919 that meant cold-blooded murder) because he was "a public menace."⁴ The legitimists, whose ranks Friedrich had joined in August 1919, doubted his sincerity on the Habsburg question, claiming that his stand was at best one of vacillation.⁵ And the Social Democrats, whose government Friedrich and his co-conspirators had overthrown, understandably would have nothing to do with him; in fact, they immortalized him as the villain of modern Hungarian history.⁶

1. Louis Varjassy, *Révolution, bolchevisme, réaction: Histoire de l'occupation française en Hongrie (1918-1919)* (Paris: Jouve et Cie, 1934), pp. 99-100; Oszkár Jászi, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary* (London: P. S. King and Son, 1924), p. 156; Mihály Károlyi, *Egy egész világ ellen* (Budapest: Gondolat, 1965), pp. 240-41.

2. Edgar von Schmidt-Pauli, *Graf Stefan Bethlen: Ein Abschnitt ungarischer Geschichte* (Berlin: Verlag von Reimar Hobbing, 1931), p. 129. See also Miklós Surányi, *Bethlen: Történetpolitikai tanulmányok* (Budapest: Singer és Wolfner, 1927), p. 13.

3. György Borsányi, ed., *Páter Zadravecz titkos naplója* (Budapest: Kossuth, 1967), pp. 242-43.

4. Ágnes Szabó and Ervin Pamlényi, eds., *A határban a Halál kaszál . . . : Fejezetek Prónay Pál feljegyzéseiből* (Budapest: Kossuth, 1963), p. 214. For a report on an actual attempt on his life by members of Horthy's National Army, see *Új Nemzedék*, March 3, 1920. When this did not succeed, the rightist opponents of Friedrich managed to implicate him in the murder of István Tisza. A number of witnesses were frightened into giving false testimony against Friedrich and two liberal politicians. Friedrich was eventually acquitted, but only after two grueling trials lasting over a year.

5. Országos Levéltár, Budapest (henceforth cited as O.L.), Minisztertanácsi jegyzőkönyv (henceforth cited as M.j.), February 13, 1920.

6. Ernő Garami, *Forrongó Magyarország: Emlékezések és tanulmányok*, 2nd ed. (Vienna: Pegazus, 1922), p. 156 ff.; Vilmos Böhm, *Két forradalom tüzeiben* (Budapest: Népszava, 1946), pp. 69-71, 91-93, 364; Manó Buchinger, *Küzdelem a szocializmusért: Emlékek és élmények*, 2 vols. (Budapest: Népszava, 1946), 2:94-95.

At home, then, Friedrich was attacked from all sides, and, for the benefit of the West, Charles Upson Clark, an American classical scholar and a promoter of the Rumanian cause during and after the war, drew a composite portrait of Friedrich in his well-received book, *Greater Roumania*. Here we learn that Friedrich “became at once dictator of the Hungarian state” and that he was “one of the most unscrupulous of Hungarian politicians [who] has now been shown to have inspired the murder, or attempted murder, of several of his opponents, including Károlyi.”⁷ This, by 1922, was the image of István Friedrich which circulated in the West: a dictator who ordered the murder of his political adversaries.

Friedrich’s reputation has not improved in the hands of historians since 1922. His meteoric rise from relative obscurity in the chaotic days of 1918, his revolutionary zeal in the early weeks of the October revolution, and his eventual cooperation with right-wing elements in the overthrow of the Social Democratic government of Gyula Peidl easily lent credence to the accusation that he was no more than a political adventurer, a demagogue “with a ready pen and a good baritone voice.”⁸ Friedrich’s checkered political career prompted C. A. Macartney to call him “an Elizabethan figure” whose breeding ground was the political instability which reigned in vanquished Hungary in 1918 and 1919.⁹ Once the label “political adventurer” took hold, any further investigation of Friedrich’s ideas and motives seemed superfluous.¹⁰

However, by retracing Friedrich’s career before and during the revolutions, by reevaluating his relationship to the conspirators, and by analyzing his political moves during the first week of August and shortly after, a new portrait of this ill-fated prime minister emerges. The political adventurer becomes a serious, if unrealistic and inexperienced, politician who attempted the impossible: to restore a moderate form of the Károlyi program under the leadership of the conservative faction of the former Károlyi party, the Party of Independence.

7. Charles Upson Clark, *Greater Roumania* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1922), p. 312.

8. Iván T. Berend and György Ránki, “Az ellenforradalom kora,” in Erik Molnár and Ervin Pamlényi, eds., *Magyarország története*, 2 vols. (Budapest: Gondolat, 1964), 2:364.

9. C. A. Macartney, *October Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary 1929–1945*, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: The University Press, 1957), 1:23.

10. The dearth of serious historical investigations of Friedrich’s premiership and his political ideas is appalling. In the *Magyar életrajzi lexikon*, 2 vols. (Budapest: Akadémia, 1967–69), the most authoritative recent Hungarian biographical encyclopedia, the bibliography under Friedrich’s name consists of one second-rate novel dealing with the Peidl government’s six days in power: Kálmán Sándor, *Szégyenfa (Fehér augusztus)* (Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1951). With the exception of the brief paragraphs which the general histories devote to these few months, the only article on the subject, unfortunately a weak one, is Károly Mészáros’s “Adatok a reakciós politikai irányzatok arculatához és tevékenységéhez (1919 augusztus),” *Történelmi Szemle*, 13 (1970): 65–105.

István Friedrich was born on July 1, 1883, in Malacka, a small town close to Pozsony (Bratislava) inhabited by Slovaks, Germans, and Hungarians. Both his father, János Friedrich, and his mother, Erzsébet Wagner, were of German extraction. Contrary to the allegation that he was a half-educated man,¹¹ Friedrich received engineering degrees from the technical schools (*Hochschule*) of Budapest and Charlottenburg (Berlin) and, on the side, studied law in both cities. Until 1908 he was an engineer at the Allgemeine Elektrizitätsgesellschaft in Berlin.¹² At this time he returned to Hungary and married well; his bride was the daughter of Emil Asbóth, president of one of the largest industrial concerns in the country, the Ganz-Danubius factory.¹³ He, however, did not join his father-in-law's firm; instead, he opened a modest business of his own in Mátyásföld on the outskirts of Budapest. Friedrich was a successful businessman, and within a few years his machine shop was enlarged and became a small factory.¹⁴

The young factory owner, a man of comfortable means and good connections, soon became interested in politics. He espoused left liberal ideas and allied himself with others of similar persuasion. In 1912 he became a Freemason; and, although the lodge which he joined was less radical in composition than the Martinovics Lodge frequented by Oszkár Jászi's radicals and the leading members of the Social Democratic Party, his very participation in the movement placed Friedrich among a small group of men of progressive ideas.¹⁵ At about the same time, he became an associate member of the Party of Independence. The party which he joined was in the midst of one of its periodic crises, but in 1913 the split ranks of the Party of Independence were joined under the leadership of Mihály Károlyi. Friedrich soon began to make his mark within the newly-united party, becoming president of its Mátyásföld branch. In 1914 he accompanied Károlyi and other leading members of the party to the United States on a fund-raising drive among Hungarian-Americans. On the way back, the two men had long political discussions on the ocean liner's deck, during the course of which Friedrich proved to be a stalwart admirer of his party chief. From this time on, Friedrich belonged to

11. Böhm, *Két forradalom*, p. 92.

12. *Magyar életrajsi lexikon*, 1:543; László T. Boros, ed., *Magyar politikai lexikon: Magyar politikusok, 1914–1929* (Budapest: Európa irodalmi és nyomdai, rt., 1929), p. 126.

13. Dezső Nemes, *Az ellenforradalom története Magyarországon, 1919–1921* (Budapest: Akadémia, 1962), p. 129.

14. By 1921 Friedrich estimated his estate as being worth five or six million crowns. See *Új Nemzedék*, April 13, 1921.

15. József Palatinus, *Szabaddöművesek Magyarországon* (Pécs, 1944), p. 52. For Friedrich's career in the Freemason organization, see Gusztáv Wilczek and Arthur Singer, eds., *Szabaddöműves Almanach az 1919-ik esztendőre*, 2nd series (Budapest, 1918), p. 100. The above references were kindly supplied to me by Zsuzsa L. Nagy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Károlyi's closest entourage.¹⁶ Károlyi was impressed with the young Friedrich, whom he liked and held in high esteem "for his youthful, idealistic enthusiasm and for his resolute desire for peace."¹⁷

A few days before the outbreak of the October revolution, Friedrich was constantly in the limelight, leading mass demonstrations to the Royal Castle demanding the premiership for his idol, Károlyi.¹⁸ He participated in all the political discussions which took place at the headquarters of Károlyi's National Council a few days before the formation of the first Károlyi government.¹⁹ For his steadfast allegiance Károlyi rewarded him with the important post of undersecretary of defense.²⁰ In fact, he soon became, at least for a short period, the virtual chief of the ministry since the minister, Béla Linder, was not only incompetent but was also occupied with the pending peace negotiations.

The political struggle between Socialist and non-Socialist forces which instantly beset the new coalition government was especially fierce within the Ministry of Defense. It was the reorganization of the new Hungarian army which aroused the greatest passions; the non-Socialist parties, not without reason, feared Social Democratic intentions concerning the military. As the Social Democrats began to gain the upper hand in this struggle, the unity of Károlyi's political coalition became increasingly strained.

Frightened by this shift within the government in favor of the Social Democrats, Friedrich began to side more and more with the moderate wing of his party headed by Márton Lovászy and Tivadar Batthyányi. By the middle

16. Tivadar Batthyányi, *Beszámolóim*, 2 vols. (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1936), 2:59; Garami, *Forrongó Magyarország*, pp. 22–23.

17. Károlyi, *Egy egész világ ellen*, p. 240.

18. Tibor Hajdu, *Az 1918-as magyarországi polgári demokratikus forradalom* (Budapest: Kossuth, 1968), p. 46.

19. Garami, *Forrongó Magyarország*, p. 22.

20. The account of Friedrich's career handed down in diaries and memoirs by members of the Károlyi government is greatly distorted. They claim that, obscure in the days of October 1918, with no political influence, Friedrich took over the post of undersecretary by simply arriving at the ministry and sitting down in the office of one of the undersecretaries. When the Ministerial Council discovered that he had no official assignment, they took steps to remove the usurper, but Friedrich refused to relinquish his self-appointed post. Böhm, *Két forradalom*, pp. 69–71, and Garami, *Forrongó Magyarország*, p. 55. Elek Karsai repeats the same erroneous story in *Számjeltávirat valamennyi magyar királyi követségnek* (Budapest: Táncsics, 1969), pp. 119–20, as does Gábor Vermes in "The October Revolution in Hungary: From Károlyi to Kun," in *Hungary in Revolution 1918–19*, ed. Iván Völgyes (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971), p. 40. However, Friedrich testified at a preliminary investigation into Tisza's murder that Károlyi had promised this post to him and that he had received a telephone call from the National Council on October 31 asking him "to take over the administration of the Ministry of Defense." *Új Nemzedék*, December 3, 1919. Later, at the trial, Friedrich repeated his story. *Nemzeti Újság. Melléklet. A tárgyalás tizedik napja*, August 12, 1920. Károlyi himself acknowledged at the meeting of the Ministerial Council that Friedrich occupied this position with his approval. O.L., M.j., November 8, 1918.

of November, outsiders could discern the beginning of an open split in the party, with Friedrich's name appearing in a hyphenated form beside that of Lovászy as the nominal heads of the moderate faction.²¹ This moderate wing, without repudiating the principles of the October revolution, wanted a more energetic stance against the growing influence and power of the Social Democrats in the government. At the beginning of December, Friedrich and four other undersecretaries appeared before Károlyi to demand a check to this Socialist shift. They also voiced their opposition to Károlyi's foreign policy as executed by his undersecretary, József Diner-Dénes, a Socialist. When it became evident that Károlyi was either unwilling or unable to meet their demands, Friedrich asked to be relieved of his post. Surprisingly, despite his opposition to the government's composition and foreign policy, Károlyi asked him to remain.²² But, having spoken his mind to Károlyi, Friedrich became more and more a disillusioned adversary of his former idol. When, in January 1919, the party split asunder, Friedrich followed the majority: of the 1,773 members of parliament and associate members of the party, only 411 remained faithful to Károlyi.²³ Lovászy resigned as minister of education, and Friedrich followed suit by leaving his post. The Lovászy-Friedrich-Batthyányi faction became an open opposition party.

In combination with other bourgeois parties which sprang up one after another in the first weeks of the new year, this group posed a serious threat to the Károlyi government at the coming elections. But time was running out for the Károlyi regime—the elections were never held. On March 20, Colonel Ferdinand Vix, head of the French Military Mission in Budapest, handed the Hungarian president a note from the Peace Conference demanding the withdrawal of Hungarian troops beyond a new demarcation line in the East. This line closely approximated the maximum territorial claims of Rumania; if it were to become a political reality, another half-a-million Hungarians would find themselves in Greater Rumania. Károlyi could not accede to this demand, and the coalition government resigned. To everyone's surprise, the Social Democrats refused to form a new government; instead, as a result of a last-minute combination of left-wing Social Democrats and the small, newly-established Communist Party, a proletarian dictatorship, dominated by Béla Kun, the commissar for foreign affairs, was declared.

When Béla Kun assumed power on March 21, 1919, leaders of the bourgeois parties deserted the Hungarian capital and went abroad or to the

21. Miklós Kozma, *Az összeomlás, 1918–1919* (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1933), p. 28. Friedrich dated his disillusionment with Károlyi's political stance from as early as November 3, 1918, when József Pogány, a Social Democrat, was named to head the Soldiers' Council. See Friedrich's testimony at the Tisza trial, *Új Nemzedék*, April 14, 1921.

22. Hajdu, *Polgári demokratikus forradalom*, pp. 234 and 244.

23. Batthyányi, *Beszámolóm*, 2:234–35.

countryside. However, both Lovász and Friedrich decided to remain in Red Budapest, where they were soon embroiled in plots against the new regime. Arrest came on April 19 when, in the face of the Rumanian attack, the Soviet government took hundreds of hostages. Friedrich was condemned to death for his counterrevolutionary activities. What saved him was his appeal to Zsigmond Kunfi, his former Social Democratic colleague in the Károlyi government, who now filled the position of commissar of education. Soon after, with the help of some of his workers, he managed to escape and spent the rest of the Soviet period in hiding.²⁴

By July 1919 it became evident that the days of the Hungarian Soviet Republic were numbered. While the professional counterrevolutionaries in Vienna and in the southern Hungarian city of Szeged spent their energies in party squabbling, a storm was brewing in Hungary. The Soviet government's popular base, small to begin with, had narrowed considerably by June and July. The peasants refused to supply the towns, and the workers expressed their opposition to the government by means of strikes. The middle classes, opposed to the proletarian dictatorship from the very beginning, became more vocal. In June officers staged a counterrevolutionary uprising which was, however, easily put down by the Red Army troops stationed in Budapest. In July small secret societies sprang up which were dedicated to the removal of Béla Kun and his followers. One of these counterrevolutionary groups, which had a longer history than most, was known as the White House. It was this group which was instrumental in the eventual overthrow of the Social Democratic government on August 6, 1919.

The White House had its roots in a secret society, the Hungarian Association (*Magyar Társaság*), formed in 1916 by András Csilléry, a dentist serving as a colonel in the medical corps during the war. Csilléry was an anti-Semite; his Hungarian Association was established in order to maintain "Hungarian supremacy over the extremes of the Jewry."²⁵ By the end of April 1919, the handful of right-wing professionals—lawyers, civil servants, doc-

24. Böhm accused Friedrich of double-dealing in the course of this incident. He claimed that Friedrich wrote a servile letter from jail to the editor of *Vörös Újság*, the official paper of the Communist Party of Hungary, in which he called attention to his democratic and revolutionary past and begged for his release. As a result, Böhm claimed, he was freed after a few weeks of imprisonment. *Két forradalom*, p. 301. Boros, in his *Magyar politikai lexicon* (p. 126), gives the accurate account, which is also confirmed by other sources—for example, by the testimony of Baron Sándor Szurmay, a fellow prisoner, at the Tisza trial. See *Új Nemzedék*, June 12, 1921.

25. This account is based on Csilléry's own recollection. Gyula Lábay, *Az ellenforradalom története az októberi forradalomtól a kommun bukásáig* (Budapest: Élet irodalmi és nyomda rt., 1922), p. 169. Lábay's book, which is actually a compilation of eyewitness accounts told in the first person, is of crucial importance to a proper assessment of Friedrich's role in the coup.

tors—began to meet regularly in Csilléry's apartment and assumed a new name, the White House, which not only corresponded to the color of their meeting place but also signified their counterrevolutionary stance. Soon the organization developed strong ties with military men, mostly members of the MOVE (*Magyar Országos Véderő Egyesület*), a right-wing association of army officers. By July, according to Csilléry, their connections were extensive. For example, they had developed a spy system within the Soviet commissariats and were thus well informed on the inner workings of the government. They could also count on the support of the Budapest police since the chief of police was a White House member. Moreover, the loyalty of some of the army units, in and near the capital, was also ensured.²⁶

The White House members, like everyone else in Budapest, considered the fall of Béla Kun a certainty by July, and accordingly they began thinking about the formation of a new government. They agreed to make one of their own members, Gyula Pekár, a third-rate novelist and playwright, the new prime minister of Hungary in case the group managed to seize power. Pekár, before the revolutions, had belonged to the closest entourage of István Tisza, and during the revolutionary period he had developed a distinctly anti-Semitic, racist ideology.²⁷ The members of the White House were not only ready to repudiate the Soviet measures; they were also enemies of the democratic achievements of the Károlyi revolution.

Friedrich was not a member of the White House. Instead, he worked closely with Márton Lovászy and Albert Bartha, minister of defense in the Károlyi ministry, both of whom had been arrested along with Friedrich in April.²⁸ However, at the very end of July, perhaps because of his earlier acquaintance with Csilléry, Friedrich's path crossed that of the White House. By that time the conspiracy was in full swing. The coup was to take place on July 30, and Pekár was to be installed as prime minister.

The White House coup against the Soviet government never materialized; the destruction of the Red Army by the Rumanians changed the insurgents' plans. On August 1, in the aftermath of military defeat and under mounting pressure from their Social Democratic partners, the Béla Kun government

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 170–73.

27. On Pekár, see *Magyar politikai lexikon*, pp. 325–27, and, more recently, *Magyar irodalmi lexikon*, 3 vols. (Budapest: Akadémia, 1963–67), 2:461–62.

28. Lábay is quite explicit on this point. *Az ellenforradalom*, p. 170. Yet all Marxist secondary sources make Friedrich the head of the White House or at least one of its long-standing members. See especially Nemes, *Az ellenforradalom*, p. 53; Béla Kirschner, *A 'szakszervezeti kormány' hat napja, 1919* (Budapest: Kossuth, 1968), p. 223; Tibor Hajdu, *A Magyarországi Tanácsköztársaság* (Budapest: Kossuth, 1969), p. 354. On Friedrich's close connection with Lovászy and Bartha during the Soviet period, see László Fényes, *Védőbeszéde a Tisza-perben. A forradalom okai és a Tisza-bűnper vádja* (Budapest: Loblowitz, 1922), p. 90.

resigned, and the Social Democrats assumed power. However, almost no one was satisfied with this transfer of leadership. Half of the new cabinet members had been active partners in the Soviet government, and to the population “everything seemed the same in the streets: the red flag was still floating over the county hall, the Red soldiers were leaning out of the guard room window just as they had done during the victories of the dictatorship.”²⁹ The White House, accordingly, persisted with their plans for a coup.

Friedrich, being fully informed of the extensive preparations and the unshakable resolve of the White House to use force against the Peidl government, began negotiations with the Socialist prime minister. He asked Lajos Beck, a former member of the Károlyi party and the governor of the Austro-Hungarian Bank during the Károlyi period, to act as his representative. Friedrich assumed that the Socialists would accede to a plan for major reorganization in the face of the rumored attempts at the overthrow of their government. Beck approached Peidl “for a change of government in an amiable way”;³⁰ he suggested that the government should resign and that a provisional government, in which the Social Democrats would play only a minor role, should be formed. He recommended Márton Lovászy, Friedrich’s close political ally, for the post of prime minister.³¹ Peidl stood firm. He responded in substance: “I am here by the will of the workers, and I will resign only by their will.”³² It was not that Peidl was opposed to forming a coalition government; rather, he was already negotiating with other, in his opinion, more important politicians.³³ Although he was ready to contact Lovászy, he was unwilling to enter into any understanding which would deprive the Social Democratic Party of its commanding role in the provisional government.³⁴ Friedrich’s attempt to prevent the coup through direct negotiations had failed.

29. Cecile Tormay, *An Outlaw's Diary*, 2 vols. (London: P. Allen, 1923), 2:201.

30. Interview with Lajos Beck, *Neue Freie Presse*, August 9, 1919.

31. Beck’s negotiations were widely reported. See Albert Halstead, American commissioner in Vienna, to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, August 9, 1919, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Record Group 59, M820/215/309. Gyula Peidl gave details of his negotiations with Beck in a parliamentary debate on the coup on August 2, 1922. Jenő Kalmár, *Kik hosták be a románokat Budapestre, vagy hogyan ütötték agyon Friedrich, Csilléry, Pekár úrék a magyarországi szociáldemokrata pártot?* (Budapest: Népszava, 1922), p. 122. Kalmár’s book is a reprint of the parliamentary debate.

32. Interview with Lajos Beck, *Neue Freie Presse*, August 9, 1919.

33. On Peidl’s negotiations with István Nagyatádi Szabó, the leader of the Smallholders, and Sándor Giesswein, head of the left wing of the Christian Socialist Party, see Gyula Peidl’s speech in Parliament, August 2, 1922, in Kalmár, *Kik hosták be a románokat*, p. 121.

34. In spite of Peidl’s later protestations to the contrary, the Social Democratic attitude on this question was inflexible. Vilmos Böhm, Peidl’s diplomatic representative in Vienna, rejected an arrangement, suggested by István Bethlen, by which the Social Democrats would receive only one-third of the portfolios while the bourgeois and

After having tried, unsuccessfully, to come to an understanding with the Social Democrats, Friedrich sought support from the only Allied representative in Budapest, Colonel Guido Romanelli. The head of the Italian mission was not ignorant of the existence and plans of the White House; he had already been approached by two representatives of the underground organization in July.³⁵ Yet Friedrich's intervention was in vain. The Italian representative, who had been instrumental in fostering Social Democratic dissatisfaction with the Soviet government, refused to acknowledge the precarious position of his Social Democratic friends. He dismissed Friedrich as an impatient and rash man³⁶ and paid no attention to his demand for the immediate reorganization of the Peidl government.

Once Friedrich realized that the Social Democrats would not negotiate and that Romanelli would not assist in the reorganization of the government, he decided to influence the outcome of the White House conspiracy. On August 3, he warned Lovászy of the impending coup, and the two political allies agreed to cooperate. Lovászy was to travel to Vienna in order to negotiate with the Entente representatives in the Austrian capital while Friedrich was to remain in Budapest, using his influence with the members of the White House. First and foremost, he tried to convince the leaders of the conspiracy to accept Lovászy as prime minister. However, the members of the White House, standing ideologically far to the right of Friedrich, violently objected to Lovászy because "it would mean the return of Vázsonyi and Garami," that is, the Liberal and Social Democratic party leaders. Realizing the solid opposition to his proposal, Friedrich had to drop the idea of Lovászy's candidacy. Nevertheless, he still insisted on the formation of a coalition government which would include the representatives of "the bourgeoisie, the peasantry, and the industrial workers."³⁷ Moreover, looking over the motley group gathered under the aegis of the White House, he decided to "cover their action by someone who had universal prestige."³⁸ He found his man in Archduke Joseph, a distant cousin of the Habsburg king.

peasant parties would share the remaining cabinet posts. Böhm made it clear to Bethlen and to the Allied representatives that his party would not accept "the principle of majority before the elections." See Mrs. Sándor Gábor, "Böhm Vilmos, bécsi magyar követ jelentései a Peidl-kormányhoz és Ágoston Péter külügyminiszterhez," *Párttörténeti Közlemények*, 6 (November 1960): 202.

35. Csilléry's speech in Parliament, August 2, 1922, in Kalmár, *Kik hozták be a románokat*, p. 63.

36. Guido Romanelli, *Nell'Ungheria di Béla Kun e durante l'occupazione militare romana: La mia missione, maggio-novembre 1919* (Udine: Doretti, 1964), p. 337.

37. On the agreement with Lovászy, see *Nemzeti Újság*, October 9, 1919. For Friedrich's insistence on a coalition government which would include the Social Democrats, see Lábay, *Az ellenforradalom*, pp. 174 and 177.

38. Gusztáv Gratz, *A forradalmak kora: Magyarország története, 1918-1920* (Budapest: Magyar Szemle Társaság, 1935), p. 229.

Joseph was a Magyarized Habsburg: he had gone to Hungarian schools, had studied law in Budapest, and in 1904 had served as the commander of the first hussar regiment of Budapest. As field marshal of the common K-und-K army during the war, he had quickly gained the reputation of being an outstanding military man. He was a popular figure in Hungary. At the time of the political crisis of October 1918, King Charles had named him *homo regius* of Hungary, in which capacity he was to settle the crisis and, in the absence of the king, appoint a new government in the king's name. It was he who had appointed the Károlyi government and had sworn its members into office. And he had remained a supporter of the 1918 revolution, with particularly close ties to the moderate wing of the Károlyi party.³⁹ Moreover, Joseph had been friends with Friedrich ever since the young engineer had served as his transportation officer during the war.⁴⁰

Friedrich's insistence on Joseph's governorship was unpopular with members of the White House. Nevertheless, Friedrich called upon the archduke to leave his country estate and come to Budapest. When Pekár heard this news, he announced that Friedrich's move was sheer "madness" which had upset "the rational plans of the White House," and he immediately resigned. The insurgents were thus left without a candidate for prime minister.⁴¹

On August 5 everything was still in flux. Friedrich had made no headway in his negotiations with Peidl and Romanelli, the White House had no candidate for the post of prime minister, and there was a split in their ranks over the governorship of Joseph. Yet the more vehement members of the White House decided to move against the Peidl government on the next day. The reason for their haste was a telephone conversation between Vilmos Böhm, Peidl's minister in Vienna, and a member of the Social Democratic government. On August 5 Böhm phoned Budapest to tell the encouraging news of his meeting with the Allied representatives in Vienna. Although the Allies still insisted on the formation of a representative government, they suggested that this could be accomplished with only a modest reorganization of the cabinet. If the Social Democrats would give two cabinet posts to the Szeged government, they would remain in power. However, the member of the Peidl government who received the call was not the only person to hear the news from Vienna. A White House contact in the telephone company listened in on the conversation and immediately informed Csilléry of its contents. Not only did the Peidl gov-

39. In contrast to most aristocrats, not only did Joseph not call for the removal of the Károlyi government; he even sent the outline of Oszkár Jászi's nationality law to "his dear cousin" in Buckingham Palace as an indication of Hungary's democratic intentions towards the nationalities. Tibor Hajdu, "Adatok a Tanácsköztársaság kikiáltásának történetéhez," *Párttörténeti Közlemények*, 18 (September 1972): 135.

40. Lábay, *Az ellenforradalom*, p. 193.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 177.

ernment have no intention of resigning; if it were not overthrown, it might soon be recognized by the Allies. Böhm's telephone call confirmed the counter-revolutionaries' worst fears and increased their sense of urgency. They must take over power quickly, before the Social Democrats gained Allied support.⁴²

On the evening of August 6, three of the conspirators—András Csilléry, General Ferenc Schnetzer, a friend of Friedrich, and Jakab Bleyer, a professor of German at the University of Budapest—went to Buda. At about 7:00 P.M., under the protection of forty Hungarian mounted police,⁴³ they made their way into the prime minister's palace in the *Vár* where the Ministerial Council was then in session. After a brief exchange, in which members of the council promised major governmental reorganization, Peidl acceded to the wishes of the insurgents. The takeover had been carried out expeditiously and peacefully.

Friedrich's negotiator, Lajos Beck, had tried, up until the very last moment, to arrange for a voluntary transfer of power. He stopped Csilléry in the corridor of the prime minister's palace before the conspirators entered the Ministerial Council meeting and offered his services as a middleman between Peidl and Csilléry. Csilléry, who may or may not have known that Beck was Friedrich's political ally, refused, asserting that he had "nothing to say to this gentleman."⁴⁴ Thus, despite Friedrich's best efforts, the Hungarian nation experienced the first coup d'état in its history.

In the meantime, while the takeover was in progress, discussions concerning the composition of the future cabinet took place in the Bristol Hotel where Archduke Joseph was staying. After some hesitation, Friedrich accepted the premiership, but, as Lábay noted, "there was no one else to take it anyway."⁴⁵ Indeed, once it was agreed that the archduke would be the provisional governor of Hungary, Friedrich, the man who had been his chief confidant in the days of the Károlyi regime and who had suggested his governorship in the first place, was the logical choice for prime minister.

42. Peidl eventually denied that such a telephone conversation had ever taken place. See his speech in Parliament, August 2, 1922, in Kalmár, *Kik hosták be a románokat*, p. 121. However, Böhm's well-documented discussions with István Bethlen and the Entente representatives only a day before the alleged telephone conversation indirectly support the claim of the insurgents. For details, see Gábor, "Böhm Vilmos jelentései," pp. 200–203.

43. The police officer instrumental in providing police protection for the insurgents was none other than Károly Kormos, the same man who had been the spokesman for the revolutionary faction of the Budapest police force in October 1918. As early as October 29, 1918, Kormos announced the allegiance of the police to the National Council. See László Bús Fekete (pseud.), *Katona-forradalmárok* (Budapest: Újságüzem, 1918), p. 39. On Kormos's role in the coup, see his testimony at the Tisza trial, *Nemzeti Újság. Melléklet. A tárgyalás tizenötödik napja*, August 17, 1920, and Károly Dietz, *Októbertől augusztusig* (Budapest: Rácz Vilmos, 1920), p. 160.

44. Lábay, *Az ellenforradalom*, pp. 190–91.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 193.

In Budapest the response to news of the coup was enthusiastic. The Peidl government had, from its formation, enjoyed almost no popular support, and the people welcomed a change in leadership. As Francis Deák commented: "Whatever criticism may be made of the unconventional method whereby they took over the government . . . , it cannot be denied that they were acting in conformity with popular sentiment."⁴⁶ Social democracy had been discredited in Hungary, and, although the population was in the dark concerning the immediate future of the country, the passing of revolutionary Hungary went unmourned.

Once stripped of fifty years of distortion by contemporaries and historians, István Friedrich ceases to be the leader of an "open counterrevolutionary dictatorship"⁴⁷ or even the key figure in the White House conspiracy. On the contrary, he was a lonely politician from the Károlyi period holding unpopular ideas in the alien surroundings of right radicalism. His influence on the actual execution of the coup was minimal. The original leaders of the conspiracy were bent on removing the Peidl government from power, and the White House, even without Friedrich's participation, had the necessary means to execute the coup. His neutrality or even opposition to the plans of the White House would not have changed the outcome of the independently prepared plot. It was this lack of influence within the White House organization which forced Friedrich to seek direct agreement with Gyula Peidl. By approaching first the Social Democrats and later Colonel Romanelli for an immediate reorganization of the cabinet, Friedrich hoped to prevent the coup which otherwise seemed inevitable.

As for Friedrich's political ideas at the time of the coup, his allegiance seems clear. He suggested Márton Lovászy, the leader of the moderate faction of the Károlyi government, for the post of prime minister; he employed Lajos Beck, another moderate Károlyi follower, for his negotiations with Peidl; he insisted on a coalition government which would have included the Social Democrats, and he asked Archduke Joseph, who had appointed and supported the first Károlyi ministry, to be provisional governor of the country. István Friedrich, by all indications, seems to have envisaged, at the time of the coup, the establishment of a government which would salvage some of the achievements of the October revolution of 1918. To be precise, he wanted to reestablish the early phases of the Károlyi regime but to exclude the later shift which had given the Social Democratic Party a dominant voice in the affairs of state.

46. Francis Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference: The Diplomatic History of the Treaty of Trianon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942), p. 116.

47. Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt. Központi Bizottság. Párttörténeti Intézet, *A magyar forradalmi munkásmozgalom története*, 3 vols. (Budapest: Kossuth, 1966–70), 2:7.

The establishment of the *ancien régime*, pure and simple, was not one of Friedrich's aims. Not only do his activities before and during the coup make such an accusation baseless; his whole political past excluded such a stance. He was, after all, one of the most outspoken, if minor, critics of István Tisza's regime;⁴⁸ moreover, he had been heavily involved in the Károlyi government. If his government were bent on persecuting not only those who had embraced the Soviet cause but also those who had supported the first revolution, the prime minister himself would have been a victim of this purge. Yet, although Friedrich was innocent of the charge of complete restoration, he was not entirely blameless in fostering this accusation; his government's stand on this critical issue remained unclear. Friedrich announced at the very first meeting of the Ministerial Council that "the government is returning to the legal status as existed on October 31, 1918," that is, the first day of the victorious revolution and the swearing in of the Károlyi government, but he also added that "all appointments which were made since will be reviewed."⁴⁹ The first part of the announcement left no doubt that Friedrich and his government were ready to recognize the validity of Károlyi's revolutionary government. However, the second part of the statement in many ways negated the optimistic sense of the first and left Friedrich open to the charge of a complete restoration of the old regime. One reason for these accusations was that most of the appointments in the Károlyi ministries, even some of the cabinet appointments, had been made after October 31. Most of the undersecretaries, among them Friedrich himself, had been appointed only in the first weeks of November. Friedrich's desire to restore the initial stages of the Károlyi revolution but not its later development (which had, after all, resulted in the proclamation of the Soviet Republic) was couched in language which could easily be misinterpreted and used against him. Moreover, Hungary had not become a republic until November 16, and returning to the legal status of October 31 might have included the restoration of King Charles.

In spite of Friedrich's genuine efforts to reestablish a moderate democratic regime, he was soon labeled an arch-reactionary and one of the instigators of the white terror. His insistence on the governorship of Archduke Joseph cast doubt on his democratic convictions from the beginning. This was especially true in the West and in the Successor States, where the name Habsburg was synonymous with reaction and the *ancien régime*. Although the *Neues Wiener Tageblatt* reported that "the appointment of M. Friedrich as

48. Friedrich established a newspaper, *A Nép*, in cooperation with the Socialist poet Sándor Csizmadia. See Friedrich's testimony at the Tisza trial, *Új Nemzedék*, April 14, 1921. Nándor Korcsmáros, a vehement opponent of Friedrich, quoted at length from *A Nép* to show his brutal attacks on the Tisza regime and to discredit Friedrich as a turncoat. *Forradalom és emigráció* (Vienna, 1923), pp. 78–79.

49. O.L., M.j., August 7, 1919.

Premier, despatches from Budapest assert, is generally accepted by Hungarian politicians as assurance that the Government will be democratic bourgeois and not monarchistic in tone,"⁵⁰ R. W. Seton-Watson summed up the predominant reaction to the archduke: "Today Joseph . . . , to-morrow Andrassy, Apponyi, Szmrecsányi and all the old gang."⁵¹ In vain did Friedrich insist that, in spite of the presence of the archduke, he and his government stood on a democratic platform and were ready to abide by the decision of the first parliament, chosen by universal suffrage, on the issue of constitutional form and on the composition of the permanent government.⁵² From the start, suspicion surrounding Friedrich's involvement in the coup and his choice of a Habsburg as governor marked him as a man of reaction.

The provisional cabinet which was hastily formed on August 7, 1919, should have calmed any fears about Friedrich's intentions. Its composition reflected the civil servant revolt against the Peidl government which, by the time of the coup, had brought governmental operations to a halt.⁵³ Friedrich's first ministry was composed almost entirely of former undersecretaries of the Károlyi period, a clear indication that he did not plan to return to the pre-October 31 situation.⁵⁴ Moreover, the "civil service" government, as it came to be known, was a guarantee that Friedrich was prepared to wait for the return of émigré politicians and would then form a government representing parties of all ideological colorings, including the moderate Social Democrats.

The prospects for democracy seemed brighter than one would have expected after a coup d'état. The new prime minister repeatedly emphasized that

50. Reported in the *New York Times*, August 9, 1919.

51. R. W. Seton-Watson, "The Fall of Béla Kun," *The New Europe*, 12 (July-October 1919): 99.

52. O.L., M.j., August 7, 1919.

53. The text of the memorandum handed to Gyula Peidl by an interministerial delegation demanding a reorganization of the government was read by Csillery in Parliament, August 2, 1922; in Kalmár, *Kik hozták be a románokat*, pp. 75-76. Peidl refused their demands.

54. In fact, Péter Ágoston, Peidl's foreign minister, stated in his diary that "the new government reestablished the status of March 21, 1919," that is, the status quo prior to the Communist takeover. Ágnes Szabó, comp., "Részletek Ágoston Péter naplójából," *Párttörténeti Közlemények*, 9 (May 1963): 162. (Henceforth cited as Ágoston, "Napló.") Some Marxist historians, on the other hand, in their effort to prove the "counterrevolutionary" nature of the Friedrich government, resort to outright historical falsification. Dezső Nemes finds it necessary to make and even emphasize the untrue claim that the undersecretaries chosen for the provisional cabinet posts "were undersecretaries of the pre-1918 regime." *Az ellenforradalom*, p. 35. He thereby implies that Friedrich's ministers were officials who had been removed after the victory of the 1918 revolution. Although some of the undersecretaries had been employed in lesser posts in the ministries prior to October 31, 1918, all without exception served as undersecretaries in the Károlyi government. Some also came to the Károlyi regime as new political appointees. See *Magyar életrajzi lexikon*, passim.

“the government is filled not with revenge but with the spirit of compassion and conciliation,”⁵⁵ and, going against public sentiment, he took his stand against wholesale reprisals. For example, when demands were made to expel all those municipal employees who had taken part in the Soviet administration, Friedrich disagreed. “I do understand that these men were in a difficult situation, that they have families, and that they were unable to refuse. . . . Gentlemen, please be very careful.”⁵⁶ In the first few days after the coup Friedrich envisaged punishment only for those who had been directly involved in clearly unlawful acts—for example, the murderous gang of the Lenin boys. However, while the majority of the anti-Bolsheviks were satisfied with verbal denunciations at this early stage, public wrath against the former Bolshevik regime and its supporters (expressed in anti-Semitism) occasionally assumed violent forms, upsetting the longed-for tranquillity.⁵⁷ The government promptly made its stand on the issue clear when, on August 8, it published a proclamation in which Friedrich warned the population against any arbitrary acts against the Communists. He promised that the guilty ones would be punished through legal means and called the public’s attention to the fact that anti-Semitism “would lower our moral value before the eyes of the world.” He warned that officials who “forget their duty” and “students who participate in the disturbances” would be removed from their posts and expelled from the universities.⁵⁸

55. *Budapesti Közlöny*, August 9, 1919.

56. *Budapesti Közlöny*, August 10, 1919 (morning).

57. Anti-Semitic outbursts, especially at the universities, were the greatest domestic problems facing the new government. On August 6 fights broke out between Jewish and non-Jewish students in the cafeterias. Jenő Gaál, *Élmények és tanulságok* (Budapest: Magyar Történelmi Társulat, 1940), p. 554. The next day Jewish officials were beaten by students. Ágoston, “Napló,” p. 160; Ferenc Harrer, *Egy magyar polgár élete* (Budapest: Gondolat, 1964), p. 430. Eventually, the universities had to be closed for an indefinite period of time. See the rector’s announcement in *Budapesti Közlöny*, September 28, 1919. As for the widespread denunciations, Gyula Hevesi, a high Communist official in hiding, remembered that “the anti-Communist denunciations to the district police stations were so numerous that the police were unable to register them all.” Gyula Hevesi, *Egy mérnök a forradalomban* (Budapest: Kossuth, 1965), p. 294.

58. *Budapesti Közlöny*, August 8, 1919. Friedrich was himself accused of being anti-Semitic. See, for example, Malbone Watson Graham, *The New Governments of Central Europe* (London: Pitman and Sons, 1924), p. 250. Contradicting these charges, Gusztáv Gratz reports that Friedrich appointed Jenő Polnay, director of the Atlantica Shipping Company, as his first minister of food. “Polnay was a close friend of Friedrich, and he was a Jew. The original idea was that Jakab Bleyer would also take part in the first ministry, and accordingly he showed up at the first Ministerial Council meeting. But when he found the Jewish Polnay there, he would not take the portfolio. Csilléry also shared Bleyer’s view. The latter gave up his appointment when Friedrich announced that the Entente demanded the presence of a Jew in the cabinet, which, by the way, was untrue. Bleyer, on the other hand, could not be persuaded. . . . When the officials of the Ministry of Food heard that in the person of Polnay they were getting a Jewish minister,

All in all, contemporary liberal opinion seemed to be justified when it hoped that Hungarian democracy might not be completely lost. To Ferenc Harrer, a staunch supporter of the Károlyi regime and its minister to Vienna, it seemed that "the events after all would return, if not to the line of the October revolution, at least to a democratic and progressive political life."⁵⁹ And even such a violent opponent of Friedrich as the Socialist Nándor Korcsmáros had to admit that Friedrich's initial program "was the very same program which had been announced by the Peidl government."⁶⁰

The reestablishment of a democratic regime was not an easy proposition in postrevolutionary Hungary. Public opinion was swinging dangerously to the right, and after a year of political chaos and uncertainty the population was becoming increasingly disillusioned with the entire political process. Nevertheless, in mid-August 1919 there were grounds for optimism: with the exception of the Social Democrats, all parties decided to join Friedrich's government. Lovászy, the hope of the Liberals, became minister for foreign affairs; István Nagyatádi Szabó, the powerful peasant leader, headed the Ministry of Agriculture. Only the Social Democrats refused to cooperate. In itself, Social Democratic opposition would not have posed a serious threat to Friedrich's government, for the Socialists represented only about 10 percent of the population.⁶¹ But the Allies insisted on their inclusion. As long as they refused to

they almost revolted. Archduke Joseph and Friedrich themselves went to the ministry and tried to calm the officials and to warn them against religious intolerance." Gratz, *A forradalmak kora*, pp. 233 and 235. See also Friedrich's warning words concerning the incident in *Budapesti Közlöny*, August 8, 1919.

Vilmos Vázsonyi, the liberal Jewish leader of the National Democratic Party, testified in Parliament that Friedrich's government had initially showed no signs of anti-Semitism and that Friedrich personally was in no way involved in any acts of violence against Communists or Jews. In fact, he tried to save them from the public wrath. See Kalmár, *Kik hozták be a románokat*, pp. 75-7. Gratz also called Friedrich, before and during the Károlyi revolution, "a pro-Semite flirting with Zionism." *Revolution and Counter-Revolution*, p. 156. It is true, however, that in the early 1920s Friedrich moved in the direction of anti-Semitism.

59. Harrer, *Egy magyar polgár élete*, p. 446.

60. Korcsmáros, *Forradalom és emigráció*, p. 71.

61. The Social Democrats, claiming persecution and terror, refused to participate in the first postwar elections on January 25, 1920. The party, however, did instruct its followers to cast blank ballots signifying their political stance. In Budapest, the most industrial city, 19.3 percent of the ballots cast were blank. However, this figure also includes genuinely void ballots. See Ágnes Ságvári, ed., *Források Budapest múltjából*, 4 vols. (Budapest: Budapest Főváros Levéltára, 1972), 3:24. The elections proved to be a resounding defeat for the Liberals and Social Democrats. For example, out of the 37,266 votes cast in Kispest, a suburb of the capital which had been called Red Kispest even before the war, only 10,203 were blank. The Christian Social candidate won the election with an absolute majority of 19,921 votes. *Nemzeti Újság*, January 30, 1920. Trade union membership also declined drastically. While in 1917 there were 215,222 members and in 1918 membership almost tripled, in 1920 Social Democratic trade unions

join the coalition, no Allied recognition would be forthcoming. The survival of Friedrich's government therefore depended on the will of the Socialist leaders. Moreover, the Allies put additional pressure on the new cabinet by supporting Miklós Horthy's National Army, whose right-wing officers were violently opposed to the liberal tone of Friedrich's government.

The new Hungarian regime was caught between two groups, both of which enjoyed Allied backing: the intransigent Social Democrats and the National Army. In November 1919, under the guidance of the Paris Peace Conference's special representative, Sir George Clerk, these two groups temporarily joined hands in order to force István Friedrich's resignation. Their pact allowed Horthy's National Army to enter the capital and initiate a reign of terror in "the sinful city," as Horthy called Budapest.⁶² What followed was one of the most shameful periods in Hungarian history. Although on paper apolitical and subordinate to the government, the military, for all practical purposes, ruled the country. Lynchings, mob attacks on individuals, mysterious murders, and other unspeakable atrocities were committed in the name of nationalism and Christianity. It would be two years before the power of the extreme right could be checked.

The failure of István Friedrich indicated that the liberalism which had inspired the revolution of 1918 no longer had a place in Hungarian political life. The mood of the country had changed. Even when, in 1921, Count István Bethlen brought about a consolidation of political life, it was the conservative forces of the *ancien régime* who were triumphant. The liberals failed either to recruit a sizable following or to gain a commanding voice in the affairs of state. Hungarian society was not ready for the democratic transformation envisaged in 1918.

could boast only 152,441 members. See Samu Jászai, *A magyar szakszervezetek története* (Budapest: Magyarországi Szakszervezeti Tanács, 1925), pp. 272-73. Vilmos Vázsonyi, a Liberal politician and an ally of the Social Democratic Party in 1919, estimated that at the forthcoming elections "there would be no *ten* socialists elected out of about 200 deputies." J. Schiopul to George D. Herron, September 11, 1919, George D. Herron Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

62. Ságvári, ed., *Források Budapest múltjából*, 3:21. Horthy's address to the inhabitants of Budapest on November 16, 1919, included references to the denial of Budapest's thousand-year-old past, red rags, and alienation from the national ideal. Altogether it was written in the spirit of revenge. It can be profitably compared to Archduke Joseph's address to the municipal delegation which visited him a day after he was named governor. In it Joseph repeatedly talked about his "beloved Budapest" and asked "God's blessing on this city." See *Budapesti Közlöny*, August 10, 1919 (morning).