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The European Union as a destination of Turkish migrants in 2008–2018

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Abstract

In the 1950s and 1960s, Europe was a popular migration destination for Turkish people due to its employment opportunities. Today, however, these labor market drivers of migration destinations in the EU-28 have been superseded. This article empirically investigates the drivers of the migration destinations of Turkish newcomers to EU countries between 2008–2018. It contributes to the literature by focusing only on Turkish newcomers, whereas other studies rely on migration stock data. Using data provided by the OECD, Eurostat, and the World Bank, the findings show that security-based and social drivers mostly attract Turkish newcomers to EU-28 destinations, specifically a demand for democracy and social networks.

Keywords: Democracy; migration destination; migration flow; migration networks; newcomers

Introduction

A migration destination is the best place among different possible locations that can more-or-less satisfy all of a migrant’s potential needs, i.e. the place offering the highest expected utility (Geis et al. 2015). For decades, besides countries like Australia, Canada, the USA, and those in the Gulf, Europe has been a popular migration destination for Turkish people (İçduygu and Kirişi 2009). Turkish migration stock (by country of birth) in EU member states has been increasing since 1960 (UNDESA 2017b; World Bank 2011): in 2017 there were 2,668,826 people1 from Turkey in the EU-28 (see Graph 1), with more than 1.5 million in Germany alone.

We hypothesize that the favorable labor market conditions in the destination is no longer the strongest driver of the migration destinations of Turkish citizens. Instead, security-based, social, and geographical drivers may also play a key role. This article empirically investigates the main motivations for Turkish people to migrate to EU

1 According to the UN Handbook on Measuring International Migration through Population Censuses (UNDESA 2017a), immigrant stock includes all native-born persons, whether citizens or foreigners, who emigrated and returned thereafter, and all foreign-born persons, including citizens born abroad who immigrated.

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destinations and contributes to the literature by paying special attention to Turkish newcomers in the twenty-first century.2

Unlike previous studies (Dedeoğlu and Genç 2017; Fafchamps and Shilpi 2013; Jennissen 2003; Mayda 2010; Nica 2015; Pânzaru 2013; Tabor et al. 2015; Van Der Gaag and Van Wissen 2008; Winter 2019) which relied on migration stock data, this article aims to identify the relevant drivers of Turkish migrants’ EU destinations in the 2000s and 2010s using migration flow data at the macro level. The scope is limited to Turkish people in the EU-28 who obtained their first long-term residence permits (i.e. for more than 12 months) between 2008 and 2018, the longest period data permits. The article uses evidence-based research through security-based, labor market, social, and geographical drivers blending data from Eurostat, UNDESA, the OECD, and the World Bank. The regression analysis shows that Turkish newcomers are mostly attracted to EU countries because of social networks and a demand for democracy.

The next section reviews the literature, after which the focus turns to the history of migration from Turkey to Europe in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Then the method and data are described. The findings are presented and discussed before the conclusion is presented in the final section.

Literature review

The drivers of choosing a migration destination

Several studies (De Jong and Gardner 1981; Faist 2000; Hagen-Zanker 2008; Hemmerechts et al. 2014) have categorized the drivers of migration decision as follows: (1) societal-level (macro) studies explain aggregate migration trends as a part of the social, political, and economic development of a country; (2) household-level (meso) studies link migration cause or perpetuation to household or community based on social ties and networks; and (3) individual-level (micro) studies examine individual values, desires, and expectations focusing on the cost-benefit calculation

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2 Turkey refers to their home country, and the 28 EU Member States refer to destination countries.
of potential immigrants. Since this article focuses on the macro level, it adopts the word “drivers” commonly used for the macro level analysis (Carling and Collins 2017). Based on these works (Carling and Collins 2017), we adopt Dudu’s (2018) re-categorization which divides the characteristics of migration destinations into four groups: security-based, labor market, social, and geographic drivers (see Figure 1).

**Figure 1.** Drivers of migration destination.
Source: Dudu (2018).

**Security-based drivers**

Security-based drivers have links with migration caused by obligations (human insecurity) due to the public or private actions (like war conditions, slavery, and human trafficking) and environmental disasters (like climate change or destructive earthquakes) (Dudu 2018; De Jong and Gardner 1981; George 1970). A valid legal residence status is a security measure (Eurostat 2011) that eliminates the fear of deportation (Fasani 2014). Gaining a legal residence document is easier in a destination country with an open border immigration policy (Bartram 2010; Velasco 2016), therefore, potential immigrants may consider a country’s immigrant-friendly policies when choosing a destination (Carling 2002; Ozcurumuz and Yetkin Aker 2016). An immigrant with a work permit can enjoy the opportunity to work, unemployment benefits, and bargaining power over wages and working conditions (Bailey 1987; Fasani 2014; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2000; Rivera-Batiz 1999).
Despite the visa restrictions, “a well-founded fear of persecution in their home country based on their race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group” (UNHCR 1951) is the reason for seeking asylum. However, these people can also apply for long-term residence permits abroad if they meet the requirements.

Running away from social and/or political pressure is a strong security-based migration motivation. For example, LGBTQ+ people may want to leave their home countries due to social pressure and choose a country with broader democratic rights. Similarly, highly skilled women suffering from gender inequalities may decide to migrate abroad (Elveren and Toksöz 2019). Some minority groups might face social exclusion such as alienation and lack of freedom (Bhalla and Lapeyre 1997) and social coercion, that is, the constraint experienced as a result of people’s attitudes and opinions (Aseh 1955; De Crespigny 1964), which hinder their participation in daily social and economic activities (Chakravarty and D’Ambrosio 2006). People may wish to emigrate to a country where they can avoid social exclusion (Abrahamson 1995), even if this means becoming a minority multiple times (e.g. being an immigrant LGBTQ+).

People may desire to immigrate when their home country does not provide democratic conditions—the right to be protected, the right to participate in the political process, and the right to equal status (Cedefop 1998; Lawson 1991; Sirkeci and Ergüloğlu Utku 2020). Escape through emigration from social coercion and political oppression is related to identity (Benson and O’Reilly 2016) because of the emigrants’ desire to express themselves freely.

The EUMAGINE project conducted a survey and in-depth semi-structured interviews in Morocco, Turkey, Ukraine, and Senegal between 2010 and 2013. The results demonstrated the role of perceptions on human rights and democracy over migration aspirations (Carling and Schewel 2017; Hemmerechts et al. 2014). It showed that the EU has a positive image in terms of democracy and human rights in the migration-impacted districts of Turkey (Timmerman et al. 2014).

**Labor market drivers**

The labor market drivers are more employment opportunities, higher wages, lower cost of living, and better working conditions (like fewer working hours) (Tabor et al. 2015). According to Jennissen (2003), Keynesian economic theory attributes international migration to employment rate differences (Piore 1979), while neo-classical economic theory (Sjaastad 1962) explains it as the consequence of wage differences, which lead to differences in income (Harris and Todaro 1975).

**Social drivers**

Social drivers include cultural similarities. For example, interviews with people who migrated from the UK to New Zealand revealed that cultural similarities affected the migration destination. They believed that living in New Zealand is similar to living in the UK due to the cultural overlap, but ultimately life there is better than in the UK (Tabor et al. 2015).

Another advantage for easier adaptation is speaking the language of the destination country or having linguistic proximity between the immigrant’s language and
the language of the destination country so as not to face a language barrier (Eurostat 2009; Tabor et al. 2015). If newcomers cannot speak the primary language in the destination country, then they generally work in the enterprises of earlier immigrants from the same region. These migration networks can help the newcomer integrate more quickly (Dudu 2018).

Migration networks are created through kinship or cultural ties (Guilmoto and Sandron 2001; Hagen-Zanker 2008). Such networks help newcomers to adapt by providing support regarding jobs, housing, education, and cultural issues (Beine et al. 2010). Another feature of migration networks is remittances from the destination to the origin country (Day and İçduygu 1999). Migration networks also provide information to newcomers before they arrive (Hagen-Zanker 2008; Roseman 1983).

**Geographical drivers**

A moderate climate (De Jong and Fawcett 1981; European Commission 2006; Lee 1965; Tabor et al. 2015; Thompson 2017) and environmental quality, including landscape (Berger and Blomquist 1992; Tabor et al. 2015), cause retirement migration from powerful economies to countries with moderate climates to reduce the risks of living on a low retirement income (Karakaya and Turan 2006; Özerim 2012; Südaş 2009; Williams et al. 1997). It also includes lifestyle migration, which refers to migration to achieve a more fulfilling lifestyle (Torkington 2010). For example, UK citizens living in Portugal’s Algarve region have migrated for lifestyle reasons, including a moderate climate, slower pace of life, healthier diet, more sociable culture, and more leisure opportunities (Torkington 2010). Interestingly, Turkish migration stock in the Mediterranean-European countries like Italy, Spain, and Portugal—presumably attractive due to their moderate climate—has been increasing slowly but steadily in recent years (UNDESA 2017b).

The destination choice is also affected by the distance between the destination and the country of origin (Dedeoğlu and Genç 2017). Distance increases travel costs and time, and limits the available means of transportation. Thus, a nearby destination country may be attractive for feeling close to the home country, while a potential immigrant is more likely have options to travel by road, rail, or sea.

**Modeling the drivers of migration destinations**

Linear regression is a commonly used technique for modeling migration destination (Rogers 2006). Some studies (Nica 2015; Pânzaru 2013; Winter 2019) showed the importance of economic drivers such as the cost of living, income opportunities, GDP, and the unemployment rate. Others (Geis et al. 2015; Mayda 2010; Tabor et al. 2015) demonstrated the significance of non-economic factors such as quality of life, safety, environment, and cultural similarity, as well as a migrant-friendly perception, good education and health systems, and the existence of migration networks.

Dedeoğlu and Genç (2017) examined Turkey as a home country, focusing on migration drivers for 31 European destination countries. They drew on the gravity model, which emphasizes distance over migration destinations. Their main findings were as follows: better economic conditions strengthen Turkish nationals’ migration to that country; populations in the home and destination countries increase migration stock; Turkish migration stock in Europe significantly influences the migration choices.
Turkish nationals make; and “volume of immigration decreases with distance and conversely increases with contiguity” (Dedeoğlu and Genç 2017, 14).

Migration destinations: history of migration from Turkey to Europe

Turkish migration stock (by country of birth) has been increasing in EU member states since 1960 (UNDESA 2017b; World Bank 2011). Historically, this migration flow was stimulated by demand for labor, predominantly in Germany due to the “guest-worker scheme” of 1961 (Abadan-Unat 2017; Çağlar and Soysal 2003; Erdoğan 2015; Toksöz 2006), which allowed workers to migrate for as long as there were jobs for them, on the condition that they returned to their home countries when demand dropped (Hansen 2003), but also in other countries like France (in 1965), Austria (in 1964), the Netherlands (in 1964), Belgium (in 1964), and Sweden (in 1967). The Turkish government of the 1960s thought that this agreement provided an opportunity to increase Turkey’s skilled labor force by its predominantly low-skilled workers undergoing training in Germany (Abadan-Unat 2017), while increasing Turkey’s remittance earnings (Martin 2012). These agreements are one reason for these countries’ large Turkish populations today. After Turkish workers came to Europe, applications from Turkey for family reunifications increased.

During the 1970s, however, Turkish immigrants to Europe were equally motivated by political as by economic factors due to conflict between the political left and right. Escalating political polarization in Turkey led to the 1980 military coup, and in that year alone, more than 60,000 people applied for asylum in the EU-15, almost all of whom (59,424 people) chose Germany as their destination (Sirkeci and Esipova 2013; UNHCR 2001). Given that potential immigrants tend to prefer a destination country with a strong migration network, they may have preferred Germany because of its massive Turkish migration stock (75 percent of the total number in Europe) (UNHCR 2001).

In the mid-1980s, a conflict erupted in Turkey between the Turkish government and the separatist militant Kurdish Workers’ Party, due to the Turkish state’s long-standing assimilation policies towards the Kurdish minority (Sirkeci 2003). This resulted in an increase in the number of asylum seekers during the 1990s. In 2002, following the 2001 economic crisis, the AKP (the Justice and Development Party), with a democratic Islamic identity, took power (Yavuz 2006). During its early years in government, during a period of economic stability (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013), the emigration of Turkish citizens slowed. In the 2010s, however, the number of highly skilled migrants from Turkey to the EU increased as a result of two main factors: the authoritarian policies and practices of the AKP and the loss of economic stability. In particular, highly skilled Turkish citizens emigrated due to increased state interference and authoritarian policies (Sánchez-Montijano et al. 2018). Several studies, which used in-depth interviews and online surveys (Elveren 2018; Ozcurumez and Yetkin Aker 2016; Sunata 2010; Yanasmayan 2019), investigated the migration of highly skilled workers from Turkey to developed regions like the countries of the EU, the USA, and Canada in the 2000s and 2010s. They concurred that drivers other than labor market factors, such as social networks, familial consideration, quality-of-life explanations, the social-cultural-political context in the destination country, and demand for better governance and civic society also impact individuals’ migration
destination choices. During this period, the war in Syria (started in 2011) and terrorist attacks, such as the Suruç bombing (in 2015), the Istanbul Atatürk Airport attack (in 2016), the 15 July coup attempt (in 2016), and the Reina Nightclub shooting (in 2017), increased instability in Turkey.

Since each organization collects data using different sources and methods, the number of Turkish migrants in Europe is a matter of dispute today. For example, UNDESA (2017b) declares that Turkish migrant stock numbered 2,668,172 people in the EU in 2017. On the other hand, Turkey’s Ministry of Labor and Social Protection reported the Turkish migrant population at 4,933,598 in 2015 (including 2,544,141 dual citizens) in 14 EU member states (see Graph 1) (DİYİH 2015).3

Up until recently, Turkish people have been able to gain legal residence status in the UK under the Ankara Agreement, signed in 1963. However, this Agreement was never implemented in other European countries due to several economic and political obstacles, including German concerns about increasing numbers of Turkish immigrants, thus, the rights gained remain limited (Cesarz 2015; Düzenli Halat 2010; Öğuz 2012; Yalincak 2013). From 1973, the UK implemented the Ankara Agreement by offering Turkish nationals one-year work visas (extendable for three more years). Each year, thousands of Turkish citizens applied for a UK visa. For example, in 2017, 2,925 Turkish people applied for the Ankara Agreement visa, but only 1,430 visas were granted. In total, 77,220 visas were granted through the Ankara Agreement between 1997 and 2017 (Migrants’ Rights Network 2018). Since the UK is no longer a member of the EU as of the end of 2020, this Agreement does not apply anymore.

Aside from the demand for workers from European states, Turkey’s insecure labor market has played a crucial role in this migration flow. The lower unemployment rate in many Western European countries compared to Turkey during 2008–2018 (Eurostat 2019a) encouraged Turkish immigrants to remain in Europe even if Europe’s demand for their labor had decreased. Since 2009, however, due to the global economic crisis, many countries with labor force agreements with Turkey have reduced the number of first permits and visas for 12 months or longer for Turkish citizens (Eurostat 2019b). The economic slowdown caused job losses, with immigrants facing the inevitability of returning home (Skeldon 2010).

To sum up, the most significant drivers for Turkish emigrants choosing a destination in Europe have changed over the decades. In the 1960s, the labor market was the most significant driver, while security-based drivers became equally important in the 1970s before predominating in the 1980s–1990s. Due to Turkey’s economic and political stability in the 2000s, emigration to Europe stagnated.

Data and methods

Data

This article uses panel data blended from the databases of the OECD, Eurostat, and the World Bank. The central hypothesis is that the labor market, which was a key factor during the twentieth century, is no longer the only significant driver for choosing a

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3 Comprising Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the UK.
The article focuses on documented (i.e. legal) immigrants. The dependent variable is the number of first residence permits issued (i.e. for more than 12 months; the abbreviation is “FirstPermit”) to Turkish nationals (Eurostat 2019b). Since people prefer to immigrate to countries where they can more easily obtain a residence permit, the security-based drivers are effective over the documented immigrants. A person who fears persecution in Turkey can apply for and hold a long-term residence permit in the EU because the line between the concepts “voluntary” and “forced” migration is blurred (De Haas 2021) (see Table 1).

In 2018 almost half of the first residence permits received by Turkish nationals were issued for family reasons, which is a social driver resulting from the connection with migration networks. In contrast, although labor migration used to be an important reason for Turkish nationals entering Europe, only around 16 percent of the permits were issued for labor reasons (Eurostat 2019b) (see Table 2). Other studies (Kiriçi 2007; Kulu-Glasgow and Leerkes 2013; Timmerman et al. 2009) also report that currently many Turkish immigrants continue to move to the EU for family reasons.

The following are the independent variables:

**Security-based drivers**
- **Freedoms**: The democracy index percentile ranks each country compared to others on, among other things, the freedom to elect the government,

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4 The share of first permits issued (for 12 months or more) from Turkey has never exceeded 0.7% of the total population of any EU member state as calculated by dividing each country’s total population into the number of the first permits issued.
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and having a free media (World Bank 2019). Since democracy, which is the fundament of human rights (Kirchschlaeger 2014), includes being free from fear, we use this variable as a security-based driver. This variable controls the possibility of whether Turkish citizens emigrate due to the authoritarian policies in the given period or not.

### Labor market drivers

- **Emp**: Employment rate (OECD 2018). It is highly correlated to earnings and GDP. Since the prerequisite for earning well is to have a job, we chose the employment rate instead of earnings and GDP.
- **Wage**: Compensation of employees (Eurostat 2020). Since the data were in national currencies and some countries are not in the Eurozone, compensation in these countries was converted to Euros according to the currency rate in the December of each year (Trading Economics 2020). Compensation in Euros was then divided into the number of employees (Eurostat 2020).
- **WorkHour**: Average usual weekly hours worked on the main job (OECD 2019). Employment itself is not enough since a worker takes account of the quality of employment, including working conditions.
- **LivingCost**: Price-level ratio of the PPP conversion factor (GDP) to the market exchange rate (World Bank 2020). It provides a comparison between the USA and another country regarding how many dollars are needed to buy a dollar’s worth of goods (World Bank 2020).

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5 ‘Other’ category includes: “diplomat, consular officer treated as exempt from control; retired persons of independent means; all other passengers given limited leave to enter who are not included in any other category; non-asylum discretionary permissions” (Eurostat, 2019b).
Social drivers
• TMigSt2005: Immigrant stock level from Turkey in EU member states in 2005 (UNDESA 2017b). These data represent the migration stock related to Turkey, which refers to all native-born persons, whether citizens or foreigners, who emigrated to Turkey and returned from Turkey thereafter, and all Turkey-born persons, including citizens born in Turkey who immigrated. Even if a number of these people are not ethnically Turkish, these data represent the network between an EU country and Turkey.
• ExOttoman: Dummy variable represents whether an EU member state was a part of the Ottoman Empire in any time of its history. It shows the cultural/historical link between Turkey and that country. The values are 1 for the ex-Ottoman countries (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Hungary, Greece, and Romania) and 0 for the other EU countries. Many people of Turkish origin in the Balkans lack Turkish nationality. The Turkish/Muslim population in the Balkans is estimated at 1.3 million (55,000 in Romania, 200,000 in Greece, and 750,000 in Bulgaria) (Cole 2011). The Ottoman legacy and kinship construct a migration network. Besides, this variable is both a social and geographic determinant because it refers to the geographical proximity to Turkey of the destination country. The ex-Ottoman countries are closer to Turkey than other EU countries like Germany, Spain, France, Portugal, and the UK.

Geographical drivers
• **ColdDays**: Heating degree days (number of cold days) (Eurostat 2019c; General Directorate of Meteorology of Turkey 2020). This variable represents a measure of how cold the temperature was during a year for a country. Countries with lower heating degree days have more moderate climates. Following the literature, this article hypothesizes that this variable might explain why Turkish migration stock has been increasing in the Mediterranean-European countries in recent years.

Methodology
The panel data included 11 years (from 2008 to 2018) and 28 EU countries (including the UK), yielding 308 observations. After transforming the model into log-log form, all the independent variables for Turkey (EmpT, WageT, WorkHourT, LivingCostT, FreedomsT, and ColdDaysT) were subtracted from all the independent variables for the member states (EmpMS, WageMS, WorkHourMS, LivingCostMS, FreedomsMS, and ColdDaysMS). Since using data at the macro level does not allow

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6 We do not use geographical distance as an independent variable since the variation in the other variables we are using captures the variation in geographical distance almost perfectly, causing a multicollinearity problem.
7 Although geographical drivers do not seem significant for Turkish migration to Europe, these drivers are a part of the general migration literature. Excluding them would mean falling into the trap of omitted variable bias—a type of selection bias that occurs in regression analysis when one does not include all the potential factors that may have some explanatory power on the dependent variable.
the development of a more complex approach to the interaction of macro and micro levels, we assume that the differences between the home country and destination are highly correlated with migration motivation (Dudu 2018; Sirkeci 2018). For example, if the difference in employment rates between the two countries is high, the probability of migrating for employment reasons to the country with a high employment rate from the country with a low employment rate is likely to be high. Thus, while the dependent variable remained the same, new independent variables were created considering these differences:

\[
\ln(\text{EmpDif}) = \ln(\text{EmpMS}) - \ln(\text{EmpT})
\]

\[
\ln(\text{WageDif}) = \ln(\text{WageMS}) - \ln(\text{WageT})
\]

\[
\ln(\text{WorkHourDif}) = \ln(\text{WorkHourMS}) - \ln(\text{WorkHourT})
\]

\[
\ln(\text{LivingCostDif}) = \ln(\text{LivingCostMS}) - \ln(\text{LivingCostT})
\]

\[
\ln(\text{FreedomsDif}) = \ln(\text{FreedomsMS}) - \ln(\text{FreedomsT})
\]

\[
\ln(\text{ColdDaysDif}) = \ln(\text{ColdDaysMS}) - \ln(\text{ColdDaysT})
\]

The estimation was made using the ordinary least square (OLS) model. The following model was used for the estimation:

\[
\ln(\text{FirstPermit}_{ijt}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1\ln(\text{EmpDif}_{jt}) + \beta_2\ln(\text{WageDif}_{jt}) + \beta_3\ln(\text{WorkHourDif}_{jt}) + \beta_4\ln(\text{LivingCostDif}_{jt}) + \beta_5\ln(\text{FreedomsDif}_{jt}) + \beta_6\ln(\text{ColdDaysDif}_{jt}) + \beta_7\ln(\text{ExOttoman}_{ij}) + \beta_8\ln(\text{TMigSt2005}_{ij}) + \epsilon_{ijt}
\]

A high employment rate indicates a high probability of finding employment (Ortega and Peri 2009). Similarly, higher wages (European Commission 2006) attract immigrants, so here the expected relationship is also positive. Better working conditions in a country, like more leisure time, is a positive motive (De Jong and Fawcett 1981). Accordingly, countries with lower-than-average normal weekly hours in the main job are more attractive, so a positive relationship is expected. On the other hand, a higher cost of living (Berger and Blomquist 1992; Cedefop 1998) is negatively related to applying for a work permit.

The perception that Europe supports democracy and human rights increases the probability of migrating there (Timmerman et al. 2018). Likewise, since Turkey has greater cultural/historical proximity with countries ruled by the Ottoman Empire and Turkish nationals still have relatives in these countries, a positive relationship is expected. Conversely, since a moderate climate increases immigration, a negative relationship is expected.

The descriptive statistics show a wide range of residence permits issued yearly for Turkish people by each member state. For example, one country issued only three long-term residence permits per year whereas another issued more than 17,000 (see Table 3). The total number of residence permits issued follows a similar trend to the number of residence permits issued for Turkish nationals from the countries with labor force agreements with Turkey (see Graph 2).
Turkey’s employment rate, wages, working hours, and democracy level are lower than those in EU member states, whereas its climate is more moderate. Turkey’s employment rate has gradually increased since 2008, reaching a peak of 51.98 percent in 2018 (OECD 2018), although this was still lower than the EU-28 average. Wages are also lower in Turkey. Average weekly working hours range from 30 to 42 hours in the EU, while they had decreased from 51.7 to 47 hours in Turkey by 2018 (OECD 2019). Turkey’s democracy level, which was already lower than any EU country, has fallen sharply from 46.15 to 25.12 since 2008 (World Bank 2019). When comparing the average heating degree days with countries in the EU, like Greece, southern Italy, and Spain, Turkey has a moderate Mediterranean climate (Spinoni et al. 2017) (see Table 3).

<table>
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<th>Obs.</th>
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<th>Mean</th>
<th>Max.</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Descriptive statistics

Graph 2. Number of first permits issued for Turkish nationals from EU member states. Source: Eurostat (2019b).
Table 4 shows us that some variables are highly correlated. For example, FirstPermit and TMigSt2005 are highly positively correlated at 0.85. Signing a labor force agreement with Turkey significantly strengthens the migration network between two countries, encouraging a significant number of Turkish citizens to live in these member states. Another high correlation is between lnWageDif and lnLivingCost at 0.92. The reason for this high correlation is that people can adopt different product search strategies to buy a similar product with a different brandmark (Committee on Finance US Senate 1995) thus paying less when they cannot afford that product anymore.

**Empirical findings and discussion**

The independent variables (EmpDif, WageDif, WorkHourDif, TMigSt2005, FreedomsDif, ColdDaysDif, and ExOttoman) explain 78.8 percent of the variance—$R^2$ is 0.788—in the dependent variable, FirstPermit. The estimation shows that FreedomsDif and TMigSt2005 are positively and highly significant in determining FirstPermit, and the density of migration networks and differences in freedoms between Turkey and the EU-28 are significant drivers for Turkish migrants’ EU destinations.

FreedomsDif is significant in determining FirstPermit. The estimation shows that a 1 percent rise in the freedom difference between Turkey and the EU-28 increases the number of first permits issued for Turkish nationals by 2.02 percent (see Table 5). This article focused on 2008–2018, when Turkey’s democracy level deteriorated sharply from 46.15 to 25.12 (World Bank 2019) and demand for greater democracy increased. Turkey ranked lower than any EU country: 110th among 167 countries in 2019 (The Economist 2020). This finding suggests that increasing state interventions and authoritarian policies have motivated more Turkish people to emigrate (Sánchez-Montijano et al. 2018) as suggested by the EUMAGINE project (Timmerman et al. 2018). Although the level of democracy in Turkey has decreased consistently each year between 2005 to 2018, people in Turkey have repeatedly elected AKP governments since 2002 (as of 2020) (World Bank 2019). The war in Syria and terrorist attacks in the 2010s also damaged democracy in Turkey. Accordingly, many young people in Turkey think that there is a democratic deficit (SODEV 2020).

TMigSt2005, the number of Turkish people in EU countries in 2005 just before the period covered in this article, significantly influenced Turkish nationals’ migration destinations. It represents the power of migration networks because a larger Turkish population in a member state means having a more powerful migration network to provide support to newcomers. Like other studies (Dedeoğlu and Genç 2017), the findings show that migration networks make that country a more likely migration destination. The estimation indicates that a 1 percent rise in Turkish migration stock in a member state in 2005 increases the number of first permits issued for Turkish citizens by 0.62 percent (see Table 5).

The findings of this study using macro data—the influence of social networks and demand for democracy on the Turkish nationals’ migration destinations—support the findings of other studies (Elveren 2018; Ozcurumez and Yetkin Aker 2016; Sunata 2010; Yanasmayan 2019) which benefited from in-depth interviews and
Table 4. Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>lnFirstPermit</th>
<th>lnEmpDif</th>
<th>lnWageDif</th>
<th>lnWorkHourDif</th>
<th>lnLivingCostDif</th>
<th>lnFreedomsDif</th>
<th>lnColdDaysDif</th>
<th>lnTMigSt2005</th>
<th>ExOttoman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>lnFirstPermit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnEmpDif</td>
<td>0.2991</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnWageDif</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td>0.5232</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnWorkHourDif</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>-0.5797</td>
<td>-0.6326</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnLivingCostDif</td>
<td>0.3512</td>
<td>0.5003</td>
<td>0.9219</td>
<td>-0.5332</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnFreedomsDif</td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td>0.2539</td>
<td>0.5687</td>
<td>-0.1468</td>
<td>0.739</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnColdDaysDif</td>
<td>0.2447</td>
<td>0.4835</td>
<td>0.0652</td>
<td>-0.2192</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.0762</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnTMigSt2005</td>
<td>0.8562</td>
<td>0.3251</td>
<td>0.419</td>
<td>-0.4552</td>
<td>0.476</td>
<td>0.2175</td>
<td>0.1876</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ExOttoman</td>
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<td>-0.624</td>
<td>-0.532</td>
<td>0.4804</td>
<td>-0.4897</td>
<td>-0.4041</td>
<td>-0.2261</td>
<td>-0.0481</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
survey. This study filled a gap in the literature by focusing on the drivers of migration destinations of Turkish newcomers in the EU by using macro data.

**Conclusion**

The drivers of Turkish newcomers’ migration destinations to the EU-28 in the twenty-first century are different from those in the twentieth century. Until the 1990s, Turkish immigrants were motivated by political and economic factors. Although Turkish citizens’ emigration to the EU slowed due to Turkey’s economic stability in the first years of the twenty-first century, it stepped up again towards the second decade. This article confirms that a country’s migration network and freedom level were significant drivers of Turkish migrants’ EU destinations between 2008 and 2018.

This study’s novel significance is its exclusive focus on Turkish newcomers to the EU. The article drew on data collated from OECD, Eurostat, and World Bank databases.

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**Table 5. Coefficients of the estimation (OLS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnEmpDif</td>
<td>0.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.863)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnWageDif</td>
<td>-0.229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.322)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnWorkHourDif</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnLivingCostDif</td>
<td>-1.728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnFreedomsDif</td>
<td>2.029***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.806)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnTMigSt2005</td>
<td>0.622***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnColdDaysDif</td>
<td>0.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ExOttoman</td>
<td>-0.525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.394)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple R²</td>
<td>0.788</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors adjusted for 28 clusters in the country. Robust standard errors in brackets; significance denoted by *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
The regression analysis produces two main findings: the size of an EU country’s Turkish migration stock significantly increases the number of Turkish immigrants receiving a long-term residence permit because of familial ties, and the greater the difference in freedom levels (in the meaning of being free from fear as a security-based driver) between an EU country and Turkey, the larger the number of Turkish immigrants. Thus, the analysis confirms that the sharp decrease in Turkey’s democracy level due to state interventions and authoritarian policies is a significant driver of destination choice. This is such that the effect of a possible rise in the difference between the freedom levels of Turkey and the EU-28 is greater than the effect of the possible rise in Turkish migration stock in Europe.

Security-based (democracy level) and social (migration networks) drivers have become highly relevant in the twenty-first century because the profile of Turkish immigrants has changed. Unlike in the 1960s, labor market drivers are no longer the strongest motives. Thus, this article presents the drivers of migration destinations of Turkish newcomers in the EU in the twenty-first century at the macro level. For further studies, we will consider examining the link between highly skilled newcomers and the demand for more democracy, which contributes significantly to brain drain studies, and the migration networks from the perspective of identity studies.

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Conflicts of interest. None.

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