AESCHYLUS, EUMENIDES 522–5*

ABSTRACT
Eumenides 517–25 contains a centrepiece of Aeschylean ideology—the role of punishment and fear in the ruling of the city. However, the text is vexed by serious issues at lines 522–5. This paper reassesses the main problems, reviews the most influential emendations, and puts forward a new hypothesis. It argues in favour of circumscribing the corruption, offering a new interpretation that permits retention of parts of the text that most editors have deemed impossible to restore.

Keywords: Aeschylus; Oresteia; Eumenides; fear; lyric; textual criticism

I

On the eve of the trial against Orestes, the chorus of Eumenides remind the audience about the risks of allowing impunity, and conclude that fear is a useful principle for any community.1 The Erinyes advance this notorious thesis by means of a rhetorical question (Eum. 522–5), which is thus transmitted:

τίς δὲ μηδὲν ἐν φάει
ekαρδίαν ἀνατρέφον
ἡ πόλις βροτός θ᾽ ὀμοί-
ας ἔτ᾽ ἂν σέβοι δίκαν;

525 οἱ supra lineam pro ei M

The core of the argument here seems intelligible. Since in the previous lines (517–21) the Chorus praised the deterrent action of fear, we now expect that the Erinyes will ask: ‘what city or mortal would still revere Justice’, sc. if they did not feel fear? This principle is later reiterated by Athena: τίς γὰρ δεδοικὼς μηδὲν ἔνδικος βροτῶν; (699). However, the text of lines 522–3, which should supply the concept of fear, appears highly problematic.

1. ἀνατρέφον offers an unsatisfying meaning. The word occurs only once in fifth-century poetry (Ar. Ran. 944), in a long medical metaphor, and most of its

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occurrences in pre-Hellenistic prose are also medical; the verb must mean "feed up" the patient in the stage of convalescence, or 'feed again', according to one value of the preposition ἀνά. This meaning seems hardly suitable.

2. ἀνατρέψον is also suspect for metrical reasons: to produce responson with line 514, 523 must be a lekythion. To this end, the second syllable of ἀνατρέψον requires a syllabic lengthening in semi-initial position before mute and liquid, something extremely rare—though perhaps not impossible—in Aeschylean odes.

3. Most interpreters find ἐν φόβοι unclear, or even plainly meaningless—although, as we shall see, without cause.

4. As the text stands, lines 522–3 fail to supply the necessary condition for the realization of ἐνσέβεσθαι implied by the main clause.

At present, then, the paradogy is unanimously considered corrupt, deemed beyond sure restoration by most editors; they have nevertheless intervened to insert the notion of fear (problem 4) while simultaneously addressing problems 1–3. Some supply the idea of fear by correcting ἐν φόβη: so Auratus conjectured ἐν δέει ("nourishing the heart on fear"), and Schütz proposed ἐν φόβῳ. The majority, however, have preferred to emend ἀνατρέψον.

(a) It is possible to emend the second part of the participle: the concept of fear can be supplied by emending –τρέψον to –τρέμον or –τρέον, 'shiver'. Both verbs are close to the paradogy; however, they require a further intervention, to find a solution for the prefix ἀνα-. Herein lies the greatest liability of this line of emendation. The least invasive hypothesis is Mazon’s καρδίαν ἀνά τρέον, 'shivering in the heart', which involves no further change to the paradogy. However, while the anastrophe is plausible, the resulting expression ἀνά καρδίαν does not look idiomatic. Other hypotheses look equally unconvincing, and less economic than Mazon’s. Murray’s ἀνήρ τρέμον, for instance, requires further emendations: to avoid a repetition with ἦ πόλις βροτός θ’ (524), we need to change βροτός to βροτόν, thus creating the unwelcome phrase πόλις βροτόν (a useless redundancy and an uncommon insanctura),

2 G. Thomson, The Oresteia of Aeschylus (Amsterdam and Prague, 1966), 1.77. See also Ferrari (n. 1); M.L. West, Studies in Aeschylus (Stuttgart, 1990), 286; Avezzù (n. 1).

3 LSJ s.v. F.3: cf. ἀναβλαστάνον, ἀναγεννάω.

4 Even when the verb occurs in metaphorical contexts (e.g. Xen. Cyr. 5.2.34 ἀναθρέψις τὸ φρόνημα), the concept of restoration or improvement introduced by ἀνά- still stands.

5 Sommerstein (n. 1 [1989]), 290; West (n. 1), 501.

6 Tragic lyric is 'shy' of syllabic lengthening in initial and semi-initial positions (W.S. Barrett, Euripides Hippolytos [Oxford, 1964], on Eur. Hipp. 760). However, we find Aeschylean parallels for initial position (Eum. 378, widely accepted by editors; Cho. 606 and Pers. 665, disputed) and perhaps for semi-initial position (Cho. 44, Supp. 880, both disputed).

7 To solve the metrical problem, Lachmann proposed to add a syllable (καρδίαν <ἀνά> ἀνατρέψον) and to have νεοσποθις at 514 scan ὁ ὁ ὁ, to create a response that does not require syllabic lengthening. Frieztsche’s καρδίαν <ἀνά> ἀνατρέψον and Ahrens’s καρδίαν ἀνά τρέον also address the metrical problem as well as that of the meaning of ἀνατρέψον; see also Casaubon’s ἀνατρέψον for ἀνατρέψον.

8 Page (n. 1), ad loc.: ‘non intellegitur’; Sommerstein (n. 1 [1989]), ad loc.: ‘ἐν φόβηι can be assigned no relevant meaning’.

9 Approved by G. Hermann, Aeschylus tragœdiae (Berlin, 1859), vol. 1 (see also 2.611–12).

10 C.G. Schütz, Opuscula philologica et philosophica (Halle, 1830), 22–8. See e.g. Eur. Ion 1498–9 (ἐν φόβῳ) ἐν καρδίᾳ; Or. 1419 (πεῖν ἐν φόβῳ).

11 H. Weil, Aeschylus quaer supersunt tragœdiae, vol. 1, sect. 3 (Giessen, 1858).

12 G.F. Schoemann, Des Aeschyllos Eumeniden (Greifswaden, 1845), 220.


14 F.H.M. Blaydes, Aeschylis Eumenides (Halle, 1900), 38.
and reshaping the opposition between individual and community as follows: τίς ... ἀνήρ τρέμουν | ἥ πόλις βροτῶν.\textsuperscript{15}

(b) We might also supply fear as an object of τρέφων, by emending ὀννα-. Paley’s δέος τρέφων— with μηδέν (522) referring to δέος, ‘not nourishing any fear’—supplies the concept of fear, restores normal scansion, and creates a phrase acceptable in Greek verse (for example Soph. \textit{Trach.} 28 ἂει τιν’ ἐκ φόβου φόβον τρέφω).\textsuperscript{16} Ferrari’s φόβον τρέφων is along the same lines, with μηδέν’ as a masculine accusative qualifying φόβον.

However, if we introduce an object for τρέφων, we must then correct καρδίαν, the original object of ἀνατρέφων. Campbell, Ferrari and others follow Canter in emending καρδίαν to καρδίας, a genitive governed by ἐν φαεί (‘in the light of the heart’).\textsuperscript{17} This emendation raises serious semantic and stylistic issues.\textsuperscript{18} Recent editors assign ἐν φαεί | καρδίας two different meanings. Ferrari translates it as ‘cum laetitia cordis’, comparing two Aeschylean passages in which light is related to joy.\textsuperscript{19} Metaphors involving light are common in Greek poetry,\textsuperscript{20} but Canter’s emendation would produce an expression different both from the Aeschylean metaphors cited by Ferrari and from the Aeschylean passages in which the imagery of light is applied to emotions (for example \textit{Cho.} 565 φαεὶ φρενῦν): in the former cases, light is mentioned with no direct reference to a person’s soul, while in the latter the light side of a person’s soul is always described by an adjective related to the noun which in turn designates the seat of feelings.\textsuperscript{21}

The relationship between φάος (or a synonym) and emotion, then, is anything but obvious in fifth-century drama,\textsuperscript{22} and Canter’s emendation introduces an expression that is not idiomatic in Aeschylus. Moreover, the association between fear and the mental attitude implied by Ferrari’s ‘cum laetitia cordis’ seems an unnecessary stretch.\textsuperscript{23} West’s interpretation of the phrase looks even less persuasive: on the basis of a textually problematic parallel,\textsuperscript{24} West argues for the meaning “in his dreams”, when the mind sees by its own light.\textsuperscript{25} This interpretation seems too dense, while also implying that terror only emerges in dreams—a notion detrimental to a universal statement such as that of \textit{Eumenides}.

II

None of these hypotheses is satisfying, and it remains difficult to determine where the corruption lies. It may be useful to try to restrict it to a specific point.

\textsuperscript{15} G. Murray, \textit{Aeschylus septem quae supersunt tragoediae} (Oxford, 1955\textsuperscript{2}); thus Sommerstein (n. 1 [2009]).

\textsuperscript{16} F.A. Paley, \textit{Aeschylus translated into English Prose} (Cambridge, 1871\textsuperscript{2}), 233 n. 1.

\textsuperscript{17} e.g. H. Lloyd-Jones, \textit{The Eumenides by Aeschylus} (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1970); West (n. 1); Avezzù (n. 1). Blaydes (n. 14) accepts καρδίας, but also emends ἐν φαεί to ἐν ἑνὶ βάθει.

\textsuperscript{18} We do not consider the scholium at \textit{M}—glossing ἐν φαεί with λαμπρότητι, ὀρθότητι φρενῦν— a reliable witness (\textit{pace} Ferrari (n. 1). 248 and West (n. 2), 286): the genitive φρενῦν in the scholium is oriented by the metaphorical interpretation of ἐν φαεί given there.

\textsuperscript{19} Ferrari (n. 1); \textit{Pers.} 300, Ag. 23, to which add Ag. 522.


\textsuperscript{21} For other parallels, see Ferrari (n. 1), 248.

\textsuperscript{22} For an extensive overview of the semantics of φάος and its cognates, see M.G. Ciani, \textit{Φάος e termini affini nella poesia greca. Introduzione a una fenomenologia della luce} (Florence, 1974).

\textsuperscript{23} Avezzù (n. 1), 76.

\textsuperscript{24} Heraclitus B26 DK.

\textsuperscript{25} West (n. 2), 286.
While, as we have seen, ἀνατρέψων carries an undesirable meaning, ἐν φάει does not look problematic at all. Editors have neglected a fundamental poetic meaning of φάες, that of ‘vital light’: since Homer, whoever sees the sunlight is alive.26 Accordingly, ‘to come to light’ means ‘to come (back) to life’: Agamemnon’s return to life in Clytemnestra’s dream in Sophocles’ *Electra*, for instance, is described as a return to light (419 ἐλθόντος εξ φάες). Analogously, the condition of being alive is frequently described in Greek tragedy by means of the prepositional expression ἐν φάει: see, for example, Eur. *Hec.* 415 ὁ θύγατερ, ἡμεῖς δ’ ἐν φάει δούλεύσομεν.27

In light of this, ἐν φάει in *Eumenides* seems anything but unintelligible, and certainly does not need to be expanded or specified by the genitive καρδίας. At *Eum.* 522–3, ἐν φάει has its most common meaning, that of ‘alive’, referring to τίς … | ἥ πολίς βροτός θ’; this interpretation, then, restores a widespread tragic idiom. If ἐν φάει need not be suspected, then nor does καρδίας, and the accusative can retain its role of object for the participle.

As a consequence, we can conclude that the corruption concerns only ἀνατρέψων, or even better the prefix ἀνα–. The expression resulting from the removal of ἀνα–, namely καρδίαν τρέφειν (‘nourishing the heart’), creates a metaphor suitable in tragic diction: verbs related to nourishment are frequently allowed figurative meanings (see, for example, Soph. *Aj.* 1124 for a similar image, ἡ γλῶσσα σου τῶν θυμῶν ὡς δεινὸν τρέφει).28 At *Eum.* 522–3, then, the emendation should concern only two syllables.

The only missing element is thus the concept of fear, which can be supplied by emending the two corrupt syllables of ἀνατρέψων. Since τρέψων already has an object, what the heart is fed with must be expressed by a dative indirect object, as often with τρέψων.29 We may think, with Thomson, of φόβος,30 or of δέει.31 As a result, the neutral pronoun μηδὲν should be interpreted as an adverb, functioning as a negation of τρέψων.32

This hypothesis assigns to ἐν φάει an autonomous meaning that occurs frequently in tragedy, solves the problem with the sense of ἀνατρέψων, creates a perfectly intelligible metaphor, introduces the concept of fear, and avoids an extremely rare metrical scanion.

26 e.g. Hom. *Od.* 4.540; Fabbro (n. 20), 13–14. The expression is well known to tragedy: e.g. Aesch. *Eum.* 746; Eur. *Hipp.* 4.
29 LSJ s.v. τρέψω III. Cf. βόσκειν: e.g. Soph. *Ant.* 1246 (ἐλπίσιν δὲ βόσκομαι); Eur. *Bacch.* 617 (ἐλπίσιν δ’ ἐβόσκετο); Aesch. *Cho.* 26–7 (n. 28 above).
30 Thomson (n. 2), 1.78. Thomson, however, considered ἐν φάει corrupt, and φόβος ‘too weak to have stood alone’, and conjectured ἐμφατεῖ καρδίαν φόβος τρέφει, ‘nourishing the heart with inborn fear’. He probably derived the notion of innate terror from a mistaken interpretation of *Eum.* 691 (φόβος τε ξυγγνής), where ξυγγνής means not ‘inborn’ but rather ‘cognate’ (with σέβας, line 690)—it is the kinship between worship and fear that will lay the foundations for the Areopagus.
31 The corruption may be due either to a gloss (Thomson [n. 2], 1.77 shows that ἀνατρέψων was often used as a gloss for τρέψων) or to a corruption caused by confusion between Α and Δ.
32 Both μηδὲν and οὐδὲν can be assigned the role of negations, and despite West (n. 2), 286 the former can be ‘satisfactorily as an equivalent of μή or μηδομάζω’: LSJ s.vv. οὐδεῖς III and μηδεῖς III (e.g. Hom. *Il.* 1.142, 24.370; Aesch. *Eum.* 730).
To sum up, the text that we propose is:

τίς δὲ μηδὲν ἐν φόει
καρδίαν δέει τρέφων
ἤ πόλις βροτὸς θ΄ ὁμοίως ἐτέρ οὐν σέβοι Δίκαιον;

523 δέει vel φόβο

Which may be translated as follows: ‘What city or man who never in their life nurtured their heart on fear would still revere Justice?’

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