The treatises attributed in Arabic to the Aristotelian philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. 200) include several pieces based in reality on some of the 211 sections of the Elements of Theology by the Neoplatonist Proclus (d. 485). When Albert Dietrich produced his survey of the Arabic Alexander, he excluded one such piece, which had already been recognised as a translation of three sections of the Elements.1 Others escaped notice until later. D27 (i.e. no. 27 of Dietrich’s list) turned out on inspection to include no fewer than twenty. D23 proved on publication to be based on section 77. And D29 will presently be seen to be based on section 98. That, I think, is the last piece of Proclus still awaiting to be struck off the current register of treatises by Alexander.2


2 The most comprehensive among recent lists are found in: R.W. Sharples, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation’, Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, 36.2 (Berlin and New York, 1987): 1176-243 (D23 and D27 are set aside at 1194, where they should be joined by D29 from 1192); and R. Goulet and M. Aouad, art. ‘Alexandros d’Aphrodisias’, in R. Goulet (ed.), Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques (= DPhA) (Paris, 1989), vol. I, pp. 125-39 (D23 is listed among the spuria at 139 (62), where it should be joined by D29 from 137 (36)). For ease of reference, here is a checklist of the pieces of Proclus sive Alexander to be considered in this article.

P1-3: based on sections 1-3 of the Elements; text included in D27; separately transmitted as a piece of Alexander; no mention of translator; see under J below.

P15-17: based on sections 15-17 of the Elements; text included in D27; separately transmitted as a piece of Alexander translated by Dimashqi; see under I below.
D27 and D29 are uniquely preserved in C, the Istanbul manuscript Carullah 1279. The Proclus of D27 was published long ago by Gerhard Endress in his imposing volume on Proclus Arabus. D29 has had to wait till now. I am grateful to the authorities of the Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi in Istanbul for providing me with photographs of C. The text of the Arabic will be found at the end of this article. Here is a translation of both the Arabic and the corresponding Greek.

A

Proclus, Elements of Theology, section 98 (ed. Dodds, pp. 86-8) D29 (MS Istanbul, Carullah 1279, fol. 69r34-v19)

(a)

A treatise by Alexander of Aphrodisias: That every separate cause is in all things and in none. According to the view of Aristotle.

Alexander says: Aristotle says in his book called <Theologia, i.e. theory> of divinity, that

<every separate cause is in all things and in none> at all.

(b)

Every separate cause (αἴτιον χωριστόν) is at once everywhere and nowhere.

D23: based on section 77 of the Elements; not included in D27; separately transmitted as a piece of Alexander; no mention of translator; see under K below.

*P77: lost original version of D23 (the asterisk serves to mark its conjectural nature).

D27: includes twenty sections of the Elements; obscure heading; no mention of translator; see beginning of section II below for the contents, and beginning of section IV for the heading.

D29: the piece here published; based on section 98 of the Elements; not included in D27; separately transmitted as a piece of Alexander; no mention of translator.

*P98: lost original version of D29 (inferred).


4 E.R. Dodds (ed., tr.), Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1963). To suit my comparative purpose, Dodds’s English version has been adapted too drastically for it still to be called his.
We wish in this treatise to expound <that> claim and to explain it <briefly as follows.

The First Cause emanates> upon all things; and because it <so> emanates, the Sage\(^5\) says that it is in all things.

For what defines (?) the First Cause is that it will emanate upon all things that will receive it; that it will fill them with excellence according to their receptivity and capacity; and that it will be with <all> things in that its rays go forth to bring fruit in them.

On the other hand, in saying that it is in nothing at all, he means that the First Cause does not mix with things that are in places: that is why the First Cause is describable as (\(\text{sāra}\))\(^6\) not being in anything.

For if it is a separate cause, it cannot but be loftier than its effects and works, and outside all of them, so that it will be in none of the things that are beneath it.

We say: A cause may indeed be in its effects, as humanity is in choice and rationality (?);\(^7\) but then it is a form, which is not prior to them. And we say: If the cause is not in its effects but is separate from them, it is prior to them.

We further say: If it were merely in all things, it would not be prevented from being a cause, as it would then be taken to be (\(\text{sāra}\)) in all things receptive to it; but it could not be prior to them or separate from them.

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\(^5\) In the Kindi-circle Alexander, Aristotle's sobriquet of 'the Philosopher' appears, now as al-faylasūf, now as al-hakim. To mark the difference, I translate the latter as 'the Sage'.

\(^6\) '\(X\) has come to be (\(\text{sāra}\)) \(P\)' often means 'One has come to think (claim, conclude) that \(X\) is \(P\)'. For further examples of the usage in Kindi-circle translations see Endress, Proclus Arabus, pp. 176-8 at (e).

\(^7\) I owe the conjecture to the kindness of Maroun Aouad, whose thorough reading of a complete draft of this article has led to several corrections and improvements.
And if it were nowhere, without being everywhere, it would not be prevented from being prior to all inferior things and belonging to none; but it would not be in all things as it is natural for causes to be in their effects (ἐν τοῖς αἰτιαῖς), through their unstinting impartings (ἀφθόνους μεταδόσειν) of themselves.

In order, then, for it both to be present, as a cause, in all things that can partake, and to be prior, separate by itself, to all things filled out of it, it is at once everywhere and nowhere.

Neither is it partly (μέρει) everywhere and partly nowhere. For thus it would be disparate and separate from itself (ἐαυτῷ δισπασμένον καὶ χωρίς), if some of it were everywhere and in all things and some of it nowhere and before all things. Rather, it is wholly (ὅλον) everywhere, and likewise nowhere.

For the things that can partake of it encounter it as a whole and find it wholly present to themselves, though it is wholly excepted. For the participant does not subordinate it within itself, but partakes <of> as much <of what comes> from it as it can take.

Neither, through imparting of itself, is it pinched (στενωσεῖται) by the participations (μεθέξεσι) of more

If so, i.e. if it is the First Cause that emanates upon all things, while being prior to them and separate from them, all things being posterior to it, the First Cause is never too tight to emanate upon the multitude of things that <can> attain its emanation.

As Aouad points out, the syntax of the transmitted text is sound, with the apodosis beginning at \( n \). If that is to be retained, the sentence will read: \( ' l \) If so, ... all things being posterior to it and secondary (ثانیياتن), with the First Cause never too tight ..., \( n \) then it has become clear and sound ...'.
things, as it is separate; nor do the participants attain (μεταλαγχάνει) defectively (ἐλλιπῶς), as the imparting <cause> (τοῦ μεταδιδόντος) is everywhere.

Thus it has become clear and sound that the First Cause is in all things, and that it is in none, as the excellent Aristotle says. And that is what we wanted briefly to explain.

The discourse is concluded. Praise to God, and peace upon His servants that He chose (cf. Sura 27:59: quli l-ḥamdu li-ilāhī wa-salāmūn ‘alā ‘ibādihi lladhina ṣṭafā). Written by Muḥammad son of Ḥasan, may God forgive them both.

To begin at the end, our manuscript is a large codex containing far more than Alexander of Aphrodisias. Its scribe, Muḥammad b. Ḥasan al-Nihmī of Ṣa‘da in Yemen, occasionally signed himself in the course of his work, often at rather greater length than here at (p).9 But that is the only such signature in the section devoted to Alexander. It is set apart from the preceding text by a less formal style of writing and by an ornamental full stop. Everything up to that point was presumably copied from the exemplar. The ḥamdala concluding the explicit at (o) would therefore appear to be the mark of an earlier scribe.10 Muṣṭafā,

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9 Manuscript C was described by F. Rosenthal, 'From Arabic books and manuscripts V: A one-volume library of Arabic philosophical and scientific texts in Istanbul', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 75 (1955): 14-23; on the scribe, see pp. 14-16.

10 It so appeared to Rosenthal, 'One-volume library', p. 17n11. But it must be said that the scribe of C himself uses the ḥamdala of Sura 27:59 at least once (my microfilm covers only about a third of the codex), towards the end of a dated note to a text transcribed two or three years earlier: katabahu Muḥammad b. Ḥasan b. ‘Ali ... al-Nihmī ... al-Ṣa‘dī ... ‘aṣa Allāhu ‘anhum wa al-musulimin katabahu shahr Ṣa‘far sanat khams wa-thamānīn wa-thamānīmīn ‘a hījriyya. al-ḥamdu li-ilāhī wa-salāmūn ‘alā ‘ibādihi lladhina ṣṭafā wa-hasbunā llāhu wa-ni‘ma l-wakil. ... (fol. 173*, top margin). The same ḥamdala occurs in the subscription to Pseudo-Farabi's *R. fi al-‘ilm al-ilāhī* at fol. 140'26 (does that mean that the text derives from another manuscript by ‘Muṣṭafā’?). It further occurs at the beginning of at least three other pieces included in our codex. Rosenthal (ibid.) mentions a work by Suhrawardī al-Maqtūl. The others are a *K. al-hay‘a* by Qāsim b. Maṭraf (sic) al-Qaṭṭān al-Andalusi al-Qurtubi (fol. 315'2) and a *K. jawāmi‘* ‘ilm al-nujūm by A. b. M. b. Kathir al-Farghānī (fol. 383'32).
as he may be called, left his mark also after D27 and D28, the
two pieces immediately preceding D29 in our manuscript C,
but not after any of the six pieces of Alexander preceding D27.
I take that to mean that he derived everything up to and
including D27 from one source and added D28 and D29 from
two others, using his hamdala to mark the end of each lot. If
so, D29 may have been separate from the Proclus of D27, and
indeed have been transmitted singly, for a long time before
‘Muṣṭafā’ added it to his collection.

But it is not at all probable that D29 had always been sepa-
rate. It is united with the Proclus of D23 and D27 by its pecu-
liarities of expression, and by the freedom with which it para-
phrases the Greek — now adding, now omitting, sometimes
with scant regard for the sense of the original. Those peculiari-
ties are wholly characteristic of an unmistakable style of trans-
lation — unmistakable, because it has been well charted by
Endress, who traced it to the circle of Kindi (c. 795-865).
Endress’s catalogue of characteristics includes what I shall call
the istibāna. His catalogue of texts attributable, on account of
their style, to the circle of Kindi includes what I shall call the
Kindi-circle Alexander. An istibāna is a stereotyped conclusion
typically employing the verb istabāna ‘to become clear’ and
often without counterpart in the Greek. The Kindi-circle
Alexander is a corpus of short pieces surviving in small groups
of varying composition within the amazingly heterogeneous
collections of ten manuscripts surveyed by Endress.11 All end
with an istibāna; all bear the name of Alexander; none bears
the name of its translator. Stylistic similarities suggest that
most if not all were translated by the same man, most probably
a member of the circle of Kindi. Occasional attributions to well-
known later translators such as Abū Ṭuthmān al-Dimashqī (c.
900) can be discounted as transmitter’s errors. D23 and D27
belong to that corpus, and so does D29.12 In the face of the

11 Endress, Proclus Arabus, pp. 33-51. It is there that readers will find detailed
information on manuscripts here simply referred to by means of Endress’s sigla.

Stellung in der griechisch-arabischen Übersetzungsliteratur’. For the istibāna, see
pp. 180-2 at (a). In summing up his findings, Endress concludes that the Arabic
pieces of Proclus’s Elements were translated, not by Dimashqī (190), but by a mem-
ber of the circle of Kindi (192); within the larger body of Kindi-circle translations,
Plotinus, Liber de causis, Alexander, the Proclus of D27, and Aristotle’s De caelo
form a distinct group (186), within which the last three are closer to each other than
to the rest (188f); as the translation of the De caelo is attributed to Ibn al-Bīṭrīq, the
ascription at (a) and the istibāna at (n), there is no need to go into details of style in order to prove the relationship. What remains to be seen is whether D29 was fitted with its pseudepigraphic beginning and ending before, during, or after translation.

Unlike other pieces of Proclus transmitted under the name of Alexander, D29 carries pseudepigraphy beyond title and incipit into the text itself at (b), (d), and (e), by turning Proclus’s proposition into a quotation from the mythical ‘Theology of Aristotle’. If, as would appear, the underlying section 98 was translated by the same man as was the rest of Proclus siue Alexander, it will not have been the translator who singled it out for special treatment. Either, then, he translated it as it stands today from a falsified original; or his translation was falsified by a transmitter on the way to manuscript C. We shall soon see that the first alternative can safely be dismissed. We may take it that D29 was produced from an earlier Arabic version *P98 similar in form to the sections included in D27. It will have lacked the ascriptive elements of the inscription at (a), the false references at (b), (d), and (e), the interpolated sentence at (c), and the last two clauses of the istibāna at (n). Other discrepancies between the Arabic and the Greek need not have been caused by the reviser. Presumably, he did not add the istibāna proper. Even pluses and minuses like those at (f) and (k) are common enough in other pieces to arouse no suspicion.

To confirm the reality of *P98, I shall next produce a parallel case where the earlier version does exist. Readers feeling, as I suspect I do myself, that the reality of *P98 is too obvious to need confirming will lose little by going straight to the summary of observations at the end of section IV below.

## II A PARALLEL CASE OF ARBITRARY CHANGE AFTER TRANSLATION

Under the curious heading ‘Extracted (?) by Alexander from Aristotle’s *Theologia*’ (to be discussed in section IV below), D27 unites twenty-six pieces classifiable as follows.

**D27a:** ‘On the First Cause’ and similar titles (= Proclus, *Elements*, sections Kindi-circle Alexander, including the Proclus of D27, may also be his work (191f). By extension, the same applies to D23 and D29.
D27b: ‘On the First Cause’ (an additional section, dubbed 167a by Endress, without counterpart in the Greek of the Elements).
D27c: ‘That form is not predicated <as being> in matter ...’ (= Alexander, Quaestio 1.8).
D27d: ‘If the privation is not the same as the contrary ...’ (= Alexander, Quaestio 2.11).
D27e: ‘On what parts of the world need to be governed ...’ (= Alexander, Quaestio 2.19).
D27f: ‘On the power coming from the motion of the sublime body ...’ (= Alexander, Quaestio 2.3).
D27g: ‘On coming-to-be’ (Greek original unknown).

D27d translates what is known to modern readers of the Greek Alexander as Quaestio 2.11. A slightly different version, D7, survives separately elsewhere under the name of Alexander tout court. The fact that, unlike D27d, D7 is transmitted as what according to the Greek original it is — namely, a treatise by Alexander — might lead one to expect that it was the older of the two. But it is not, as will be evident from the synopsis below of beginnings and ends. I also translate a short passage from the middle, to which I shall return later.

B14

Quaestio 2.11 (ed. D27d (MS Istanbul, Bruns ii, 55. 18-27, 56. Carullah 1279, fols. 27-30, 57. 3-6; tr. Sharples 107-10)
Section (faṣl).
Discourse of Alexander of Aphrodisias: That

13 The contents of D27 were sorted out by J. van Ess, ‘Über einige neue Fragmentische von Aphrodisias und des Proklos in arabischer Übersetzung’, Der Islam, 42 (1966):148-68, who abolished the mark ‘D27’ (p. 152); catalogued separately the contents of what I have dubbed D27a and D27b (159-63); correctly identified D27d with D7 (150f, with list of variants) and, incorrectly, D27g with D16 (151); and added D27c, e, f on to Dietrich’s list as nos 32-34 (153). Of the last five items, only D27d has hitherto been published (in the shape of D7). Cf. Sharples, ‘Alexander’, p. 1194 (on D27) and 1190-2 under quaest. 1.8, 2.3, 2.11, 2.19, and D16; DPhA i.132f, at 19(h) (= D27), (f), (k), (l), (m); and 137 (35). The last item in each case, D27g, should be distinguished from D16 in MS G (Escorial 798), which is not in fact another version of the same text.

14 I. Bruns (ed.), Alexandri Aphrodisiensis praeter commentaria scripta minora, 2 pts (Berlin, 1887-1892); R.W. Sharples (tr.), Alexander of Aphrodisias, Quaestiones 1.1-2.15 (London, 1992); A. Badawi, Arisṭū 'inda l-'Arab (Cairo, 1947). Here and under C-E, H below, I have freely adapted Sharples’s English to my needs.
Why what comes to be, changing from the privation, changes at the same time from the contrary itself, if the privation and the contrary are not the same.

If the privation is not the same as the contrary, how does a thing that is brought into being, whenever it changes from its privation, also change from its contrary at the same time, as the Sage says in his *On coming-to-be and passing-away*?

Some people have questioned that as follows.

If the privation is not the same as the contrary, how does a thing that is brought into being, whenever it changes from its privation, also change from its contrary at the same time, as the Sage says in his *On coming-to-be and passing-away*?

We wish to know why the thing that is brought into being is supposed to (ṣāra) change from its privation, and also from its contrary at the same time, given that the privation is not the same as the contrary.

For the contrary is a form and the privation an absence of form.

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15 *fīmā* C; *limā* Badawi.

16 See note 6 above.
vation is the absence of that of which the underlying thing is receptive in accordance with its own nature.

(e) For of the first bodies that come to be from it there are two forms, the first of the contrarieties among causes (τῶν ἀντίων ἐναντιώσεων), <that is> of heat and cold and dryness and moisture; and it is by these that the simple bodies are defined.

(f) So with the presence of one contrary is coupled (συνεκτόχθαι) the privation of the other; and so necessarily, whenever it changes from its privation to <its> possession, in respect of that the presence of which was the cause for the underlying thing's being, it comes to be in the privation of that.

(g) If it is as we described, and the presence of a thing's contrary is connected with the presence of that thing's privation, then necessarily, whenever the thing changes from its absence (privation) to its presence, it will change also from its form's contrary to its presence. I mean to say, whenever that thing comes to be in the supporting thing, it will cause the privation of that thing's contrary to come to be in the supporting thing,

as when we say that whenever heat comes to be in a body, it causes the absence (privation) of cold

17 šūra C; šuwar Badawi.
18 fi C, Badawi: read min. Min and fi are often mistaken for one another; an additional explanation for the present mistake is that the clause in which it occurs looks as though it should be related to ‘the forms’ rather than ‘the bodies’.
19 hiya anniyyatun min C; fa-hiya ityān Badawi: read fa-hiya ithnātān.
20 al-šūra C, Badawi: read al-šuwar.
21 fa-in C; wa-kāna Badawi: read wa-in kāna.
22 mufāriq C; mufāriqan Badawi: read muqārinan.
23 šūratīhi C; šūratīhā Badawi.
24 wa-aqūl C; aqūl Badawi.
25 idhā mā C; idhā Badawi.
in that body, and causes the presence in it of the contrary of cold also.\textsuperscript{26}

For the privation is the contrary in potentiality, being caused by the presence of its contrary.\textsuperscript{27} For heat will not become cold; rather, the receptivity of matter will change from the potential contrary, i.e. privation (absence), to the actual contrary, i.e. presence.

Thus it has now become clear and sound that everything that is brought into being changes from its privation and from its contrary at the same time, though the privation is not the same as the contrary, through sound and thorough arguments.

The discourse is complete. Praise to God as is His due.

The core of both Arabic versions from \( (d) \) to \( (f) \) is virtually the same, following the Greek quite closely from beginning to end. D27d follows the Greek throughout, except that it adds a reference at \( (c) \), an illustration at \( (g) \), and an istibána at \( (i) \). D7 includes the whole of D27d, with a transposition at \( (b)-(c) \) and substantial additions at the beginning and the end. Where it differs from D27d it also differs from the Greek. We cannot but conclude that D27d represents the original from which D7 was produced without regard to the Greek. D7 is proof that some of the Kindi-circle Alexander was subjected to arbitrary change after translation. In what follows I shall try to find out more about the man who turned into a debate between Aristotle and his critics what in the Greek is but a problem in Alexander’s mind. For want of a better name, I shall call him ‘the animator’.

\textsuperscript{26} wa-kānat ‘illat ‘adam wujūd ẞiddihā fīhā aydan C; wa-kānat ‘illat wujūd ẞiddihā fīhi aydan Badawi. The example of heat has previously been used in the authentic text (56.21ff Bruns = 287.11ff Badawi), where the Arabic for ‘e.g.’ is shibḥa. The present example is introduced by ka-qawlinā instead, which may be a sign that it was added after translation.

\textsuperscript{27} wa al-‘illa ẞiddihu wa-ẞidd ẞiddihī Badawi: read wa al-‘illa hiya wujūd ẞiddihī?
III THE ANIMATOR

There is nothing inherently suspicious about the secondary opening of D7. Without D27d, we should be unable to tell that the opening of D7 was not part of the original translation. Without Quaestio 2.11, we should be unable to tell which version was closer to the original Greek. Given both, we are for once in a position to see what happened. And in the light of what we see, the openings of some other Kindi-circle pieces look as though the animator had had a hand in them too.

Quaestio 1. 12 (ed. Bruns ii. 24. 23-25. 1; tr. Sharples 55f)

(a) How it is possible for the same person to be pleased and distressed at the same time, if those are opposites.

(b) If it is impossible for contraries to hold of the same thing at the same time, how is it possible for the same person to be pleased and distressed at the same time, as happens to those who are thirsty and are drinking, and similarly to those who are hungry and are eating, and further to those who itch and are scratching? For either pleasure is not contrary to distress, or it is not true that it is not possible for contraries to hold of the same thing at the same time.

D5 (MS Z, ed. Badawi, Arisțu 283. 2-8)

A discourse by Alexander: That one can be pleased and distressed at the same time. According to the view of Aristotle.

He says: Aristotle remarks in his book called (alladhi yud'ā) [...]28 that one can be pleased and distressed at the same time, as happens to someone thirsty and drinking, hungry and eating, or itching and scratching.

Alexander says: Some people have questioned that as follows. If contraries cannot obtain at the same time, how can a person be pleased and distressed at the same time?

If so, either pleasure is not the contrary of distress, or it is not true to say that contraries will not obtain at the same time.

28 The title is missing. The proposition that follows is not strictly a quotation; the original writer may in fact have been thinking of Plato rather than Aristotle. For the classical background see Sharples's note 151 to his translation.
(d) Or rather: that it is impossible for contraries to hold of the same thing at the same time is not true without qualification, but <it is impossible for them to do so> in the same respect; and neither is pleasure contrary to distress without qualification, for not every pleasure is contrary to every distress ...

Alexander says: What we say is that not every distress is a contrary of every pleasure ...

D

Quaestio 2.15 (ed. Bruns ii. 59. 25-27; tr. Sharples 116)

(a) How we say that the same power is <a power> for contraries at the same time.

(b) Alexander says: Aristotle remarks in his On coming-to-be and passing-away that it is possible for a single power to be receptive to contraries all at once. According to the view of Aristotle.

(c) We wish to discuss, explain, and elucidate (nulakhkhis, nubayyin, nūdīh) his statement as follows.

(d) When we say that the same power is <a power> for contraries, we do not mean to say ...

Quaestio 1. 5 (ed. Bruns ii. 13. 9-14; tr. Sharples 36)

D19 (MSS G, D, ed. Ruland 62. 2-11; MS Tk, ed. Badawi, Commentaires 51. 1-10)31

29 al-ladhda Badawi: read kull ladhdha?
30 The locus Aristotelicus in question is not in fact in the De gen. et corr.; see Sharples’s note 387.
Why growth is in form only, and not also in matter.

If the substrate of what is said to grow grows — the matter too remains, not only the form, for it does not all change —, why is growth only in form, and not also in matter?

For not all the matter in things that grow changes ...

Discourse of Alexander of Aphrodisias: That increase and growth occur in form, not in matter. Published(?) by (ikhrāj) Abū ’Uthmān al-Dimashqi.

Alexander says: Aristotle remarks in his On coming-to-be and passing-away that increase and growth occur in form, not in matter. Some people have rejected that as follows.

A body, and everything that receives growth, grows in both its form and its matter. Why, then (fa-limā), does the Philosopher say that growth occurs in form and not in matter?

Alexander says: We wish to resolve that puzzle as follows.

Matter changes bit by bit in growing ...

D9 (Greek original unknown; MS Z, ed. Badawi, Aristu 293. 2-12)

(a) Discourse of Alexander: That actuality (fi‘l) is more general than motion. According to the view of Aristotle.

(b) Alexander says: Aristotle remarks in his book called Auscultatio physica (fī kitābihi alladhi yud‘ā al-samā‘ al-ṭabī‘i) that actuality is more general than motion.

(c) Some people have doubted that as follows. If every motion has actuality, and every actuality is the result of a motion, how can Aristotle say that actuality is more general than motion?

(d) We wish to resolve and explain that puzzle as follows. There are two kinds of actuality, defective and complete. Of defective actuality the Sage remarks that it is motion (Phys. iii. 2. 201b31f). For motion according to him is the

₃² For once the reference to the De gen. et corr. (i.5.321b11ff) is apt; see Ruland’s introduction, p. 55, and Sharples’s note 85.

₃₃ fa-thumma qāla Badawi; fa-qāla Ruland (the faqym preceding in G and D, omitted by Ruland, suggests fa-kayfa as an alternative to fa-limā).

₃₄ The thesis is extrapolated from Aristotle’s remarks that ‘motion may be thought of as a sort of actuality (ἐνέργεια), but an incomplete one’ (Phys. iii.2.201b31f), and ‘motion is the incomplete entelechy (ἐντελέχεια) of a movable thing’ (Phys. viii.5.257b8f), which imply the distinction mentioned at (d) below.

₃₅ ffym Badawi: read fa-kayfa?
transition (intiqāl) of power (potentiality) to actuality. Thus he defines motion in the third book of his so-called Auscultatio physica (fi kitābihi alladhi yud‘ā sam‘ al-kīyān) <by saying> that ‘motion is the perfection of power and possibility’. And so it has now become clear and sound that motion is defective actuality. As for complete actuality, it is the sudden appearance of a thing’s state ..., like the appearance of the light, say, <of> a fire or the sun ...

All openings from A to F exhibit much the same pattern. A tripartite inscription is supplied at (a). It begins with maqālat al-Iskandar, continues with a title drawn from the original title at (b), and ends with the formula ‘alā ra‘y Aristū(ţālis) (though the first word at A(a) is risāla; and at E(a) the third element seems to have been lost through the intrusion of what will be seen to be a secondary addition). The erstwhile title and opening sentence(s) are then recast in a sequence of paragraphs marked off as proposition, objection, and solution. The proposition at (b) always takes the strict form of a quotation, however spurious, from Aristotle. In cases A and D, where the paradoxical nature of the proposition is taken for granted, the comment at (c) simply states the author’s intention to explain the paradox away. Elsewhere, the puzzle addressed by the text is, so to speak, dramatised as a debate between the original voice of Aristotle, anonymous critics of the past, and Alexander as Aristotle’s present spokesman.

One striking feature of the animated pattern is that where the Greek title duplicates (part of) the opening sentence, the Arabic repeats it all over at (a) and sometimes again at (c). In each case it looks as though the animator mistook the title for the opening sentence. That suggests that he was working from a collection set out like D27, with no incipit other than the word faṣl to mark the beginning of a piece, and no explicit other than the istibāna to mark the end. D27 cannot, of course, itself have been his source because, out of all the pieces surveyed from A to F, it includes a counterpart only to D7 at B.

Another striking feature is that there is no mention of a

36 Phys. viii.5.257b7f: When the movable moves, its ‘potentiality (τὸ δυνάμει) passes (βαδίζει) into entelechy’.
37 Phys. iii.1.201*10f: ‘The entelechy of what is potentially, as such, is motion’.
38 Dr Sharples points out to me that as the titles under which the original quaestiones are transmitted may well be secondary additions, it is of interest to know that the Arabic translations show them to have been in place by the early ninth century.
translator. The seeming exception at E(a) will be explained in a moment. Presumably, the animator was simply kept in the dark by his source. For it is hard to believe that he would have denied himself the pleasure of introducing another rubric into his elaborate pattern of beginnings and endings. That too suggests a source like D27, which is equally silent on the subject of translators. If, then, the animator had no information of his own, he cannot have been too close in time and place to those around Kindi. On the other hand, we shall presently see that some of his work is supposed to have been transmitted by the translator Dimashqi. If that is true, it must have been there to be transmitted by about 900. We cannot go far wrong if we locate him in the second half of the ninth century.

More precisely, it is the animator of B-F that can be so located. It is not as safe as would at first appear to identify him with the animator of D29 at A. More evidence wants to be taken into account. Unlike D29, the five pieces sampled under B-F are all associated with the name of Dimashqi. D19 refers to him in its inscription at E(a). The other four form part of a group of seven Kindi-circle pieces — D4, D5, D6, D7, D8, P15-17, D9 — jointly transmitted in manuscript Z (Damascus, Žahiriyiya 4871) and followed by a note saying that they derive from a copy in Dimashqi's hand. If that is true, D19 too derives from that copy. Since Dimashqi was neither the animator nor the translator of the pieces concerned, he must have played the part of a mere scribe and transmitter. He was not the animator: because we know from his own translations that he was perfectly happy to open and close a piece of Alexander with the same degree of suddenness as did the Greek; he would not have embroidered someone else's translations, let alone without regard to the Greek. He was not the translator: because by Endress's stylistic criteria our eight pieces belong to the circle of Kindi and not to Dimashqi. (Sceptics may now assure themselves of the reliability of those criteria by savouring the contrast between the two Arabic versions of Quaestio 1.

39 The text of the note is reproduced from manuscript Z (fol. 115r) by Badawi, Arisiši 294, and Endress, Proclus Arabus 60. As it would take too long to discuss the ambiguities with which it is riddled, here is a translation: 'The preceding [i.e. Kindi-circle] pieces, which are attributed <by their inscriptions> to Alexander of Aphrodisias <with no mention of the translator> were all translated by Abū 'Uthmān Se'id al-Dimashiqi, because <unlike the first exemplar, from which I transcribed the earlier part of my collection,> this second exemplar (hādhihi al-nuskha al-manqūla [understand minḥā] al-thāniya) <from which I transcribed the last [i.e. Kindi-circle] pieces> is in Dimashqi's own hand.'
21 sampled under H below.) If Dimashqi made copies of older versions, it was presumably in order to use them in his work of re-translation.

We do not know how many pieces Dimashqi's copy contained. If the animator was the source of five out of the eight we now have, perhaps the whole collection was his? The answer is not clear. Here are the beginnings (and in one case more) of the three remaining pieces.

G

D4 (Greek original unknown; MS Z, ed. Badawi, Ἀρίστω 281. 3-10)

(a) Discourse of Alexander of Aphrodisias: Against <the claim of> Xenocrates that form (species) comes before genus and is a principle of it by natural priority.

(b) Alexander says: Xenocrates says that if form (species) is to genus as part is to whole, and if the part comes before the whole and is a principle of it by natural priority, ... the form (species) too must come before the genus, just as the part relates to the whole.

(c) [...]40

H

Quaestio 1.21 (ed. Bruns ii. 34. 30ff, 35. 9f; tr. Sharples 74f) D8 (MS Z, ed. Badawi, Ἀρίστω 289. 2-13, 17; 290. 2-5) D2 (MS Z, ed. Badawi, Ἀρίστω 278. 1, 279. 5-9, 11f)

[A text by Alexander of Aphrodisias. Translated by Sa'id b. Ya'qūb al-Dimashqi.]41

(a) [In what category motion belongs. Discourse of Alexander: That form is the completion and perfection of motion. According to the view of Aristotle.

40 The beginning of the reply is missing; cf. J. van Ess's German translation, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 55 (1973): 188-90.-

41 The inscription was evidently supplied by the transmitter who first copied, evidently from a defective exemplar, what is in fact a sequence of three pieces. Ours is the second, beginning in mid-sentence immediately after the unmarked end of the first. Its identity was established by H. Gätje, Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 116 (1966): 262. The identity of the parallel version in D8 remained unnoticed because it disagrees with the transmitted Greek at the beginning. See further Sharples, 'Alexander' 1191, at 1.21, where D2 should be joined by D8 from 1192; and DPhA i.133 (19p) and 137 (32), which should be linked.
(b) If someone did not accept that motion was in quantities because it is not placed in quantities in the Categories, it would be said to be relative to something.

(c) But whatever it is for motion to be possessed of relativity, it will be an affection. For if to be moved is to be somehow affected (nadoxew τι), and it is by the presence of an affection (nadoe) that the affected is affected, and the moved is moved through the presence of motion, motion will be an affection.

(d) But affection is a quality; for the third species of quality is <that of> affective qualities and affections.

Alexander says: Aristotle remarks in his book called Auscultatio physica (fi kitabihī alladhī yudā al-samā al-ṭabi‘ī) that form is the completion and perfection of motion.\(^{42}\)

We wish to discuss and elucidate (nulakhkhis, nudihi) what the Philosopher says about motion and form as follows. Motion is an affection (athar): it is by an affection that the affected is affected, and by a motion that the moved is moved; and if so, then motion will be an affection.

But affection is a quality; for the third species of quality is <that of> affective qualities and affections.

42 The thesis seems to have been extrapolated from Phys. iii.1-3. Aristotle says that ‘the mover will always confer <on the moved> a form, <the form of a> this or such or this much’ (2.202a9f). And he explains that since the bronze qua bronze is not the same as the bronze qua potential statue, i.e. the material without the form, ‘just as the colour is not the same as the visible, motion is clearly the entelechy of the possible qua possible’ (1.201a29-b5). That reference to colour and visibility may explain why the discussion turns to light and colour at (f) below. We understand that while the bronze is turning into a statue, its eventual form is no longer purely potential and not yet wholly actual. The movement from the one to the other is, so to speak, an ‘incomplete actuality’ (2.201b31f). When the statue is finished, the new form has been accomplished and so has the movement that led to it. Forms can therefore be said to be the entelechy — in the sense of ‘accomplishment’ — of motion, but only if they are subject to change, and to gradual change at that (cf. F(d) above).

43 The beginning does not tie up with the end, as Sharples observes in his note 220. The divergence of the Arabic makes it seem all the more likely that the Greek here is spurious.

44 al-mutaharrir: read al-taharruk.

45 thabitā: read ṭhālitha.
So incomplete actuality (ἐνεργεία), being an affection, will be quality; but what will complete actuality be, and under what category? Or rather: if such actuality and entelechy (ἐντελέχεια) is form ...

Resuming now we say: There is defective and complete motion (haraka). Defective motion is affection, I mean a thing's incidental quality; and complete motion is form, I mean a thing's completion and perfection, which is what the Philosopher in his book called (alladhi yud'ā) Auscultatio physica also terms (samma) anṭālāshiyā, which means the passage of power and possibility to the completion and perfection that is a thing's form.

So if imperfect actuality (fi'l) is an affection, it belongs to quality; but complete actuality is form ...

What then must one say light is, since it too itself is the entelechy of the transparent qua transparent?

If someone objects: If so, light is the form and perfection of the transparent, we reply ... What then must we say about light, since it is the completion of the transparent qua transparent?

46 A distinction between complete and incomplete actuality is implied at Phys. iii.2.201b31f (see note 34 above). The substitution, here and later, of 'motion' for 'actuality' makes no sense in Aristotelian terms. It has been carried out too consistently to be explained as a mere scribal error. D9 preserves the original distinction at F(d) above.

47 The same question receives a different answer at F(d) above.

48 For once, Dimashqi's version agrees with D8 against the transmitted text of the Greek, which does not necessarily mean that the Greek version he had in front of him lacked the missing words. If it is true that he went to the trouble of making a copy of D8, he was presumably looking at it while re-translating the Greek. He may have simply overlooked the words skipped by D8. Note that the word ἐντελέχεια, omitted by him, is deferred in D8 to a gloss appended to the sentence.


50 ḥarab: read dhahāb, translating the βαδιέν of Phys. viii.5.257b8? The parallel sentence at F(d) above has intiqāl.

51 See note 36 above.
Thus it has become clear that light is not the form of the transparent but an affection and a colour. It has also become sound and clear that natural form is complete motion, i.e. a thing’s completion and perfection, and that it is a substance, as the Philosopher says. The discourse is complete. Praise to God as is His due.

I

Proclus, Elements of Theology, section 15 (ed. Dodds 16. 30-2) P15-17 (MSS, Z, G, H, M, Tk; readings recorded in Endress, Proclus Arabus, Arabic pp. 12f)62

Discourse of Alexander [of Aphedodias]: On affirming the spiritual, immaterial forms. [Translated by (tarjama) Abū ‘Uthmān al-Dimashqi.]

All that is apt to turn back upon itself is incorporeal; for it is not in the nature of any body to turn back upon itself. ...

None of those three openings conforms to the animated pattern, except that D8 bears the familiar tripartite inscription.53

52 The piece was first published from MS Z in Badawi, Arisṭū, 291f. The words in square brackets are not in Z, which refers to Dimashqi in a separate note (see note 39 above). The ascriptions to Alexander and Dimashqi are peculiar to manuscripts transmitting sections 15-17 as a separate unit. MS C, where the same text constitutes but three of the 26 sections of D27, adds a reference to Dimashqi in the margin of section 15, no doubt from a manuscript of the other family. MS R, where section 15 occurs as the first of four, adds ‘from a text by Aristotle’ to its title.

53 The same type of inscription is further shared by D12 (= Quaestio 1.2) in MS G (ed., tr. H. Gätje, Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen (1967): 341-62) and D22 (= Quaestio 1.16) in MS Tk (ed. Badawi, Commentaires 47-50). The inscription of D12 adds the words “Translated by (naql) Abū ‘Uthmān al-Dimashqi”, which could mean that D12 too was once included in the copy produced by Dimashqi according to MS Z (see note 39 above).
It is easy to see why the animator might have refrained from converting D4 and P15-17: they make no reference to a conflict in or with Aristotle. Neither does D8; but it is strange that it should be so different from its twin D9 under F. Both pieces turn on Aristotle’s description of motion as an incomplete actuality or entelechy, which implies a distinction between complete and incomplete actuality or entelechy. What, then, is complete actuality or entelechy? The two pieces give different answers, which it would be easier to reconcile if ‘motion’ had not been substituted for ‘actuality’ in D8 at H(e). The clash suggests that D8 was altered, without reference to Aristotle or D9, by a transmitter before or after the animator. It does not show that D8 was never included in the animator’s collection. As far as we can tell, he confined his editorial work to beginnings and endings. We have no reason to suppose that he would have felt called upon to eliminate doctrinal inconsistencies.

No light is shed on the beginning of D8 by either of the two parallel versions flanking it in my translation above. The existing beginning of Quaestio 1.21, which chimes rather less well with the sequel than does the Arabic of D8, is likely to be spurious. Dimashqi’s version, which should have given us a clearer idea of what the Kindi-circle translator had had in front of him, has unfortunately lost its beginning. We cannot tell why D8 at H(c) is not as animated as D9 at F(c)-(d). Should we conclude that Dimashqi took D4, D8, and P15-17 from a collection other than the animator’s? But that too would have been a secondary collection, because it included a fragment of the Elements as an independent piece of Alexander. How many such secondary collections are we to suppose existed by Dimashqi’s time? And why should he have collected secondary versions from secondary collections rather than primary versions from primary collections (like D27, which includes earlier versions of Dimashqi’s pieces D7 and P15-17)? It is easier to suppose that he took all his pieces from a single collection that happened to be at hand. In that case, we should have to conclude that the animator had sometimes been content to add nothing but an ascription to Alexander. If we think of him primarily as a transmitter, there is indeed no reason why he should have changed the text of every piece that he transmitted.

Again, if the animator’s source resembled D27, it is not surprising that he should have mistaken some pieces of Proclus for pieces of Alexander. By the evidence of D27d under B, he was
merely guessing, however correctly, when he attributed the piece to Alexander. Presumably, the guess was not a difficult one. One section of D27, after stating its problem, continues with the words ‘Alexander says’ (D27g, MS C, fol. 64v21). We may take it that the animator found similar clues in his own source — clues that led him to suppose that some or most of its pieces were by Alexander. And if he included one piece of Proclus in his collection of Alexander, he may have included others. We have already looked at two of the four pieces of Proclus separately transmitted as pieces of Alexander. Here are the beginnings of the remaining two.

J

Proclus, Elements of Theology, section 1 (ed. Dodds 1.1-3)

(a) Proclus the <Platonic> Successor’s Elements of Theology.

(b) Every manifold somehow partakes of oneness. ...

K

Proclus, Elements of Theology, section 77 (ed. Dodds 72. 20f)

(a)

(b) All that is (εὐ) potentially goes forth (πρὸς ἔνα) into <being> actually because of what is in actuality what the other is potentially ...

54 The piece was first published from MS Tk in Badawi, Commentaires 24-6. The words in brackets occur only in Tk. The rest of the inscription closely resembles that of D27 in MS C, where the same text constitutes the first three of 26 sections.

55 No version of section 77 exists in D27. According to Endress’s table at Proclus Arabus 43, D23 occurs also in MSS G, L, H, M. For an additional copy in MS Lucknow Naziriyah 841, see H. Daiber, ‘New manuscript findings from Indian Libraries’, Manuscripts of the Middle East, 1 (1986): 26-48, p. 37 (cf. DPhA i. 139 (62)).
The case of P1-3 at J nicely illustrates how, in the course of transmission, a vague association with the name of Alexander could turn into an outright attribution. It also suggests that the animator is not the only transmitter to have selected bits of Proclus for separate transmission under the name of Alexander. For if, as I shall argue in section IV, the words ‘extracted by Alexander’ are a scribal rubric peculiar to D27, P1-3 derives from D27 and not from the collection of the animator.

D23 at K looks like a companion to P15-17 at I, except that it is not associated with the name of Dimashqi. Title and text of P15-17, as of P1-3, agree almost entirely with their counterparts in D27. (The titles are old. Every section of the Elements in D27 has one. The Greek has none. Most probably they were supplied by the translator.) The creator of P15-17 did little beyond lifting three sections from their context and adding the words maqālat al-Iskandar and qāla al-Iskandar before and after the title of the first. The original version of D23 does not survive. But we may take it that a section *P77 once existed in what I shall call collection β. It is less certain that it was our animator who turned *P77 into D23. Its apparent absence from Dimashqi’s collection argues neither for nor against that possibility. If the animator’s collection included both P15-17 and D23, but only P15-17 was transmitted by Dimashqi, that would go to show no more than that Dimashqi did not copy the entire collection. At all events, the existence of D23 gives us a second reason to doubt that P15-17 derives, as it might, from D27. The first is that only one other piece of Dimashqi’s collection, viz. D7, has a counterpart in D27.

That finally brings us back to A and D29. Once more we may take it that an original version *P98 once existed as a section of collection β. But D29 is more elaborately dressed up than P15-17 and D23. Once more, it is conceivable that the same transmitter treated different pieces of Proclus differently. It is equally conceivable that they were not all revised by the same transmitter. The internal evidence of D29 argues both for and against the identity of its reviser with the animator of B-F. On the one hand, its opening is very similar to those at B-F, particularly that of D6 at D. On the other hand, it has risāla (instead of maqāla) for ‘treatise’ at (a) and (c); uses the verb sharaha (instead of the lakhkhaṣa or awdaha used at D(c)) for ‘to expound’ at (c) and (n); and alone in the whole Kindi-circle
Alexander speaks of ‘the excellent Aristotle’ at (n). If that means that the animator of A is not identical with the animator of B-F, he is a later imitator. For lakhhasa and awdaha are normal in the vocabulary of the Kindi-circle Alexander, sharaha in that of later translators.56 Moreover, the reference at A(b) to the ‘Theology of Aristotle’ mentioned in the inscription of D27 (but not in any of its sections) is unusual in more than one respect. No other piece of the whole corpus refers to that work. No other piece of Proclus sive Alexander refers to any work of Aristotle. And arguably no other animated piece had its reference to what is in each case a genuine work of Aristotle added by its animator. For unless we allow that *P98 underwent several revisions at the hands of successive transmitters, it must have been the animator of D29 who added the reference at A(b). By contrast, the reference in D7 to Aristotle’s De gen. et corr. at B(b) is shown by its presence in D27d at B(c) to have been supplied at an earlier stage. The references to the same work at D(b) and E(b) will have been supplied at the same stage. The references to other works at C(b) and F(b) are in an archaic style which also points to an earlier stage. Yet the same style is used, presumably at a later stage, by the animator of D29 at A(b). I shall discuss those references in sections IV and V. They do not settle the question of the identity of the animator of D29. In principle, there may have been as many animators as there are animated pieces. My own feeling is that the animators of B-F are all the same man, and that the animator of A is indeed a later imitator. But that remains a guess.

Clearly, we got more evidence of secondary change than we bargained for. The history of the secondary versions at A-K does not reduce to a tidy two-stage process of translation by one man and revision by another. It is evident from the manuscripts that the Arabic Alexander was transmitted piecemeal, not as a corpus. Our oldest witnesses are from the twelfth century. But the process of dispersal and diversification must have started much earlier. Undoubtedly, there was an early transmitter of Kindi-circle pieces who supplied standardised tripartite inscriptions, turned bits of the Elements into treatises of Alexander, and animated the odd opening. But he was not the only transmitter ever to do any of those things. We cannot be sure that D29 comes from the same reviser’s collec-

56 Cf. H(c) above; and contrast the Kindi-circle use of sharh in the sense of ‘order’: Endress, Proclus Arabus, pp. 131-3.
tion as some or all of the other revised pieces surveyed at B-K. But its substrate *P98 almost certainly belonged to a collection like D27, which also included earlier versions of some or all of those other pieces. It is the evidence of D29 which most strikingly argues that D27 is but a reduced version of an older and larger collection.

IV THE ANCESTRAL COLLECTION

The title referred to by the animator of D29 in quoting Aristotle at A(b) has been garbled in transmission. What it must have been is evident from the parallels set out below. Here is the text of the reference in D29, with the garbled portion omitted:

(i) Qāla al-Iskandar inna Aristū qāla fi kitābihi alladhi yud'ā [...] fi al-rubūbiyya ...

The complete title survives in the inscription of D27, which has come down to us in three versions. Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a (13th cent.) lists the following item among the works of Alexander (i.71.1f Müller):


Manuscript C (15th cent.) introduces D27 as follows (fol. 60v.25-27):

(iii) Tammat al-maqūla fi al-aql yatlū dhālika mā istakhrajahu al-Iskandar al-Afrūdisī min kitāb Aristūtālīs al-musammā thālūjiyā wa-ma‘nāhu al-kalām fī al-rubūbiyya — Here ends the discourse On the Intellect; it is followed by what Alexander extracted (?) from Aristotle’s book called theologia, which means theory of divinity.

Manuscripts L, Tk, T (all 17th cent.) introduce P1-3 as follows (see J(a) above):

(iv) Qawl istakhrajahu al-Iskandar min kitāb thālūjiyā (T: uthūlūjiyā), ay al-rubūbiyya.57

57 Endress, Proclus Arabus, Arabic p. 3. 8f. For another attestation in the Cairo Genizah see G.A. Khan, ‘The Arabic fragments in the Cambridge Genizah collec-
But what is generally known as the ‘Theology of Aristotle’ is a collection of fragments from the Kindi-circle Plotinus dressed up, perhaps in the second half of the ninth century, as a complete work of Aristotle. Its title reads as follows:

(v) Kitāb Arīstāṭālis al-musammā bi-al-yūnāniyya uthūlājiyyā wa-huwa qawl ‘alā al-rubūbiyya — Aristotle’s book called in Greek theologia, that is, theory of divinity.\(^{58}\)

The text transmitted under that title does not include the proposition quoted in D29 or any of the passages supposedly ‘extracted’ by Alexander in D27.

Items (ii) to (v) allow us to say that the fi al-rubūbiyya of item (i) must once have been preceded by some such words as thūlūjiyyā ay al-qawl. In return, item (i) allows us to say that D29 and D27 must have been derived from a common source. For that will explain why the same fictitious work of Aristotle is mentioned in both. Since D27 does not include the original version *P98 of D29, the common source, β, must have been larger. Like D27, β will have displayed a rubric mentioning Aristotle’s Theologia in a commanding position; it will have included pieces of both Proclus and Alexander; some of its Alexander will have been more clearly marked than its Proclus; and its inscription and subscription will have given no proper indication of the contents. That will account for the extraordinary idea on the part of a transmitter to treat a section of Proclus’s Elements as a commentary by Alexander on a quotation from Aristotle.

We must further infer from the testimony of items (i) to (v) that the title mentioned in β included both the name of Aristotle and the curious phrase alladhi yud‘ā. The variant at the end of item (ii) is clearly a substitute for the original al-rubūbiyya preserved elsewhere. But its alladhi yud‘ā is bound to be older than the al-musammā of items (iii) and (v), which is better Arabic.\(^{59}\) Item (iv) is clearly an abbreviation of (iii),


\(^{59}\) For another attestation see R.C. Taylor, ‘Two manuscripts containing ... the ‘Liber de causis’ and an anonymous Neoplatonic treatise on motion’, Mélanges de

hence does not allow us to infer, as we might like to do, that the name of Aristotle as attested by the others is a secondary addition. No attestation is older than, at best, the second half of the ninth century. But the alladhi yud‘a of items (i) and (ii) takes us all the way back to those around Kindi, where the usage is much at home. We have already encountered examples in the Kindi-circle passages at C(b), F(b), (d), and H(b), (d), (e) above. More will be mentioned in section V. Apparently, some member of the circle, whom I shall call the dā‘ī, was given to using the verb da‘ā instead of sammā in the sense of ‘to call (by a name)’. In particular, he would insert the phrase alladhi yud‘a at the beginning of titles. The mannerism of writing ‘Aristotle’s book which is called …’ and ‘Aristotle says in his book which is called …’, which I shall call the dā‘ī style of reference, was then sometimes adopted by others.60

What was the title of ‘Aristotle’s Theologia’ doing in a collection of Proclus and Alexander? As it happens, the beginning of D27 translates the beginning of a Greek work entitled στοιχείωσις θεολογική. The word thūlūjiyya with its variants could therefore be a remnant of the original Arabic title of the Elements of Proclus.61 But that does not explain why the same title attaches to a collection of Plotinus, and why the names of both Proclus and Plotinus should have been replaced by that of Aristotle. According to the explanation I adopted in the past, Plotinus and Proclus were treated in the circle of Kindi as commentators of Aristotle along with Alexander of Aphrodisias. A reader ‘On Aristotle’s theology’ was compiled from their writings. The compilation came to be scattered, the title to be misunderstood.62 I do not wish to abandon that explanation. But the misattribution to Aristotle of Kindi-circle translations of Plotinus and Proclus can no longer be blamed on transmitters alone. We shall see in section V that the formula kitāb Aristuṭālis alladhi yud‘a in Kindi-circle translations does sometimes introduce spurious titles. We cannot presume that the

60 Note that D8 uses alladhī yud‘ā in connexion with titles, elsewhere sammā (see H(e) above). The dā‘ī style is not always confined to titles of Aristotle: it occurs in references to Plato’s Timaeus in the Kindi-circle version of De Caelo 280a30, 293b32, 300a1,b17 (ed. A. Badawi, Cairo, 1961) and twice in the Kindi-circle Plotinus (see Zimmermann, ‘Theology of Aristotle’, p. 149).


62 Ibid., pp. 120-5 and passim.
difference between a book on Aristotle’s theology and a book of Aristotle’s on theology was always strictly observed within the circle itself.

We must therefore conclude that the reference to ‘Aristotle’s Theologia’ in D27 and D29 is a legacy from their common ancestor β. But the equally bizarre reference to Alexander that precedes in the inscription of D27 need not be part of the same legacy if we picture the process of transmission as follows. We saw that the section devoted to Alexander in manuscript C was copied from a collection apparently compiled by an earlier scribe ‘Muṣṭafā’ from three sources, the first of which contributed a batch of seven pieces ending with D1, D21, and D27. For present purposes, the history of that batch begins with a copy γ in which a selection of pieces from β was first appended to D21. That cannot have happened before the time of Iṣḥāq b. Ḥunayn, the named translator of D21 (d. 910). The copy of D1 that preceded D21 in γ, or came to precede it in a later copy δ, was acephalous. The scribe of δ, where the three texts were united as they are in manuscript C today, wrote as follows at the beginning and the end of his transcript of D1 (MS C, fols. 54r6f, 58r26):

Discourse of Alexander of Aphrodisias on the <theory of the> principles of the universe. 63 (i.a) extracted (?) by (istikhrāj) Ḥunayn b. Iṣḥāq, (i.b) transcribed from an acephalous copy (nuskha qad inqafa’a awwaluhā).

Here ends (tammat) the discourse on the <theory of the> principles of the universe, (ii.a) extracted (?) by (istikhrāj) Ḥunayn b. Iṣḥāq (ii.b) in an acephalous state (‘alā inqitā’ awwalihā).

Clause (i.b) is correct: by the evidence of the complete text in manuscript Z, the archetype of the copy in manuscript C lacked its first folio or two but was complete at the end. It was in the subscription that the scribe of δ found the title, and where he would have expected also to find the name of the translator — Ibrāhim b. ‘Abdallāh (c. 900) according to the subscription in manuscript Z. 64 If we assume that clause (ii.a) was found in the


64 Badawi, *Ariṣṭā* 277.8. The subscription continues with the words: ‘and <translated> from Greek into Syriac by Abū Zayd Ḥunayn b. Iṣḥāq.’ That may explain the name of Ḥunayn in manuscript C, as Charles Genequand observes in his forthcoming critical edition, of which he has had the kindness to let me see a draft.
exemplar, we are at a loss to explain its unusual expression for ‘translated by’ and its disagreement with manuscript Z about the translator’s identity. The wording, at least, is the transmitter’s. I therefore put a comma before (ii.a) but not before (ii.b). The two clauses are logically connected: it is because it is defective that the text in hand is describable as an istikhrāj. The usage, if not altogether idiosyncratic, is a piece of scribal jargon intended to convey a sense of incomplete transmission. It suggests that a mustakhrij is someone involved at the Arabic end rather than the Greek. When later our scribe came upon D27, a text without proper inscription or subscription, which looked like a translation of fragments or fragments of a translation, he duly used the word istakhraja again.

First he copied D21, the important treatise ‘On the intellect’, complete with name of translator fore and aft. When, upon completing the subscription with ‘translated by Ishāq b. Ḥunayn’, he turned to D27, he proceeded with the words ‘followed by what he (sc. Ishāq) extracted (?) from Aristotle’s Theologia’. The scribe of a later copy ε accidentally skipped the clause ‘translated by Ishāq b. Ḥunayn’, leaving the subsequent istakhraja bereft of its subject. The lacuna was perceived, but wrongly located after the verb rather than before, by the scribe of a subsequent copy ζ, who created the archetype of items (ii)-(iv) above by supplying the name of the author of the other pieces of the collection he was in the process of transcribing: Alexander.65

If that explanation seems too neat to be true, some such explanation must still be sought. On no account can D27 have had the words ‘extracted by Alexander’ attached to it from the beginning. Section D27g, we saw, purports to be a discussion by Alexander of a problem in Aristotle. In other words, it is not supposed to be by Aristotle. And we saw that section D27d, at B(c), purports to be based on Aristotle’s De generatione et corruptione. In other words, it is not supposed to derive from his Theologia. The original compiler of D27, whatever his designs, clearly did not pretend to be Alexander picking pieces from Aristotle’s Theologia. In fact, readers of ζ were not persuaded that its heading pertained to more than a few sections at the

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65 It is no longer possible, if ever it was, to make Dimashqi the original subject of the verb istakhraja, as I did in the past (‘Theology of Aristotle’, pp. 130, 185). The fact that D27 includes an earlier version (D27d) of a piece apparently transmitted in a later version (D7) by Dimashqi (see note 39 above) shows that D27 does not derive from Dimashqi’s collection (i below).
beginning. Only the initial group of three is transmitted separately under that heading (P1-3 at J and (iv) above).

The same argument applies to β, particularly if it included the original versions of some or all of the pieces surveyed under B-K. It is indeed tempting to assume that most or all of the Kindi-circle Alexander has come down to us through β. For that would help to explain its haphazard transmission. The other ‘Theology of Aristotle’ was transmitted complete as soon as the fragments of which it consists had been dressed up as an integral work. Collection β, which retained the appearance of a casual miscellany, invited selective transmission and creative editing. Since some sections plainly did not belong to a work of Aristotle’s called Theologia, and at least one was ostensibly by Alexander, readers had to decide for themselves whether any anonymous section was a piece of Aristotle’s Theologia or another treatise by Alexander. The animator of section *P98 combined the two options in D29. Others (?) plumped for either Aristotle or Alexander. The name of Proclus survived only in connexion with a batch of sections that evidently bypassed β, though even there it had almost disappeared before the batch in question passed to the Latins as the Liber de causis of Aristotle.66

It seems reasonable, then, to assign to β the original versions of all pieces inspected under B-K, even if it was not the animator of D29 who revised them. Some were united by the animator of D7 in a collection θ, whence they passed into Dimashqi’s pivotal copy I. One transmitter gave D19 its final shape by adding the words ikhrāj Abi ‘Uthmān al-Dimashqī to its inscription in his copy ξ (see E(a) above). The phrase is without parallel in the rest of the Arabic Alexander.67 I take it to mean ‘transmitted, but not necessarily translated, by Dimashqī’. The

66 According to its inscription in the two manuscripts described by Taylor (‘Two manuscripts’, pp. 256, 259), the Liber de causis was sometimes attributed to Proclus. The same manuscripts include an unpublished compilation (pseudonymous rather than ‘anonymous’, as the title of Taylor’s article has it) under the name of Aristotle, which draws, inter alia, on sections of the Elements not included in either D27 or the Liber de causis (see note 92 below). Sections 15, 17, 21 and 54 in MS R are likewise attributed to Aristotle (see note 52 above). The former cannot, the latter need not, be based on D27.

67 A parallel (ikhrāj Ḥunayn b. Iṣḥāq) in a 15th-cent.(?) manuscript of a translation of Galen was explained as a Syriacism by P. Kraus and R. Walzer, Galeni compendium Timaei Platonis (London, 1951), pp. 18, 21, 30. Rosenthal (“One-volume library”, p. 17n11a) notes it as a potential parallel to the equally odd use of istikhraj discussed above.
scribe of another copy, λ, which included at least seven pieces, added a note to the effect that those pieces had been transmitted, and therefore translated, by Dimashqi. The collection of λ was copied, complete with note, by the scribe of manuscript Z. Another transmitter (from λ rather than Z) simply added tar-jamat Abi 'Uthmān al-Dimashqi to the inscription of P15-17 in his copy μ (see G(a) above). D23 and D29 may have taken different routes. But it cannot be ruled out that they too — one or the other or both — were once included in θ.

Here is a summary of observations in stemmatic form, with Greek letters for inferred ancestors of existing copies.

c. 825  a : Kindi-circle translation of Proclus’s Elements?

β : Collection without translator’s name; beginning of Proclus marked ‘(From?) Aristotle’s Theologia’

not before c. 900  γ : Selection preceded by copy of D21 ending ‘translated by Iṣḥāq’

δ : Copy inserting mā istakhrajahu at beginning of D27

ε : Copy omitting name of Iṣḥāq

ζ : Copy adding name of Alexander

η : Copy in collection of ‘Muṣṭafā’

1477  D27 in MS C

17th cent.  P1-3 in MSS L, Tk, T

c. 875  θ : Selection revised by animator of D7

c. 900  i : P15-17, D4-D9, D19 in collection of Dimashqi

κ : Copy marked ikhrāj Abi ‘Uthmān al-Dimashqi

13th-19th cents  D19 in MSS G, L, Tk, D

λ : Copy marked ‘from a copy in the hand of Dimashqi’

1162  P15-17, D4-9 in MS Z

μ : Copy marked tarjamat Abi ‘Uthmān al-Dimashqi

13th-17th cents  P15-17 in MSS G, L, H, Tk, M

ν (part of θ?) : * P77 turned into D23

13th-19th cents  D23 in MSS G, L, H, Tk, M

ξ (part of θ?) : * P98 turned into D29

1477  D29 in MS C.

Endress’s stemma in Proclus Arabus (p. 44), which makes D27 the ultimate Arabic archetype, needs to be topped up. The main effect of the emergence, first of D23, now of D29, is to establish

See note 39 above.

See Endress’s stemma in Proclus Arabus, p. 44.
the existence at one time of an older and larger collection. Endress’s archetype is identical with $\zeta$ in the stemma above. The older and larger collection is $\beta$. I have called it $\beta$ rather than $\alpha$, because it is uncertain, if not altogether improbable, that the collection as a whole was a translation of a single Greek or Syriac prototype. We must allow that Proclus and Alexander may first have been translated separately — in other words, that the Proclus of $\beta$ may have derived from a Kindi-circle translation of the *Elements*.

V THE PROBLEM OF ARCHETYPE $\alpha$

As so often, our witnesses tell us least about what we want to know most. Essentially, what they tell us is that by the time of Dimashqi, the Kindi-circle translation of Proclus’s *Elements* was fragmented, jumbled up with pieces of Alexander, and prey to misattribution. It is fair to impute a degree of derangement to the ancestral copy $\beta$. But how did $\beta$ relate to its ultimate Kindi-circle archetype $\alpha$? Was $\beta$ itself that archetype — a miscellany of pieces selected at random from the works of Proclus and Alexander? Was it a chance collection of leaves from different Kindi-circle manuscripts? Was it a codex mutilus preserving a single compilation $\alpha$ in a fragmentary state? If so, did $\alpha$ originally include the whole of the *Elements*, in the order of the Greek, under its own title, and under the name of Proclus? How, when one lot of fragments from the middle — I am thinking of the later *Liber de causis* — escaped with a memory of its true author,70 did another, while retaining the original begin-

70 That Proclus was not completely forgotten in the Arabic tradition of the *Liber de causis* transpired some thirty years ago from the two manuscripts described more recently by Taylor (see note 66 above). One cannot help being impressed by the good sense of Otto Bardenhewer’s remark, in his *editio princeps* of the Arabic *Liber de causis* (Freiburg i.Br., 1882, p. 51), that the Arabic version of the *Elements* underly-

ing that compilation ‘doch wohl den Namen Proklos, und nicht Aristoteles, an der Stirne getragen haben wird’. D29 sheds little light on the question how the *Liber de causis* relates to our *Proclus sive Alexander*, except that it tends to add to one’s dis-

satisfaction with Endress’s conclusion (*Proclus Arabus*, pp. 55, 187f, 240) that two distinct adaptations of the *Elements* were separately translated by different members of the same group (see, in the volume cited in note 49 above, R.C. Taylor, ‘The Kalâm fī maḥḍ al-khair (Liber de causis) in the Islamic philosophical milieu’, pp. 39f, 51f; and Zimmermann, ‘Theology of Aristotle’, pp. 184-8). Those adaptations would presumably have to be assigned to a pre-Arabic period, as Endress indeed inclined to do (*Proclus Arabus*, pp. 235ff) in accordance with a wide-spread tendency to take a similar view of the origins of the so-called ‘Theology of Aristotle’. In my
ning (and title?), lose its way among the Kindi-circle Alexander? What, if anything, was the point of uniting Proclus with Alexander in a single compilation? Was Theologia the title of the compilation as a whole? Did it include the name of Aristotle from the beginning? And how did a relate to the Kindi-circle Plotinus?

Beyond the issue of α versus β, what we wish to know most is whether the archetype was somehow prefigured in the Greek or Syriac substratum. We saw that certain anomalies were caused by erratic transmission after translation. But all cannot be explained by secondary accidents of loss, error, or caprice. As we saw, the dāʿī style of the title of ‘Aristotle’s Theologia’ suggests that it originated in the circle of Kindi. The use of daʿā for ‘to call (by a name)’ is most at home in the Kindi-circle version of Aristotle’s De Caelo. The verb represents nothing in the Greek. The words alladhi yudʿā appear to be a set phrase designed, in the first place, to introduce Greek words retained in transliteration.71 For example, fi kitābinā alladhi yudʾā āsturlūjiyā ‘in our book called astrologia’ renders ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἀστρολογίαν (v.l. - ἴας) at De Caelo 291a31. The translator, not unreasonably, takes Aristotle to be referring to a work of his own.72 But if there ever was such a work, it was undoubtedly lost quite early. The Kindi-circle version of Alexander’s ‘On providence’ (D15), at the end of its istibāna, refers to what Aristotle says in al-kitāb alladhi yudʾā āsturlūjiyā as though the work had been available to Alexander, thereby investing it study of the latter, I argued at length against assigning pre-Arabic origins to the peculiarities of the Kindi-circle Plotinus; I shall here argue more briefly against assigning pre-Arabic origins to the peculiarities of the Kindi-circle Alexander. Bardenhewer probably overrated the extent to which the ‘author’ of the Liber de causis (whom he located in 9th-cent. Iraq: p. 53) departed from the underlying (complete?) translation of the Elements. But we seem to be working our way back to his conviction (p. 38) that there was no pre-Arabic model other than the transmitted text of Proclus (for a lucid account of recent advances see E.K. Rowson, ‘An unpublished work by al-ʿAmiri and the date of the Arabic De causis’, Journal of the American Oriental Society, 104 (1984): 193-9). That will almost inevitably lead us to suppose that the pieces of Proclus transmitted within and without the Liber de causis must be fragments of a single (though not necessarily complete) translation of the Elements — which will indeed have borne the name of Proclus.

71 At De caelo 306b7, al-shakl alladhi yudʾā birāmīs renders παραμικ. D8, on a similar occasion, uses sammā (cf. note 60 above).

with a bogus reality. That *istibâna*, like most others, was almost certainly without foundation in the Greek original (lost to us). The case of *al-kitâb alladhi yud'â thûlûjiyâ*, if less transparent, is disturbingly similar. We do not know whether the title had any particular basis in a Greek text. But like the supposed *Astrologia*, the supposed *Theologia* acquired content, only on a much larger scale.

I count fourteen *dâ'ī*-style references in the Kindi-circle Alexander. All are to works of Aristotle, genuine (four) or spurious (three). Eight of those references occur in pieces known to us also in Greek. Only one has a match in the Greek, but not at quite the same place — and of course, with nothing to match the phrase *alladhi yud'â*. Most if not all are likely to have been interpolated. The question is whether that was done before, during, or after translation. If we assume that those around Kindi, like later translators, worked from versions, Greek or Syriac, much like the Greek we have today (where we do have it), we are faced by the spectre of a conspiracy to pervert the history of philosophy at the heart of the circle of Kindi. It is tempting for Arabists to escape the problem by locating the ‘kernel of derangement’ in a pre-Arabic past so as to leave it to Byzantinists and Syriacists to track down the culprits. In the present circumstances, the temptation must be resisted, though the possibility of pre-Arabic change cannot always be

74 One each in D5 (see C(b) above), D14 (see next note), D27e, D27f, D29 (see A(b)); two in D9 (see F(b), (d)); three in D8 (see H(b), (d), (c)); four in D15 (see note 81 below).
76 It is of course to be expected that the Greek manuscript(s) of Alexander available to an early ninth-century Arab translator (or to an even earlier Syriac translator) were somewhat different from, and sometimes better than, those available to modern European editors. We saw that the beginning of D8 might well be closer to the original than the transmitted Greek (see note 43 above). It is all the less likely that the underlying Greek should have been riddled with spurious additions — additions, moreover, from which later re-translations are free (see note 80 below; and contrast D2 with D8 under H above).
ruled out. To illustrate the point, I shall briefly return to the evidence set out under B above.

The passage at B(e) recalls De gen. et corr. ii.2, where Aristotle argues that perceptible bodies originate from oppositions between tangible qualities reducible to the ‘tangible contrarieties’ of hot, cold, dry, and moist. It can be no coincidence that where the Greek has τὸν αἰτίων ἐναντιώσεων the Arabic presupposes τὸν ἀπτῶν ἐναντιώσεων instead. One explanation is that the copy used by the translator simply preserved the original reading. But as causality is more to the point of Quaestio 2.11 than tangibility, we may perhaps take it that the transmitted Greek text is correct. If so, αἰτίων was misread as ἀπτῶν, as would have been easy enough, by someone familiar with the Aristotelian background. One’s first thought is of a Greek transmitter. For it is not certain that the translator worked from the Greek; and it seems too much to suppose that he should have been familiar with the Greek of the De gen. et corr. Yet familiarity with the text of Aristotle was not in fact required. A knowledge of Alexander would have sufficed. Our passage has a poignant parallel, complete with reference, in Alexander’s De anima, where having enumerated the four elementary qualities he goes on to say:

For it is by those that the first bodies are defined. And the other tangible contrarieties (ἀπταὶ ἐναντιώσεις) may be reduced to those primary ones, as Aristotle has shown in the De generatione et corruptione (i.58.27-59.1 Bruns).

We know that Quaestio 2.11 was not the only piece of Alexander known to our translator. It is not too much to suppose that the collection at his disposal also included the De anima. The same, of course, applies to transmitters of the Greek. But what with the possibility, on the one hand, that the error at B(e) was the translator’s, and on the other, that it was not an error at all, we are not in a strong position to argue that the reference to the De gen. et corr. at B(c) must have been added by a Greek transmitter.

That reference is clearly an interpolation, because the loci Aristotelici primarily invoked at B(c) and (d) are not in the De gen. et corr.78 We may argue that it must have strayed into the title from the vicinity of (e), where it had been added, perhaps in a marginal note, by our Greek transmitter. But the picture

78 See Sharples’s note 351 to his translation of Quaestio 2.11.
becomes blurred when we look beyond B. There are altogether five references to the *De gen. et corr.* in the Kindi-circle Alexander. All but one are inept. All but two occur in a title, or what used to be a title before the animator got to it. Four occur in pieces that have survived in Greek without them; the fifth, in the Greekless ‘On providence’ (D15), is shown to have been added in the Arabic by its absence from the more faithful parallel translation of the same text in D18. None is in the *dāʾi* style, which adds to the impression that we are dealing with a distinct group attributable to the same hand. We are looking for an annotator obsessed, but not necessarily very familiar, with the *De gen. et corr.*, who was active before the animator, but not before the translator. Our shadowy Greek transmitter has by now dropped out of the picture. The translator is still in the running, but not in the lead. What tells against him is that he failed to interpolate references to the *De gen. et corr.* in other likely pieces that he translated, and also that if he did interpolate any references at all, he is more likely to have used the *dāʾi* style. Four out of six references in the Greekless D15 are in that style.

The pattern of references is not consistent enough to settle the question who interpolated the inauthentic majority. But the inconsistency is instructive in itself, in that it suggests a plurality of hands at the Arabic end. Within the pieces that exist in both Greek and (Kindi-circle) Arabic, not counting D29, only five out of eighteen Arabic references to titles of Aristotle have Greek counterparts. If the Greekless majority had once been in the Greek or been added by the translator, one would expect all to have come out alike. But as I said, the pattern is an irregular one. Without rhyme or reason, some are in the *dāʾi* style, others are not. The first group includes Arabic titles as familiar as *kitāb al-maqūlāt* (*Categories*) and *kitāb al-nafs* (*De anima*)

79 D6 (two); D7; D15; the exception is in D19; see notes 30, 32, 78 above, and 80 below.

80 Contrast the lower text at 81.7-10 with the upper text at 81.9f in Ruland’s edn (note 73 above). I concur with Silvia Fazzo in failing to be convinced by Ruland’s identification of the ‘quotation’ (p. 82n6).

81 Same edn, lower text: *fi kitābihi alladhi yudʿā kitāb al-tadbir* (33.3, sim. 51.5); *fi kitāb al-kawn wa al-fasād* (81.7); *fi kitāb al-samāʾ* (89.7); *fi kitābihi alladhi yudʿā kitāb ma baʿd al-ṭabiʿa* (93.1f); *fi al-kitāb alladhi yudʿā aṣṭurlūjiyā* (105.7).

82 Beginning of D14 (note 75 above); beginning of D17 (note 84 below); title and beginning of D20 (= *Quaestio* 1.24; ed. Badawi, *Commentaires* 44-6); beginning of D22 (note 53 above).
beside only one case of transliteration. Sometimes the same work is cited in the *dāʿī* style in one place but not in another. Sometimes the same title is expressed, now in one form of words, now in another. In those cases, the less familiar version would appear to be the older.

To account for all that, we must allow for a variety of hands: one to have added references in the *dāʿī* style; one to have added references to the *De gen. et corr*.; one (or more) to have sporadically added other non-*dāʿī*-style references; one (or more) to have sporadically modernised the style of references; one (or more) to have sporadically modernised the wording of titles. Needless to say, each of those hands need not have belonged to a different man. But for a comfortable explanation we shall probably need at least three. If we allow the translator to have engaged in some annotating of his own, his is most likely to be the hand of the *dāʿī*. According to Endress, the Kindi-circle Alexander (including the associated Proclus) is closely related to the Arabic *De caelo*. The *dāʿī* style is something else the two have in common. Whether that means that the translator of the *De caelo*, the translator of Alexander, the *dāʿī* of the *De caelo*, and the *dāʿī* of Alexander are all the same man (namely, Ibn al-Bīṭrīq) is a question that need not concern us here. They would certainly all appear to belong to one group. Some of the other hands observed at work above may belong to other members of the same group. The supplier of references to the *De gen. et corr.*, for one, is dated by the work of the animator of *D7* to an earlier part of the ninth century. It is possible that drafts produced by one member of the group collected accretions and other changes in the process of being discussed with others or passed around. But there is at least

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83 D8 (see H(d) above); D14 (note 75 above); D15 (end of note 81 above).

84 Contrast, e.g., the reference to the *De anima* in D14 (note 75 above) with another one at the beginning of D17: *fi kitabīhi fi al-nafs* (ed. H.-J. Ruland, ‘Zwei arabische Fassungen der Abhandlung des Alexander von Aphrodisias über die Universalia (Quaestio I 11a)’, Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen (1979): 243–74, p. 254).

85 Contrast, e.g., the references to the *Physics* at F(6) and (d) above: *samʿ al-kiyan* is unusual (though not unique) and probably archaic.

86 A likely case is the reference to the *Physics* at H(e) above, which occurs in what looks like a re-arrangement of the underlying Greek sentence by the translator himself.

87 See note 12 above.

88 Endress, in speaking of the ‘Zusammenarbeit einer Gruppe arabischer
one class of additions which, far more regular than the dāʾī- style reference, calls for assignment to a single hand, and that is the istibāna. Unless we suppose that similar winding-up passages existed in the substratum, the istibāna is evidence that the translator himself habitually added to the original.89

He who makes one change may make many. The burden of the preceding observations is that the stage on to which the Kindi-circle Proclus and Alexander were jointly or separately released, presumably in the first half of the ninth century, was too crowded with people ready to impose ideas of their own, from the translator to the animator and beyond, for us to have to turn to a pre-Arabic past in order to explain the anomalies of the Arabic present. For all we know, the Arabic fragments of the Elements, within and without the Liber de causis, may have been translated from a single, complete copy of a Greek text not very different from that of Dodds.90 The various clusters (including singletons) in which they have come down to us tell us little about the scope and order of the original translation or translations, except that we have no reason to believe that what we have today is all there ever was. In ordinary circumstances, the fact that the Arabic fragments include a section without counterpart in the transmitted Greek (D27b) would suggest a substantially different Greek original. No such suggestion is warranted here. There is something out of the ordinary about everything connected with the Kindi-circle ‘Theology of Aristotle’. By the evidence of the Kindi-circle Plotinus, one contributor to that project was willing to add substantially to the original text.91 The translator of the Elements (if there was only one), associated as he is by tradition with the same project, may have shared some of that willingness too. A close study of the Kindi-circle Alexander as a whole may shed Übersetzer’ (Proclus Arabus, p. 189), seems to allow for the possibility that some texts were translated or revised collectively by a group of people sitting, so to speak, round a table.

89 The istibāna need not always have been added in the first draft. In fact, it is almost easier to imagine that it was generalised, for the sake of uniformity, at a stage when the corpus was revised as a whole. (It may be significant that some sections of the Liber de causis lack an istibāna: see end of note 92 below). But if the reviser was not the translator himself, we shall have to add yet another second hand to our list, because all those listed so far are down for sporadic changes making for diversity rather than uniformity.

90 Cf. note 70 above.

91 If you accept my argument at ‘Theology of Aristotle’, pp. 113ff.
some light on this and other questions. And there is always the possibility of further finds.\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Proclus Arabus} has still some way to go.\textsuperscript{93}

\textsuperscript{92} See note 57 above. And the last text preserved in the two manuscripts described by Taylor includes lines (reproduced in his 'Two manuscripts', p. 258) apparently drawn from the translation of sections 15 and 17 that survives in D27 and P15-17. In the same text, the late Professor Pines additionally spotted four extracts from sections 20 (two), 41, and 66, which are not included in the Kindi-circle Alexander or the \textit{Liber de Causis} ('Hitherto unknown Arabic extracts from Proclus' Stoicheiosis theologikè and Stoicheiosis physikè', first published in \textit{The Collected Works of Shlomo Pines} (Jerusalem and Leiden, 1986), vol. II, pp. 287-93). At the beginning of his account (p. 288), Pines enumerates section 48 among the sources; but there is no extract from that section among the passages reproduced in the sequel. Clarification is to be expected from a study promised by Professor Taylor ('Two manuscripts', p. 264n31). I am inclined to discount the possibility (left open by Pines, p. 293) that the Arabic text in question will prove on publication to be a translation of a lost Greek compilation. More probably, it will show that β included more sections of the \textit{Elements} than survive in D23, D27, and D29. If it does prove to have had section 48 among its sources, it may even lend support to the view that the Proclus of β derived from a translation of the \textit{Elements} which also included the Proclus of the \textit{Liber de causis}. For the latter does include section 48, without \textit{istibana} but otherwise complete (ed. A. Badawi, \textit{Al-Aflāṭūnīyya al-muhdatha 'inda al-'Arab} (Cairo, 1955), p. 27.2-6).

\textsuperscript{93} This article is dedicated to Dr C.S.F. Burnett and his circle of enthusiasts, above all Hillary Wiesner and Silvia Fazzo, who invited me to a series of reading sessions at the Warburg Institute, London, in the spring of 1992 to pore over puzzling pieces like D29. Occasion and inspiration were thus provided by a group of people literally sitting round a table. But it would be a mistake to infer from any irregularities of style or substance that a plurality of hands had been at work.
APPENDIX:
The text of D29 in MS Istanbul, Carullah 1279

1. That this is the authentic word is shown by its recurrence at (c). I do not know what to make of two marginal notes giving as an alternative. One, in the left margin, has the appearance of having been transcribed at the same time as the text; the other, immediately to the right, of having been added later by the same hand. Both are followed by a squiggle probably denoting in the sense of 'variant reading collated from another manuscript'. If two additional copies had been consulted, one by 'Mustafa' or an earlier predecessor and another by the scribe of himself, one would expect at least one to have offered an improvement on the manifestly garbled title in the next line. In the absence of any further note. I doubt that additional copies were consulted at all.

2. MS preserves the correct reading in his list of works of Alexander.

3. That cannot be right. The emendation is suggested by the evidence set out at the beginning of section IV above.

4. The MS is damaged at the top; the first two lines of the present page have largely been destroyed. The words supplied by me are calculated to give a measure of the amount of text that is lost.
PROCLUS ARABUS RIDES AGAIN

 её في جميع الأشياء فإن حد 5 العلة الأولى هو أن تكون فائضة على
 الأشياء كلها 4 التي تقبلها 6 وان تكون مثلا فضيلة على نحو قبولها
 لها 7 واتساعها وان 8 تكون مع الأشياء هي بروز شعاعاتها 9 المثمرة
 فيها
 فاما قوله انها ليست في شيء من (5) الأشياء البنية (ف) يعني بذلك ان
 الكلعة الأولى لا تختلف بالأشياء التي في المواضع فلذلك صارت العلة
 الأولى ليست في شيء من / الأشياء وذلك انها ان كانت علة متباينة فلا
 محالة انها ارفع من معلولاتها وعملها وخارج منها كلها فليس في /
 شيء من الأشياء التي 10 هي دونها
 تقول ربيما (كانت) علة في معلولها كالانسانانية 11 في الاختيار
 والعقلية 12 فانها صورة فليس قبلها / ونقول اذا كانت العلة لا في
 معلولاتها 13 وكانت مباينة لها فهي قبلها

5. The MS seems to read حب.
6. MS لقبلها.
7. MS له.
8. MS فان.
9. MS في (؟) )اوز شعاعها.
10. MS الا في التي
11. MS فالانسانانية.
12. MS والتحليحة; emendation by Maroun Aouad.
13. MS معلولها.
(g) Und so wie sie war, so war sie in allen Dingen. Sie hat nie eine spezifische Kategorie von Dingen zugewiesen. Sie hat nie eine spezifische Kategorie von Dingen zugewiesen.

(h) Und so war sie in allen Dingen. Sie hat nie eine spezifische Kategorie von Dingen zugewiesen. Sie hat nie eine spezifische Kategorie von Dingen zugewiesen.

(i) Und so war sie in allen Dingen. Sie hat nie eine spezifische Kategorie von Dingen zugewiesen. Sie hat nie eine spezifische Kategorie von Dingen zugewiesen.


14. MS 
15. MS 
16. MS 
17. MS 
18. MS
فان (كان) هذا على هذا وكانت العلة الأولى هي الفائضة على جميع الأشياء وكانت قبلها ومبينةٌ لها / وكانت الأشياء كلها بعدها * كانت العلة الأولى لا تضيق عن فيضها على كثرة الأشياء التي تتنال فيضها وفضلها / لأن العلة الأولى متباعدة منها ولا تقبل الأشياء منها قبولاً ناقصاً إذ صارت العلة الفائضة في كلها عني في جميع الأشياء فقد استبان وصح أن العلة الأولى في جميع الأشياء وأنها ليست في شيء من الأشياء كما قال الفاضل ارسطو وذلك / ما اردنا شرحه وبيانه بالقول الوجيز.

تمت المقالة والحمد لله وسلام على عباده الذين أصطفى.

كتبه محمد بن حسن عفّا الله عنهما

19. MS وان.
20. MS ثابتة والعلة. Alternatively, read ثابتة والعلة ؟
21. The MS here adds the words وتقبلها وتقبل فيضها ، which I suspect of being intrusive glosses.
22. MS متباعدة.
23. The words after the last punctuation mark are squeezed into a small space at the end of the line. They are written, not in the naskhi of the preceding transcript, but in an informal, slurred style. I am grateful to my colleague Donald Richards for deciphering them for me.