

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ

Regional Variation in Female Recruitment and Advancement in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

It is commonly reported in the West that the representation of women in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is far below their representation in the population at large, and that although there are slightly increasing rates of admission, continuation of the large disparity seems to constitute a relatively permanent feature of central recruitment policy and procedures.¹ In 1970, for example, women formed 53.9 percent of the general population and 22.2 percent of the CPSU. However, that aggregate figure masks a considerable degree of regional variation. Publication of data from several regional party archives provides the opportunity to examine more closely the process of female mobility within the party and to advance more precise notions about determinants of that process than had previously been possible.

First, there are distinct differences between the Central Asian republics of Muslim culture and all others. Between 1954 and 1962, during the Khrushchev regime, these Muslim republics recruited women into their parties in the same proportion as the national average. After 1962, however, the rise in female recruitment was less steep in the two Muslim republics for which there are data: Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. By 1972, only 19 percent of the Kazakh party was female. On the other hand, two Baltic republics, Latvia and Estonia, registered percentages of female membership far larger than both the national party and the Muslim republic parties; the Baltic proportion of women in the party was almost 32 percent by 1968. The republic of Georgia shows a pattern of female recruitment that was far below the national proportionally, up to 1941, and then exceeded the national average in every subsequent year, although that percentage has remained stable (around 23.5 percent) from 1957 until the last data point in 1972. Between the very high female proportion of the Baltic republics and the relatively low proportion for the Central Asian republics are two oblasts, or provinces, in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. Both Perm and Moscow provinces show higher female participation than does the national average, although both are lower than the Baltic statistics. By 1974 the Perm organization was almost 28 percent female, and by 1972 the Moscow party organization was about 31 percent female. Rates of growth of female membership were also considerably lower than in Latvia and Estonia.

1. Gail Lapidus says that regime policy has resulted in altered occupational aspirations and roles for Soviet women, but without policy provisions for altered political roles ("Political Mobilization, Participation, and Leadership: Women in Soviet Politics," *Comparative Politics*, 8, no. 1 [October 1975]: 115).

The author wishes to express her appreciation to the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, for their generous support of the research project of which this article is a part.

All the regional parties show similar dramatic increases in female participation during wartime and subsequent decreases in the unusually high proportions, though the proportions do not fall to the prewar level. During wartime, for example, the proportion of female party members skyrocketed in the Central Asian republics for which there are data, from about 13 percent for Kazakhstan and Tadzhikistan and about 17 percent for Uzbekistan and Kirghizia to almost 39 percent for Kirghizia, 33 percent for Kazakhstan, 31 percent for Uzbekistan, and 30 percent for Tadzhikistan. Although the other republics in the study experienced rapid growth of female membership, rates were lower: Georgia went from about 14 percent to a high of about 29 percent female; Perm, from 18 percent to almost 34 percent; Moscow, from about 24 percent to almost 35 percent. In party life, as throughout the Soviet economy, females were called upon to staff the positions which the conscripted males had been forced to abandon. This pattern also is visible in the rapid growth of females as a proportion of all students in higher education and in responsible sectors of the civilian economy.

The postwar aspect of the female recruitment pattern shows a correspondingly sharp decline in percentages of women in republic parties but, once again, the decline is not uniform across republics. Female party membership in the Central Asian republics declined to about 18 percent; in Georgia the decline was only to about 23 percent female; Moscow returned to about 25 percent female in the immediate postwar years; and Perm to about 21 percent female. In no case did female representation decline below prewar proportions, and, in spite of the evident policy of accommodating returning males and a parallel lowering of women's expectations of political mobility, it could be argued that a lasting improvement in female representation had been accomplished by the wartime mobilization, although, of course, the improvement differed in degree by region.

Sex balance might explain variation in female party recruitment patterns to some extent, but cannot explain the size of the *differences* among the republics.² Moreover, although party recruitment increasingly is dependent on educational attainment, particularly so with reference to mobility within the party elite, it is quite clear that the pattern of female party recruitment does not conform to the pattern of education in the republics in very precise terms. Why, for example, should the Baltic republics register roughly a 30 percent greater proportion of females than the national average? Contrary to the theories of the "monolithic" CPSU which have prevailed in the past, many decisions concerning recruitment of certain categories of party members apparently are sufficiently decentralized to be within the jurisdiction of the regional parties themselves, and the considerable variation in the proportion of women in regional parties reflects that *de facto* decentralization. I have argued that this is undoubtedly the case in regard to the recruitment of indigenous nationals in non-Russian republics.³

2. In 1939 the greatest difference in sex balance for the republics for which there are data was 5.5 percent between Kazakhstan and Estonia. By 1970, however, that gap had narrowed to 2.4 percent. In 1970, the widest gap in the data set was 3.5 percent, between Tadzhikistan and Estonia.

3. See Ellen Mickiewicz, "Native Nationality Recruitment and Mobility in Selected Non-Russian Republics," paper prepared for American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies/Department of State Conference on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, September 1975.

Thus, regional parties may not, in fact, be given criteria to admit (a) a given percentage of women; or (b) a percentage of women eventually proportionate to the sex distribution of the population at large; or (c) a percentage of women eventually proportionate to the percentage of highly educated women in the regional labor force. Little policy standardization across regions is discernible.

Evidence of this type of variation in recruitment criteria is also found in data concerning mobility from candidate (probationary member) to full member of the Communist Party. The study of mobility from candidate to full member is particularly interesting in that it compares opportunities for men and women who have achieved a common first step of probationary admission into the party. Analysis of the data again reveals a clear difference between the republics of Muslim heritage and all others.

Candidacy, according to the Basic Statute of the Soviet Communist Party, is a probationary year during which the prospective party member is socialized into his duties, taught Marxist-Leninist theory, initiated into active participation in meetings, and assessed by party members who judge his enthusiasm, capability, and reliability. Throughout its history, the party has on occasion relaxed or stiffened the requirements for this probationary period: in the early days of the Soviet state, the length of a candidate's term was contingent upon his social class, with workers, as the ideologically most favored class, subject to the shortest term. The policy of party expansion during the Second World War shortened the period of candidacy to as little as three months for recruits from the armed forces. Most recently, the Brezhnev policy has called for stricter procedures governing the probationary year, and formal recognition of these new requirements was granted by the Twenty-third Congress of the party in 1966. The new rules, which necessitated changes in the Basic Statute of the party, require first that party members who recommend someone for candidacy must have been in the party for at least five, as opposed to three, years. Second, approval of a candidate's application for admission to membership must be based on a two-thirds majority vote of the local party organization, instead of the previous simple majority vote. Third, entrance into candidacy through the party's auxiliary youth organization, the Komsomol, is now required of all youth up to the age of twenty-three, not twenty as previously required.⁴ The new recommending procedure has been the subject of attention in the central party press, where outlines of the form of the recommendation are published for adoption by the lower party organs. Subject to scrutiny are the "political, labor, and moral qualities" of the prospective candidate, how he relates to others on the job, how he participates in public life, and what kind of supplementary courses he takes, whether political or job-related.⁵ If the candidate should change jobs, his recommendations accompany him and in no case should he suffer loss of the time he has already spent in candidacy. The party, with these statutory revisions, has sought to increase the accountability of members making recommendations. In Moscow and other cities, all candidates are expected to give an accounting of their activity during the probationary year, with the recommenders taking the most active part in the preparation of these public examinations.⁶

4. "KPSS v tsifrah," *Partiinaiia zhizn'*, 1973, no. 14, p. 13.

5. "O rekomendatsiakh vstupaushchim v partiiu," *Partiinaiia zhizn'*, 1972, no. 18, p. 36.

6. A. P. Petrov, "Printsip demokraticheskogo tsentralizma v stroitel'stve KPSS na

Table 1. *Postwar Expulsions from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*

Year	Percent of CPSU Membership
1958	0.7
1959	0.7
1960	0.5
1962	0.7
1963	0.7
1964	0.6
1966	0.5
1967	0.48

Sources: T. H. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R., 1917–1967* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 311; “Priem v KPSS i nekotorye izmeneniia v sostave partii za 1966 god,” *Partiinaia zhizn'*, 1976, no. 7, p. 8; “Ob itogakh priema v partii i izmeneniakh v sostave KPSS za 1967 god,” *Partiinaia zhizn'*, 1968, no. 7, p. 27.

Two courses of action have been available, in theory, to correct a faulty recruitment decision. One is resignation from the party. But as T. H. Rigby has pointed out, resignation was, after 1935, no longer a significant feature of the party; sanctions for this “anti-social” behavior have been too great.⁷ The other course of action, required by party procedure, has two options: expulsion, or rejection of the candidate’s application for admission to membership by the local party organization. Expulsion, as table 1 shows, has rarely been used, and available data suggest that the second option has only been used infrequently. Under the terms of the Basic Statute of the party, however, “losing contact” or dropping out of the party, that is, failing to participate in party activities or perform the function of party member, is subject to mandatory expulsion. This category of expulsions is also included in the percentages of table 1. Thus, 65,258 full members and candidates were expelled for all reasons combined in 1967.

The data on the process of advancement from candidate to member indicates that the lowest rate of rejection of candidates’ applications for membership has occurred in the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan: 0.7 percent in 1946 and 0.9 percent in 1947.⁸ More recently, for the CPSU as a whole, membership has been denied to no more than 4.7 percent of the candidates. The percentage for 1954 was 2.4,⁹ for 1966, 4.7;¹⁰ for 1967, 2.5;¹¹ and between 1966 and 1971, the

sovremennom etape,” in *KPSS—Politicheskii avangard sovetskogo naroda* (Moscow, 1971), p. 158.

7. T. H. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R., 1917–1967* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 205. As to the results of the exchange of party cards under Brezhnev, recent studies suggest that a sharp increase in expulsions has not occurred. See, for example, Aryeh L. Unger, “Soviet Communist Party Membership under Brezhnev: A Comment,” *Soviet Studies*, 29, no. 2 (April 1977): 308.

8. *Kommunisticheskaia partiia Kazakhstana v dokumentakh i tsifrakh* (Alma Ata, 1960), p. 289.

9. Mervyn Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia* (New York: Walker, 1972), p. 229.

10. “Priem v KPSS i nekotorye izmeneniia v sostave partii za 1966 god,” *Partiinaia zhizn'*, 1967, no. 7, p. 7.

11. “Ob itogakh priema v partii i izmeneniakh v sostave KPSS za 1967 god,” *Partiinaia zhizn'*, 1968, no. 7, p. 27.

average annual rate of denial of membership was 3.37 percent.¹² The beginning of the Brezhnev regime coincided with the highest rate of denial in almost twenty years but this rate declined in subsequent years. Thus, less than five of every hundred recruits undergoing probationary testing are denied membership.

It is unfortunate that sex-specific data breakdowns of the categories of expulsions of all types and rejections of candidates' applications for full membership are not available. The numbers in both of these categories together, however, are too small to distort the conclusions that follow. It may well be the case that females form a larger proportion than males of the small percentages of drop-outs, expellees, and rejected candidates. Most studies of the status of Soviet women agree that females bear a greater burden of work; their free time is significantly less than that of males. It is also true, at least at the present time, that women tend to hold jobs which provide less responsibility and that party membership may be considerably less crucial for their career advancement.¹³ These facts suggest that females might be less able to bear the increased commitment of time and responsibility that party membership entails. However, it is also true, as noted below, that there have been campaigns to recruit females into the party and that their numbers have been increasing in regional organizations.

If there were no criticisms of local recruitment decisions on the part of the central leadership, it might be assumed that an average 3 percent rate of denial has been sufficiently selective. But criticism has been a continuous feature of party pronouncements on recruitment, and the recent reorganization of the stage of candidacy implies official dissatisfaction at the top of the party hierarchy with the fineness of the screening. Given the reluctance of local party organizations to deny membership to candidates at the end of the probationary year and given the risk to the candidate of public resignation, is there an informal mechanism which has replaced the official one? In other words, has the CPSU evolved an adaptive method by which recruitment is rationalized? The widespread but illegal practice throughout the regional components of the CPSU is to retain, in some cases for ten or more years, the "failed" recruits within the ranks of the candidates.

The central and republic leadership of the CPSU has shown awareness of the infractions of recruitment regulations and of the informal sanctioning mechanism, but no systematic pattern of resolution has been forthcoming. Typical of official concern at the highest level, and setting the tone for the postwar period, were Khrushchev's "Theses," a report to the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952, in which he stated that "for a considerable number of candidates [the candidate stage] is stretched over many years. The party cannot countenance this shortcoming. It is necessary to improve the party organizations' work with candidates and also to raise the responsibility of the candidates themselves during their candidature."¹⁴ The Credentials Commission of the congress followed up

12. "Kandidatskii stazh," *Partinaiia zhizn'*, 1972, no. 20, p. 49.

13. See *Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data*, ed. Ellen Mickiewicz (New York: Free Press, 1973).

14. N. S. Khrushchev, "Changes in Statutes of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks," *Pravda*, August 27, 1952, p. 2. Reprinted in *Current Soviet Policies*, ed. Leo Gruliov (New York: Praeger, 1953), p. 34.

Table 2. *Candidates with Expired Status, Communist Party of the Soviet Union*

Year	Percent of Candidates with Expired Status
Communist Party of the Soviet Union	
1967	15.3
1968	10.1
1955	39.6 ^a
Ukrainian Communist Party	
1946	65.0
1951	75.0
1954	53.0
Kirghiz Communist Party	
1948	95.8
1954	72.0
1960	41.0
Tadzhik Communist Party	
1950	92.2
1956	43.0
Georgian Communist Party	
1956	21.1
1957	15.4
1958	22.9

^a Kiev province – 53.4 percent; Kharkov province – 45.3 percent; Donetsk province – 44.2 percent; Lugansk province – 44.1 percent.

Sources: "Ob itogakh priema partii i izmeneniiakh v sostave KPSS za 1967 god," *Partiinaiia zhizn'*, 1968, no. 7, p. 26; M. M. Matvyichuk, *Organizatorska robota partii u promislovosti Ukraini* (Kiev, 1966); *Rost i regulirovanie sostava kommunisticheskoi partii Kirgizii* (Frunze, 1963); *Kommunisticheskaia partiia Kazakhstana v dokumentakh i tsifrakh* (Alma Ata, 1960); *Kommunisticheskaia partiia Tadzhikistana v dokumentakh i tsifrakh* (Dushanbe, 1965); *Kommunisticheskaia partiia Gruzii v tsifrakh* (Tbilisi, 1971).

by specifically castigating the Ukrainian party, with 62,000 overdue candidates; the Moscow party, with 34,000; the Kazakh party, with more than 22,000; the Uzbek party, with more than 17,000; and the Leningrad party, with 14,000.¹⁵

The extent of overdue candidacy is indicated by tables 2 and 3. Table 2 shows that overdue candidates in 1967 numbered at least 104,284, roughly twice the number of all members expelled for all reasons during that year, even though candidates made up less than 5 percent of the entire party. Of course, the aggregate CPSU figures, though not strictly comparable, might well be understated and mask substantial interregional variation. The data show the Georgian and Estonian parties ranking well below the Ukrainian party and considerably below the three Central Asian parties in the percentage of candidates with expired status. The data also show a strikingly high rate of candidates with expired status for the immediate postwar years, obviously reflecting the relaxed wartime admission requirements. The term "expired status" is an elastic one. In Kirghizia, for example, 30 percent of all candidates with expired status in 1954 were still candidates after five years;¹⁶ in Georgia, almost 20 percent of the candidates

15. "Report of Credentials Commission of the Nineteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)," *Pravda*, October 9, 1952, p. 6. Reprinted in *Current Soviet Policies*, p. 94.

16. *Rost i regulirovanie sostava kommunisticheskoi partii Kirgizii* (Frunze, 1963), p. 234.

Table 3. *Candidates with Expired Status, Estonian Communist Party*

Year	Percent of Candidates with Expired Status
1945	69.0
1946	42.4
1948	69.0
1949	68.7
1951	60.3
1956	25.25
1957	22.28
1958	18.73
1959	19.89
1960	19.82
1961	18.25
1962	15.55
1963	22.41
1964	16.91
1965	13.94
1966	18.22

Source: A. Panksejev, "EKP Tegevusest Partei Ridade Kasvu Reguleerimisel (Aastad 1944-1965)," *Toid EKP Ajaloo Alalt II* (Tallinn, 1966).

with expired status in 1955 had already spent seven years as candidates.¹⁷ In some cases local party organizations designate a specific term by which candidacy will be prolonged: in Georgia, 28 percent of the total number of candidates with expired status in 1958 were given specific terms for the extension of candidacy; however, another 28 percent of the total with expired status had already served the additional term and were still unable to advance to membership.

The relative opportunity structure by which males and females advance from candidacy to full membership may be used, therefore, as a way to compare mobility. It permits a comparison of recruits by sex starting at a common step within the party. The degree to which overdue candidacy falls more heavily on one sex or is evenly distributed, is, of course, pertinent to the assessment of female mobility within regional Communist parties. The data for the analysis have been grouped by regime: the postwar Stalin period, 1949-53; the Khrushchev period, 1954-64; and the Brezhnev period, 1965 to the present (as available).¹⁸ In some cases, time series data on party membership have been provided for a much longer period, but this study excludes consideration of the strong exogenous forces such as purge losses, wartime mortality rates, and the evacuation and return of party members, removed during the war to unoccupied areas of the USSR for administrative purposes.¹⁹ The effect of sex differentiation on overdue candidacy is examined, therefore, in the period of greatest stability. The mobility rate from candidate to member is defined as the increase in membership from one year to the next (from the year $y-1$ to year y) as a proportion of the

17. *Kommunisticheskaia partiia Gruzii v tsifrakh* (Tbilisi, 1971), p. 315.

18. These divisions follow Rigby, *Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R.*

19. See, for example, John A. Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite* (New York: Praeger, 1959), pp. 132-37.

previous year's (year $y-1$) total number of candidates. Before proceeding to the analysis, however, some comments on the reliability of this measure of mobility will be useful.

First, this measure assumes that in the period under review the Soviet mortality rate does not fall disproportionately on individual years or regions and is a relatively constant factor that does not distort the gross party figures. Deaths among the general population have averaged 7.6 per 1,000 between 1950 and 1969. Further, the maximum range of the death rate during those nineteen years is only 2.8 per 1,000, while for the nine years between 1940 and 1949, the highest and lowest annual death rates are separated by 8.3 per 1,000. Thus, in terms of the overall mortality rate, the years for which data have been selected are relatively stable. In fact, the normal mortality rate is probably lower among party members because the party has consistently been more youthful than the general population. In 1927, for example, only 3 percent of the party were over fifty. At present, that age category contains about one-fifth of the party, and Rigby finds that "despite the trend to greater maturity of membership, the CPSU remained considerably younger than . . . the Soviet adult population as a whole."²⁰

Second, this measure of candidate mobility assumes that interrepublic migration does not substantially affect the reliability of the results. The most recent Soviet census does give data for age and sex of in-migrants by republic. However, out-migration is not similarly broken down. Nevertheless, some rough estimates of the impact of migration on party membership can be made. Certain categories of migrants, for example, are ineligible for party membership because of age. Thus, ineligible youth are eliminated from the in-migration figures for each republic and a similar percentage of the out-migration from that republic is calculated. Furthermore, party membership in the USSR between 1959 and 1966 averaged 8.3 percent of the eligible age group in the population. This percentage can be calculated, from the 1970 census, for all in-migration and, assuming a roughly similar pattern in out-migration, a party estimate for the figure from which the ineligible age-group had been subtracted can also be calculated. Soviet census sources bearing on migration define such a movement as having lived in the area for less than two years. If one assumes that the *entire* estimated net party migration for each republic swelled or diminished party ranks in a *single* year, the result would be the maximum impact on in- or out-migration. Table 4 shows both the raw data for net estimated party migration and that figure calculated as a percentage of total Communist Party membership in the republic for 1967. This unrealistically heavy weight does not exceed 1.5 percent of the total party organization and averages 0.7 percent. It is undoubtedly more realistic to assume that migration stretches over a number of years and that the impact of migrants on the republic party organization is much less than implied by the "maximum impact" figures. Moreover, if the "maximum impact" figure is applied only to the category of full members of the party for maximum distortion effect, the differences in the mobility rates for Azerbaidzhan and Georgia given in table 5, for example, are no greater than 4 and 6 percent, respectively, in no way invalidating the finding. Although the estimates of party migrants are only

20. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R.*, p. 358.

Table 4. "Maximum Impact" Net Migration of Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1967

	Estimated Net Migration of Communist Party Membership	Percentage of Communist Party Membership
Ukraine	-6874	-0.31
Belorussia	147	0.04
Uzbekistan	-5155	-1.31
Kazakhstan	-1355	-0.25
Georgia	-2398	-0.85
Azerbaijan	-1773	-0.74
Lithuania	156	0.14
Moldavia	-634	-0.59
Latvia	981	0.83
Kirghizia	-882	-0.88
Tadzhikistan	-1026	-1.26
Armenia	333	0.27
Turkmenia	-710	-1.07
Estonia	1007	1.49

Sources: *Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda* (Moscow, 1974), pp. 6-7, 177-83; *Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data*, ed. Ellen Mickiewicz (New York: Free Press, 1973), pp. 161-62, 173. Actually, current evidence suggests that most internal migration in the USSR is within rather than between republics. See Murray Feshbach and Stephen Rapawy, "Soviet Population and Manpower Trends and Policies," in *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective*, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 94th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976).

proximate, the use of those estimates to present the weakest case possible, should strengthen confidence in the mobility measure employed. It is in the case of the Moscow party organization, particularly, that in-migration might skew results, because that organization functions not as a regional elite, but rather as a national or central elite, and the results of table 5 might be inflated by a migration factor relating to the peculiar status of the Moscow party.

Third, in some cases Soviet party data contain a category of "candidates admitted" and "members admitted." These figures are sometimes published annually, sometimes in grouped years. However, this category does tend to obscure the phenomenon of overdue candidates and it has not been used in this study. Let us assume, for example, that in Time 1 the composition of a party organization is made up of 50 members and 20 candidates. In Time 2 total party composition might be 60 members and 20 candidates, of whom 10 are new members and 10 are new candidates. At this point, there are 10 overdue candidates. In Time 3, we have a party organization with 70 members and 20 candidates, of whom 10 are new members and 10 are new candidates. There are still 10 overdue candidates, even though the *new* members in Time 3 are equal to 100 percent of the *new* candidates in Time 2. Thus, the "candidates admitted" and "members admitted" categories simply fail to take into account the historical process by which the residue of overdue candidates has been built up and continues to form a part of the party organization.

What is the relative advantage of males and females having attained the common stage of candidacy in the CPSU? Data are available for this variable from the republic of Estonia, the most developed and Westernized area in the

Table 5. *Mobility from Candidate to Member in Selected Regional Communist Parties*
(Increase in members as percent of candidates/previous year)

	AZERBAIDZHAN		GEORGIA		MOSCOW CITY		PERM PROVINCE (RSFSR)		ESTONIA	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
1950-54	53.16	33.83	59.79	60.62	109.20	104.32	76.9	76.9	40.13	91.29
1955-65	87.88	75.51	83.97	76.18	139.80	98.54	71.1	61.9	90.52	77.27
1966-69	75.64	43.15	54.13	52.80	76.25	74.90	31.04 ^a	61.44 ^a	n.a.	n.a.

^a 1966-73 for Perm Province.

Source: *Kommunisticheskaia partiia Azerbaidzhana v tsifrakh* (Baku, 1970); *Kommunisticheskaia partiia Gruzii v tsifrakh* (Tbilisi, 1971); *Moskovskaia gorodskaia i Moskovskaia oblastnaia organizatsii KPSS v tsifrakh* (Moscow, 1972); A. Panksejev, "EKP Tegevusest Partei Ridade Kasvu Reguleerimisel (Aastad 1944-1965)," *Toid EKP Ajaloo Alalt II* (Tallinn, 1966); *Permskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh* (Perm, 1974).

Soviet Union; from Georgia, a highly developed region in the Caucasus; and from Azerbaidzhan, also a Caucasian republic, but Muslim, thus differing radically in culture and economic development from its Caucasian neighbors. The fourth unit of analysis is the Moscow city party organization. This unit, rather than the larger Moscow province party organization, was chosen because of its importance as a channel into the top Soviet elite.²¹ The fifth unit of analysis is the Perm province party organization, located in an industrial and mining center on the rim of the Urals in the RSFSR. Table 5 shows the differences in male and female mobility from candidate to full member of the party. The increase in candidates by sex is used as a percentage of increase in members by sex for the following year.²² Unfortunately, one cannot, on the basis of available data, approach the question of the representation of Russian women versus women of the titular nationality; these data have not been published for broad party membership categories.

21. An excellent analysis of the careers of Moscow city party organization secretaries is provided by Christian Deuvel, "Career Frustrations for Moscow City Party Leaders," *Radio Liberty Dispatch* (New York, 1971).

22. In cases where the party meeting for confirmation of candidates' promotion to membership may accidentally fall on dates a month or two beyond the year's term, the candidate may, strictly speaking, become overdue. However, random events of this sort are expected to be essentially nonadditive and hence would not affect trends. It should be noted, too, that my measures of mobility have had to rely, in some cases, on estimates of increases in male and female members. These estimates are based on official tables providing data for (a) female members and candidates; (b) total candidates recruited; (c) female candidates recruited; (d) total members; and (e) total candidates. By subtracting relevant categories, I arrived at estimates of male members, female members, and male candidates recruited. In order to assess the reliability of my estimates, I reaggregated my data and compared mean rates of increase for males and females combined, and compared these to the mean rates of increase for the combined category from the official tables. The average number of percentage points by which the estimates deviated from the official tables was only 3.68. The largest single deviation was for Azerbaidzhan for 1966-69, where the estimates fell short of the official tables by a total of 9.94 percent. Furthermore, because the data for expellees and deaths are not sex-specific, and because, as noted earlier, these cases account for very small proportions of the categories of membership used in this study, their absence is not expected to distort the rather clear trends in the data.

The percentages in table 5 for Azerbaidzhan indicate that mobility rates are much lower for women than for men. During the Stalin years, the membership increase represents about half of the male candidates, but only a third of the female candidates; similarly, in the Brezhnev years the membership increase represents about three-fourths of the male candidates, but less than half of the female candidates. Only in the Khrushchev period does female mobility improve relative to male. Rigby notes that the party has promoted a policy of recruiting females from predominantly Muslim areas, in order to combat what it regards as cultural discrimination against females. Thus he writes that "the campaign to recruit women to the party in such areas formed part of the long-term struggle for the emancipation of women and for asserting the values of communist against traditional Islamic values. In the period since World War II the representation of women in former Muslim areas has been raised to approximately party levels [slightly over 21 percent at the time to which Rigby refers]. . . ." ²³ Why, then, do the data in table 5 indicate less mobility for female than for male candidates. It may be that women in this republic are unable or unwilling to fulfill the requirements of the probationary period in the party and are thus ruled out from advancing to membership, or traditional cultural values may be more durable than the government admits. It is likely, therefore, that women provide the majority of the nonwartime candidates with expired status in Azerbaidzhan, and probably for the other republics of Central Asia as well. Because the options of resignation and expulsion are infrequently chosen, one may assume that retention in prolonged candidacy falls more heavily on females than on males in the republics of Muslim heritage during the Stalin and Brezhnev periods. The dramatic rise in female mobility during Khrushchev's leadership reflects the improvement in relative advantage of Azerbaidzhani females during the years in which an expansionary party policy was pursued.

In the neighboring republic of Georgia no such sex differences are found in mobility from candidate to member. The Georgian party maintains a relatively equal status for both male and female candidates in each of the three periods under review. Similarly, in the Moscow city party organization, for both the Stalin and Brezhnev periods, the male and female mobility rates are very close to equal. However, for the Stalin and Khrushchev periods, the number of candidates recruited during the previous year is smaller than the number by which the party membership increased. Although it may be the case that some recruits were inducted directly into membership, it is likely that to some extent the rates exceeding 100 percent reflect the belated entrance of overdue candidates. In the Khrushchev period, this category of overdue or surplus candidates is dominated by males; nonetheless the females are assured near total predictability of mobility. It should be kept in mind, however, that the Moscow city party represents the special case of a national Soviet elite. As the bureaucratic center of the party universe, there are large numbers of party personnel posted there, as well as numerous central officials who are assigned to the provinces. Thus, the growth of this particular party unit undoubtedly reflects the imperatives of a national bureaucracy. And because males tend to populate more heavily the positions of power and responsibility, one might further speculate that the influx of members

23. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R.*, p. 360, n.16.

into the elite Moscow organization would add to the male, rather than the female, component.

The data from the RSFSR reveal the same parity of opportunity for mobility from candidate to member among women and men in the party until the present regime. Indeed, during the Stalin period, perfect equality seems to be the case. During the Khrushchev period, although males experience a somewhat superior opportunity structure, near parity is nonetheless maintained. In the Brezhnev period, which here, as elsewhere in our data set, exhibits a severe decrease in the opportunities for any candidate to become a member, female mobility from candidate to member is somewhat, though not dramatically, less than in the previous period. Male mobility, on the other hand, is less than half the previous rate. Thus, male candidates bore the brunt of the contraction of opportunities in the Perm organization, although virtually identical *numbers* of male and female candidates progress to membership.

Finally, in Estonia, for the Stalin period, there is a substantial difference in the relative advantage of males and females, but here, as opposed to Azerbaijan, the advantage overwhelmingly favors females. The very low proportion of male candidates becoming members suggests that it is primarily males who fill up the large contingent of Estonian candidates with expired status for this period. Although it is possible that the low proportion of males is partially attributable to war losses, it is also true that Estonian recruits have been the object of considerable suspicion, because of the special circumstances of that republic's late entry into the Soviet Union (and therefore the longer preservation of the republic's capitalist economy), the German occupation, and the significant emigration to the West (indicating the presence of foreign or "anti-Soviet" nationalism). Concern about the purity of the party has been a strong undercurrent of official party publications in Estonia, and the leading party analyst has written of these years as follows:

During the postwar years also, the Estonian party organization took as the guiding principle of recruitment into the party the Leninist principle of individual selection. Here the special circumstances of the party organization in the republic had to be taken into account, due to the existence of kulak-nationalistic elements, [and] the sharpness of the class struggle. In Soviet Estonia there began to unfold that tendency which Lenin had talked about, that all types of imposters and careerists will attempt to glue themselves to the ruling party.²⁴

The near total predictability with which females became members and the fact that more than half of the male candidates were retained as candidates with expired status might be traced in part to the probable difference in level of education. The overwhelming proportion of females drawn into the higher educational system during wartime, coupled with the losses of educated males, may have resulted in a temporary educational imbalance by sex within the Estonian party. In 1939, there were 6,900 male graduates and 1,800 female graduates of Estonian institutions of higher education. By 1959, however, females with higher

24. A. Panksejev, "EKP Tegevusest Partei Ridade Kasvu Reguleerimisel (Aastad 1944-1965)," in *Toid EKP Ajaloo Alalt II* (Tallinn, 1966), p. 156.

education outnumbered males with higher education by 200 (males – 12,500; females – 12,700).²⁵ During the Khrushchev decade the male/female mobility rates came considerably closer to parity.

For every region included in table 5, mobility within the party organization differs for the three time/regime periods. In each party organization except the Perm province, the Khrushchev period stands out as one of much greater access to membership for all candidates. The expansion of the party during this period tended to erase the sex differences so noticeable in Azerbaidzhan and Estonia and did not affect the near parity of the Moscow and Georgian parties. Both the Stalin and Brezhnev periods, on the other hand, present situations in which mobility from candidacy to membership was by no means assured within the statutory one-year period. In this, the Moscow party, representing perhaps the national party elite, is an exception, with the highest rate of mobility for the Stalin period. In all three periods advancement was most predictable for a candidate in the Moscow party; it was least assured for the Azerbaidzhani candidate during Stalin's leadership and the Georgian during Brezhnev's. Most impressive is the rise in male mobility in Azerbaidzhan, where, after two decades, the Azerbaidzhani male was as likely to advance into membership as his Moscow counterpart. The Brezhnev period marked a cutback in the Georgians' relative advantage, as only one in two would advance to membership, as well as that of the Azerbaidzhani female, which declined from a rate of three out of four candidates advancing into membership under Khrushchev, to fewer than one out of two under Brezhnev; Azerbaidzhani women, unlike men, improved only marginally on their very low mobility under Stalin. In the case of the RSFSR province of Perm, the females in the party organization, once the common stage of candidacy has been attained, experience virtually no disadvantage in mobility to full member and, when contraction occurs in admission rates, the females suffer very little loss of mobility. The weight of the new Brezhnev admissions policy falls on the male candidates.

It is quite clear, from examination of the data, that considerable variation in opportunities for female mobility does occur within the Communist Party at the regional level and that the national aggregated figure masks that pattern. Certainly, there is very little evidence of standardized female mobility policies for individual regional party organizations. This particular measure of female mobility is one of very few measures in which both males and females begin at the same starting point and yet differ in their subsequent progress. It is one of the few instances in which one does not have to make ecological inferences, generalizing from population statistics to party proportions.

In fact, it may be *only* at the regional level that one may understand the question of female party mobility at all. As in the United States, the examination of a national political elite may require methods of study and sources that differ substantially from an understanding of how day-to-day political life is structured across a vast and differentiated country. As this study demonstrates, a system of standardized, immediate responses to national recruitment directives does not,

25. Jonathan Pool and Jeremy Azrael, "Education," in *Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data*, ed. Ellen Mickiewicz (New York: Free Press, 1973), p. 150.

in fact, describe the pattern of female party recruitment in the organizations under review. Once it is clear that effective decentralization and variation more nearly explain reality, the major differences in the structure of opportunities and expectations that women have among the party organizations across the USSR become apparent.