# **International Organization**



Autumn 1982

Vol 36 No 4

## Sponsored by the World Peace Foundation Edited at Cornell University Published quarterly by The MIT Press

### EDITORIAL BOARD

### Stanley Hoffmann, Chairperson

James A. Caporaso Robert W. Cox Jorge Dominguez Albert Fishlow Robert Gilpin Leon Gordenker Peter Gourevitch Ernst B. Haas Wolfgang Hager Gerald K. Helleiner

Alfred O. Hero
Kal J. Holsti
Harold K. Jacobson
Abdul Aziz Jalloh
Gerd Junne
Takashi Inoguchi
Robert O. Keohane
Stephen D. Krasner
Theodore H. Moran
Lynn K. Mytelka

Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
Guillermo O'Donnell
Janice Stein
Susan Strange
Laura Tyson
William J. L. Wallace
Louis T. Wells
Thomas D. Willett
Mark W. Zacher

Editor: Peter J. Katzenstein

Associate editor: Roger M. Haydon

Review editor: James A. Caporaso

International Organization invites the submission of manuscripts on all aspects of world politics and international political economy. Manuscripts should be addressed to the Editor, International Organization, 190 Uris Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. 14853. Manuscripts should be double-spaced and submitted in triplicate, along with an abstract and author's note. Footnotes should be numbered consecutively, typed double-spaced, and placed at the end of the manuscript. The style followed should be consistent with the University of Chicago Manual of Style.

Authors may expect a decision within two months of the Editor's receipt of a manuscript.

Statements of fact and opinion appearing in *International Organization* are made on the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the Board of Editors, The Board of Trustees of the World Peace Foundation, Cornell University, or The MIT Press.

Subscriptions and business correspondence: All inquiries concerning subscriptions should be sent to the MIT Press Journals, 28 Carleton Street, Cambridge, MA 02142. Yearly subscription rates are: individuals, \$15; institutions, \$30. Subscribers outside the United States and Canada should add \$4 for surface mail and \$18 for airmail. Postmaster: send address change to International Organization, 28 Carleton Street, Cambridge, MA 02142. Second class postage is paid at Boston and at additional mailing offices.

International Organization is published quarterly, Winter, Spring, Summer, and Fall by the MIT Press.

Advertising: Please write to Advertising Manager, MIT Press Journals, 28 Carleton Street, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA. Telephone (617)253-2889.

Rights and permissions: All inquiries concerning rights and permissions should be sent to International Organization, MIT Press Journals, 28 Carleton Street, Cambridge, MA 02142.

The code number at the bottom of the first page of each article indicates consent to make copies for personal or internal use, or for the use of specific clients on the condition that the copier pay the stated per-copy fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., for copying beyond that permitted by Sections 107 or 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law. It does not extend to other kinds of copying, such as for general distribution, advertising, promotion, for creating new collected works, or for resale. Pre-1978 articles are subject to a uniform \$1.50 fee for copying.

© 1982 by the World Peace Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology ISSN 0020-8183

# https://doi.org/10.1017/50020818300019044 Published online by Cambridge University Press

# International Organization

Volume 36, Number 4, Autumn 1982

# **Articles**

Capitalism and hegemony: Yorubaland and the international economy	David D. Laitin	687
Exchange rate system, policy distortions, and the maintenance of trade dependence	Bruce E. Moon	715
Intergovernmentalism in the European Communities in the 1970s: patterns and perspectives	Paul Taylor	741
Trade politics in the Third World: a case study of the Mexican GATT decision	Dale Story	767

# Research Note

Technology transfer patterns and industrialization in LDCs: a study of licensing in Costa Rica

Devora Grynspan 795

# **Contributors**

Devora Grynspan is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Northern Illinois University, DeKalb.

David D. Laitin is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego.

Bruce E. Moon is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.

Dale Story is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas, Arlington.

Paul Taylor is Lecturer in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

# **Abstracts**

Capitalism and hegemony: Yorubaland and the international economy by David D. Laitin

Certain relationships among hegemony, international openness, capitalism, and state formation are stipulated by Polanyi, Kindleberger, Gilpin, Krasner, and Wallerstein. Here they are put to question through an examination of the rise and fall of the Yoruba state in the 18th and 19th centuries. In contrast to what widely held theories would predict, the Yoruba state was strengthened through greater exposure to international commerce. Second, from the point of view of African traders, the rise of British hegemony meant a decline in freedom to trade. Third, although the remnants of the Yoruba state were on the periphery of the world economy, its traders were able to penetrate international markets, even during periods of international economic crisis, with considerable success. In light of these findings, some suggestions are made for the reformulation of conventional theories:

Exchange rate system, policy distortions, and the maintenance of trade dependence

by Bruce E. Moon

Two central tenets of dependency theory are supported by the analysis of the causes and consequences of the exchange rate policies of less developed countries (LDCs). First, one critical component—high partner trade concentrations—is recreated by the choice of exchange arrangements. Specifically, nations that have maintained a dollar peg have significantly increased their concentration of trade with the United States since 1973. This occurs because of the exchange rate risk present in any transaction that involves a dollar-pegged currency and any other major currency against which it floats. Second, such an effect produces incentives for internal and external actors with an interest in the partner composition of future trade to influence the exchange rate policy of LDCs. Various components of the dependence situation that strengthen the role of such actors—partner trade concentrations, treaty arrangements, foreign aid, etc.—are significantly correlated with actual exchange rate practice. Thus, exchange rate policy is a linch-pin mechanism, in that it both manifests distortions produced by dependency and further acts to recreate a vital aspect of the situation that gave rise to the distortions.

Intergovernmentalism in the European Communities in the 1970s: patterns and perspectives

by Paul Taylor

The direction of movement of integration between the member states of the European Communities was uncertain in the early 1970s. The increasingly intergovernmental style of decision making was then seen to have a potential for furthering integration, although a number of disintegrative pressures were noted. In

1973-1974, however, the teleological ambiguities were resolved, and in the late 1970s member states increasingly stressed autonomy rather than integration. Intergovernmental decision making then acquired a different character from that which it had shown in the early seventies. A shift in the center of gravity of the Communities' institutions, away from the Commission and in favor of the Presidency and the national foreign ministers and officials, both reflected and encouraged these developments.

Trade politics in the Third World: a case study of the Mexican GATT decision by Dale Story

In 1980 Mexico decided not to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Certain objective conditions formed a positive environment for Mexican adherence, but President López Portillo postponed Mexican entry indefinitely. This critical decision is examined from two perspectives: a left-leaning foreign policy, and domestic constraints in the Mexican political system. Major foreign policy factors were a growing resentment of U.S. dominance combined with a preference for conducting relations with the U.S. on a bilateral basis. Internal political pressures reflected the continued reform of the Mexican political system at the upper levels and the relative autonomy of some elite groups from the state. López Portillo's decision did not constitute an outright rejection of trade liberalization. However, the decision could have international repercussions in "politicizing" U.S.-Mexican trade relations, in slowing trends toward freer trade (especially in Latin America), and in strengthening multilateral organizations like UNCTAD in which Third World countries exercise considerable power.