^1. AUSTIN, Granville, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966) at 84-99Google Scholar [Austin, Cornerstone]; AUSTIN, Granville, Working a Democratic Constitution: A History of the Indian Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)Google Scholar [Austin, Working]; MERILLAT, H.C.L., “The Indian Constitution: Property Rights and Social Reform” (1960) 21 Ohio State Law Journal 616Google Scholar [Merillat, “Constitution”]; MERILLAT, H.C.L., Land and the Constitution in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970)Google Scholar [Merillat; Land]; Mohammed, IMAM, “Changing Contours of Right to Compensation: Part I” (1970) 5(19) Economic and Political Weekly 779Google Scholar; IMAM, Mohammed, “Changing Contours of Right to Compensation: Part II” (1970) 5(20) Economic and Political Weekly 812Google Scholar; GAE, R. S., “Land Law in India: With Special Reference to the Constitution” (1973) 22 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 312CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

^2. See e.g. RAJAGOPALAN, Shruti, Economic Analysis of Amendments to the Indian Constitution (Ph.D. thesis, George Mason University, 2013)Google Scholar, online: George Mason University <http://digilib.gmu.edu/xmlui/handle/1920/8223> (the frequent amendment of the Constitution, especially in relation to property, undermines the rule of law and ultimately the prospects for economic growth; the analysis does not consider the relevance of Article 300A); GUPTA, Priya S., “The Peculiar Circumstances of Eminent Domain in India” (2012) 49 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 445 at 449Google Scholar (referring to “the absence of constitutional protection for property rights”). See also GANGULI, A.K., “Right to Property: Its Evolution and Constitutional Development in India” (2006) 48 Journal of the Indian Law Institute 489 at 521-523Google Scholar.

^3. See WAHI, Namita, “Land Acquisition, Development and the Constitution” Seminar Magazine (February 2013)Google Scholar, online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2222321>. See also the general discussion below at Part III.

^4. The Constituent Assembly was convened in 9 December 1946; the Constitution was agreed on 26 November 1949 and took effect on 26 January 1950. On the right to property, see Austin, , Cornerstone, supra note 1 at 84-99Google Scholar; Merillat, Constitution, supra note 1.

^5. E.g. Constituent Assembly Debates, vol. IX, 1249-50 (Jaspat Roy Kapoor), 1250-51 (K.T.M. Ahmed Ibrahim) and 1255 (Prabhu Dayal Himatsingka) (10 September 1949).

^6. E.g. ibid., vol. IX, 1271-73 (Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga) (12 September 1949).

^7. E.g. ibid., vol. IX, 1201-06 (Prof Shibban Lal Saksena) (10 September 1949).

^8. E.g. ibid., vol. IX, 1253-54 (Guptanath Singh) (10 September 1949).

^9. The two leaders of Congress, Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel are sometimes described as socialist and pro-business, respectively. However, by the time the Constituent Assembly had convened, Nehru had become more moderate (see infra notes 27-35). Patel said little about his economic views in the Assembly, except that he did not support full compensation in every case: see Austin, , Cornerstone, supra note 1 at 43Google Scholar n. 73. See generally Richard, SANDBROOKet al., Social Democracy in the Global Periphery: Origins, Challenges, Prospects (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 12-64Google Scholar; Rajagopalan, cf., supra note 2 at 92Google Scholar: “The vast majority of the Constituent Assembly were socialists.” (Note that Rajagopalan does not distinguish between socialism and social democracy.)

^10. See BERMAN, Sheri, The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe's Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

^11. See ALLEN, Tom, “Liberalism, Social Democracy and the Value of Property Under the European Convention on Human Rights” (2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1055CrossRefGoogle Scholar [Allen, “Liberalism”]; ALEXANDER, Gregory S., “Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right? The German Example” (2003) 88 Cornell Law Review 733Google Scholar.

^12. For an economic analysis of the reasons for taking this position, see Rajagopalan, , supra note 2 at 66-83Google Scholar.

^13. The Constitution did not set out any principles on which assent would be granted or denied: see Austin, , Working, supra note 1 at 83-87Google Scholar.

^14. Constituent Assembly Debates, vol. IX, 1195 (10 September 1949).

^15. Ibid.

^16. MEHTA, Uday S., “Constitutionalism” in Niraja Gopal JAYAL and Pratap Bhanu MEHTA, eds., The Oxford Companion to Politics in India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 15Google Scholar.

^17. The Constitution of India, art. 38(1) [Constitution].

^18. Ibid., art. 38(2).

^19. Ibid., art. 39(b).

^20. Ibid., art. 39(c).

^21. Ibid., arts. 41, 45.

^22. Ibid., arts. 37.

^23. The Court portrayed itself as following a positivist ideology of judging, especially in relation to the meaning of “compensation”. To some extent this has been accepted by scholars, but it was rejected by the Congress leadership: see the overview in RAJAMANI, Lavanya and SENGUPTA, Arghya, “The Supreme Court of India” in Niraja Gopal JAYAL and Pratap Bhanu MEHTA, eds., The Oxford Companion to Politics in India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 80 at 80-83Google Scholar.

^24. See the material cited supra note 1.

^25. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, 1967 SCR (2) 762.

^26. Kesavananda v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461.

^27. JOSHI, Vijay and LITTLE, I.M.D., India Macroeconomics and Political Economy 1964-1991 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 22CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

^28. See NAYAR, Baldev Raj, “State Entrepreneurship in the Nehru Era: Ideology vs Necessity” in Ram JOSHI and R.K. HEBSUR, eds., Congress in Indian Politics: A Centenary Perspective (London: Sangam, 1987), 204 at 204Google Scholar.

^29. CHIBBER, Vivek, “Organized Interests, Development Strategies, and Social Policies” in R. NAGARAJ, ed., Growth, Inequality and Social Development in India: Is Inclusive Growth Possible? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 168 at 174CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

^30. CHIBBER, Vivek and USMANI, Adaner, “The State and the Capitalist Class in India” in Atul KOHLI and Prerna SINGH, eds., Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics (London: Routledge, 2013), 204 at 204Google Scholar; they also remark that the large public sector was “designed to function at the service of the private sector…Planning was the means by which state assistance to private capital would be effectively coordinated.” Ibid. at 206.

^31. TAI, Hung-Chao, Land Reform and Politics: A Comparative Analysis (London: University of California Press, 1974) at 214-218Google Scholar.

^32. Ibid. at 218.

^33. KHUSRO, A.M., “Land Reforms Since Independence” in V. B. SINGH, ed., Economic History of India: 1857-1956 (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1965, reprinted 2002)Google Scholar; Tai, , supra note 31 at 93-97Google Scholar.

^34. HARRISS, John, “Politics and Redistribution in India” in Kohli and Singh, eds., supra note 30, 211Google Scholar [Harriss, “Politics”]; Frederick, G. BAILEY, “Politics and Society in Contemporary Orissa” in C.H. PHILIPS, ed., Politics and Society in India (London: Allen and Unwin, 1963), 97Google Scholar; KOHLI, Atul, “State and Redistributive Development in India” in Nagaraj, ed., supra note 29, 168 at 187Google Scholar.

^35. CHIBBER, Vivek, Organized Interests, Development Strategies, and Social Policies, in Nagaraj, ed., supra note 29, 168 at 170Google Scholar.

^36. Rajamani, and Sengupta, , supra note 23 at 84Google Scholar; MATE, Manoj, “Priests in the Temple of Justice: The Indian Legal Complex and the Basic Structure Doctrine” in Terence C. HALLIDAY, Lucien KARPIK, and Malcolm M. FEELEY, eds., Fates of Political Liberalism in the British Post-Colony: The Politics of the Legal Complex (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 112 at 124Google Scholar.

^37. Janata Party Manifesto (1977) 4(9) Executive Intelligence Review Asia 5.

^38. E.g. Rajya Sabha, 8 November 1976, col. 119 (Indradeep Sinha), col. 130 (Maqsood Ali Khan), and col. 182 (Saraswati Pradhan).

^39. Ibid., 28 August 1978, col. 54.

^40. Ibid.

^41. Ibid., col. 55.

^42. Ibid., 28 August 1978, col. 54.

^43. Constitution, supra note 17, art. 13(2).

^44. Ibid., art. 32.

^45. Joshi, and Little, , supra note 27 at 58-65Google Scholar; ARMOUR, John and LELE, Priya, “Law, Finance, and Politics: The Case of India” (2009) 43 Law and Society Review 491CrossRefGoogle Scholar; NAGARAJ, R., “India’s Economic Development” in Kohli and Singh, eds., supra note 30, 189Google Scholar.

^46. See BAXI, Upendra, “Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of India” (1982) 29 Review of the International Commission of Jurists 37Google Scholar.

^47. E.g. Maharahadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh Darghanga v. State of Bihar, AIR 1951 Patna 91, aff’d in part, rev’d in part State of Bihar v. Maharahadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh Darghanga, (1952) 1975 AIR 1083 [Kameshwar Singh]; P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector, Madras, 1965 SCR (1) 614.

^48. Constitution, supra note 17, arts. 30(1A) and 30A(1) were also relevant, as they contained guarantees of compensation for takings in specific circumstances.

^49. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 SCR (2) 621.

^50. See MATE, Manoj, “The Origins of Due Process in India: The Role of Borrowing in Personal Liberty and Preventive Detention Cases” (2012) 28 Berkeley Journal of International Law 216Google Scholar.

^51. See also Bhagwati, J, in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India, 1979 SCR (3) 1014 at 1031-1032Google Scholar (the principle of non-arbitrariness is also part of the general principles of the rule of law).

^52. See generally e.g. ibid.

^53. Minerva Mills v. Union of India, 1981 SCR (1) 206.

^54. Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974, No. 57 of 1974.

^55. Minerva Mills v. Union of India, 1986 SCR (3) 718.

^56. Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976, s. 4.

^57. SEERVAI, M., Constitutional Law of India, 4^th ed (Bombay: NM Tripathi, 1991-1993) vol. 2 at 1354-1427Google Scholar; see also JAIN, H.M., “The Forty Fourth Amendment and the Right to Property” (1979) 13 Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies 23Google Scholar.

^58. BASU, Durga Das, Shorter Constitution of India, 12^th ed (New Delhi: Wadhwa, 1996 reprint 1999) at 873-877Google Scholar. See also SINGH, Jaivir, “Separation of Powers and the Erosion of the ‘Right to Property’ in India” (2006) 17 Constitutional Political Economy 303 at 312Google Scholar (“Thus, while Article 300 A has been perceived as a protection of private property against executive action, there is no such protection from the intentions of a legislature particularly in relation to ‘inadequacy of compensation’ set by the legislature.”.

^59. Basu, supra note 58 at 868; see also 872.

^60. Ibid. at 873 (Basu was critical of the repeal, but felt that the language was clear.)

^61. Vora Saiyedbhai Kadarbhai v. Saiyed Intajam Hussen Sedumiya, (1981) 22 GLR 596 at para. 53.

^62. Mutha Parasmal Jain v. Union of India, AIR 1981 Raj 139.

^63. Basantibai Fakirchand Khetan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 Bom 366 at para. 19.

^64. Ibid. at para. 19.

^65. Ibid. at para. 22.

^66. Ibid. at para. 24.

^67. State of Maharashtra v. Basantibai Mohanlal Khetan, 1986 SCR (1) 707 at 729. The legislation is the Maharashtra Housing and Development Act, 1976, No. 28 of 1977.

^68. Ibid. at 726.

^69. Ibid. at 729.

^70. See also State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy, 1978 SCR (1) 641; Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., 1983 SCR (1) 1000; Waman Rao v. Union of India, 1981 SCR (2) 1.

^71. Bhim Singh v. Union of India 1985 SCR Supl (1) 862 [Bhim Singh]. Krishna Iyer J. delivered a concurring judgment, but in the short judgment for the majority, Chandrachud C.J. expressed agreement with Iyer J.’s reasons.

^72. Ibid. at 881; the cap was under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, No. 33 of 1976. As the claim was filed before the Amendment, the Court decided it against the prior law.

^73. Bhim Singh, supra note 71 at 884.

^74. Ibid. at 883.

^75. Ibid. at 889.

^76. Ibid. at 890.

^77. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Council, 1985 SCR Supl (2) 51 [Tellis v. Bombay]; see HOHMANN, Jessie H., “Visions of Social Transformation and the Invocation of Housing Rights in Mumbai: The Struggle for the Right to Housing” (2010) 13 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 135Google Scholar.

^78. Tellis v. Bombay, ibid. at 79.

^79. Ibid. at 87.

^80. See Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1980 SCR (3) 1159 at 1168 (Iyer J) (“The dichotomy between personal liberty, in Article 21, and proprietary status, in Articles 31 and 19 is plain, whatever philosophical justification or pragmatic realisation it may possess in political or juristic theory.”). See also State of Maharashtra v. Basantibai Mohanlal Khetan, 1986 SCR (1) at 730.

^81. Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State Of Gujarat, AIR 1995 SC 142; 1994 Supp(1) SCR 807 [Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar]. See AGARWAL, Diwakar and RAGHAVAN, Vikram, “Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v State Of Gujarat, AIR 1995 SC 142: A Review” (1996) 9 Central India Law Quarterly 96Google Scholar (supporting the revival of a right to property); Singh, , supra note 58 at 318Google Scholar.

^82. Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar, supra note 81 at para. 19.

^83. Ibid. at para. 33; see also para. 51.

^84. Bombay Land Revenue Code and Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1982, No. 8 of 1982.

^85. State of Tamil Nadu v. Ananthi Ammal, 1995 AIR 2114.

^86. Ibid. at para. 17.

^87. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn Ltd v. Darius Shapur Chenai, (2005) 7 SCC 627, at para. 6 [Hindustan Petroleum].

^88. State Of Bihar v. Project Uchcha Vidya, 2006 (2) SCC 545 at para. 65 [Bihar v. PUV].

^89. Chairman, Indore Vikas v. M/S Pure Industrial Cock & Chem., (2007) 8 SCC 705, at para. 47 [Chairman, IV].

^90. M/S Entertainment Network v. M/S Super Cassette Industries Ltd., 2008 (9) SCALE 69, at para. 77 [M/S Entertainment].

^91. Hindustan Petroleum, supra note 87; Bihar v. PUV, supra note 88; Chairman IV, supra note 89; M/S Entertainment, supra note 90. It is interesting to note that the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, which included a number of retired senior judges, recommended that Article 300-A be amended to the following: “300-A (1) Deprivation or acquisition of property shall be by authority of law and only for a public purpose. (2) There shall be no arbitrary deprivation or acquisition of property …” (Further provisions would have covered Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.) National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (Ministry of Justice, 2002) at para. 3.16.2. The Commission did not explain why it made its recommendation, but it is worth noting that the proposed paragraph (2) seems to introduce the same substantive standard as found in Article 14.

^92. K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, [2011] 13 (ADDL) SCR 636 [KT Plantation].

^93. S.H. Kapadia, Mukundakam Sharma, K.S. Radhakrishnan, Swatanter Kumar, Anil R. Dave, JJ.

^94. Subject to the specific exceptions in Articles 30(1A) (property of educational institutions established by minorities) and 31A(1) (certain smallholdings under personal cultivation) of the Constitution, supra note 17.

^95. K.T. Plantation, supra note 92 at para. 115.

^96. Ibid. at para. 115; see also para. 121: “the right to claim compensation or the obligation to pay, though not expressly included in Article 300A, it can be inferred in that Article and it is for the State to justify its stand on justifiable grounds which may depend upon the legislative policy, object and purpose of the statute and host of other factors.”

^97. Ibid. at paras. 84-91.

^98. Ibid.

^99. Ibid. at paras. 84-85.

^100. I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2007 AIR 861, 2007 (1) SCR 706, 2007 (2) SCC 1 [IR Coelho].

^101. Glanrock Estate Ltd v. The State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 10 SCC 96 [Glanrock Estate].

^102. See, ibid. at para. 8.

^103. Kameshwar Singh, supra note 47, is an example.

^104. K.T. Plantation, supra note 92 at para. 134.

^105. See Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union Of India, (2008) 6 SCC 1 at para. 191: “legislation cannot be challenged simply on the ground of unreasonableness because that by itself does not constitute a ground.”

^106. K.T. Plantation, supra note 92 at para. 122.

^107. See the material cited supra note 1.

^108. Supra note 71.

^109. Ibid. at paras. 121 and 122.

^110. Constituent Assembly Debates, vol. IX, 1194 (10 September 1949).

^111. Ibid., 1196.

^112. Ibid., 1194.

^113. E.g. Karnataka State Financial Corporation v. N. Narasimhaiah, (2008) 5 SCC 176 at para. 30 (“Right of property, although no longer a fundamental right, is still a constitutional right. It is also human right.”); State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, [2011] 14 (ADDL) SCR 211, 230-31; N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, (2008) 15 SCC 517, at para. 17; Rajendra Nagar Adarsh Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd v. State Of Rajasthan, [2013] 7 SCR 192, at 213-14; Chandigarh Housing Board v. Devinder Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 67, at para.11; Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan, AIR 2009 SC 103, at para. 26; Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram, (2007) 2 SCR 980, at para. 16; P. T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59 at para. 51; Chairman, Indore Vikas, supra note 89 at paras. 54, 56.

^114. E.g. P. T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, supra note 113 at paras. 51-56 and Hemaji Waghaji Jat, supra note 113 at para. 26 for examples of borrowing from the Convention case law.

^115. See Simpson, A.W.B., Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at c. 15CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

^116. See Allen, , “Liberalism”, supra note 11Google Scholar.

^117. James v. The United Kingdom (1986), 98 ECHR (Ser. A) [James].

^118. Lithgow v. The United Kingdom (1986), 102 ECHR (Ser. A) [Lithgow].

^119. James, supra note 117 at 36; Lithgow, supra note 118 at 51.

^120. See Allen, , “Liberalism”, supra note 11Google Scholar.

^121. Radovici and Stănescu v. Romania, nos. 68479/01, 71351/01, and 71352/01, [2006] ECHR.

^122. Ibid. at para. 88 (emphasis added); see also Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, no. 35014/97, [2006] ECHR [GC].

^123. See RAJAGOPAL, Balakrishnan, “Pro-Human Rights but Anti-Poor? A Critical Evaluation of the Indian Supreme Court from a Social Movement Perspective” (2007) 8 Human Rights Review 157CrossRefGoogle Scholar; O’CONNELL, Paul, “The Death of Socio-Economic Rights” (2011) 74 Modern Law Review 532 at 545-548Google Scholar.

^124. WALTON, Michael, “Can a Social Democratic Resolution Tackle Inequality and Support Growth for India?” (2011), online: Michael Walton <http://www.michaelwalton.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Walton_Social-democracy-and-inequality_July2011.pdf>>Google Scholar.

^125. This point was tested and upheld in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 US 498 (1998).

^126. Ibid.

^127. Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden (1982), ECHR 5.

^128. Ibid. at para. 69.

^129. See generally ALLEN, Tom, Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) at 180-193Google Scholar.

^130. Ibid. at 257-281.

^131. See e.g. Haig v. Aitken, [2000] 3 WLR 1117.

^132. See the cases cited supra note 80.

^133. E.g. State of Tamil Nadu v. Ananthi Ammal, supra note 85.

^134. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.

^135. I.R. Coelho, supra note 100 at para. 61.

^136. ALEXANDER, Gregory S., The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006) at 24Google Scholar.

^137. Ibid. at 26.

^138. See NEUBORNE, Burt, “The Supreme Court of India” (2003) 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 476 at 479Google Scholar, n. 16: “With the fall of the Soviet Union and the increasing reliance on markets as the dominant form of economic organization, little or no effort has been made by the Indian parliament to impose radical restrictions on private property.” See also Wahi, , supra note 3Google Scholar.

^139. See e.g. SINGHAL, M.L., “Right to Property and Compensation Under the Indian Constitution” (1995) 1(2) Judicial Training and Research Institute Journal,Google Scholar online: Judicial Training and Research Institute <http://www.ijtr.nic.in/articles/art41.pdf>; Vyshnavi NEELAKANTAPILLAI, “Right to Property under the Indian Constitution” Lawyers Club India (7 March 2011), online: Lawyers Club India <http://www.lawyersclubindia.com/articles/Right-to-Property-under-the-Indian-Constitution-3515.asp>; Sushanth SALIAN, “History of the Removal of the Fundamental Right to Property” (2002) Centre for Civil Society Working Paper No. 0041, online: Centre for Civil Society <http://ccs.in/working-papers-rule-law>; JAGANNATHAN, R., Land Bill is placebo; real cure is restoring Right to Property, Firstpost (5 September 2013), online: Firstpost <http://www.firstpost.com/economy/land-bill-is-placebo-real-cure-is-restoring-right-to-property-1081261.html>>Google Scholar. The Good Governance India Foundation’s web site has a collection of news articles on the deletion of the right to property: see Good Governance India Foundation, “Our Campaign – Other Links”, online: Good Governance India Foundation <http://www.goodgovernanceindia.com/otherlinks_ourcampain.html>.

^140. Sanjiv Kumar Agarwal v. Union of India, (18 October 2010), Writ Petition (Civil) No. 464 of 2007 (no reasons given; a description of the hearing is given at J. VENKATESAN, “Court Rejects Plea to Make Property a Fundamental Right” The Hindu (19 October 2010), online: The Hindu <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/court-rejects-plea-to-make-property-a-fundamental-right/article836599.ece>.

^141. See Venkatesan, supra note 140.; Good Governance India Foundation, supra note 139.

^142. PANDRY, Gyanedra, “Congress and the Nation, 1917-1947” in Richard SISSON and Stanley WOLPERT, eds., Congress and Indian Nationalism: The Pre-Independence Phase (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 121Google Scholar; LOW, D.A., “Congress and Mass Contacts, 1936-1937Google Scholar: Ideology, Interests, and Conflict over the Basis of Party Representation” in Sisson and Wolpert, eds., ibid., 134.

^143. Parthapratim PAL and Jayati GHOSH, “Inequality in India: A Survey of Recent Trends” DESA Working Paper No. 45, online: UN <http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2007/wp45_2007.pdf>; see also CORBRIDGE, Stuart, HARRISS, John, Craig, and JEFFREY, , India Today: Economy, Politics and Society (Cambridge: Polity, 2012) at 69 (“it is clear that economic growth in India since 1990 has worked extremely well for its best-off households.”)Google Scholar

^144. BANERJEE, Abhijit and IYER, Lakshmi, “History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India” (2005) 95 The American Economic Review 1190CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See Pal, and Ghosh, , supra note 143Google Scholar; Corbridge, Harriss, and Jeffrey, supra note 143; Kohli, “State”, supra note 34 at 187; Poulomi CHAKRABARTI and Dinsha MISTREE, “Disaggregating Social Development: The Variant Politics of Education and Healthcare in India” (20 August 2013), online: Princeton University <http://www.princeton.edu/~dmistree/DSD_8_20.pdf>; Gupta, Monica Das, “Public Health in India: Dangerous Neglect” 40(9) Economic and Political Weekly 5159Google Scholar.

^145. See, for example, Harriss, , “Politics”, supra note 34 at 216Google Scholar: “The farmers’ movements that acquired significant political clout in the 1980s were vehicles primarily of the interests of the wealthier and more highly commercialized cultivators beneath the veil of a struggle on behalf of the disfavored majority of rural ‘bharat’ against urban India.”

^146. SINGH, Prerna, Public Goods Provision and Social Development in India, in Kohli and Singh, eds., supra note 30, 230Google Scholar.

^147. Nayar, supra note 28 at 205-06.

^148. HELLER, Patrick, “Democratic Deepening in India and South Africa” (2009) 44 Journal of Asian and African Studies 123 at 139Google Scholar.

^149. SIRCAR, Oishik, “Spectacles of Emancipation: Reading Rights Differently in India’s Legal Discourse” (2012) 49 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 527 at 540Google Scholar.

^150. Heller, supra note 148 at 139.

^151. Ibid. at 138.

^152. Government of India, National Common Minimum Programme of the Government of India (May 2004).

^153. Harriss, John, “Audacious Reforms? India’s New Rights Agenda: An Introduction” (2013) 86 Pacific Affairs 561-568CrossRefGoogle Scholar [Harriss, “Audacious Reforms?”].

^154. Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005, No. 42 of 2005.

^155. Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, No. 35 of 2009.

^156. National Food Security Act, 2013, No. 20 of 2013. On the recent legislation, see RUPARELIA, Sanjay, “India’s New Rights Agenda: Genesis, Promises, Risks” (2013) 86 Pacific Affairs 569-590CrossRefGoogle Scholar; BIRCHFIELD, Lauren and CORSI, Jessica, “Between Starvation and Globalization: Realizing the Right to Food in India” (2010) 31 Michigan Journal of International Law 691Google Scholar.

^157. GAURI, Varun, “Public Interest Litigation in India: Overreaching or Underachieving?” (2010) 1 Indian Journal of Law and Economics 71 at 86Google Scholar (but cf. BRINKS, Daniel M. and GAURI, Varun, “The Law's Majestic Equality? The Distributive Impact of Litigating Social and Economic Rights” (2012) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5999Google Scholar).

^158. BARDHAN, Pranab, “Challenges for a Minimum Social Democracy in India” (2011) 46(10) Economic and Political Weekly 39Google Scholar.

^159. Harriss, , “Audacious Reforms”, supra note 153Google Scholar.

^160. Supra note 123 and accompanying text.

^161. Sircar, supra note 149. The Foreign Education Institutions (Regulation of Entry and Operations) Bill, 2010 is unlikely to be enacted, as the same ends are likely to be achieved by ministerial order: see MISHRA, Alya, “Access for Foreign Campuses as Legislation ‘Abandoned’” 287 University World News (12 September 2013), online: University World News <http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20130912115621960>>Google Scholar.

^162. LI, Tania Murray, “To Make Live or Let Die? Rural Dispossession and the Protection of Surplus Populations” (2010) 41 Antipode Issue Supplement 66Google Scholar; GONSALVES, Colin, “Judicial Failure on Land Acquisition for Corporations” (2010) 45(32) Economic and Political Weekly 37Google Scholar.

^163. On the estimates, see PARASURAMAN, S., UPADHYAYA, Himanshu, BALASUBRAMANIAN, and Gomathy, “Sardar Sarovar Project: The War of Attrition” (2010) 45(5) Economic and Political Weekly 39 at 41Google Scholar; PETERSON, M.J., “Narmada Dams Controversy – Case Summary” (2010) International Dimensions of Ethics Education in Science and Engineering Case Study Series at 22, online: UMass Amherst <http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=edethicsinscience>>Google Scholar; and see RAJAGOPAL, Balakrishnan, “The Role of Law in Counter-Hegemonic Globalization and Global Legal Pluralism: Lessons from the Narmada Valley Struggle in India” (2006) 18 Leiden Journal of International Law 345CrossRefGoogle Scholar; NARULA, Smita, “The Story of Narmada Bachao Andolan: Human Rights in the Global Economy and the Struggle Against the World Bank” in Deena R. HURWITZ, Margaret L. SATTERTHWAITE, and Douglas B. FORD, eds., Human Rights Advocacy Stories (New York: Foundation Press, 2009), 351Google Scholar.

^164. Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, No. 7-16/2002-FC, 3 May 2002.

^165. SPRINGATE-BAGINSKI, Oliver, SARIN, Madhu, and M. Gopinath REDDY, “Resisting Rights: Forest Bureaucracy and the Tenure Transition in India” (2013) 12 Small-Scale Forestry 107 at 111Google Scholar (discussing reports that hundreds of thousands of forest dwellers were evicted).

^166. Almitra H. Patel v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 1256 [Patel]. See CHAPLIN, S., “Cities, Sewers and Poverty: India’s Politics of Sanitation” (1999) 11 Environment and Urbanization 145CrossRefGoogle Scholar; BHUSHAN, Prashant, “Misplaced Priorities and Class Bias of the Judiciary” (2009) 44(14) Economic and Political Weekly 32Google Scholar; BHAN, Gautam, “‘This Is No Longer the City I Once Knew’. Evictions, the Urban Poor and the Right to the City in Millennial Delhi” (2009) 21 Environment and Urbanization 127CrossRefGoogle Scholar; SHUKLA, Rakesh, “Rights of the Poor: An Overview of Supreme Court” (2006) 41(35) Economic and Political Weekly 3755Google Scholar.

^167. Bhushan, supra note 166 at 35; Chaplin, supra note 166; WILLIAMS, G. and MAWDSLEY, E., “Postcolonial Environmental Justice: Government and Governance in India” (2006) 37 Geoforum 660CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and see the Court’s comments on the precautionary principle in Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, AIR [2000] SC 3751; 2000 10 SCC 664 at para. 149-151. See also Rajamani and Sengupta, supra note 23 at 89-90: the real issue with these cases is the lack of judicial craft, as judgments on environmental rights are poorly explained and exhibit little more than a “jurisprudence of exasperation”.

^168. Compare Patel, supra note 166 at 1258, where the Court stated that “[r]ewarding an encroacher on public land with free alternate site is like giving a reward to a pickpocket”, with the reluctance to evict large corporate enterprises in illegal developments in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union Of India [1997] 2 SCC 267.

^169. Walter FERNANDES, “India’s Forced Displacement Policy and Practice: Is Compensation up to Its Functions?” in CERNEA, Michael M. and MATHUR, Hari Moham, eds., Can Compensation Prevent Impoverishment? Reforming Resettlement Through Investment and Benefit-Sharing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 181 at 181-207Google Scholar (across India, only about one-third of those displaced by development projects are resettled as part of the project).

^170. PEARCE, David W. and SWANSON, Timothy, “The Economic Evaluation of Projects Involving Forced Population Displacements” in Cernea and Mathur, eds., supra note 169, 99 at 111-112Google Scholar.

^171. Land Acquisition Act, 1894, No. 1 of 1894, ss. 11 and 23(1).

^172. Ibid., ss. 11 and 23(2).

^173. Ibid., s. 6.

^174. Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, No. 30 of 2013. See GHATAK, Maitreesh and GHOSH, Parikshit, “The Land Acquisition Bill: A Critique and a Proposal” (2011) 46(41) Economic and Political Weekly 65Google Scholar; SARKAR, Swagato, “The Impossibility of Just Land Acquisition” (2011) 46(41) Economic and Political Weekly 35Google Scholar; PALIT, Amitendu, “The Land Acquisition, Resettlement and Rehabilitation (LARR) Bill 2011: Providing Solutions or Raising Questions?” (2012) 4(7) Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets, online: JEKEM <http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jekem/vol4/iss1/7/>CrossRefGoogle Scholar; GAHLAUT, Baibhaw, “Land Acquisition and Resettlement and Rehabilitation Bill 2011 – A Bane or Boon?” (2013) 34(2) Statute Law Review 175 at 177Google Scholar.

^175. Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, supra note 174, c. II.

^176. Ibid., sched. 1.

^177. Ibid., sched. 2.

^178. Ibid., s. 2(2)(b)(i); the Act does not define “public private partnership project” (or “public private partnership” or “partnership”).

^179. See Gahlaut, supra note 174 at 177.

^180. See Pearce and Swanson, supra note 170.

^181. Sarkar, supra note 174.

^182. Wahi, supra note 3.

^183. I. R. Coelho, supra note 100, Glanrock Estates, supra note 101 and K.T. Plantation, supra note 92 all concerned the application of laws imposing ceilings on the size to large estates.