

In this study, drawn largely from documents in the Hoover archives, Hoover emerges as an institutional autocrat sincerely desirous of feeding the hungry, although influenced by other motives such as promoting American agriculture, promoting himself, and perhaps hastening the fall of Bolshevism. Lenin, set as the other protagonist, is not treated in detail, although Lenin's reserved support for the ARA mission is discussed. The author's distinction between pro-ARA Bolsheviks, including Kamenev and Dzerzhinskii, and anti-ARA hard-liners, including Stalin, Trotsky, and Zinoviev, warrants further treatment of how roles affect the behavior of Soviet leaders. After all, Kamenev was given the task of coping with the famine, while Zinoviev was spokesman for the Third International.

Professor Weissman has made a needed contribution to the literature on the early years of Soviet rule. He also provides an excellent building block for any long-term perspective on Soviet-American relations. Generalizations concerning political theory in the introduction and conclusion span many ideas and provoke thought. The book is well and clearly written, holds attention, and deserves to be widely read.

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THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS, 1933–1945. By *Lucy S. Dawidowicz*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975. xviii, 460 pp. Maps. \$15.00.

I remember all too vividly the endless and painful debates that were almost inevitable whenever a small group of Jewish survivors of the Nazi holocaust would get together in the aftermath of World War II among the smouldering ruins of what were once Jewish towns and villages and crowded Yiddish-speaking neighborhoods of large urban cities. Sooner or later, after some harrowing tales from ghettos and concentration camps, from those who had hidden under assumed identities and those who had fought in the guerilla movement (which, it should be remembered, was often itself loath to admit Jews into its ranks) and those whose stories were *least* painful—those lucky enough to have fought in a regular army—a consensus of sorts would emerge. Individual physical survival, all would agree, was largely accidental. Others, with very similar histories and personal attributes, were murdered nevertheless. It was to larger questions that no answers could be found. Why *did* the Nazis murder six million Jews, slowly and systematically? Why was the mass slaughter continued *up to the very end*, when the outcome of the war was already determined, when German cities were themselves in flames, indeed, when Soviet and American tanks were already rumbling through Germany? And concurrently another question was posed: Why did the Jews fail to foresee that, unlike all earlier anti-Semitic rulers, Hitler was not merely intent on destroying Jewish statehood, robbing Jewish property, or forcibly converting Jews to another faith, but on their total physical extermination?

A provocative but closely reasoned answer to these questions is contained in the main thesis of Lucy S. Dawidowicz's magnificent and shattering book, easily the most important and moving work on the subject to appear in any language in the thirty years since the collapse of the Nazi Reich. Drawing on a huge amount of documentary evidence in many languages, Professor Dawidowicz establishes a convincing pattern of evidence that leads her to the conclusion that Nazi anti-

Semitism, though nourished by various kinds of anti-Jewish prejudice of earlier periods ranging from the traditionally religious (Jews as Christ-killers) to the more "modern" economic (Jews as exploiters), was nevertheless fundamentally different from the earlier waves of hatred. In Nazi ideology, and in it alone, the poisonous loathing of the Jews was not an incidental feature, not even a means toward a broader end. To Hitler, total extermination of the Jews was one of the major goals of the Nazi doctrine. That is why, until the end of World War II, Jews and non-Jews in Nazi-occupied territory and people elsewhere simply refused to believe that Hitler was serious when in his speech to the Reichstag on January 30, 1939, he declared: "Today I will be a prophet again: If international finance Jewry within Europe and abroad should succeed once more in plunging the peoples into a world war, then the consequence will be not the Bolshevization of the world and therewith a victory of Jewry, but on the contrary, the destruction of the Jewish race in Europe."

Professor Dawidowicz documents that which even eyewitnesses refused to believe during the war. In the Nazi order of priorities, mass murder of the Jews took precedence over the war effort itself. Among the millions killed there were hundreds of thousands employed in war industries that were desperately short of labor. And at a time when German troops on the Eastern front awaited supplies and ammunition, thousands of railroad cars and locomotives were tied up hauling Jews to the gas chambers. So determined was Hitler to murder all Jews that he was prepared to pay for it, quite literally, with the blood of German soldiers.

In the gruesome annals of wartime Jewish heroism and martyrdom one inspiring incident stands out, that of Denmark, where a determined effort by the country's population, including the king, saved the Jews from the fate of most of their kinsmen in Europe. Paradoxically, the Communist policy of systematic suppression of evidence on specifically Jewish aspects of Nazi crimes (the long history of refusal to erect a monument at Babi Yar, the site of mass murder of Kiev's Jews is but one of its examples) has obscured the fact that a similar incident took place in one Slavic country, Bulgaria, a wartime ally of Nazi Germany. The Bulgarians had long resisted Nazi pressures to deport the country's small Jewish population to the death camps in Poland, but by 1943 they could resist no longer. We read in Professor Dawidowicz's chapter, "The Fate of the Jews in Hitler's Europe: By Country": "On March 6 [1943], news leaked out in Kyustendil, a [Bulgarian] town some fifty miles from Sofia, that a camp was to be set up nearby for the Jews who would be deported by the Germans 'to the East.' The Kyustendil Jewish community notified the Jewish consistory in Sofia and also the town's leading citizens, including Demiter Peshev, a deputy and vice-president of the Sobranie . . . Peshev's protests and opposition succeeded in halting the deportation of the Bulgarian Jews, though as a consequence he himself was dismissed as vice-president. The Germans continued to exert pressure to deport the Jews, but the counter-pressure of Bulgarian opinion, especially of the Bulgarian Orthodox church, restrained the government from compliance. King Boris, too, was opposed to deporting any but 'Communist elements'. . . . In response to German pressure for deportation, the Bulgarians responded that Germany's insistence on deportation would make the government less favorably inclined toward Germany. . . . The fifty thousand Bulgarian Jews were spared."

Many of the events in Lucy S. Dawidowicz's memorable book are set in Eastern Europe, where the decisive battles of Hitler's war against the Jews were

fought. Her stirring yet at the same time impeccably scholarly account should be read by all those interested in recent history of Central and Eastern Europe. A few centuries ago, translations of Flavius Josephus's *Jewish War* were among the most widely read books in Muscovy, in the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom, in Bohemia, and in neighboring lands. It is sad and incongruous that Professor Dawidowicz's volume, which deals with a more recent war against the Jews fought largely on the territory of these countries, is not likely to be published in any of them.

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OPERATION KEELHAUL: THE STORY OF FORCED REPATRIATION FROM 1944 TO THE PRESENT. By *Julius Epstein*. Introduction by *Bertram D. Wolfe*. Old Greenwich, Conn.: The Devin-Adair Company, 1973. xv, 255 pp. \$8.95.

THE LAST SECRET: THE DELIVERY TO STALIN OF OVER TWO MILLION RUSSIANS BY BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES. By *Nicholas Bethell*. Introduction by *Hugh Trevor-Roper*. New York: Basic Books, 1974. xvi, 224 pp. \$8.95.

The years 1971 and 1972 were important in the historiography of World War II, for it was then that nongovernment researchers finally were given access to much of both the American and the British archives concerning the forcible repatriation in 1944-47 of about two million Russians and Ukrainians. Bethell's *The Last Secret* resulted directly from such access; Epstein's *Operation Keelhaul* had the misfortune to be substantially completed before that access was granted.

Forcible repatriation was too big and too shocking to be kept really secret, despite Solzhenitsyn's use of that label and Bethell's borrowing of it for his title. Many American and British servicemen spoke publicly of their disgust at having been ordered by their superiors to deceive, betray, and violently deport Russian and Ukrainian prisoners from Germany and Austria—prisoners who in many cases chose suicide rather than return to Stalin's rule. Much information came also from Germans and from Soviet refugees in Germany and the United States. Consequently, professionals in the Russian field, especially after the publication in 1952 of George Fischer's *Soviet Opposition to Stalin*, were aware of the general outlines of the story. And any reader of the Russian émigré press has encountered, each May and June, poignant reminders of the "Lienz Tragedy" and related events of 1945, when British troops forcibly delivered into Stalin's hands over 30,000 Cossacks, many of whom had been émigrés since 1920, had never been under Soviet rule, and were not liable to repatriation even under the official Soviet interpretation of the Yalta agreement.

Yet it is shamefully true that the harrowing drama of forced repatriation, equivalent in human suffering to hundreds of My Lais, has remained long unknown to most of the American and British public. For this, the lack of early and full access to government documents on both sides of the Atlantic has been partly to blame. The two books under review constitute a welcome corrective, supplemented coincidentally by Mark R. Elliott's article in the *Political Science Quarterly*, 88, no. 2 (June 1973):253-75.