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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 March 2018
Although judicial decisions in tort law primarily determine the (correlative) responsibilities and liabilities of the proceeding parties, they also have regulatory effects on non-litigants. In this contribution, these regulatory consequences of tort law will be analysed in light of a court’s quest when it decides a tort claim involving (uncertain) risks. It will be argued that decisions in tort law about uncertain risks involve the possible occurrence of a false positive (eg accepting liability for a non-existing risk) and a false negative (eg denying liability for a real risk). False positives and false negatives have adverse consequences for the parties to the proceedings but, bearing in mind the regulatory effects of tort adjudication, potentially also for non-litigants. While courts might want to avoid both, scientific uncertainties and complexities make it difficult for them to assess to what extent there is a chance of either a false positive or a false negative occurring. Therefore, they necessarily need to determine which party bears the risk of the involved errors. In addition, the question arises whether courts should also take the potential regulatory consequences of their rulings into account and, if yes, how? To that purpose, they can employ a bipolar reasoning style and a multipolar reasoning style. Although tort law is about determining the applicable rights and obligations between the plaintiff and defendant (bipolar reasoning), in light of the regulatory implications of tort law and developments in several tort systems, the relevance of considerations transcending this bipolar relationship (multipolar reasoning) is increasing. However, the possibilities for courts to engage in multipolar reasoning are restrained by the bipolar nature of tort law which gives rise to information and specialism deficits. This will be illustrated by referring to issues in relation to setting the standard of care and examining causation.
Dr ER de Jong is an Associate Professor at Utrecht Centre for Accountability and Liability Law (Ucall). The author can be reached at e.r.dejong@uu.nl. From April 2017 to April 2018 he is a visiting fellow at the Institute of European and Comparative Law of Oxford University, funded by the Dutch NWO program Rubicon. I am thankful to Ivo Giesen, Doug Kysar, Ida Lintel and Peter Mascini for their comments on earlier versions of this contribution.
1 Scientific uncertainties about risks, economic interests that are at stake, corporate lobbying, created doubt by industry and the potential of regulatory capture, all complicate governmental risk regulation. See, for an illustration, European Environmental Agency, Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, innovation (EEA 2013)Google Scholar; P Harremoës (ed.), Late lessons from early warnings: the precautionary principle 1896-2000 (Environmental issue report No 22) (EEA 2001).
2 See inter alia Viscusi, WK (ed.), Regulation through Litigation (American Enterprise Institute–Brookings Institution 2002)Google Scholar; Morris, AP, Yandle, B and Dorchak, A, Regulation by Litigation (Yale University Press 2008) 1 Google Scholar; Ewing, B and Kysar, D, “Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm” (2011) 121 Yale Law Journal 350 Google Scholar; Luff, P, “Risk Regulation and Regulatory Litigation” (2011) 61 Rutgers Law Review 73 Google Scholar; Faure, MG, “The complementary roles of liability, regulation and insurance in safety management: theory and practice” (2014) 17 Journal of Risk Research 689 Google Scholar; Spier, J and Magnus, U, Climate Change Remedies (Eleven International Publishing 2014) 2-155 Google Scholar; Enneking, L and de Jong, ER, “Regulering van onzekere risico’s via public interest litigation?” (2014) 23 Nederlands Juristenblad 1542 Google Scholar; de Jong, ER, “Rechterlijke risicoregulering bij gezondheids- en milieurisico’s” (2015) Ars Aequi 872 Google Scholar; Luff, P, “The Political Economy of Court-Based Regulation” in U Mattei and JD Haskell (eds), Research Handbook on Political Economy and Law (Edward Elgar 2015) 192 Google Scholar.
3 District Court of The Hague, 24 June 2015, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7145. See, for a description of this judgment in light of judge made risk regulation, de Jong, ER, “Dutch State Ordered to Cut Carbon Emissions” (2015) 6 EJRR 448 Google Scholar.
4 District Court of The Hague, 7 September 2017, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:10171; HR 10 October 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2928, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 2015/12, comm. EA Alkema; District Court of The Hague, 09 November 2015, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:12746.
5 See for references section II.2.
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7 See on this issue the contribution of M Loth in this special issue.
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10 See eg the contribution of Kysar in this special issue. See in general, on this civil recourse theory, Goldberg, JCP and Zipursky, BC, “Tort law and Responsibility” in J Oberdiek (ed.), Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Torts, (Oxford University Press 2014)Google Scholar;
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11 Eg due to cost barriers and the influence(s) of lobby practices.
12 The argument will be mainly illustrated by experience in The Netherlands, a civil law jurisdiction, and in the common law world, especially jurisdictions in the US. The aim of this article is not, however, to give an exhaustive overview on how courts dealt with risk regulatory lawsuits in these jurisdictions. Although the jurisdictions differ on the level of detail, on the general substance they are comparable. See also Magnus, U, “Why is U.S. Tort Law so Different?” (2010) 1 Journal of European Tort Law 102 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. And for Europe, van Dam, C, European Tort Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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14 WK Viscusi, “Overview” in Vicusi, supra, note 2, 19–20. This norm amplificaion can be observed in relation to, inter alia, decision about the applicable standards, causation requirements, (actionable) damages and standing requirements and is especially present when courts stretch the boundaries of these legal concepts in order to accommodate the plaintiffs claim.
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18 Eg Cane, P, “Tort Law as Regulation” (2002) 31 Common Law World Review 305, 312 Google Scholar and 320–322.
19 See also section V.3. See, for a discussion on how climate change might influence doctrinal tort law, Kysar, DA, “What Climate Change can do about Tort Law” (2011) 41 Environmental Law 1 Google Scholar.
20 See especially HR 6 April 1990, ECLI:NL:HR:1990:AB9376, NJ 1990/573, comm. PA Stein (Janssen/Nefabas); HR 25 June 1993, ECLI:NL:HR:1993:AD1907, NJ 1993/686, comm. PA Stein (Cijsouw I). HR 17 December 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AR3290, NJ 2006/147, comm. CJH Brunner (Hertel/Van der Lugt); HR 25 November 2005, ECLI:NL: HR:2005:AT8782, NJ 2009/103, comm. I Giesen (Eternit/Horsting).
21 HR 7 June 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ1721, NJ 2014/99, comm. T Hartlief (Lansink/Ritsma). See I Giesen, ER de Jong and MA Overheul, “Risks: how Dutch tort law responds to risks and how the law can shape risks” in M Dyson, supra, note 9. Sometimes the legislature intervenes. A striking example relates to the ruling of the English Supreme Court in Barker v Corus Ltd [2006] 2 AC 572, where it denied joint and several liability for solvent employers that exposed their employees, but where others are also responsbile for the exposure but are not solvent. The introduction of the Compensation Act 2006 reversed this ruling for situations of mesothelioma.
22 The tort of public nuisance stems from the old English common law and traditionally belongs to the domain of criminal law. In England and Wales some commentators would argue that the tort does not belong to the domain of tort law, since it is concerned with public interests and not with private interests: McBride, NJ and Bagshaw, R, Tort Law (5th edn, Pearson Longman 2015)Google Scholar; Harlow, C, State Liability (Oxford University Press 2015) 658 Google Scholar et sqq. See, for a general discussion of the tort and its critics in England and Wales, Neyers, JW, “Reconceptualising the tort of public nuisance” (2017) 76 Cambridge Law Journal 87 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
23 Restatement (sec.) of Torts, §708 to the end, §821B(1). For a description of the other elements of the tort under US law see also Faulk, RO and Gray, JS, “Alchemy in the Courtroom: The transmutation of Public Nuisance Litigation” (2007) Michigan State Law Review 941, 962–964 Google Scholar.
24 Faulk and Gray, supra, note 25, 948; Schwartz, VE and Goldberg, P, “The Law of Public Nuisance: Maintaining Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort” (2005–2006) 45 Washburn Law Journal 541 Google Scholar.
25 There are a few exceptions. See Faulk and Gray, supra, note 25.
26 Interestingly, states also attempted to push the tort in this direction. According to Faulk and Gray especially this state litigation undermines the separation of powers theory, Faulk and Gray, supra, note 25, 974.
27 Two legal explanations can be given for this reluctance: the harm is public and not private and the tort as such is vague.
28 Cane, P, “Consequences in Judicial Reasoning” in J Horder (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press 2000)Google Scholar; see, for an exception and interesting study on the possibility of courts to bring about social change, Rosenberg, N, The Hallow Hope. Can Courts Bring About Social Change? American Politics and Political Economy Series (2nd edn, University of Chicago Press 2008)Google Scholar.
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31 Viscusi, supra, note 14, 3.
32 Luff, P, “Regulating Tobacco through Litigation” (2015) 47 Arizona State Law Journal 126 Google Scholar.
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34 Wagner, W, “When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation” (2007) 95 The Georgetown Law Review 693 Google Scholar, fn 81 with further references.
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36 See, for an instructive overview, Viscusi, supra, note 14, and Morris, Yandle and Dorchak, supra, note 2.
37 See section IV.
38 Luff, supra, note 34, 169. This, however, says nothing about the adequacy of these regulatory regimes. The point to make here is that they are (partly) induced by litigation.
39 KS Abraham, “The insurance effects of regulation through litigation” in Viscusi, supra, note 2.
40 Oliphant, K, “The Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspecive” in K Oliphant (ed.), The Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspectives (Intersentia 2016) 860–861 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Van Dam, supra, note 12, 531.
41 For instance Bergkamp, L, “Is There a Defect in the European Court’s Defect Test? Musing about Acceptable Risk” (2015) 2 EJRR 309, 321 Google Scholar,
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42 Section IV.3.
43 See, on these concepts in the context of risk governance, SFH Hansen and JA Tickner “The precautionary principle and false alarms – lessons learned” in EEA 2013, supra, note 1, 21.
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45 This point was brought to my attention by one of the peer reviewers.
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56 Cane, supra, note 19, 329.
57 Eg Spier, J, “Balancing Acts: How to Cope with Major Catastrophes, particularly the Financial Crisis” (2013) 4 Journal of European Tort Law 223 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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107 Martin-Casals and Papayannis, supra, note 98, 4; Nolan, supra, note 64, 189.
108 This argument clearly makes sense when there is no scientific evidence for the existence of causation at all (unknown risks). The question is whether the argument holds in situations of uncertain risks, where there is an indication of a causal relation.
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112 See the end of section III.
113 Particularly if the claim is negligence-based.
