

spoken in Mani throws light on the process of diverging development in what was at first one dialect, and any light thrown on the Mani dialect is valuable because of its interesting position in the general field of Modern Greek. It belongs to those dialects which fringe the Peloponnese all round from Kymi to Aigina and Megara, and so even to the Ionian Islands; their existence raises all sorts of questions hardly yet resolved. For

this full use of Dr. Blanken's book it is plain that it should be read in conjunction with Professor Mirambel's book on the dialect of Mani. I do not know any recent book on a Greek dialect better done than this one, and it must remain always the best record of this dying, or we may now say dead, form of Greek speech.

R. M. DAWKINS

Exeter College, Oxford

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editors of the CLASSICAL REVIEW,

Gentlemen:

Several years ago Professor Hackforth published an article in your periodical (*C.R.* lxiv [1950], pp. 43-45) in which he argued from *Symposium* 208 a-b that Plato when he wrote the *Symposium* had dropped the claim that soul, collective or individual, is imperishable. When in the last issue of *C.R.* (n.s. ii [1952], pp. 135-7) I observed that J. V. Luce had replied to this article, I expected to find some reference to the passage which by itself proves the invalidity of Professor Hackforth's inference. I had been puzzled by Professor Hackforth's failure to mention that passage; but I am still more puzzled by the absence of any reference to it in Mr. Luce's reply, the more so since I felt that it must have been trembling on the point of his pen when he wrote: 'in the *Symposium* attention is focused on the immortality of ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις' (p. 140). The passage occurs at 721 b-c in the *Laws*: γαμῖν . . . διανοηθέντα ὡς ἔστιν ἢ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος φύσει τιμὴ μετέληφεν ἀθανασίας . . . γένος οὖν ἀνθρώπων ἔστιν τι συμφύες τοῦ παντός χρόνου, ὃ διὰ τέλους αὐτῷ συνέπεται καὶ συνέφεται, τούτω τῷ τρόπῳ ἀθάνατον ὄν, τῷ παῖδας παίδων καταλειπόμενον, ταῦτόν καὶ ἐν ὄν ἀεί, γενέσει τῆς ἀθανασίας μετεληφέναι. (Cf. also 773 e 5 ff.) Both Hackforth and Luce refer to the *Laws* for Plato's emphatic re-assertion of the immortality of the soul; yet neither one mentions the fact that in this dialogue there is also the statement at 721 c, a clear parallel to the passage of the *Symposium* that they are debating. Their failure to mention it is the more puzzling because the parallel is not only recognized by commentators on the *Laws* but is also duly recorded by Robin in his edition of the *Symposium*.

Yours sincerely,

HAROLD CHERNISS

Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton

MR. LUCE writes:

Professor Cherniss implies that he is in agreement with the main contention of my article, and his support is very gratifying to me. I venture, however, to submit that his assertion that *Laws* 721 b-c 'by itself proves the invalidity of Professor Hackforth's inference' is a little too sweeping. The passage is undoubtedly a significant parallel to *Symp.* 207 c 8-208 b 6, and is recorded by most of the editors of the *Symposium* from Stallbaum on. I had it in mind (as Professor Cherniss divines) when forming my views on mortal φύσις and divine ψυχή, and perhaps I should have cited it as an illustrative reference in addition to *Tim.* 90. I do not, however, regard it as quite the 'killing blow' that Professor Cherniss would have it to be. I may well have underestimated its importance, but the following points occur to me: (a) the immortality of the soul, my primary concern, is not mentioned in it; (b) statements by Plato in the *Laws* do not necessarily have any bearing on the main point at issue between Professor Hackforth and myself, viz. Plato's alleged 'temporary' (italics mine) relapse into scepticism' between the writing of the *Phaedo* and the *Symposium*. I readily allow, and I am grateful to Professor Cherniss for making the point, that the passage, if taken in conjunction with the argument of *Laws* bk. 10, does afford a strong presumption that Plato in his old age did not feel it to be inconsistent to maintain simultaneously the vicarious immortality of the human organism and the immortality *per se* of the human soul. To this extent *Laws* 721 b-c corroborates my contention that Plato's thought, at the time when the *Symposium* was written, was 'fluid enough to hold the two kinds of immortality in solution'. But I beg leave to doubt whether the passage proves my thesis 'by itself'.