
BOOKS IN REVIEW

RECENT TRENDS IN LATIN AMERICAN LABOR HISTORIOGRAPHY

POLITICS AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT IN CHILE. By ALAN ANGELL. (London: Oxford University Press, 1972. Pp. 289. \$17.00.)

LARU STUDIES. "The Situation of the Working Class in Latin America," No. 1 (October 1976).

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES. "Imperialism and the Working Class in Latin America," 3, No. 1 (Winter 1976).

ORGANIZED LABOR IN LATIN AMERICA, 1850-1960. By HOBART A. SPALDING. (New York: New York University Press, 1977. Pp. 297. \$15.00.)

THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF ARGENTINA, 1890-1930. By RICHARD J. WALTER. (Austin: The Texas Press Services, 1977. Pp. 284. \$5.95.)

Interest in the Latin American urban working class has rarely been higher, a significant change from a decade ago when the history of urban workers seemed lost among studies of elites, middle sectors, and peasants. A recent spate of publications, only a very few of which are considered here, suggests that labor history is slowly but surely moving into the mainstream of Latin American historiography.¹

Unfortunately, the major works reviewed here display little of the conceptual or methodological innovation that characterizes the work of labor historians of Europe or the United States who, over the last twenty years, have directed their attention to the large majority of the labor force; those urban workers who never joined trade unions. Even where they have examined unionized workers, these innovative practitioners of "working class history" have done so in a broader context to define the nature, texture, and structures of working class life in attempts to link everyday activity to political action. As a result, the parameters of European and North American labor history have been significantly broadened and our knowledge of working class culture, social

structure, and politics has been immensely increased. The continuing isolation of most scholars studying Latin American workers from these attempts to write the history of the working class from the bottom up, from letting workers speak for themselves through the creative use of both new and traditional sources, from attempts to write the history of the working class as a whole rather than merely the history of trade unions or political parties indicates the need to incorporate these breakthroughs into Latin American labor scholarship.

In contradistinction to labor history, working class history examines the totality of working class culture. The subject matter includes the values, traditions, and institutions which reflect class consciousness and which, thereby, become dynamic and changing resources drawn on by workers in particular societal circumstances. The concept also implies that working people should be viewed as conscious historical actors who contribute to, and help define, change rather than merely absorb and respond to it.² Traditional labor history, on the other hand, rarely penetrates the trade union structure or electoral behavior to define, explain, and analyze how working class culture and class consciousness affect politics.

Hobart A. Spalding's *Organized Labor*, the most ambitious synthesis of Latin American labor history in more than a decade, is an excellent example of the traditional approach. Spalding argues that "labor history can best be understood within the larger context of the world economy," and that "three variables have influenced labor's evolution: fluctuations of the international economy and decisions taken by governments in advanced capitalist nations; the competition of, and tensions between, the international and the local ruling classes; and the composition, structure, and historical formation of the working class" (p. ix). "Of these," he concludes, "the international dimension weighs heaviest" (p. 292).

Within this framework, Spalding identifies three chronological stages—origins (1870–1914), expansion (1914–29), and co-optation and repression (1930–present)—in the evolution of organized labor. Case studies of Mexico, Argentina and Brazil, and Bolivia illustrate particular forms of co-optation and repression. Only in Cuba have "workers increasingly made basic decisions affecting their lives" (p. 242).

Despite his sympathy for revolutionary goals, Spalding rarely departs from established interpretations. In arguing, for example, that all of Lázaro Cárdenas' policies "led toward a single goal: preservation and strengthening of Mexico's industrial and agricultural capitalism," Spalding accepts what has become the new wisdom.³ In a recent article, however, Liisa North and David Raby take issue with "post facto determinism" and convincingly argue that "the progressive coalition which Cárdenas represented accentuated rather than attenuated class conflicts" and that "Cárdenas and his closest collaborators embarked on a radical reform program whose ultimate limits were not fixed in advance" (p. 26).⁴ Thus, they conclude, "it cannot simply be assumed that . . . Mexican capitalism was the only and inevitable product of Cárdenas' reforms. The Cuban revolution also began with 'mere' reforms. . . . The revolutionary potential of certain types of popular mass based regimes has to be taken

seriously. Even when this potential is not realized, it cannot be assumed that it did not exist" (p. 53).⁵

Post facto determinism also characterizes Spalding's analysis of populism in Argentina and Brazil. In both cases, he writes, "populism ultimately serve[d] to weaken working class organization by restricting its autonomous development, and in that sense [did] not attack existing structures." Spalding's conclusion that "in reality, conflict arising around populist movements represents intraclass struggles on a national or extranational level rather than interclass warfare, as is often supposed" (p. 151), both underestimates the importance of sectors opposed to populist leadership and the dialectical relationship between classes in a polyclass movement that generates class consciousness among workers.

There is a wealth of data, and painful experience, to support the contention that populism is fundamentally conservative. But, it is difficult to deny the benefits that both labor movements, particularly the Argentine, enjoyed from state power exercised on their behalf. A relatively small group of skilled workers excepted, most Latin American labor movements developed only with the backing of the state. Whether this failure was the result of surplus labor, late industrialization, or repression, or a combination of them among still other factors remains to be determined.⁶ Alistair Hennessy, for example, argues that "the inability of the urban working class to develop independent autonomous organizations" is, in itself, a precondition for the emergence of populism.⁷

In its expansive phases, populism facilitated impressive organizational success and economic gains through the support of the state. Hennessy's observation that "only when populists are in opposition and are not compromised by the support of governmental apparatus can they retain the essence of their beliefs," suggests both the long-run unviability of a polyclass movement and the inherent characteristic of populism to radicalize at least a portion of its supporters as the populist leader is forced to make difficult choices while in power.⁸ Thus, Peronism undoubtedly stimulated the formation of a more radical, non-populist class consciousness that characterized the movement's left wing between 1969 and 1976. While Spalding accuses the majority of Argentine workers of what amounts to "false consciousness," their adherence to Peronism depended on concrete historical conditions, material benefits, and what they perceived to be the changing nature of the Peronist movement over the course of three decades.

José Nun's "Workers' Control and the Problems of Organization," in *LARU Studies* calls attention both to "anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist" struggles at the factory level in Argentina between 1969 and 1975 and the more general theoretical importance of such demands (p. 54). Thus, while workers aligned with Peronism at the party level, and while the Peronist trade union bureaucracy cooperated with the government to repress workers, significant struggles organized around the recovery of trade union democracy and the reassertion of workers' control over the production process took place at the rank-and-file level.

Nun stresses the importance of the exploitation and alienation that stem

from capitalist productive relations in the workplace and link working class culture and consciousness to political protest. Agreeing with E. P. Thompson that "class is not a 'thing,' a statistical category which can be defined 'a priori' and into which 'correct consciousness' can abstractedly be injected *from outside*," Nun argues that "class is a historical process situated in a particular context. It has its own national characteristics and is limited by the specificity of struggles which emerge from and become a part of traditions, value systems, ideas and concrete modes of organization" (p. 51). Nun advises proceeding cautiously to avoid mechanistic formulae: "An investigation into 'the prevailing system of class consciousness' presupposes a historical analysis of a multiplicity of both institutionalized and non-institutionalized practices. Those processes cannot be synthesized simplistically, not only because that form is in itself multidimensional, but also because in fact the dimensions are always unevenly developed" (p. 51).

Nun's emphasis on productive relations, on national specificity, and on the dynamics of working class cultural formation, is consonant with the approach taken by working class historians of other areas. It is a more promising framework for future research than Spalding's generalizations about the hegemony of the capitalist system and his assertions that common patterns in the evolution of labor emerge at roughly the same time throughout the continent (p. 282). Nun would not argue, as Spalding does, that between World War I and the Depression, Cuba's "labor history is . . . a study in microcosm of the period" (p. 78).

Spalding cannot be faulted for not having written a history of the urban working class of Latin America; he made no pretense of trying. He has accomplished his goal of synthesizing a vast amount of data. Further, his recognition of the international dimension is valuable, although exaggerated. A conceptual framework that attempts to unify data about vastly different countries at different stages of industrial and social development by emphasizing the "global" nature of modern capitalism ignores, perhaps necessarily, a host of important differences among those cases. For example, Spalding devotes little attention to the distinctions in labor movements caused by different dominant productive functions (mining, food processing, textiles), the ethnic, racial, and sexual composition of the work force (Indian, black, white, immigrant), the effect of important secondary cities on labor organization and protest (Brazil and Colombia with at least two foci being different from Cuba and Argentina with one dominant center), and source of wealth of the ruling class (land, mining, industry), among others.

In addition to distorting that which it unifies, "globalism" lacks sufficient sensitivity to explain the internal dynamics of Latin American societies. The study of this "global system" and its explicit use of dependency theory should be replaced by the study of dependent societies in which greater attention would be paid to the nature of local economies, social structures, and dialectical relationships between ruling class and working class.⁹ Spalding's conceptual framework, precisely because of its emphasis on that variant of dependency theory which emphasizes the international dimension, significantly underestimates the

ability of Latin American workers to participate actively in shaping their own destinies.

Nowhere is the emphasis on U.S. hegemony more misplaced than in analysis of the role of the AFL-CIO in the present state of Latin American labor. The lack of AFL-CIO success rather than its minor gains (accomplished in countries with especially weak labor movements) should attract our attention. Instead, as an issue of *Latin American Perspectives* devoted to "Imperialism and the Working Class" indicates, some practitioners of labor history emphasize the role of the United States to the exclusion of domestic factors. Edited by Timothy Harding and Hobart Spalding, the issue reflects many of the suppositions present in Spalding's book.¹⁰ Thus, Kenneth P. Erickson and Patrick V. Peppe's "Dependent Capitalist Development, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Repression of the Working Class in Chile and Brazil" argues that "two major related variables condition the evolution of labor in Latin American countries: first the type of integration of their national economies into the world capitalist system, and second, the specific structure and nature of national elites" (p. 28).

The case of Chile provides a counterpoint to the "global" approach. Alan Angell's highly competent and detailed analysis of *Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile* illustrates the importance of national historical evolution in determining the course of the movement. Emphasizing structural and legal factors, Angell argues that Chilean unions have had to align with political parties to an unusual degree to garner support. Geography, natural resources, immigration all helped to determine the evolution of the Chilean working class. Also important was the nature of state regulation of labor, particularly as expressed in the labor code first promulgated in 1924. While Chilean trade unions were regulated by the state they "have never been dominated by the Ministry of Labor or the official party" (p. 2). Thus, "union leaders are not appointed and controlled by the state and . . . broadly speaking, union policies are made by union leaders democratically elected by the rank and file" (p. 2). Rather than see these characteristics as fostering conservatism, Angell concludes that "the labor movement has developed radical and strong political affiliations because the effects of the labor code, the attitude of employers, and the activities of the state have combined to weaken unions as economic bargainers, thereby driving them to seek political allies and political solutions" (p. 7).

Peter Winn's "Loosing the Chains: Labor and the Chilean Revolutionary Process, 1970–1973" in *Latin American Perspectives*, further indicates problems with the "global" approach. Winn describes and analyzes those structures in working class life that provided for the evolution of radical class consciousness and "the revolutionary process from below" (p. 75); a process beyond the control of Salvador Allende, the Unidad Popular coalition, and the trade union federation (CUT), itself. Similar to the Nun article in its emphasis on the workplace and worker control struggles and its recognition of what Nun calls "'latent' class consciousness which could explode at any time" (p. 55), Winn traces changes in worker consciousness (across a five-stage typology) brought about by factory seizures and demands that workers control the means of production "that the UP had neither ordered nor approved" (p. 76).

After the October 1972 strike of the bourgeoisie, even previously conservative or apolitical workers experienced leaps in consciousness. During "the finest hour of the revolution from below, the self-managed factories maintained their production levels, while organizing their own defense. . . . When the government agencies alone proved incapable of assuring neighborhood defense, the workers and their local organizations filled the breach" (p. 80). Workers outran the desires of the UP and the CUT. By March 1973, the UP, "its political ingenuity and economic resources exhausted, proved incapable of effective leadership and creative response to the succeeding months of chronic crisis and renewed counterrevolutionary activity" (p. 82).

The point is not to discount or minimize the important role the United States played in the overthrow of Allende, but to insist that internal structures, divisions on the left between party and trade union leadership and rank and file, and confusion over the historical role of the UP coalition led to a situation in which the Allende administration was moving too slowly for many of its friends and too quickly for many of its enemies. If this state of affairs is a function of Chile's "dependence" on the world economy, the term loses its analytical viability: it simultaneously means everything and nothing. By focusing on the demands of workers, themselves, Winn's article alerts us to the limitations of comprehending Allende's overthrow simply through foreign policy considerations and the covert activities of the United States.

Richard A. Walter's *The Socialist Party of Argentina* places a high priority on national and local conditions but leaves the characteristics of the working class vague. Walter's task is "to present a case study of a Latin American political party within the overall framework of Argentine political history, . . . focusing on the interaction of political parties in national elections and national government" (p. xx).

Walter has two main objectives: to make and defend the claim "that the Socialists sought political power not for its own sake but rather to effect significant modifications in Argentine national life . . . they also hoped to provide a model for modern political organization and activity, a model that would serve to alter permanently the prevailing political culture in the republic" (p. 22); and to explain why Socialist accomplishments fell so far short of their aspirations.

Walter traces the party's evolution focusing on its leadership and its fortunes at the polls. He combines traditional sources with an analysis of voting returns in the Federal Capital between 1912 and 1930 to register Socialist successes at the *barrio* level. Using data from 1918 to define the voting districts according to social class (an admirable, although not entirely satisfying, effort to get beyond schematic and impressionistic suppositions about who voted for which party), Walter is nonetheless careful to avoid the ecological fallacy of assigning to people the characteristics of the areas in which they live. The degree to which the social composition of the barrios remained unchanged is problematical.¹¹ Equally unclear is the extent to which the Argentine Socialists really comprehended the totality of working class life.

Despite its original poor showings, the party's commitment to social change was based on an incisive analysis of the objective conditions of the urban

working class, especially in Buenos Aires (city and province). But the Socialists neither understood nor sympathized with the traditions, values, and aspirations of their constituents. Rather, the party's notions of discipline, public and private behavior, and citizenship reflected its desire to promote bourgeois norms in the working class. The party's dedication to electoral participation and naturalization, in spite of immigrant indifference and official obstacles, underscores its reformism. That so few immigrant workers became naturalized, both before and after the 1912 electoral reform law, suggests that electoral politics held little attraction for Argentina's immigrant workers.

While the party's support for improved working conditions reflected its implicit recognition of the importance of the workplace, Socialists showed little enthusiasm for the strike and instead emphasized electoral competition and cooperativism. In spite of the party's ambivalence, workers frequently resorted to the strike tactic. As a result, the Socialists attracted many of Argentina's best middle-class minds, but lost ground in the working class to anarchists and syndicalists.

Walter contends that "the increased incidence of strikes, however, did not always mean a corresponding efficacy of strike action" (p. 56). But the issue is not so clear-cut. Strikes represent a level of working class consciousness and organization and their effects are potentially broader than whether stated goals are achieved. To take but one example: strikes forced the oligarchy to confront the "social question." Thus, President Roca's preface to the proposed national labor code of 1904 stated that the legislation had been inspired by the General Strike of 1902 (p. 83). Likewise, the frequency and wide range of issues over which strikes were called reflected the depth and breadth of working class discontent.¹²

In his debate with Italian Socialist Enrico Ferri, party founder Juan B. Justo defined the party as one that "presents itself above all as the political organization of the most numerous class of the population, the wage earning workers." Justo had found the lowest common denominator: all wage earners were oppressed by colonial capitalist development (p. 67). Thus, its caution regarding the strike, theoretical confusion about its true constituency, and the issue of Argentine nationalism versus proletarian internationalism, as well as a numerically restricted constituency combined to limit the party's appeal. Finally, strongest in the capital and in Buenos Aires province, the Socialist claim to be a national party remained suspect. The net effect of intraparty splits was that the Socialists never successfully appealed to unskilled laborers. According to Walter, "these divisions . . . would, in the long run, do more to weaken Socialist effectiveness than any of the repressive measures of the government between 1900 and 1910" (p. 71).

Neither the critiques of foreigners, nor splits in unity, nor competition from the left changed the Socialists' self-perception of being the party of the oppressed. Nevertheless, the party had become an organization devoted to campaigning and to representing an estranged constituency in Congress. The 1916 presidential election, won by Hipólito Irigoyen, showed that the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR), which sought votes from the same constituencies, had

outdistanced the Socialists. While the party continued to grow, and even to prosper, it had severed its working class roots and had become, in an international context, a moderate reformist party committed to "good government."

The 1922 presidential election made clear that the Socialists needed a conjuncture on the order of the personalist (Irigoyen)—antipersonalist (Alvear) split in the UCR to give them the balance of power in Congress they desired. Indeed, it took the Radical schism to elect the first Socialist deputies from the interior in 1924. Perhaps the starkest indication of Socialist impotence was that the eight-hour day, the cornerstone of its platform, did not become law until 1929.

Why did the Socialist party fall so far short of its aspirations? In addition to institutional obstacles and to ideological confusion, Walter suggests that "those immigrants who determined to stay in the republic might often have preferred the status quo, finding conditions far from good but still not so intolerable as to dictate a commitment to socialism" (p. 232). Adherence to the Socialist party, however, constituted at best commitment to a very mild form of socialism.

Walter contends that the party was too radical for Argentine workers. Equally defensible is the claim that the party was too moderate for the working class. In 1920, the Socialist party undertook a study of its membership that revealed that only 20 percent defined themselves as workers, while almost 38 percent offered their occupations as artisans and small merchants, and about one-third called themselves employees. The Socialists had become a petty bourgeois party and had ceased to represent the aspirations of the working class.

The Socialists did not adopt the road to power taken by other Latin American parties with working class members. It neither resorted to a full scale Populist appeal (through which it might have pre-empted Peronism) nor became explicitly Marxist (through which it might have offered a more radical alternative). Instead, it increasingly reflected the petty bourgeois characteristics of its members; skilled workers who nurtured the dream of entrepreneurship and who had inculcated the bourgeois norms the Socialists held so dear. The Socialists never became a populist party, nor a revolutionary party, nor a labor party with a strong trade union base.

Walter is correct in his claim that the Socialists "introduced new issues for public debate, brought new men into politics and national life, and provided models for political organization and behavior," but his data suggest that they were much less effective in enacting legislation or in getting other parties to accept their model. Walter's own evidence makes equally plausible the suggestion that while new men were introduced, the party did less well in keeping high level positions open; that, in short, defection not circulation brought new leaders to the top. He further contends that "the Socialists helped to introduce a new political spirit and orientation into the republic; committed to political democracy, social justice and economic equality, they offered a real alternative to prevailing conditions and an opportunity for Argentines to achieve peacefully the basic revolutionary change that has eluded them for so long" (p. 233). Here, Walter clearly claims too much for the party. Although by 1930 Argentina was a de facto one-party nation, it was clear long before that the Socialists offered no real threat to the oligarchy.

Walter analyzes the reasons for the socialist failure but he does not seriously address his question of how the Argentine experience illuminates the viability of socialism elsewhere in Latin America. Explicit comparisons with the Chilean case, in which the Socialist party outgrew its populist origins, might have been particularly helpful.¹³ Nor is Walter clear about the relationship between the Socialist party and the rise of Peronism (so vigorously opposed by the Socialists), except to note that Perón borrowed and adapted Socialist campaign techniques and proceeded to enact laws that the party had long championed. Walter's careful scholarship, however, does make clear why the Socialist party ceased to be a viable alternative for those Argentines desirous of social change.

Studies of political parties and trade unions do add to our knowledge of the Latin American working class, but these emphases have built in distortions. They focus attention on a minority of workers and give short shrift to the unorganized. They emphasize the role of political parties and thus define political activity as synonymous with voting. They overestimate the strike as opposed to other forms of popular protest. They inflict an accommodationist, or integrationist, model on relations between workers and the state, and, as we have seen, can make workers the passive recipients of elite or employer decisions rather than treat them as agents of social change. Finally, trade union history can slide imperceptibly into the history of labor relations, which emphasizes struggles for higher wages and better working conditions but eliminates any ideological considerations.

Both trade union and party histories show discernible tendencies to focus on the national level to the detriment of the local level. This traditional approach slights sources in which workers speak for themselves: popular protest away from the workplace, working class theater, art, music, and religion, among others. Quantitative sources, also neglected, offer potentially valuable insights into employment patterns, residential and geographic mobility, and family structures, all of which affect working class behavior and class consciousness.

If Latin American labor and social historians are to understand fully the complex nature and evolution of working class activity and consciousness, they must begin at the level of specific productive and social relations and move from this most basic level toward a theory of working class development rooted in the broadest possible range of workers' cultural, social and political expressions and organizational forms.

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NOTES

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2. Alaine Touraine and Daniel Pécaut, "Consciencia obrera y desarrollo económico en América Latina," *Revista Latinoamericana de Sociología* (1966), p. 152. Leading proponents of the "working class history" perspective, and some of their relevant works, include: John Foster, *Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution* (London, 1974); Her-

- bert G. Gutman, *Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing America* (New York, 1977); Eric Hobsbawm, *Labouring Men* (London, 1964); David Montgomery, "Workers' Control of Machine Production in the Nineteenth Century," *Labor History* 17, no. 4 (Fall 1976):485–509; E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York, 1966); and Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly and Richard Tilly, *The Rebellious Century, 1830–1930* (Cambridge, 1975). A provocative review of the assumptions underlying working class history is Daniel T. Rodgers, "Tradition, Modernity, and the American Industrial Worker: Reflections and Critique," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 7, no. 4 (Spring 1977): 655–81. Elizabeth Jelin has critically reviewed the evolution of Latin American labor historiography in "Orientaciones e ideologías obreras en América Latina," *Estudios Sociales*, no. 3 (oct. 1976).
3. Ramón E. Ruiz, *Labor and the Ambivalent Revolutionaries* (Baltimore, 1976) argues that the revolutionary potential of the Mexican working class had been blunted and dissipated long before Cárdenas assumed the presidency in 1934.
 4. Liisa North and David Raby, "The Dynamic of Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mexico under Cárdenas, 1934–1940," *LARU Studies* 2, no. 1 (Oct. 1977):26.
 5. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
 6. On the role of the state see, among others, David Collier and Ruth Berins Collier, "Who Does What, To Whom, and How: Toward a Comparative Analysis of Latin American Corporatism," in James M. Malloy (ed.) *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh, 1977), chap. 15. Other articles in the same anthology are also illuminating. See especially Kenneth S. Mericle, "Corporatist Control of the Working Class: Authoritarian Brazil since 1964," chap. 10. Also see Miguel Urrutia, *The Development of the Colombian Labor Movement* (New Haven, 1969).
 7. Alistair Hennessy, "Latin America," in Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Geller (eds.) *Populism* (New York, 1969), p. 30. More generally, see Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina* (Buenos Aires, 1969).
 8. Hennessy, "Latin America," p. 53.
 9. See Juan Eugenio Corradi, "The Politics of Silence," Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the Modern Language Association, 1977 (revised version in press, *Radical History Review*). Corradi draws on Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "The Consumption of Dependency Theory in the United States," *LARR* 12, no. 3 (1977):7–24; Cardoso and Faletto, *Dependencia*; and Alain Touraine, *Les sociétés dépendentes* (Paris, 1976).
 10. Indeed, the final chapter of *Organized Labor*, "The Imperialist Threat," is similar to the same author's "U.S. and Latin America: The Dynamics of Imperialist Control," in the *Latin American Perspectives* issue under consideration. According to Spalding, "the results of U.S. labor's foreign policy have varied . . . but its greatest successes in Latin America have come in countries with authoritarian military regimes and its strongest supporters have been tied to conservative political parties and governments" (*Organized Labor*, p. 276), which suggests the need to study the dynamics of authoritarianism at least as much as it does the foreign policy of organized labor.
 11. See Eugene F. Sofer, "Invisible Walls: Jewish Residential Patterns in Gran Buenos Aires, 1890–1947," *Occasional Paper #26*, NYU Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 1977, for a study of residential mobility and the dangers in assuming static neighborhoods.
 12. Both Walter and Spalding uncritically cite Argentine strike data but the data offer more possibilities than they make use of. To take but one example, Walter notes that many more workers than union members participated in strikes. In such cases, a "solidarity index" similar to that used by Jon Amsden and Stephen Brier ("Coal Miners on Strike: The Transformation of Strike Demands and the Formation of a National Union," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 7, no. 4 [Spring 1977]:583–616) would be useful. Also see Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly, "The Shape of Strikes in France, 1830–1960," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 8, no. 1 (Jan. 1971):60–85.
 13. See Paul W. Drake, *Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932–1952* (Urbana, 1978).