In the past half-century it has often seemed paradoxical, and to the politically correct embarrassing, that Athens in the second half of the fifth century was democratic, and indeed a champion of democracy in the Greek world, and therefore admirable, but was also the head of the greatest empire in which Greeks controlled other Greeks, and therefore deplorable. One advantage available to those who challenged the orthodox dating criteria for fifth-century Athenian inscriptions, and moved to the 420s texts which orthodoxy placed ca. 450, was that the more extreme manifestations of imperialism could be associated not with Pericles, of whom (following Thucydides) we ought to approve, but with Cleon, of whom (again following Thucydides) it was respectable to disapprove: “None of the inscriptive evidence for fully organized Athenian imperialism can be dated before 431 B.C. Even the very language of imperialism does not seem to have been current until the last years of Perikles’ ascendancy.”

G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, in an avowedly if idiosyncratically Marxist interpretation of ancient history, developed the idea first expressed by G. Grote (who in the nineteenth century did more than anybody else to make Athenian democracy an object of praise) that, despite the judgment of Thucydides that the Athenians exercised their power as far as they could, as was natural, and their subjects hated it, as also was natural, in fact the Athenian empire was unpopular only with upper-class oligarchs in the member states and was popular with lower-class democrats: “It is unique among past empires known to us in that the ruling city relied very much on the support of the lower classes in the subject states.” Elsewhere he claimed, “Although Athens certainly exploited her allies to some extent, I see no evidence that she did so in any extensive way.” On the other hand, M. I. Finley, who took an interest both in Athenian democracy and in
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Athenian imperialism, wrote, “Athenian imperialism employed all the forms of material exploitation that were available and possible in that society;” but he also wrote, “We must acknowledge that other societies can act, and have acted, in good faith in moral terms other than ours, even abhorrent to us. Historical explanation is not identical with moral judgment.” Let us in that spirit investigate the connections between the Athenians’ democracy and their empire.

Thucydides’ digression (1.89–117) on the Pentecontaetia, the period of (nearly) fifty years between the Persian War and the Peloponnesian War, is not just a chronicle but was placed in book 1 with a purpose, to show how Athens set out from innocent beginnings to become so powerful as to be perceived by Sparta as a threat. There is no need to doubt that the beginnings were innocent. In 483/2 the Athenians had spent surplus revenue from their silver mines on shipbuilding, as a result of which they had been able to contribute 200 ships to the Greek navy which fought against the Persians in 480, more than half of the total. At the end of 479 nobody could be sure that the Persian War was at an end even in the short term, and in 478 fighting against the Persians continued under Spartan leadership. But in 478/7, after the Spartan regent Pausanias had made himself unpopular with the allies, Athens took over as the leader of the Greeks who still wanted to continue the fighting, appropriately because of its large navy and because it was regarded as the mother city of the Ionian Greeks, who occupied many of the islands of the Aegean and the central part of the Aegean coast of Asia Minor. This new organisation, with its headquarters originally on the island of Delos, is known to modern scholars as the Delian League (Thuc. 1.94–97.1).

Thucydides’ purpose is to outline the growth of Athenian power, and it is likely enough that before ca. 449 there was a good deal of campaigning against the Persians, which he does not report, with which the League members were entirely happy. The League appears in fact to have been a full and permanent offensive and defensive alliance (AP 23.5), but that is not incompatible with a declared anti-Persian aim. However, from the beginning, in the period when the Athenian commander was Cimon, Athens found ways of advancing its own interests through the activities of the League. Eion, on the north coast of the Aegean, was indeed a surviving Persian outpost in Europe, but after its capture Athenian settlers were sent there. The island of Scyros had nothing to do with the Persians, but it lay on the route from the Hellespont to Athens, and this time Thucydides does mention the Athenian
settlers.\textsuperscript{12} Carystus, at the southern end of Euboea, after being sacked by the Persians in 490, had supported them in 480 and had afterwards been punished by the Greeks:\textsuperscript{13} it too lay near to the route from the Hellespont to Athens, and it was attacked and forced to join the League (Thuc. 1.98.3). Naxos, for whatever reason, wanted to leave the League, but it was forced back and (metaphorically) enslaved (Thuc. 1.98.4). Thucydides then comments on Athens’s strict insistence on the allies’ obligations: an unending alliance was to mean unending service in campaigns under Athenian leadership (Thuc. 1.99). For the revolt of Thasos he does give a reason, a dispute over Thasos’s trading-posts and mines in its 
\textit{periaia}, the territory which it possessed on the mainland opposite: after a long siege Thasos was made to demolish its walls, surrender its ships, pay tribute in cash, and give up its possessions on the mainland.\textsuperscript{14} The seizure of opportunities to advance Athens’s interests and the use of force to crush opposition thus quickly became established.

In the late 460s Cimon disagreed with his opponents both on foreign and on domestic policy: he stood for good relations with Sparta, and took a force to help Sparta against the rebelling Messenians. His chief opponent, Ephialtes, had not wanted to help Sparta; and after the Spartans had sent Cimon and his soldiers away Athens broke off the alliance with Sparta which had been in force since 481 and instead made alliances with Argos and other enemies of Sparta in Greece.\textsuperscript{15} At first the supporters of Ephialtes extended the area within which Athens could be ambitious rather than the nature of Athens’s ambitions. Fighting against Persia led the Athenians to Cyprus, where Pausanias and Cimon had gone before, and an invitation received there led them on to fight against the Persians in Egypt and Phoenicia.\textsuperscript{16} They also became involved in the First Peloponnesian War, and started building up their power in mainland Greece (Thuc. 1.102.4, 103.3–4, 105–8, 111).

A further stage, about which we learn more from inscriptions and from later literary sources than from Thucydides, was reached in the years around 450. About 454 the Egyptian campaign ended in disaster, and the campaigning in Greece ran out of steam; in 451 Athens made a five-year truce with the Peloponnesians and Argos made a thirty-year peace with Sparta.\textsuperscript{17} Persia seems to have been willing to exploit this apparent weakness: it had tried unsuccessfully to incite Sparta against Athens during the Egyptian war (Thuc. 1.109.2–3); the League treasury may have been moved from Delos to Athens in 454 because a small island in the middle of the Aegean seemed unsafe;\textsuperscript{18} the first of the tribute lists (strictly, the lists of offerings to Athena of $\frac{1}{60}$ of the tribute, calculated separately on each member state’s payment) which began in 453 show
considerable variations from one year to the next, and point to unrest in the League; and it appears from Athens’s decree for Erythrae, probably of the late 450s, that rebels there had Persian support. Cimon, back in Athens after his period of ostracism, campaigned again to Cyprus and Egypt, but he died, and the Athenians, though victorious, withdrew (Thuc. 1.112.1–2). Whether the Athenians made a treaty with the Persians, the so-called Peace of Callias, continues to be disputed, but it is not disputed that after Cimon’s death regular campaigning against Persia came to an end.

What was to become of the League? The likelihood that no tribute was collected in 448, and Plutarch’s report of an invitation from Athens to all the Greeks to discuss what looks like the foundation of a new league, may be seen as signs that Athens considered the question seriously. The resumption of collection in 447, with the numbering of the lists resumed probably in 446 as if there had never been an interruption, and the abandonment of the congress proposal when Sparta declined the invitation, show that Athens’s final answer to the question was to keep the Delian League in being although it was not going to continue regular warfare against Persia. In 447–446 most of Athens’s mainland acquisitions succeeded in asserting their independence, but the Thirty Years’ Peace of 446/5 effectively recognised the division of the Greek world into a Spartan bloc based on the Greek mainland and an Athenian bloc based on the Aegean (Thuc. 1.113–115.1).

It is in the middle of the century that we start finding evidence for Athens’s setting up democracies in allied states; requiring offerings at the festival of the Panathenaea, perhaps at first only from allies which were Ionian in the strict sense of the term, but eventually from all the allies; transferring lawsuits from local courts to Athenian courts; sending garrisons and governors and other officials to allied states; and simply changing the language used in oaths and in Athenian decrees, so that “the allies” became “the cities,” or even “the cities which Athens controls,” and they were required to promise obedience to Athens. Above all, allies which had been disloyal were liable to have some of their land confiscated and given to colonies or “cleruchies” of Athenian settlers: this device will both have installed unofficial garrisons to keep an eye on allies of doubtful loyalty and have provided land for Athenians – particularly poorer Athenians – at the allies’ expense. There were opportunities for richer Athenians as well: normally only citizens of a city could own land in the city’s territory, but we happen to know that a man called Oeonias, one of those involved in the religious scandals of 415, owned land in Euboea which was sold in Athens along with
the rest of his confiscated property and which realised the enormous sum of $81\tfrac{1}{3}$ talents. From the middle of the century we can justifiably say with Finley that “Athenian imperialism employed all the forms of material exploitation that were available and possible in that society.”

After the reforms of Ephialtes in 462/1, Athens was self-consciously democratic, with a regime in which the poorer citizens were encouraged to play an active part. I have argued that, although particular provocations help to explain why the reforms were made when they were, the reformers did consciously want to transfer power from the council of the Areopagus (of which men who had served as archons became members for life) to bodies more representative of the Athenian people (the council of five hundred, the assembly, and the jury-courts); we perhaps see in Aeschylus’s Suppliant Women, probably of 464/3, the concept of demokratia at the time when it was coined; by the middle of the fifth century Athens was encouraging or requiring democratic regimes in allied states; and by the time of the Peloponnesian War Athens was perceived as a champion of democracy and Sparta of oligarchy.

Democracy was literally “people-power;” but the demos, the “people” among whom power was shared, was limited to free adult males of Athenian descent. Indeed, Pericles’ citizenship law of 451/0 defined the demos more strictly than before by requiring an Athenian mother as well as an Athenian father – probably not, as a fourth-century writer thought, to restrict the size of the citizen body, but to guarantee its quality and ensure that what were perceived as the growing benefits of belonging to the Athenian demos were enjoyed only by those who were genuinely Athenian. Large numbers of citizens were actively involved in running the democracy, through machinery which required a very high level of participation: decision-making, by an assembly of citizens guided but not dominated by the council of five hundred, whose membership changed each year; administration, by large numbers of officials and boards, again changing each year, supervised by the council; law-courts with amateur chairmen and juries of hundreds or thousands. The empire added to the business which the citizens had to transact: more decisions had to be taken by the assembly; there was more administration to be done and more officials and committees were needed; there were more lawsuits to be decided, especially when Athens took to having cases transferred from local courts to Athenian courts. Not every citizen was an activist – there were “quiet Athenians,” uninvolved in public affairs – but the system could not have worked unless a substantial proportion of the citizens were willing to play an active part at least...
in some years of their life. Pericles in his funeral oration is represented as saying that Athens alone regards the uninvolved not as leisured but as useless (Thuc. 2.40.2).

This high degree of involvement for the citizens was possible only because of the many non-citizens who were not and could not be involved. While a citizen was attending the assembly or sitting on a jury or doing the work of some office or simply talking to other citizens in the Agora, ordinary economic life had to continue, in the house and in the field, in making and transporting and selling and buying goods. Much of a citizen family’s economic work would be done by the citizen’s wife and children, and if he could afford any by his slave or slaves; much of the making and transporting and selling of goods was in the hands of metics, free men and women who were not of Athenian descent, and who unless granted it as a special privilege were not allowed to own land and houses in Attica and therefore needed non-agricultural forms of livelihood. It was still easier to devote much of one’s time to public life if one was rich rather than poor. As the modern world has found, unless one adopts a communist regime (in which case there is a danger that open financial advantage will disappear only to be replaced by other kinds of advantage), the advantages of wealth cannot be abolished, but they can be moderated: Athens, in order to moderate them and make it easier for poorer citizens to play an active part, introduced modest payments for performing the various civilian duties of a citizen, beginning with service on juries, probably in the 450s, and culminating with attendance at the assembly, in the 390s.36

The empire generated more business and more officials for the democracy, but it also helped to pay for the democracy. By the 440s, nearly all the members of the Delian League were paying tribute in cash rather than contributing ships to the League’s forces. As we have seen, the League’s treasury, originally kept on the island of Delos, was apparently in 454 moved to Athens. This treasury was kept separate from Athens’s other treasuries until ca. 411, when it and the main treasury of the state were amalgamated,37 but at any rate between ca. 449, when regular campaigning against Persia came to an end, and 431, when the Peloponnesian War began, the income from tribute must greatly have exceeded the sums spent for League purposes. In any case, from 453 onwards, 1/60 of the tribute was given as an offering to the (Athenian) treasury of the goddess Athena; and, whatever may have been done with the surplus tribute,38 the fact that Athenian military and naval expenditure was a legitimate charge on the tribute meant that Athens could afford out of its own funds expenditure for other purposes (including
Rowing the Athenian navy’s ships was primarily the responsibility of the poorer citizens, the *thetes*, those too poor to be able to equip themselves to fight in the army as hoplites. Athens’s leadership of the Delian League meant that it would continue to have a use for a large navy and a large number of oarsmen, as a result of which the poorer citizens would be more important to the city’s military success in Athens than in most cities. Cimon opposed the democratic reforms in 462/1 and was ostracised (Plut. Cim. 15; Per. 9.5): the hoplites stood to gain as much as the *thetes* from the transfer of powers from the Areopagus to more representative bodies, and the reforms should not be seen in any crude sense as a triumph for the *thetes*. Nor is there any occasion when the assembly is known to have divided on class lines, with the hoplites voting one way and the *thetes* the other, though the absence from Athens in 411 of many of the *thetes* (who were serving in the fleet, based at Samos) made it easier for the oligarchs to get acceptance by the Athenian assembly for their revolution, by which ostensibly the hoplites would remain full citizens but the *thetes* would not.39

It would be wrong to claim too simple a link between social class, the dominant mode of fighting, and the distribution of political power; and H. van Wees has argued recently that Athens’s naval power encouraged the development of democracy only by increasing the confidence of lower-class citizens who were in any case ambitious for more power.40 However, it is still true that the League enabled the navy and the *thetes* to enjoy more importance in Athens than they did in other cities, and that this will have had some effect on the ethos of the city and the way in which the city confronted its enemies and fought its wars: “It is right that there [i.e., at Athens] the poor and the *demos* have more than the noble and the rich, for this reason, that it is the *demos* that rows the ships and surrounds the city with strength . . . far more than the hoplites and the noble and the good.”41

But how far did the democracy in turn affect the way in which Athens treated the League? There is no sign that anybody in Athens disapproved of the empire or of the way in which Athens treated the allies. In the 440s and 430s Athens was spending large sums on buildings on the Acropolis and elsewhere,42 which were paid for certainly indirectly and probably to a considerable extent directly out of surplus tribute from the League. The criticism attributed to the democracy’s aristocratic opponent Thucydides son of Melesias is only that it was wrong to spend...
on beautifying Athens' tribute collected for war against the Persians (Plut. Per. 12–14). The criticism made by Bdelycleon in Aristophanes’ Wasps is that the money collected from the allies enriches politicians like Cleon rather than ordinary citizens (Ar. Wasps 655–712). The oligarchs in 411 wanted not to abandon the empire but to substitute oligarchic regimes for democratic in the allied states as well as in Athens, though Thucydides both states himself and attributes to Phrynichus the view that what the allies wanted was freedom rather than any particular kind of constitution imposed on them by Athens. Until the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the level of tribute was kept generally constant; there were then sharp increases, in 428 (probably) and in 425, imposed specifically in order to help pay for the war rather than in order to enrich Athens at the allies’ expense. The speech Against Alcibiades which purports to have been written in connection with Athens’s last ostracism, in 415, makes it a point of complaint against Alcibiades that he and his fellow tribute-assessors had presumed to double the original amount levied; but this passage would be unique in fifth-century Athenian texts in suggesting that there was anything wrong in the extraction of tribute from the allies, and its inclusion is one reason among several for thinking that this is not an authentic speech of 415 but a later composition.

Speculation about how things might have differed in other respects if they had differed in one respect is artificial and not very profitable, but I will indulge in it for one paragraph. We have seen the first signs of imperialism visible already under the leadership of Cimon and before the reforms of Ephialtes; it is possible to imagine a scenario in which Cimon was still dominant in the 450s, democratic reforms were delayed, and while Cimon remained dominant campaigning in and beyond the Aegean continued but conflict with the Peloponnesians was avoided. Increasing interference with and control of the allied states might yet have taken place. It is hard to believe that an empire which depended on Athens’s navy, and which increased the volume of business to be transacted and the number of officials to be appointed by a state in which, after the reforms of Cleisthenes in 508/7, citizen involvement was already becoming important, would not have moved in the direction of democracy eventually even if it had not done so in 462/1. And, when we see how the Thirty Years’ Peace of 446/5 proved unsustainable, even though after it Athens was not powerful in mainland Greece, it is also hard to believe that, even if the pro–Spartan policies of Cimon had continued for a time, the power of Athens would not in the end have led to conflict between Athens and Sparta. While the course
which history actually took was not inevitable, it is the course which history actually took, and maritime empire and democracy were natural partners.

Since this book is a *Companion to the Age of Pericles*, it is appropriate to ask how far the Athenian combination of democracy and empire is to be attributed to Pericles himself. Despite the claim made by Thucydides, what we find in Periclean Athens cannot have been “in theory democracy but in fact rule by the first man” (Thuc. 2.65.9) – because that is not how Athens worked.\(^4\) Pericles was frequently elected general, according to Plutarch for each of the last fifteen years of his life (Plut. *Per* 16.3), and in the heyday of the Delian League the generals were the political as well as the military leaders of Athens. Nevertheless, as general Pericles was one of a board of ten men, who were constitutionally equal, and he and his colleagues had little formal power inside Athens. To be general he had to be elected, year after year (and in 430 he was deposed, but subsequently re-elected\(^17\)). To direct Athenian policy he had to ensure that the assembly voted as he wanted, again and again, on proposal after proposal; and in a society without disciplined political parties nobody, however influential, could be certain of achieving that on every occasion. It does, however, seem likely that from the 450s to the 430s Pericles was sufficiently influential to ensure that the assembly did vote as he wanted, not on every occasion but more often than not. The assembly could easily take a decision which impeded or conflicted with another decision taken earlier, at a previous meeting or even at the same meeting; but in so far as Athens pursued a consistent policy during this period we can reasonably assume that Pericles approved of that policy and was working for it.\(^4\)

We have seen above that the development of the empire began under Cimon’s leadership, while after Cimon’s ostracism his opponents pursued more ambitious policies; and that Cimon’s opponents were responsible for the development of a self-conscious democracy. If we look for items explicitly attributed to Pericles, we find, in internal affairs, that he was a prosecutor of Cimon (allegedly not as zealous as he might have been),\(^4\) and was associated with Ephialtes in the reform of the Areopagus;\(^5\) he was responsible, perhaps in the 450s, for the introduction of jury pay,\(^5\) and in 451/0 for requiring two Athenian parents as a qualification for citizenship (*AP* 26.4, Plut. *Per*. 37.3). He is said to have fought in the Athenian forces at Tanagra ca. 457 (Plut. *Per*. 10.2); he was in command of an expedition to Sicyon and Acarnania ca. 454 (Thuc. 1.111.2–3), in the Sacred War for Delphi in the early 440s,\(^5\) in Euboea and the Megarid in 446 (Thuc. 1.114, Plut. *Per*. 22–3), and in
the Samian war of 440–439 (Thuc. 1.115.2–117, Plut. Per. 25–28). He is credited also with colonising expeditions, to the Chersonese, perhaps in the 440s, and to the Black Sea, perhaps in the 430s (Plut. Per. 19.1, 20.1–2). He was the author of the invitation to the Greeks to a congress to discuss what may have been a plan of the early 440s to convert the Delian League into a league of all the Greeks (Plut. Per. 17). He is associated also with public works: in particular, with the works on the Acropolis in the 440s–430s, and with defending the expenditure of surplus tribute from the Delian League on these works; also with the Odeum, said to be an imitation of a Persian building (Plut. Per. 13.9–11), and the Middle Wall, running close to the more northerly of the Long Walls between Athens and the Piraeus which had been built in the 450s. Although it now seems to be established that Athens’s inscription concerning an alliance with Egesta, despite its older form of sigma, is to be dated 418/7, this does not automatically invalidate the earlier dates proposed for all disputed inscriptions, and some signs of imperial behaviour are still probably to be found in the middle of the century. In the 430s Pericles is credited with the decision to make a defensive alliance with Corcyra (when the Athenians could, if they were anxious to avoid trouble, have refused to involve themselves in the dispute between Corcyra and Corinth); and with the first, “reasonable and humane,” decree against the Megarians, and with the insistence that the decree imposing sanctions on them should not be repealed. Although by no means everything that Athens did in this period was done on Pericles’ formal proposal or under his leadership, he is associated with enough, over a sufficient range, to justify the view that the policies which Athens was pursuing were Pericles’ policies.

In 427 Cleon tried to prevent the revision of the decision taken by Athens on his proposal to execute all the men of Mytilene and enslave all the women and children. He is represented by Thucydides as stating that democracy is incapable of ruling an empire, because the citizens’ trust of one another is carried over into trust of the allies, and they are not willing to take and to keep to the firm decisions that are needed (Thuc. 3.37). In fact, by Greek criteria there was nothing paradoxical about a democracy’s ruling an empire. The foundation of democracy was not human rights but citizens’ rights, and, just as a democracy felt no obligation to grant equal rights within the state to metics and slaves, it felt no obligation to treat as equals the allies which it gained in the wider Greek world. It would favour democratic regimes among the allies, both because it believed in the principles of democracy (interpreted as above) and because it found other democracies easier to deal with,
but its primary commitment was to its own demos and the interests of its own demos.

Independence for one’s local community was a persistent desire in Greece: for the strong and ambitious, independence for themselves could be combined with the absorption or subjection of lesser, neighbouring communities; for the weak and unambitious the best that could be hoped for was often a measure of local freedom and independence combined with a measure of subordination to a more powerful neighbour. The Greek word autonomia (from which the English “autonomy” is derived) may have been coined in connection with that lesser hope, and in particular with the hopes of the members of the Delian League. Thucydides states that the members of the League were “autonomous at first” (Thuc. 1.97.1), probably not because there was any foundation document which stipulated that they should be, but because it never occurred to anybody at the time that states which voluntarily joined an alliance might not be autonomous. Every state which enters into an alliance loses something of the total freedom to make all decisions without reference to anybody else, but no previous alliance in Greece had gone beyond committing its participants to joint action in the area with which the alliance was concerned. But Thucydides can use the term “enslaved” of Athens’s suppression of a revolt from the League; and when he is dealing with the League in its later state the concept of “subjects” (hypekooi) appears both in his own narrative and in the speeches of Athenians and others.

According to Thucydides, Sparta’s last demand to Athens before the Peloponnesian War was that Sparta wanted peace, and there could be peace if Athens would leave the Greeks autonomous. He tells us later that at the beginning of the war people’s sympathies were in general with the Spartans, particularly because they proclaimed that they were going to liberate Greece (Thuc. 2.8.4). Pericles’ response to the Spartan demand was, “We shall leave the cities autonomous if they were autonomous when we made the treaty [sc. the Thirty Years’ Peace]” (Thuc. 1.144.2). Athens may have regarded none of the League members as autonomous, though there were a few with which it had interfered comparatively little: in 428 the Mytilenaees apply the word only to themselves and the Chians (Thuc. 3.10.5–11.3). In the Peace of Nicias, in 421, it was stated that six north-eastern cities returned to Athens were to be autonomous, free from attack by Athens and remaining neutral if they wished, as long as they paid tribute at the original rate (attributed to Aristides in 478/7): their status is contrasted with that of other cities, about which the Athenians could decide as they saw fit (Thuc. 5.18.5, 8).
At the end of the war, after Athens had capitulated and accepted Sparta’s terms, “Lysander sailed into the Piraeus and the exiles returned and they began to demolish the walls to the music of pipe-girls, with great enthusiasm, thinking that that day was the beginning of freedom for Greece.” Thus by the late fifth century the League was perceived as an organisation through which Athens infringed the freedom of the other Greek states.

Athens was a major state for which freedom meant not only freedom from receiving orders from superiors but also freedom to give orders to inferiors; and through the Delian League Athens succeeded in obtaining that kind of freedom for itself, on a scale and to an extent unparalleled in Greece. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War Pericles is represented as telling the Athenians that what was at issue for them was not just slavery or freedom but loss of the empire and danger from those whose hatred they had incurred through the empire: it was not possible to give the empire up; it was like a tyranny, and, although it may have been wrong to acquire it, it would be dangerous to let it go (Thuc. 2.63.1–2). The image of Athens the tyrant city is found also in speeches of the Corinthians and of Cleon and Euphemus – and in Aristophanes’ *Knights*. Councils of the allies probably ceased meeting when the treasury was moved to Athens. The formal independence of the member states as separate *poleis* with their own separate political institutions was preserved: they were not treated as demes of a greater Athens as, later, cities around the Mediterranean were to be treated as *municipia* (municipalities with their own local government but with no pretence of greater power or independence) of a greater Rome, and to that extent their pride was safeguarded. However, by prescribing a form of constitution, transferring major lawsuits from local courts to Athenian courts, and forbidding cities to issue their own silver coins and to use their own weights and measures, Athens had imposed forms of submission to which states which aspired to be independent had not previously been subjected.

Economically, there were probably advantages for all in belonging to the Athenian power bloc which dominated the Aegean, rather than standing outside it and in opposition to it, but the advantages depended on the retention of Athens’s favour. Athens had learned that control of the sea meant not only that it could import whatever it wanted to import from wherever it wanted (Thuc. 2.38.2, [Xen.] *AP* 2.6–7), but also that it could help its friends to import what they wanted and hinder its enemies. The cost of paying the tribute would fall mostly on the richer citizens of the allied states, and the rich would suffer more than...
the poor, quantitatively though perhaps not proportionally, when part of a city’s land was acquired individually or through a cleruchy by Athenians. On the other hand, while having a few ships of its own would bring a city a sense of security as well as pride, it might cost less in terms both of cash and of demands on manpower to pay tribute than to maintain those ships and send them to serve in the League’s navy. Moreover, not all the opportunities for employment provided by the League benefited Athenian citizens only: to an unquantifiable extent the allies provided oarsmen for the Athenians’ ships, and metics and slaves worked alongside citizens on the various building projects.

We need to ask, as de Ste. Croix did, whether Thucydides was right to suggest that the citizens of the states which Athens treated in this way all hated it. His attempt to distinguish between an “editorial” Thucydides, revealing his own opinions in the speeches and a few direct comments, and a narrative of events which proves the editorial opinions to be mistaken, was too simple. Whatever degree of authenticity we think Thucydides aimed for, and achieved, in his speeches, the extent to which he allowed speakers to contradict one another makes it clear that we can never interpret a speech simply as a vehicle for his own opinions. Notoriously, in the debate on Mytilene, Cleon says, “Do not pin the blame on the oligarchs and acquit the people, for all alike attacked us,” while Diodotus replies, “At present the people in all the cities are well disposed to you, and either refuse to join the oligarchs in rebellion or, if compelled to join them, promptly become enemies of the rebels” (Thuc. 3.39.6, 47.2). And Thucydides’ narrative of events is not straightforward. Mytilene when it rebelled against Athens was oligarchically governed; after it had been besieged during the winter, and there was no sign of the promised further help from Sparta, the Spartan commander Salaethus armed the ordinary citizens for a final attack on the Athenians, but they refused to obey orders, accused the leading men of hoarding food, and demanded a fair distribution (Thuc. 3.27). De Ste. Croix focused on their refusal to obey orders and argued that they were pro-Athenian; D. W. Bradeen focused on their demand for food and argued that they had reached the limit of their endurance.

From Naxos in the League’s early years to various states in the last phase of the Peloponnesian War, including states on the Asiatic mainland, which seem not to have been greatly deterred by Sparta’s intention of returning them to Persian control, we can construct a substantial list of revolts, but there were also of course many occasions when a state did not revolt even though it might have done so with a reasonable chance of success. It must be remembered that both Athens and Sparta...
were much larger and more powerful than most Greek cities, so that if a force from one arrived outside a city, threatening to take hostile action if it did not receive cooperation, it might seem prudent to that city to cooperate with the attacker for the time being, and to express penitence and plead that they had succumbed to irresistible force if the other great power sent a retaliatory expedition later, whatever its true sympathies.  

One distinction needs to be emphasised. We may assume that most poorer men are likely to have preferred democratic regimes, under which they had political rights, to oligarchic, under which they did not, while some though not all of the richer men will have preferred oligarchic regimes, under which they did not have to share political rights with the poor. Desire for a congenial regime will have had to be balanced against the desire for a city to be free to make its own choice, which Thucydides and Phrynichus believed to be a stronger motivating factor. But we have evidence from many places at many times in Greek history that, whatever the attitude of ordinary citizens may have been, leading politicians frequently preferred being on the winning side in their city thanks to outside intervention, despite the loss of autonomy which that involved, to being on the losing side in a city which was free from outside intervention and retained its autonomy. In the second half of the fifth century this tended to result in leading democrats’ looking to Athens for support and leading oligarchs’ looking to Sparta. Men who did have strong reason to be pro-Athenian were those democratic leaders who were in a powerful position in their cities because Athens had imposed or encouraged a democratic constitution, and who might lose their powerful position if Athenian support was withdrawn. Even in oligarchic Mytilene in 428 the men who acted as Athenian proxenoi (local representatives of Athens) warned Athens of the city’s impending revolt (Thuc. 3.2.3). One consequence of Athens’s transferring major lawsuits from local courts to Athenian courts was that it helped Athens to support these pro-Athenian politicians: Athenian courts were likely to give a favourable hearing to pro-Athenian democrats. 

The Athenian democracy was first overthrown in 411, after the great Sicilian expedition of 415–413 had ended in disaster and the Persians had begun to support Sparta, and it could no longer be claimed that the democracy was making a success of the war. It was overthrown again in 404, when the democracy had lost the war, the empire had been taken away from Athens, and indeed Athens had been limited to a navy of twelve ships. The democracy was restored again in 403 and then survived unchallenged until it was overthrown by the Macedonians.
in 321, though it appears that there was now a change of atmosphere if not a fundamental change in the principles of the democracy.\textsuperscript{82} There was still payment for civilian service in the fourth century,\textsuperscript{83} though without the empire it must have been harder to pay for the democracy. Moreover, the prediction which Thucydides puts into the mouths of Athenian envoys to Sparta in 432, that if Sparta were to take over the empire it would quickly become more unpopular than Athens (Thuc. 1.76.1, 77.6), was to be fulfilled: after the Peloponnesian War Sparta took to interfering in the internal affairs of the Greek cities to such an extent that in 378 Athens founded a new league (cf. below) whose declared purpose was “So that the Spartans shall allow the Greeks to be free and autonomous, and to live at peace occupying their own territory in security.”\textsuperscript{84}

Athens soon recovered its ambitions. In 395 it joined with some of Sparta’s allies in the Corinthian War against Sparta; ca. 390 the Athenian Thrasybulus embarked on what looks like an attempt to recreate the fifth-century Empire, but the impetus was lost when he was killed. In 386 Sparta imposed on the Greek world the (Persian) King’s Peace (Peace of Antalcidas), by which the Greeks of Asia Minor were handed over to Persia, and in return Persia gave its backing to the provision that otherwise, with very few exceptions, “all cities and islands” were to be autonomous\textsuperscript{85} – which Sparta proceeded to interpret to suit its own interests. In 378 Athens founded a new alliance to resist Spartan imperialism, the Second Athenian League. A prospectus for the League promises that the League will be a defensive alliance based on freedom and autonomy, and that Athens will not do various things which it had done in the Delian League: prescribe constitutions, install garrisons and governors, collect tribute, allow Athenian citizens to acquire land in allies’ territory.\textsuperscript{86} Athens’s promises, and dissatisfaction with Sparta’s conduct, made the League popular at first; but the League’s original purpose was made irrelevant by Thebes’ defeat of Sparta at Leuctra in 371 and liberation of Messenia from Sparta in 370/69. Athens then turned to Sparta in alliance against an increasingly powerful Thebes, and the League found no purpose other than the furtherance of Athenian interests. Sooner or later the original promises were broken: even in the 370s, after promising that there would be no collection of “tribute” (\textit{phoros}), Athens found it necessary to start collecting “contributions” (\textit{syntaxeis});\textsuperscript{87} from the 360s land was made available to individual Athenians through the establishment of cleruchies, particularly in Samos;\textsuperscript{88} we know some instances, though admittedly not many, of the sending of governors and garrisons to allied states and of interference in their
internal affairs. However, the little evidence that we have suggests that there was no parading of power in this League as in the Delian League, and in particular that the “contributions” were not large and were not under the sole control of Athens; Athens was perpetually short of money until Eubulus, in the late 350s, argued for a change to a less ambitious foreign policy.

The Second League was never a source of power and profit for Athens as the Delian League had been. In the time of Philip of Macedon the Athenian Demosthenes tended to identify democracy with freedom from control by Philip, but in 338 Philip defeated a combination of Athens and Thebes at Chaeronea, and after that the Second League came to an end when he united all the mainland Greeks except Sparta in a new league, the League of Corinth, under his own leadership. Athens was now not the leader of an alliance but a subordinate member.

Suggestions for Further Reading


Notes


3 Succinctly expressed by the Athenians in the Melian Dialogue: “The strong do what they can and the weak put up with it” (Thuc. 5.89).


8 It is enclosed by reiterations, in 1.88 and 118.2, of the “truest reason” given in 23.6 for the war, Athenian power and Spartan fear of it.


10 483/2: Hdt. 7.144, Thuc. 1.14–3, AP 22.7. 480: Hdt. 8.1–2, 14, 43–8 (nearly two thirds of 400, Thuc. 1.74.1).

11 Thuc. 1.98.1 (476/5?); Athenian settlers: Plut. Cim. 7–8.2 (not mentioned by Thucydides).

12 Thuc. 1.98.2 (476/5?).

13 490: Hdt. 6.99.2; 480: 8.66.2; Greek retaliation: 8.112.2, 121.1.

14 Thuc. 1.100–101 (465/4–463/2).


16 Thuc. 1.104, 109–10; ML 33 = IG i 1147, trans. Fornara 78 (the only source for Phoenicia). Pausias: Thuc. 1.94.2; Cimon at the River EURymedon, in Asia Minor opposite Cyprus, 1.100.1.

17 Athens and Peloponnesians: Thuc. 1.112.1; Argos and Sparta: Thuc. 5.14.4, 22.2.


19 ML 40 = IG i 14, trans. Fornara 71. 26–9.


22 E.g., Erythrae, probably late 450s (ML 40 = IG i 14, trans. Fornara 71); Samos, 440 (Thuc. 1.115.3); Miletus, not later than 434/3 (inscription published by P. Herrmann, “Zu den Beziehungen zwischen Athen und Milet im 5. Jahrhundert,”
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Ionian Erythrae: ML 40 = IG i\(^3\) 14, trans. Fornara 71.24; generally ML 46 = IG i\(^3\) 34, trans. Fornara 98. 41–3.

[Cfen.] AP 1.16–18, Antiph. 5, Murder of Herodes 47, Chamaeleon fr. 44 Wehrli ap. Ath. 9.407 b; cf. ML 40 = IG i\(^3\) 14, trans. Fornara 71.31; ML 46 = IG i\(^3\) 34, trans. Fornara 98.31–43; also Thuc. 1.77.1–4, where the Athenians make a virtue of resorting to lawsuits rather than simply exercising their power.

E.g., Erythrae: ML 40 = IG i\(^3\) 14, trans. Fornara 71.13–15.

“The allies”: ML 40 = IG i\(^3\) 14, trans. Fornara 71.24 etc.; “the cities”: ML 46 = IG i\(^3\) 34, trans. Fornara 98.67 etc.; “the cities which Athens controls”: IG i\(^3\) 19.8–9 and 27.14–15 (verb restored in both cases); obedience: ML 52 = IG i\(^3\) 40, trans. Fornara 103.21–32, cf. similar language in ML 47 = IG i\(^3\) 37, trans. Fornara 99.43–51.

Plut. Per. 11.5–6, cf. Diod. Sic. 11.88.3, Paus. 1.27.5. Poorer Athenians: ML 49 = IG i\(^3\) 46, trans. Fornara 100.43–6.

IG i\(^3\) 422.375–8, cf. Andoc. 1. Myst. 13: that was not the whole of his property, and other offenders had property overseas which was sold at the same time. For these scandals see especially Thuc. 6.27–9, 53, 60–1; Andoc. 1. Myst. 11–70.


Cf. p. 27 with n. 22.

E.g., Thuc. 3.82.1, [Cfen.] AP 1.14, 16, 3.10–11.


AP 24.3 has 700 domestic and 700 overseas officials, but the second 700 is probably the result of a textual corruption (for a defence of the first 700 see M. H. Hansen, “Seven Hundred Archai in Classical Athens,” GRBS 21 [1980]: 151–73).


AP 27.1–5 (juries), 41.3 (assembly); 62.2 (third quarter of fourth century). Many of the fifth-century payments to officials are not attested in the fourth, and it is disputed whether they continued to be made: see M. H. Hansen, “Misthos for Magistrates in Classical Athens,” SO 54 (1979): 5–22; V. Gabrielsen, Remuneration of State Officials in Fourth Century b.C. Athens, Odense University Classical Studies xi (Odense: Odense University Press, 1981).

AP 30.2 with Rhodes (n. 33), ad loc.


The crucial assembly was held not inside the city walls but a short distance outside, at Colonus (Thuc. 8.67.2): with the countryside exposed to the Spartan forces based at Decelea, in the north of Attica, the poorer of the citizens still in Athens, who could not afford armour, will probably have been disproportionately deterred from attending.


42 For once the buildings can be dated, from the accounts published by the boards of overseers of the different projects: the Parthenon, beginning 447/6, IG i 3 436–51; the gold and ivory statue of Athena, which the Parthenon housed, IG i 3 453–60; the Propylaea, IG i 3 462–6. Probably in 434/3, the winding-up of the Acropolis building programme was ordered in the decrees of Callias, ML 58 = IG i 3 52, trans. Fornara 119.

43 Thuc. 8.64, cf. (Phrynichus) 48.5–7.


45 [Andoc.] 4. Alc. 11–12: see Rhodes, “The Ostracism of Hyperbolus,” in Ritual, Finance, Politics: Athenian Democratic Accounts Presented to David Lewis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 85–98 at 88–91 (415 is certainly the date for the ostracism implied by the speech, and although I do not think the speech was written then I am prepared to believe that the ostracism was held then).


47 Diod. Sic. 12.45.4, Plut. Per. 35.4–5; cf. Thuc. 2.59, 2.65.2–4.

48 However, for caution against assuming that policies can be attributed to Pericles without supporting evidence see A. W. Gomme, HCT 1.306–7; de Ste. Croix (n. 5), pp. 78–9.


50 Arist. Pol. 2.1274 a 7–8, Plut. Cim. 15.2, Per. 9.3–5.

51 Arist. Pol. 2.1274 a 8–9, AP 27.3–4, Plut. Per. 9.2.

52 Plut. Per. 21 (commander not named by Thuc. 1.112.5).

53 Plut. Per. 12–14; cf. possibly the Anonymus Argentinensis (P. Strasbourg 84, verso), of which Fornara 94 translates no fewer than three reconstructions.

54 Plat. Gorg. 455 e, Plut. Per. 13.7. The original Long Walls are mentioned by Thuc. 1.107.1, without attribution to any individual.

55 The old view of the change in letter forms goes back to nineteenth-century German scholars. A major challenge to that view has been advanced over many years by H. B. Mattingly, many of whose articles on this subject are collected in his The Athenian Empire Restored (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).

56 Plut. Per. 29.1–3 (neither Pericles nor anybody else is named by Thuc. 1.44).
57 Plut. Per. 29.4–31.1; cf. on the sanctions decree Thuc. 1.140.3–5. On the chronology of the items mentioned by Plutarch I agree with de Ste. Croix (n. 5), pp. 246–51.
58 For this kind of affinity cf. Thuc. 5.29.1, 31.6.
60 Thuc. 1.19 states that “the Spartans led their allies without making them liable for tribute, but merely took care by means of oligarchy that they should conduct their politics in a manner advantageous to themselves;” but there is no evidence that before the fourth century Sparta intervened in its allies’ internal affairs as Athens did.
62 E.g., Thuc. 1.35.3, 77.2, 5, 117.3.
63 Thuc. 1.139. 3, cf. 140.3.
64 Xen. Hell. 2.2.23, cf. Plut. Lys. 15.5.
65 Cf. Pericles in Thuc. 2.63.1 (summarised below), Diodotus in 3.45.6, Alcibiades in 6.18.3.
66 Thuc. 1.122.3, 124.3; 3.37.2; 6.85.1; Ar. Knights 1111–20, cf. 1330, 1333.
67 Thuc. 1.97.1, 3.10.5, 11.4, is not enough to prove that, but there is no positive evidence for meetings later, and the Athenians certainly took decisions which ought to have been taken by the council of the allies if the council did still exist.
69 [Xen.] Ap. 2.3, 11–12; cf. (helping friends) ML 65 = IG i³ 61, trans. Fornara 128.34–41; IG i³ 62.1–5; (hindering enemies) Thuc. 1.120.2, cf. 3.86.4, Ar. Ach. 719–958. Despite de Ste. Croix (n. 5), pp. 251–89, Athens’s notorious decree
against the Megarians (Thuc. 1.67.4, 139.1–2, 144.2, cf. Ar. Ach. 515–39, 719–835) should be seen as the imposition of economic sanctions.

Cf. p. 27.

Cf. Thuc. 1.99.3.

Cf. p. 27.

Cf. p. 27.

Oarsmen, e.g., Thuc. 1.121.3, 143.1, 7.63.3; contrast special fleets manned by citizens and metics, 3.16.1, or by citizen hoplites, 3.18.3–4. For building projects see in particular the Erechtheum records, IG i² 474–9, with R. H. Randall, Jr., “The Erechtheum Workmen,” AJA 57 (1953): 199–210.


However, in 411 Persian garrisons were expelled by Miletus (the Milesians had been told that they must put up with servitude for the time being by Lichas, who not much earlier had himself objected to the prospect of Sparta’s imposing Persian rule rather than freedom on the Greeks), and by Antandrus and Cnidus: Thuc. 8.84.4–5, 108.4–109.1; Lichas earlier, 43.3, 52.

See especially J. de Romilly, “Thucydidès and the Cities of the Athenian Empire,” BICS 13 (1966): 1–12; also H. D. Westlake, “Ionians in the Ionian War,” CQ n.s. 29 (1979): 9–44, republished in his Studies in Thucydidès and Greek History (Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1989), pp. 113–53. The Spartan Brasidas in his speeches at Acanthus and elsewhere, described by Thucydidès as “attractive but untrue,” is represented as offering genuine freedom rather than a change of regime accompanied by a change of master, but also as threatening to take hostile action if his offer is not accepted: Thuc. 4.85–87.1 + 87.2–6; threat acted on, 109.5; Thucydidès’ comments, 108.5, cf. 88.1.

Cf. p. 31 with n. 43.

In general: Thuc. 3.82.1, cf. Plat. Rep. 8.556 e; a particular instance, Megara in 424: Thuc. 4.66.1–3, 71, 74.2–4.

Cf. [Xen.] AP 1.16, 3.10–11.


Cf. p. 29 with n. 36.

IG ii² 43 = Tod 123, trans. Harding 35.9–12.


IG ii² 43 = Tod 123, trans. Harding 35.9–51.


No cleruchies were established in the territory of states which joined the League in time to be included in the list of members on IG ii² 43 = Tod 123, trans. Harding 35, a list to which no additions were made, for whatever reason, after (probably) 375.
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The more benign view of the League presented by J. L. Cargill, *The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free Alliance?* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), depends on the assumption that only states included in that list were members of the League.


90 My thanks to the editor both for his invitation to contribute to this volume and for his helpful comments on my first draft.