
REVIEW ESSAYS

HISTORIOGRAPHY AND HISTORICAL STUDIES IN URUGUAY

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- EL URUGUAY DEL NOVECIENTOS.* By JOSÉ P. BARRAN AND BENJAMÍN NAHUM. (Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 1979. Pp. 286.)
Volume 1 of *Batlle, los estancieros y el Imperio Británico.*
- UN DIÁLOGO DIFÍCIL, 1903–1910.* By JOSÉ P. BARRAN AND BENJAMÍN NAHUM. (Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 1981. Pp. 503.)
Volume 2 of *Batlle, los estancieros y el Imperio Británico.*
- HISTORIA ECONÓMICA DEL URUGUAY CONTEMPORÁNEO.* By HENRY FINCH. (Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 1980. Pp. 280.)
English version: *A Political Economy of Uruguay since 1870.* By M. H. J. Finch. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. Pp. 339. \$29.95.)
- EL URUGUAY EN LA CRISIS DE 1929. ALGUNOS INDICADORES ECONÓMICOS.* By RAÚL JACOB. (Montevideo: Fundación de Cultura Universitaria, 1977. Pp. 92.)
- EL FRIGORÍFICO NACIONAL EN EL MERCADO DE CARNES. LA CRISIS DE 1929 EN EL URUGUAY.* By RAÚL JACOB. (Montevideo: Fundación de Cultura Universitaria, 1979. Pp. 162.)
- INVERSIONES EXTRANJERAS Y PETROLEO.* By RAÚL JACOB. (Montevideo: Fundación de Cultura Universitaria, 1979. Pp. 186.)
- EL EQUILIBRIO DIFÍCIL. LA POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL DEL BATLLISMO.*
By DANTE TURCATTI. (Montevideo: Arca-Claeh, 1981. Pp. 126.)
- JOSÉ BATLLE Y ORDOÑEZ OF URUGUAY. THE CREATOR OF HIS TIMES, 1902–1907.* By MILTON I. VANGER. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer-

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sity Press, 1963. Pp. 320.) Reprinted, with a new introduction, by University Microfilms International (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1980). Spanish edition by Eudeba (Buenos Aires, 1968).

THE MODEL COUNTRY. JOSÉ BATLLE Y ORDOÑEZ OF URUGUAY, 1907–1915.

By MILTON I. VANGER. (Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 1980. Pp. 436. \$25.00.)

LAS DISIDENCIAS DEL TRADICIONALISMO. EL RADICALISMO BLANCO. By CARLOS ZUBILLAGA. (Montevideo: Arca-Claeh, 1979. Pp. 170.)

DEUDA EXTERNA Y DESARROLLO EN EL URUGUAY BATLLISTA (1903–1915).

By CARLOS ZUBILLAGA. (Montevideo: Centro Latinoamericano de Economía Humana, Claeh, 1979. Pp. 216.)

Historical research in Uruguay before the 1970s was centered in public institutions—the University of Montevideo (the only university in the country), the National History Museum, and the secondary schools. The latter never had a formal research program because of severe budgetary restrictions. Secondary education teachers did have the option of a one-year sabbatical leave every seven years to carry out research; however, the incentive this provided depended more on personal motivation than on the pursuit of a specific research project. Within the university, the Department of Humanities and Sciences (created in 1945) provided for the training of a small number of scholars through its Institute of Historical Research. Despite limited funds, they produced a sizeable number of publications. The Institute of Architectural History, a division of the Department of Architecture, also carried out a vast research effort related to the topics in which it specialized—architectural styles, housing, urbanism. From the 1940s onward, the National History Museum, spurred by its director, Juan E. Pivel Devoto, engaged in many research efforts, the results of which have been published in the *Revista Histórica*.

Researchers also found themselves obliged (and still are) to engage in a second activity, usually teaching. The only place able to absorb full-time researchers was the humanities department, which had less than a dozen positions. Museums and archives were not a significant source of employment because, in addition to few available positions, there were requirements of a nontechnical nature (public administration was highly politicized and ran on patronage).

Many researchers also came from the former Instituto Artigas (Teachers College), a university-level organization that was not dependent on the university but on the state organ responsible for secondary education. It provided better access to the job market (as a secondary school teacher), which made it the more popular choice among students, despite its required entrance examination and the limited number of openings available (the university was free and had no such restric-

tions). However, although teachers at the Artigas Institute had an advantage in training teachers, they were at a disadvantage in preparing researchers.

Due to a misplaced sense of competition, there was also no coordination of effort between the Artigas Institute and the humanities department of the university. They had been created for different reasons—the one for the training of teachers, the other as a place for nourishing one's spirit—and their activities were quite separate. When a curriculum reform was proposed in 1965 to include the Artigas Institute within the university framework, creating a Department of Education whose graduates would be teachers adequately prepared for research, the project met with decided opposition from the secondary school teachers.

At the beginning of the 1970s there was a promising opening towards the outside world. As a result of the turn to new topics to compensate for the well-known backwardness of historiographical studies, the first works in economic and social history appeared. However, methodologies reflecting advances in the social sciences were not adopted and the unfavorable aspects of traditional history lingered on. The influence of amateur historians, lawyers who often "doubled" as politicians and professors, or descendants of long-term participants in political history (many of them journalists with a penchant for anecdotes) was evident. This led to the identification of history, and most of its results, with such activities. The rejection of academic innovations from the advanced countries, or, more accurately, ignorance of them, contributed to a lack of knowledge about the advances made by professional historians and other social scientists. Descriptive history, with a clearly local, provincial tone, predominated.

This was also a period of increasing economic deterioration. The salaries of professional and research personnel were reduced noticeably, there was no possibility of institutional scholarships, and budgetary deficiencies, which kept salaries low, had repercussions upon academic interchange and even upon library resources. Thus, backwardness and isolation were reinforced. Despite these difficulties, the work that younger historians had been engaged in for over a decade began to receive attention. These individuals had overcome deficiencies in their academic background through self-teaching and contact with the few professors in their specialty. Economic difficulties were overcome through self-denial and work in activities that were unrelated to their enthusiasm to develop a "new history," new with regard to the topics it would study, the methodology it would use, and, basically, the perspective from which it would observe the events of the past, tinged by a commitment to the present.

Their subject was the "modernization" of Uruguay at the end of

the nineteenth century, following, to a large degree, the studies carried out in Argentina, and they attempted to fill important gaps in historiographical knowledge. The "new history" blamed the backwardness of the country on the *latifundio* and its persistence, the difficulties of imposing an industrial model on the country, the origins of its economic dependency, the role of immigration from Southern Europe, etc.

Among the most influential of these works were the first volumes of *Historia rural del Uruguay moderno (HRUM)* by José P. Barran and Benjamín Nahum, based on the press, magazines, bibliography of the period, and archival research. It describes the development of Uruguayan agriculture, but at the same time reinterprets the overall history of the country between 1851 and 1914. Until 1973, this work was perceived by the researchers themselves as a complement to their positions as secondary school teachers, without ever formally becoming part of their remunerated institutional jobs.

A team composed of Lucía Sala, Julio C. Rodríguez, Nelson de la Torre, and Rosa Alonso produced a study that, beginning with the colonial period, covered the first three decades of the nineteenth century; its objective was the reinterpretation of *artiguismo*, as a social movement, from a Marxist perspective. Juan Antonio Oddone and Blanca Paris studied socioeconomic development as a function of immigration (they also collected valuable information on the history of the university); Luis C. Benvenuto, Roque Faraone, and Julio Millot examined the history of different economic elements—the gross national product, public credit, and the industrial model; Oscar Mourat called attention to an important topic—"transit commerce," or transshipping, during the second half of the nineteenth century;¹ Nelson Martínez Díaz and Carlos Panieza advanced the study of the role of the railroad in economic development; Guillermo Vázquez Franco examined the role of *batllismo*, following the work of Ricardo Martínez Ces and Germán W. Rama; Carlos Real de Azúa made a valuable contribution to social and political history. Also noteworthy during this period is the work of Vivian Trías, from a revisionist Marxist perspective. Juan E. Pivel Devoto continued to publish the thick volumes of *Revista Histórica* and *Archivo "Artigas"* while he did research on banking and the Uruguayan state.

Methodology did not vary greatly. The major approach was still that of the French *Annales* school, including some theoretical concepts from other social sciences, like those of "desarrollo hacia adentro y hacia afuera," promoted by ECLA and G. Myrdal, and A. Gunder Frank's popularized version of dependency. Marxist researchers continued with more or less orthodox orientations, and a few isolated researchers utilized concepts from other social sciences. The absence of any quantitative approach to the material and little use of theoretical models illustrates the effects of isolation and the deficiencies in the training of researchers.

The October 1973 intervention in the university, a logical and expected corollary of the country's political process, produced noticeable changes. Teaching, the activity that had supported researchers in most cases, was hard hit. A significant number of professors—both in the Artigas Institute and in the university—were dismissed and their work interrupted. Most of the substitutes were incapable of carrying out any alternative research program. Thus, at the official level, historical research practically disappeared. The Artigas Institute was included in a new organization called the National Institute of Teaching (INADO), responsible for the instruction of all teachers, from primary to secondary level. Its precise function—the training of teachers, not researchers—was reflected in lowering of the entrance requirements, simplifying the programs of study, and shortening the total length of the course. The absence of postgraduate training was not compensated for by coursework in other countries; of the few individuals who did receive degrees at foreign universities, some did not return.

With regard to private education, the Institute of Philosophy, Science and Letters, a private Catholic university managed by the Jesuits, has courses for training history teachers. Created towards the end of the 1960s, it is presently attempting to insure that its courses have the same validity as those of INADO. This has obliged the school to maintain a similar level of programs and requirements. However, there has also been an attempt to promote research, which has centered—for the moment—on the history of the Catholic Church in Uruguay.

It should be pointed out that history is still the leading social science in Uruguay, as measured by student interest. The lack of development in sociology and its abrupt disappearance as a professional course of study in 1973, the lack of training in political science and demography, and the strong emphasis in economics on the training of accountants and administrators has led the majority of students in the social sciences to continue to concentrate on history. The outlook, however, is not good: the possibilities for training are limited, the number of history students is excessive, and the number of future jobs in this area of research are practically nil.

In this deteriorating situation, only the opening or reopening of private research centers after 1973 allowed the development of the new history to continue, even in the face of obvious difficulties. CIEDUR, the recently established interdisciplinary Center of Studies of Uruguayan Development, supports an associate researcher working on the topic of twentieth-century economic history. In 1976, CIESU, the Center for Information and Studies of Uruguay, began to develop research in the areas of urban, regional, and demographic history and it has initiated a program of study on the country's recent history. CINVE, the Center for Economic Research of Uruguay, is supporting research on batllismo, the

sociopolitical process of the first decades of the twentieth century, and on the massive European immigration of the nineteenth century. CLAEH, the Latin American Center of Human Economy, inspired by the Dominican father L. Lebert, has a specific history department and a program that concentrates on the *batllista* period. It has aimed at training historical researchers and its first graduates are now working in the program.

Clearly, the number of institutionally linked researchers is small due to all of the abovementioned limitations, to which must be added deficiencies in the infrastructure of the respective centers. Researchers without institutional links face even greater difficulties and must wait for short-term, personal financing from abroad. This also affects those who, while on the staff of these centers, act as associates on a specific project. In addition, the few funds that are obtained are basically used to maintain researchers; this restricts other support services, such as adequate bibliographical resources, the exchange of researchers with other countries, etc.

Isolation still prevails. The migratory flow that characterized the early years included professors and researchers who since have had little contact with the country. Those who remained seldom have occasion to travel, to improve their academic training, to exchange experiences, to participate in meetings and seminars, etc.² At the same time, few foreigners have carried out historical research on Uruguay: the list would only include the excellent work of Henry Finch on the economic history of Uruguay; the relevant work by Milton Vanger and his sociopolitical project; and, of less historical value due to their ideological perspective, the work of Martin Weinstein (*Uruguay, The Politics of Failure*) and Edy Kaufman (*Uruguay in Transition*).

Recent historiographical production is a good indicator of the present state of the art in Uruguay. Discussion here will be limited to the few significant works from among the publications of the past four years.

All of them deal with twentieth-century history, the majority with the period dominated by the president and *caudillo* José Batlle y Ordóñez.³ Most of them study what, from 1910 on, was called the "welfare state" or the Uruguayan "social laboratory," a style of development that has endured and today clashes with the neoliberal model, based on the monetarism of the Chicago school. The topic is not new—an important series of valuable works preceded it⁴—but the perspective is different, influenced by the recent situation in Uruguay. (Finch's *Historia económica del Uruguay contemporáneo*, by covering the period up to 1976, is a substantial advance, since works of recent Uruguayan history are almost nonexistent. Until now, only other social scientists, especially econo-

mists, had ventured into this area.) The confluence of the authors around the topic of batllismo is also in accord with the need to explain recent changes in the political and social situation in Uruguay that are considered causally related to the welfare state.⁵

Theoretically and ideologically, these authors are a diverse lot; yet, most of the works can be defined as traditional—narratives of events, based on the comparison of documentation and the transcription of quotations therefrom. Even with the same authors, one can see traditional methodology in one work and attempts to adapt other methods to the Uruguayan setting, in order to transcend narrative-interpretative history based on personal judgments, in another. The works are limited to the case of Uruguay, and comparative references to other historical situations are scarce.⁶ As a result, given the unfamiliarity with the Uruguayan historical process in other Latin American countries and even within the community of “Latin Americanists,” due to the country’s limited importance within the Latin American panorama, these works are not widely disseminated.

The explanation of how batllismo acquired the political dimension it attained in the Colorado party, in the country, and at the expense of the state is one of the principal questions raised by Barran and Nahum, Finch, and Vanger. They suggest, with marked differences, that batllismo—or Batlle—was favored by the autonomy (relative, in some hypotheses, and tending towards the absolute, in others) of the Uruguayan political system.

In *El Uruguay del novecientos*, Barran and Nahum say that “the Uruguayan political system was its own representative” (p. 215),⁷ a situation achieved by a division of “political power,” in the hands of a professional nucleus, mainly members of the Colorado party,⁸ and “economic power,” personified principally in members of the Blanco (or Nacional) party (p. 228). This position seems extreme, insofar as it makes uniform a landowning class whose internal conflicts were pointed out by Barran and Nahum themselves (in *HRUM* see, for example, 6:318ff and in *Un diálogo difícil*, see pp. 254ff or 283ff). But accepting that the majority of the big ranchers belonged to the Blanco party, and also accepting the existence of a nucleus of professional politicians (*El Uruguay*, pp. 232ff), does not remove the possibility that they were representatives of certain economic and/or social interests, which would seem to be indicated, for example, by their opposition to the proposals linked to the taxation of land promoted by batllismo.

Barran and Nahum infer that the autonomy of political power developed as a result of the permissiveness of the conservative classes with which batllismo had reached a “gentleman’s agreement” (*El Uruguay*, p. 226). In 1913, the dissidents within the group of professional Colorado politicians, until then followers of Batlle, imposed a decisive

check upon his projects. In 1916, this became an electoral defeat, when the batllista power, oligarchical in origin and never anxious to democratize society, saw itself obliged to deal with all opposition groups and put a stop to its programs. However, were not the dissidents of 1913 part of the "team of professional politicians that Batlle represented"? Had they lost their autonomy or begun to represent other interests, as did the other anti-Colegiado forces which joined together in 1916 (and which supposedly were nonautonomous with respect to the socioeconomic system, as the authors argue)?⁹

Barran and Nahum do not apply any particular theoretical framework to explain their hypothesis (which appears, poorly drawn, in *Un diálogo difícil*), although it fits into the formulations that accept the existence of a ruling class—according to Gaetano Mosca and his followers. Moreover, their absolute assertion of the independence of the Colorado politicians from socioeconomic interests seems difficult to sustain.¹⁰ In *Un diálogo difícil* they attempt to show what batllismo "wanted to be but also essentially what others saw" in it (p. 7). The adjective "reformist" is attributed to this political movement since it attempted to impose a "more or less radical [model] without resort to violence" (p. 13). This perspective, while abundantly rich in collecting impressions from the various sectors that were batllismo's adversaries,¹¹ contradicts the claims they made and the hypothesis they outlined in *El Uruguay*. The view that others had of "reformism" is limited since it shows only the opinion of the moment rather than any global vision of the process. If what it intended is summarized in the excellent diagram on pages 193–96, the adjective "inquietismo," attributed to it by the conservative Irureta Goyena, is closer to the mark than "reformism."

In *El diálogo difícil* the authors describe various actors. One is defined as a *political class*, although it does not always seem as uniform as they indicate. At times its attitudes are shown through the positions of Batlle or the more radical of the "isolated snipers" (p. 77), at times through the "moderate reformist line" (p. 116), and at other times through the unidentified presence felt in the withholding of approval for projects or through the presumably conservative tone of the political adversaries of the Blanco party. A second actor is an *upper class*, of a conservative mold, nonuniform, composed of landowners, industrialists, and representatives of British interests who joined together on certain occasions. Barran and Nahum describe its actions as a function of the diversity of its contradictory concerns accompanying, partially or collectively, specific attitudes of "reformism," or, on the contrary, attacking it, depending on the precise setting. Its interpreters are given as the Nacional party, the newspaper *El Siglo*, the British legation or *The Montevideo Times*, the Catholics or the newspaper *El Bien*, the Unión Industrial Uruguaya, the Asociación Rural, or the Federación Rural, etc. The third

actor is given as *the workers*, who find themselves the subject of concern of the “reformist” and of the “conservative classes,” but whose true weight and presence is diluted in the course of policy discussions among the social and political elites.

If what is important is to understand batllismo as a “political movement that transformed the society that created it” (*El Uruguay*, p. 7), we should analyze what, in fact, it was. The abovementioned diagram defines it—insofar as it points out what measures it promulgated between 1903 and 1910—within the narrow framework of the bourgeois state. Here, also, the hypothesis of the unlimited autonomy of political power comes into question, since batllismo was incapable of carrying forward its proposed model, even with its theoretical majority. Thus, to govern is not always to have power and even if access to government by Batlle and the small group that accompanied him was tolerated, in diverse ways and from early on, the limits to their power were agreed upon.

The characteristics of the country’s mode of production and its forms of exploitation—in the economic sense, cattle raising; in the social sense, the latifundio and the pervasive spread of the *minifundio*—promoted a socioeconomic structure, vaguely described by the 1908 census, which showed a high concentration in urban activities and, to a lesser degree, in agricultural activities. The importance of cattle raising was clear. The groups of essentially urban professional politicians which formed in Uruguay, as in other states in the process of modernization, understood these facts. Thus, the group headed by Batlle saw the possibility of carrying forward a “style” or “model” of development that would avoid a head-on clash with the landowners. At the same time, the latter faced the grave problem of converting their economic power into equivalent political power, and this led them to negotiate. They controlled a great deal of land, certainly, and also cattle, but very few men and, ultimately, the protagonists of politics are men.

Finch starts with the notion of the state’s relative autonomy to explain the “particular nature” of Uruguay’s economic and social development, but he seems to come closer to the concept of the “Bonapartism” of Marx or the “Caesarism” of Gramsci than to the concept of the “ruling class” of Mosca or Michels. During the period of “modernization” (from 1870 on) in Uruguay, “the traditional political structures, that is, [those] not directly linked to the interests of specific social groups, survive” (p. 10). This resulted in a reduction in direct political participation on the part of the economically dominant sectors. Uruguay belonged to the group of dependent societies “in which local sectors were able to retain control of the productive system” (p. 10), unlike those based on enclave-type, export-oriented development. In this case, foreign capital was restricted to activities in the areas of commerce,

finance, and the provision of technology and improvement in infrastructure, especially in transportation (railroads).

The specific historical characteristics that this development model took on reflected a plurality of interests—with conflicts and alliances—marked by (a) the early emergence of an urban bourgeoisie; (b) the political isolation of the hegemonic economic sector, the landowners (p. 21), resulting from an internal conflict between its modernizing sector and its traditional sector (the modernizing sector, due to the concentration of foreigners, promoted the separation of the roles of the political caudillo and the landowner, the sociopolitical base of support of the traditional sector, p. 16); and (c) the emergence of the state as arbiter among the various classes and factions, in particular when batllismo predominated, by balancing national and foreign capital in the urban setting, using the state apparatus to make room for a growing electoral clientele, which reaffirmed the role of the parties. In this way, Finch's version of the relative autonomy of the state—though not specifically the central topic of his research—is richer than that of Barran and Nahum.

Vanger writes biographical-political history¹² and does not accept the theoretical hypothesis that tends to relate political activity and the state to civil society. His area of study is that of totally autonomous political action in a specific setting. Within this framework, his argument is well handled. He is explicit with regard to his objective: the search for elements that contribute to "the general history of leadership." In the case of Batlle, "the creator of his times," success was achieved by using the organization and political tradition of the Colorado party, not by answering the needs and demands of a class (1963, p. viii). This view can only be upheld if Vanger's rules of the game are accepted.

However, Batlle's adversaries, identified as "the conservative classes," appear as effective representatives of threatened common interests, while the politicians, especially the batllistas, appear to act only in response to their own anxieties, ideas, and political organization. The debate in our historiography attempts to answer precisely this: How did batllismo develop and whom did it represent? Some attribute its origin to the middle classes, others to the working class, others to the governing group itself. Vanger participates fervently in this discussion, especially in *The Model Country*, and is closer to the latter position since he emphasizes the role of Batlle the man and his leadership of the Colorado party as a determinant in launching the welfare state.

In 1963, Vanger wrote: "To counteract the influence of the conservative classes (the most powerful interest group in Uruguayan politics), Batlle did not organize a coalition of rival classes, but rather united the *colorados*" (p. 274). In 1980 (pp. 100–1) he expands this view and discards the hypothesis that Batlle's reelection in 1911 was the product

of a coalition of the urban middle class and the working class, led by the former. He indicates that this view results from confusing the social base of politics with a specific social base. For Vanger, Batlle was the product of a group with a high degree of self-identification, the Colorados, onto which Batlle tacked his own program of constructing the "model country," a proposal not fully defined and which only he had thought out.

The absence of earlier studies on class structure, class interests, and their articulation through the state prevents any but a hypothetical response to Vanger. Vanger himself considered that the problem should be resolved strictly within the political realm.¹³ However, he does not analyze precisely what the Colorado party was: did it transcend merely politico-electoral functions? Or, as Solari affirms, did it have nonpolitical functions, representing those who lacked other means of direct representation in the state and favoring policies of clientelism and patronage, which might explain its long duration?¹⁴ Neither does he analyze the transition of leadership from military caudillo to civil control. This process began in the Colorado party with President Julio Herrera y Obes at the end of the nineteenth century and with the principal leader of the opposition party, Luis Alberto de Herrera, from the 1920s on.

The work of Carlos Zubillaga deals with Lorenzo Carnelli and the dissidents he represented within the Nacional (or Blanco) party—the Radicalismo Blanco. He describes the vicissitudes that led to the appearance of the Radicalismo Blanco, its definition, and the process of its separation from the Nacional party. This process converted it into a small, marginal group; yet, in 1926, despite continuous electoral erosion, it still caused the Nacional party to lose a significant electoral battle to the Colorado party, precisely at a time in which "majority government" and "political consensus" had been ardently supported. It should be noted, however, that this same defeat consolidated Luis A. Herrera's leadership of the Nacional party.

Zubillaga attempts to establish the ideology of this weakened political group and to pinpoint its position among the various political alternatives that evolved during the brief time in which it was active. He considers that doctrinal overlaps between Radicalismo Blanco and batllismo, in contradiction to its emotional adherence to the Blanco tradition, robbed the group of its political distinctiveness. This process was further accentuated by the divisions that developed among the highest echelons of its leadership and the appearance, toward the beginning of the 1930s, of a new group led by Carlos Quijano, later founder and director of the weekly *Marcha*, which continued to preach radicalism. Although the work is well documented, Zubillaga is unable to show why Radicalismo Blanco appeared and why it failed. What social sector did this movement attempt to represent? If it represented the urban sector, as it would seem, how can we explain the preponderance of the

interior as a portion of its total electorate?¹⁵ What forces moved within the Nacional party to prevent the success of Radicalismo Blanco? Was it simply a struggle between Herrera and Carnelli for leadership of the Nacional party?

It also seems important to mention two points suggested by Zubillaga's work, relating to the behavior of political parties in the first decades of the twentieth century in Uruguay. First is the high degree of acrimony surrounding the schism, both on the part of the authorities who supported the Nacional party and on the part of the Radicales Blancos (which led to the latter's expulsion from the party). This differed from disagreements within the Colorado party, some of which were even more profound in nature, but which always seemed to be negotiated. Only occasionally did they produce negative effects in the electoral sphere such as occurred with the Radical Blanco dissidence.

Second, and more significant, the voters seemed to follow leaders rather than programs. Once the national state was consolidated (under Batlle), caudillismo was forced to adopt a new civil, institutional form, but it still remained a stronger force than the program itself. The con-substantiation of the leader, his program, and his followers, the transformation of the caudillo from military chief to civilian chief (as in the case of Batlle, and, to a greater degree, Herrera, Carnelli's adversary), and society's receptiveness to each of their programs (in the case of Batlle, the construction of a "model country"; in the case of Herrera, to "give the Uruguayans what they ask for" [Vanger 1980, p. 343]) are prime topics for future study.

Turcatti's book examines a question that has received little attention in our historiography, perhaps because the role played in international politics by a small, dependent country in the twentieth century is of only slight importance. This, however, does not detract from the work, inasmuch as it does not refer to Uruguay's potential significance in such a context but rather to the measures carried out in Uruguay by the batllista governments during the first three decades of this century in an effort to strengthen the power and capacity of the state through international recognition. In this sense, it should be kept in mind that batllismo, and the Colorado party in general, tended to represent a liberal ideology, sympathetic to contemporaneous developments in the North Atlantic, whereas its political adversary, the Nacional party, was more closely linked to a regional, local, conservative framework.

The author analyzes Uruguay's international political behavior at three levels: global, hemispheric, and regional. He limits himself to the contributions made by Batlle and his followers in constructing permanent policy of the Uruguayan government. Although Turcatti admits that the success of Batlle's proposal at the Second International Conference at the Hague in 1907 (with reference to "obligatory arbitration")

was not resounding, he favors the oft-repeated argument of the value of establishing this precedent in international law (p. 90).¹⁶ He thus renders tribute to the juridical mentality of our historiography and, to a lesser degree, to that which, for political reasons, exalts the person of Batlle.¹⁷ In the analysis of Pan-Americanism and the position that Batlle and batllismo adopted towards the United States, Turcatti indicates that they supported the U.S. in order to combat the British, who were a dominant presence in the country at the beginning of the century.

Uruguay's relations with its neighboring countries is probably of more relevance as a topic because of its obvious connotations. Turcatti takes into account the absence, during almost the entire nineteenth century, of any unified national foreign policy. He suggests that batllismo leaned towards Brazil during this period, but this was the almost accidental result of the "pendular politics" to which Uruguay had to resort at that time, in response to repeated incidents with Argentina. These incidents were the product of constant clashes between Brazil and Argentina for supremacy in South America, and pendular politics was the device Uruguay used to ameliorate their effect (Vanger 1980, p. 24). The problem with Argentina, also reflected in the various positions adopted by the Uruguayan political parties, was long-standing; the situation was only recently clarified by the Statute of Río de la Plata in 1974, during the presidency of Perón, and, slightly earlier, with the agreement on the limits of the Uruguay River.

In *El Uruguay del novecientos* Barran and Nahum examine two topics new to Uruguayan historiography. The first refers to what they call "the demographic revolution" that occurred in Uruguay between 1880/90 and 1900/10, the explanation for which they attempt to find in a change in the mentality of the population, especially of women. The hypothesis, based upon French sources,¹⁸ leads the authors to certain errors; but their effort must be welcomed insofar as it introduces new techniques in historical analysis.¹⁹ They also incorporate a hypothesis on the "history of mentalities," a topic they introduced in *HRUM* (6:386ff). This is a difficult concept and here it requires the use of literary sources and recourse to only one resource—testimonies by members of the upper classes, hardly representative of that portion of the population capable of promoting demographic change.

The second innovation is their attempt to carry out an "intentionally static" stratification of Uruguayan society, using data from the only national census of the time, carried out in 1908. The difficulties posed by having only one source for a task of this nature, given that the authors also rely on only one variable, result in somewhat risky conclusions. The authors assume that the "rent paid by a family in 1908 is perhaps the best indicator of its level of income." On the basis of census information on rents in Montevideo, they estimate the size of the social

classes in the capital and suggest that this structure could be extended to cover towns, cities, and villages in the rest of the country (the rural social structure was examined in *HRUM* 6:345ff). However, the results do not really permit pinpointing the size of the social strata and, more specifically, of the so-called middle classes, presumably batllismo's basic source of support (a theory that the authors seem to adopt). The analysis is further weakened when they try to utilize another concept for a sector they call the "popular classes," which would include the lower and lower-middle classes. This invalidates their previous estimation of the middle class, which was already biased since calculations for agricultural activity were not carried out.

Batllismo is usually considered the political result of the social rise of the middle classes (and, there are those who would add, the support of the incipient working class). However, Barran and Nahum have not taken a position in this regard and, in fact, in *Un diálogo difícil* they avoid dealing with the topic; this work thus has little in common with *El Uruguay*.²⁰ Finally, the authors examine the standard of living of the popular sector and adopt a "pessimistic" position, considering the standard of living of this vast social group to be sadly deficient. But, by not making any comparisons across time, or references to what criteria should be used to calculate a low standard of living, the hypothesis loses strength. It is only possible to conclude that the poor lived badly and the rich lived well.

Finch's work deals with the economic process in Uruguay over a period of almost a century, although it concentrates on two phases: the batllista period, between 1903 and 1930, and the recent crisis from 1950 onward. He examines modernization in a strict sense, as a process of economic change induced by the incorporation of new technologies and forms of production that permitted the assimilation of advanced forms of capitalism. Finch's version is closer to "external dependency," emphasizing the problems derived from commercial and financial dependency, than structural dependency. However, it is obvious that he takes this latter position into account by admitting the responsibility of the Uruguayan upper class for this situation (p. 10). Finch reiterates his interpretation of batllismo as a conservative phenomenon.²¹ While he recognizes that its social and political achievements were important, he considers its economic results modest. This view seems to be distorted by too contemporary an optic. In their time, actions by the Federación Rural, the conservative alliance that provoked the great batllista defeat of 1916, or the attitude of the employers' unions in 1929 (when forming the Comisión de Vigilancia Económica) are—among other examples—clear proof that the "conservative classes" did fear the reach of batllista policies. "Socialism without a flag" was the threat of a style of development that promoted increased participation of the state in the economic

life of the country at the same time that it promoted social and economic legislation in favor of the workers.

By contrast, we consider correct Finch's analysis of the period 1955–70, in which he underlines the endurance of the batllista approach, based upon a style of development that favors urban sectors and that uses as an operational support the redistributive character of the economic system.²² However, he maintains that the political class of this period was incompetent since it carried the country into a crisis, even though he recognizes that the economy could not grow without at the same time affecting the system's bases of support; that is, without undermining the welfare state. This does not give due credit to the ability of the political class to maintain, until 1973, a situation that, even in 1958, could have been considered critical.

In the English edition,²³ a chapter is added on "The Military Regime since 1973." After recounting recent political events, his analysis centers on the economic strategy of the new economic model, which is designed to restore the free market economy—as opposed to the strong interventionism and state protectionism of the earlier period—by restructuring the domestic economy and integrating it into the world economy, thereby attempting to turn to the nation's advantage its admittedly dependent condition. Finch feels that the adoption of this economic model leads inexorably to the opposite of the desired goal, to the accentuation of the country's economic vulnerability. He also notes that economic growth, in this context, implies promoting an export sector that would enjoy a comparative advantage on the international market. He indicates that the decline in private consumption and an increase in exports were the result of this economic policy. However, the former was due to a fall in real wages, which should be attributed substantially to state control of union activity.²⁴ And the increase in exports was also due to the action of the state, which gave benefits to the export sector through subsidies ("export rebates"), a fact that calls into question the efficacy of neoclassical economic management without the support of the authoritarian state.²⁵ To this must be added the limited success of the economic team in carrying forward a program of privatization of public enterprises. The military team, through its exercise of power, makes it unnecessary for the capitalist class to form alliances with other sectors in order to protect its interests at a political level, but this does not guarantee them the conditions for greater profit and productivity necessary to resume the process of accumulation.²⁶

Another important chapter notes the stagnation of the agricultural export sector. Finch maintains that this is due to land extensive exploitation, which implies low productivity. This, however, supposes that producers behave rationally and act in agreement with their individual interests. This differs from the view of Barran and Nahum who

ascribe irrationality to the economic agents in the rural setting.²⁷ Finch does not believe that "the size of the establishments, or the form of ownership under which they are exploited, are themselves responsible for the stagnation of production" (p. 77). Thus he clearly differentiates the economic aspect from the social aspect. A recent analysis of this basic sector summarizes it thusly: there is a marked conflict in the use of land between production and speculation; there is also a lack of technological innovation, and the state has been clearly negligent in promoting advances in this area. The thesis of fiscal pressure as the cause of agricultural backwardness in Uruguay is discarded.

Finch also finds the statistical sources to be of limited value. His analyses of the process of industrialization and the system of taxation, in his chapter on foreign commerce, are noteworthy. In the latter, he points out the continuation of a fiscal system inherited from the nineteenth century—which, during the first batllista period, was simply rationalized. Other chapters are not as successful. The one on public services does not introduce any new elements, at least for the Uruguayan reader, and the one that examines society is also weak, although in his defense it must be said that earlier studies are deficient in the same areas. What is more objectionable, especially given the global perspective of his work, is the absence of any analysis of the commercial and financial sector, which always played a central role in the economy, and, as a consequence, in the sociopolitical life of Uruguay. Even so, this is still an excellent book.

Raúl Jacob centers his research on the repercussions of the 1929 crisis in Uruguay. The series of statistics in *El Uruguay en la crisis* are a useful and stimulating tool in an area in which such works are scarce. In *El Frigorífico Nacional*, Jacob deals with foreign investment and the creation of a state enterprise for refining petroleum and alcohol and, later, the making of portland cement. He has compiled extensive information from the press, magazines, governmental acts, etc. to assemble a good, detailed description that underlines the central role played by the state in Uruguay's historical process during those years. At the same time, emphasis is given to the interests of the various individuals, groups, and political factions that prospered at the state's expense. The conclusions to be drawn from these data are still unpublished but should be eagerly awaited, given the interrelationship of these events in the sociopolitical and economic setting of the period under study.

The work by Zubillaga on *Deuda externa y desarrollo en el Uruguay batllista*, although only preliminary, is sufficiently thought-provoking to warrant discussion here. Zubillaga examines the role of foreign capital in financing socioeconomic development, but within a framework that leans more towards the history of ideas than towards economic history (p. 4). From there he takes on broader topics for the period 1903–15: the

political viability of batllismo, the concept of development within this political movement, and the obstacles that dependency (understood as financial dependency) imposed.

In his discussion of the choice between domestic saving and external credit, he recognizes that the local capital market imposed onerous conditions, due to high interest rates. The market was small and had shrunk, due to a lack of trust stemming from batllista programs involving social welfare and economic reform; preference was given to speculative and sumptuary investments. In this situation, a government that wanted to promote economic growth, and did not hesitate to turn to formulas that would be later classified as Keynesian,²⁸ had to turn to foreign capital; at a time (about 1915) in which the European market was closed due to war, only Wall Street remained. The author also examines the problem of the real use of the funds obtained from abroad by classifying them as productive or nonproductive, concluding that the latter predominated.²⁹ But the criticism implicit in this distinction must be softened by the situation inherited from the nineteenth century, which obliged refinancing of old debts and the need to attend to claims from the civil war of 1904 (for damages wrought by the troops), and by the difficulties in obtaining funds for projects that Zubillaga labels productive. He reiterates the weakness that affected Uruguay's ability to put long-term policies into motion; internal and external crises, such as those of 1913 and 1914, blocked the proposals of Serrato and Eduardo Acevedo.

Throughout the text, Zubillaga analyzes various difficulties faced by batllismo in attempting to carry out its economic program, especially that posed by the "socioeconomic sectors that benefitted from the status quo" (p. 180). Added to this was "batllista indecision in adopting radical measures in order to solve the agrarian problem, [which] impeded modification of the agro-export economic scheme upon which the country's economy was based." In this way Zubillaga reexamines the topic of the batllista development model. He credits it with the beginning of industrial expansion through the use of a policy of state promotion based upon a traditional political scheme; we believe this should be traced back to the end of the nineteenth century. He also points to the restrictions imposed by the conservative sectors of the same political group to which batllismo belonged (the Colorado party), which kept the industrial model from being carried forward.

It can be argued that historical research in Uruguay has not made much progress during the last decade, and to consider what has been done a "significant effort" would be excessive. But everything must start somewhere, and we feel that, in the face of various difficulties, there has been quite an advance. Uruguay has limited importance in the

international arena, and the problems of the more important Latin American nations may be more interesting; but the less influential countries—which are in the majority—have their own importance as well.

Most of the works reviewed here deal with local topics. These are of only relative interest to the international academic community both because of the nature of the topics themselves and because of their limited comparative value. Local history, however, is the background for larger or more far-reaching history and, thus, can take on universal dimensions. All research, as restricted as the framework might be, is important, especially in a country in which little has been done and much remains to be done. Basic studies in economics, politics, demography, society, culture, mentality, etc. soon add up. Slowly, despite the obstacles of isolation, the absence of any continuity in the training of historians due to the interruption at the beginning of the 1970s, the lack of professors to train students, the absence of professional criticism, scant financial resources, and a limited number of researchers, work continues. It must be carried out more professionally, adopting new techniques as the other social sciences have done and continuing to deal with the topic of recent history in order to fill in the voids. But there is no doubt that the phase of hagiographic history has passed, and such a qualitative advance is important. Of all the books discussed here, the most ambitious and the most successful is Finch's; but it should be remembered that it was the product of better training and financial support that, for the present, is not within the reach of the Uruguayan researcher.

NOTES

1. Refers to the activity of commercial intermediaries in importation (and, to a lesser degree, in exportation) carried out in the port of Montevideo, serving the riparian regions of the rivers above the basin of the Plata and the southern part of the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul.
2. In the area of history, only one meeting was organized during the period, in 1970, in CIESU. It was organized in conjunction with the Commission of Regional and Urban Development of CLACSO, and brought together various researchers from the Southern Cone. This is also true at a national level, so that at the initiative of various centers, meetings of historians have been taking place since 1980 to discuss problems that affect the limited academic community and the fruits of its research.
3. Different meanings are attributed to the term *batllismo*. In one sense, it can refer to a period of study. Thus, for some, *batllismo* would be defined as a phase of national life that extended from the first (or second) presidency of José Batlle y Ordoñez—1903 or 1911—to the coup d'état of 1933. This was the period of the greatest activity of the movement's leader, who died in 1929. For others, the phenomenon is characterized as the politico-economic and social regime dominant in Uruguay during the greater part of the twentieth century, at least until the beginning of the 1970s. From another position, use of the term would be limited to the action of the political movement initiated by Batlle y Ordoñez and others, concentrating exclusively on the personal action of this politician.
4. For example, among foreigners: Simon G. Hanson, *Utopia in Uruguay: Chapter in the*

- Economic History of Uruguay* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938); George Pendle, *Uruguay. South America's First Welfare State* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1952); Russell H. Fitzgibbon, *Uruguay, Portrait of a Democracy* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1954); Philip B. Taylor, "The Uruguayan Coup d'État of 1933," *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 22, no. 3 (Aug. 1952); Goran Lindahl, *Uruguay's New Path* (Stockholm: 1960. The version in Spanish is entitled *Batlle, fundador de la democracia* [Montevideo; Arca, 1971]). Among the most noted Uruguayans we cite the works of Carlos Real de Azúa, *El impulso y su freno* (Montevideo: EBO, 1964); Ricardo Martínez Ces, *El Uruguay batllista* (Montevideo: EBO, 1962); Carlos M. Rama, "Batlle: la conciencia social," *Enciclopedia Uruguaya* No. 34 (Montevideo, 1969); Juan A. Oddone, "Batlle. La democracia uruguaya," *Historia de América en el siglo XX* (Buenos Aires, 1972); Guillermo Vásquez Franco, *El país que Batlle heredó* (Montevideo: FCU, 1971); Julio A. Louis, *Batlle y Ordoñez. Apogeo y muerte de la democracia burguesa* (Montevideo: Nativa, 1969); Gerónimo de Sierra et al., series of five articles published by the *Instituto de Ciencias Sociales de la Universidad*, *Cuaderno* No. 2 (Montevideo, 1972). Previously, from a critical position, the following had been written: Francisco R. Pintos, *Batlle y el proceso histórico del Uruguay* (Montevideo: Claudio García, 1938); Vivian Trias, "Raíces, apogeo y frustración de la burguesía nacional," *Nuestro Tiempo*, no. 3 (Montevideo: 1955). From an apologist position, among others, Roberto B. Giudice and Efraim Gonzales Conzi, *Batlle y el Batllismo* (Montevideo, 1928); José Buzzetti, *La magnífica gestión de Batlle en Obras Públicas* (Montevideo, 1946); Antonio M. Grompone, *Batlle. Sus artículos. El concepto democrático* (Montevideo, 1943); Justino Zavala Muniz, *Batlle. Heroe Civil* (México: FCE, 1945); Enrique Rodríguez Fabregat, *Batlle. El Reformador* (Buenos Aires: Claridad, 1942); Editorial Acción (various authors), *Batlle. Su Vida. Su Obra* (Montevideo, 1956).
5. Vanger notes the bias of "presentism," which characterizes many of the historical interpretations of the Uruguayan process at the beginning of the century (1980, p. vii) but he, probably more than others, falls into this same "sin" (see pages 354 and, especially, 359 of *Model Country*, where he asks, "What would Don Pepe [Batlle] do if he were alive today?")
 6. Exception should be made of Barran and Nahum, *El Uruguay*, where they compare the different modes of access to power used by Batlle y Ordoñez and Yrigoyen of Argentina (one through access to government through manipulation of the state apparatus, and the other through the support of a party from the plains). Also Finch, based primarily upon the use of British sources, tends toward a global vision of the insertion of the Uruguayan economy into the capitalist market. Vanger in the introduction to *Model Country*, points out that his book could be a contribution to understanding, in a comparative manner, the rise of populism in the Southern Cone during the first three decades (p. viii) but this is his only reference to the topic.
 7. This notion seems to have been taken from an earlier idea of Barran, in which he describes the "expulsion of young Montevidean intellectuals" in 1872; "uncontaminated . . . they felt like politicians and nothing more than that. This was also why they fell. They did not represent anyone but themselves" (in *Marcha*, 13/8/1965).
 8. On the other hand, to carry forward a "political career," which Tomas de Iriarte called a "revolutionary career" in the atmosphere of the "years of turmoil" of the nineteenth century, was, and is, an ambition common to all those who embark upon that path. It also supposes acceptance of both triumph and failure. The difficulties involved in the construction of the state in Uruguay—similar to those which occurred in the rest of Latin America—plagued with conflicts and violence, with winners and losers, allowed some to reach their goal while others did not. Thus, the members of the Colorado party, having power and, as a result, control of the incipient state apparatus, found themselves better off, having embarked upon this "career," than their colleagues of the opposition party. Curiously, it was precisely the historical vicissitudes that derived from the predominance of batllismo and from defeat of their attempt to legalize constitutionally this arbitrary behavior that constituted a system of political coparticipation—pacific in tone—which permitted the "political career" at the national level to include members of the Blanco party.
 9. Vanger indicated that if Batlle's base of support was the political elite, the defeat of

the *Colegiado* in 1916—a formulation which was proposed constitutionally—and the later deterioration of batllismo would be inexplicable.

10. Carlos Zubillaga notes, among other examples relating to the behavior of political personnel, the relationship of this to economic interests. He cites, in this case, the activity of the legislator Antonio María Rodríguez, one of the principal professional politicians noted by Barran and Nahum, who in his role as representative of some of the creditors of the Ferrocarril Pan-Americano, exercised various pressures in favor of those he represented. This was done within the legislative branch itself and was the object of a denunciation in the Senate.
11. He analyzes the period by examining how the various protagonists identified one another, particularly in the press, or in the diplomatic dispatches of the Foreign Office. His study offers a view of the everyday expressions and polemics by which the actors recognized one another. Since these were characteristic of a combative, opinionated press or of the threatened British interests, this diminishes any attempt at objectivity.
12. Although the use of the private archives of the principal actors is infrequent in our own historiography, their use here by Vanger lends the text a human dimension, characterized by Batlle's attitudes toward specific events. It is, however, necessarily partial, since it offers only his perspective and not that of his antagonists.
13. Vanger's tone is polemical, more energetic in the second volume than in the first, dealing very specifically with events and people. The author directly states that a book that studies the political activity of an individual should include sufficient politics (*Model Country*, p. viii) since its principal documentary source, Batlle's private archive, pursues a political end (p. 361, note 1). Another difference is due to developments in the author's own viewpoint. In the first volume, the description of the political process makes Batlle "the creator of his times"; in the second volume, he is the man determined to construct and direct the "model country," within a specific political setting. This had also been alluded to in 1963, when Vanger indicated that his study examined "the way in which a great Latin American reformist leader obtained and consolidated his power, of his transformation from Batlle into BATLLE."
14. Thus, Vanger refers to how the partisan electoral committee was dissolved after the election (p. 117), noting the absence of any permanent organization. Further on, he underscores that Batlle preferred the position of party chief to any other role in the state apparatus and that he wanted to reserve it for himself exclusively (p. 227). See Aldo Solari in *Estudio sobre la sociedad Uruguaya* (Montevideo: Arca, 1964).
15. The author compiles, in tables 1 and 3 (p. 159), the electoral history of Radicalismo Blanco. It is evident there that, even in 1922, the Nacional party sustained the lowest electoral percentage in the *lema* of Montevideo than in any other section in which it had candidates. Carnelli, identified by his program as a representative of the urban population, lost votes in successive elections while the radical bastions, Soriano and Tacuarembó, held strong. In the 1931 election, they achieved a vote that was, in absolute terms, higher than that in the capital. The action of local leaders, like Ricardo Paseyro in Soriano and even the activity of Carnelli in his role as a lawyer in Tacuarembó, seem to explain the behavior of radical dissidence better than any doctrinaire statements.
16. The originality of this initiative, attributed to Batlle in our country, has been recently questioned. In the archives of the Ecclesiastical Tribunal of Montevideo, there is a personal letter from Monseñor Mariano Soler, Bishop of Montevideo, to Dr. Juan Zorrilla of San Martín, Uruguayan delegate to the Ibero-American Judicial Conference in Madrid in 1892. In the letter, he proposed the arbitration of international conflicts by the Pope, in light of his having political authority without temporal interests. Zorrilla made the proposal in Congress (25/10/1892), but without mentioning the participation of the Papacy (radio interview with Carlos Zubillaga, 22/3/1981).
17. Vanger indicates that Batlle himself stated in his private correspondence that the role of Uruguay in the conference was "insignificant;" during the four-month period the Uruguayan delegate only spoke twice. The proposal was sent to a commission, treated as the last item of the final agenda and, finally, removed from the agenda.
18. The authors cite the works of P. Guillaume and J. P. Poussou, *Demographie historique*

- (Paris, 1979), and Louis Henry, *Manuel de demographie historique* (1970); they do not mention the studies of Lattes and Recchini de Lattes on Argentina, a setting fairly similar to that of Uruguay (at least with regard to the region of the Pampa), nor that of Ana M. Rothman, *Evolución de la fecundidad en Argentina y Uruguay* (Buenos Aires, Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, 1979).
19. The authors use gross rates of birth and mortality in an open population, which includes a heavy influx of foreign immigrants that raised considerably the ratios' denominators; they should have used life expectancy at birth. The results reached through the use of these data on fecundity are not convincing since the 1908 census did not cross the variable of the number of children with that of the age of the mothers. Although it might be said that foreign women had a lower fecundity, this is not easily proven; moreover, it is probable that if this were the case, it would not be so much a result of their being immigrants, as it was of the economic conditions to which they were subjected. But, the most important thing to bear in mind is that while there were many immigrant marriages, many others took place between immigrant males and native females. The importance attributed by Barran and Nahum to the decrease in the marriage rate should be balanced against the high number of nonlegal unions, of *more uxorio* marriages. These were prevalent in the rural areas and resulted in a high rate of illegitimate births.
 20. Nahum—in a work made available in 1975, *La época batllista* (Montevideo: EBO)—has maintained that Batlle attempted to create a country composed of middle classes. Vanger, in *Model Country*, completely denies this possibility, believing that any characterization of Uruguay as a country of middle classes must be postponed until after the Second World War. On this topic, one can turn to the work of Germán Rama, *El ascenso de las clases medias* (Montevideo: Arca, 1969); Solari, *Estudios sobre la sociedad Uruguaya* (Montevideo, 1964), p. 113 and ss; and G. de Sierra, "Estructura económica y estructura de clases en el Uruguay," *Cuadernos de Ciencias Sociales* (Montevideo, 1970).
 21. See H. Finch: "Three Perspectives on the Crisis in Uruguay," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 3 no. 2 (Nov. 1971): 173–90.
 22. This is the result of a program which was adequate for times of prosperity. (Similar expressions have been used by Tulio Halperin Donghi and Guillermo Vázquez Franco.) This has been noted not only during the first period of batllismo, but also after the Second World War, a period in which there was also important economic growth, especially in industry and agriculture, backed by an international climate which permitted a favorable placement of our primary export product.
 23. The ordering of the chapters is noticeably improved in Finch's English edition. Page references, except for the final chapter—which does not appear in Spanish—are from the Montevidean edition.
 24. Finch emphasizes that salary adjustment is the product of a theory that exalts the role of private entrepreneur, and its implementation leads to a decline in real wages. This should not be seen as a deliberate attack upon the working class, even though this is what it is. The government did not wish to punish the members of the working class since they did not support the subversive movement, and Finch feels they should not be considered a principal component of the leftist coalition of 1971, the Frente Amplio.
 25. More recent analyses examine the role of the financial sector and of the possible problems that maintenance of the interrelationship between the present neoliberal economic model and the possible processes of redemocratization would generate. (See J. Notaro, *Estado y Economía en el Uruguay: Hipotesis sobre sus interrelaciones actuales* [Montevideo: Ciedur, 1980], mimeo.)
 26. On this topic, Luis E. Gonzalez and Jorge Notaro recently wrote an interesting article, "Alcances de una política estabilizadora heterodoxa, Uruguay, 1974–1978," *Latin American Program*, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., 1979.
 27. See Barran and Nahum, *Historia rural del Uruguay moderno*, volume 6, *La civilización ganadera bajo Batlle* (Montevideo, 1977), pp. 386ff, and volume 7, *Agricultura, crédito y transporte bajo Batlle* (1978), pp. 187ff. The hypotheses of Luis E. Gonzales and D.

Pineiro, in accordance with Finch, can be examined in *Racionalidad empresarial y tecnología en el Río de la Plata hacia 1900* (Montevideo: Ciesu, 1980) and José M. Alonso and C. Perez Arrarte, *Adopción de tecnología en la ganadería vacuna uruguaya* (Montevideo: Cive, 1980).

28. "The State must initiate a public works plan capable of dispelling the present atmosphere of laziness and of breathing life into all the producers in the entire country," said Eduardo Acevedo, one of Batlle's ministers. This was an attitude that he would repeat on various occasions, especially in light of the crisis of 1929.
29. More precisely it would be necessary to distinguish between capital applied directly to production (there was no such case) and capital applied to infrastructure (ports, roadways), research, and technology, from that which pursued social ends (promotion and welfare, urban infrastructure, drainage, education, etc.). Zubillaga grouped all of these together as productive capital, as well as the loans destined to financial entities (state banks). He considers nonproductive capital that which is destined to handle treasury budget deficits, to refinance earlier debts, and that applied to the construction of public buildings, parks, etc.—which he considers sumptuary.