

study provides a forceful reminder of how little has, in fact, changed in the basic practice of the Soviet party dictatorship.

Conyngham nonetheless sees an intensifying conflict between the urge for total power of the monocratic-ideocratic party and the need in modern Russia for a political institution that can function effectively and responsively in an intricate, modernized continental state. At the same time he shies away from the notion that the conflict will one day produce a sudden breakdown of the party institution. Rather, he thinks a strong impulsion remains at work urging the party leadership toward a new choice between a modernized and computerized neo-Stalinist economic centralism or a decentralized, incipiently pluralist, market socialism. The cross-purposes Conyngham's study finds operating in the area of party economic leadership find their echo in Brezhnev's overall political strategy. He has of late demonstrated once more the party-state's capacity to generate power-political force for Soviet purposes in world politics, yet he betrays in his *détente* efforts its incapacity to resolve the economic and technological difficulties it now faces without major assists from its proclaimed adversaries in the West.

CARL A. LINDEN

The George Washington University

VELIKII OKTIABR' I INTELLIGENTSIIA: IZ ISTORII VOVLECHENIIA STAROI INTELLIGENTSII V STROITEL'STVO SOTSIALIZMA. By S. A. Fediukin. Moscow: "Nauka," 1972. 471 pp. 1.81 rubles.

Despite the title, this book is about neither the October Revolution nor the intellectuals; it is a carefully revised and expanded version of the author's earlier work on the use of technical personnel by the Bolsheviks in the 1920s, *Sovetskaia vlast' i burzhuannye spetsialisty* (Moscow, 1965). Fediukin argues that the intelligentsia was initially hostile to the Soviet regime but by the time of the First Five-Year Plan (1928–32) was generally supportive. By "intelligentsia" he means professionals and specialists: army officers, engineers, doctors, teachers, professors, and, to a lesser extent, artists and writers.

In his first two chapters Fediukin cites numerous examples of early intelligentsia opposition to the Bolsheviks in 1917–18 (such as the teachers' strike of December 1917) and of Lenin's benign toleration intended to win them over. In chapter 3 he uses statistics from Soviet archives to document the recruitment of tsarist army officers and technical personnel (including doctors and pilots) by the Red Army during the Civil War; of artists, writers, and teachers by Narkompros; and of engineers and economists by Goelro and Vesenkha. By the mid-1920s, Fediukin argues in chapter 4, the "significant part" of the intelligentsia had accepted the Bolsheviks by direct support or by involvement with the fellow-traveling *Smena vekh* (Changing Directions) movement which sought to reconcile intellectuals and professionals to the new regime. Finally, in chapter 5, he concludes that the First Five-Year Plan witnessed the final transition of the intelligentsia's attitudes from hostility through neutrality to acceptance.

Fediukin's book is most useful to the scholar seeking statistical data on Soviet professional groups in the 1920s, or selected statements of opinion by individuals. Yet much of this evidence may also be found in his 1965 volume. His new sections on artists, writers, teachers, and doctors are less significant than his revisions of the 1965 sections on military specialists and engineers. For example, Fediukin had

an interesting passage in the 1965 volume which concluded that during the battle for Tsaritsyn in 1918 Stalin "ignored the Leninist line of the party on using military specialists," thereby earning Lenin's personal criticism; in 1972 he simply omitted the passage. Citing statistics on the political opinions of 230 Moscow engineers in 1922, Fediukin concluded in 1965 that they demonstrated the "departure [*otkhod*] of the intelligentsia from the bourgeoisie"; in 1972 he found that the identical statistics showed the "tremendous success of the Communist Party, which sought to separate [*otryvat'*] the intelligentsia from the bourgeoisie." The party has replaced the intelligentsia as the main actor, "separating" those who might not otherwise "depart" from their class origins and loyalties. Sections on trade-union opposition to Stalin in 1929 are absent now. New critical comments on Molotov and Vyshinsky have been added, perhaps to replace the missing criticisms of the *vozhd*. A letter written by Lunacharsky to Stalin in 1929 attacking the purges (*chistki*) of educational institutions has disappeared, along with Fediukin's 1965 remark about the "destruction of legality connected with the sick suspicions of I. V. Stalin toward the intelligentsia."

In sum, this book is as illustrative of neo-Stalinism in current Soviet historiography as it is instructive about the technical intelligentsia in the 1920s. For Fediukin, at least, that group was independent and even recalcitrant in 1965, but responsive to party directives in 1972.

ROBERT C. WILLIAMS
Washington University

KLASSOVAIA BOR'BA V DEREVNE I LIKVIDATSIIA KULACHESTVA KAK KLASSA (1929–1932 GG.). By N. A. Ivnitsky. Moscow: "Nauka," 1972. 357 pp. 1.37 rubles.

N. A. Ivnitsky, a Soviet researcher noted for his work on the history of the Soviet peasantry and collectivization, offers here what probably is a product of years of patient investigation. The amount of new material published for the first time makes the book a valuable contribution to the study of the dramatic but still insufficiently understood events during which the kolkhoz system was created. The central strategic device the Soviet state applied to help collectivize the peasants—the so-called liquidation of the kulaks as a class—is Ivnitsky's theme, and he offers new figures, data, and, especially, hitherto unknown facts about the uprooted families and their subsequent fate in the Siberian and Kazakhstan wilderness, where they were forced to build a new life for themselves (those who survived, of course; but this problem is not treated by our author). Thanks to this work, the years 1930–32, during which the dekulakization operations took place, emerge much sharper and clearer. We learn much more about the opposition of peasants to kolkhozes—the different forms of "disorders," riots (*vystupleniia*), or "uprisings," which were very widespread. Scores of clandestine organizations, especially in the Northern Caucasus, are said to have existed and were engaged in preparing, in liaison with foreign intelligence services, uprisings against the regime; but not much came of it, for the plotters were arrested by the thousands. No proof is offered about those connections with foreign intelligence, and large extracts of "confessions" are sufficiently discredited for us to remain skeptical even if foreign participation is not in itself implausible.

The "kulak terror," about which a lot is said in the book, cannot be fully