Social Philosophy & Policy

FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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Social Philosophy & Policy is an interdisciplinary journal with an emphasis on the philosophical underpinnings of enduring social policy debates. Each issue is dedicated to a particular theme chosen by the editors, with the advice of the editorial board, designed to appeal to both academic specialists and a broader scholarly audience. While not primarily a journal of policy prescriptions, several contributions to each issue will typically connect theory with practice. The editors encourage and actively pursue diversity of viewpoints among contributors. Diversity is also encouraged by selecting authors from among different disciplines, especially philosophy, economics, political science, and the law. Readers' suggestions for future themes are always welcome, as are inquiries about the topics of issues already planned.

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CONTRIBUTORS

Judith Jarvis Thomson is Professor of Philosophy at MIT. She has written a number of articles on topics in ethics and metaphysics, some of which have been reprinted in her collection Rights, Restitution, & Risk. Her book Acts and Other Events is a study in the ontology of action. Her article in this volume is part of the introduction to her forthcoming book (Harvard University Press) on the theory of rights.

Jean Hampton is Associate Professor of Philosophy at University of California, Davis, and has taught at UCLA and the University of Pittsburgh. She is the author of Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, and (with Jeffrie Murphy) Forgiveness and Mercy (both published by Cambridge University Press). Her interests range over topics in political philosophy, ethics, and the philosophy of law. The paper in this volume is part of her research on theories of moral culpability, legal mens rea, and the role of retributive punishment in a liberal state. Another focus of her current research is contemporary moral and political contractarian theory.


Russell Hardin is Mellon Foundation Professor of Political Science, Philosophy, and Public Policy Studies at the University of Chicago. He is the author of Morality within the Limits of Reason (University of Chicago Press, 1988) and Collective Action (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982) and co-editor of Nuclear Deterrence: Ethics and Strategy (University of Chicago Press, 1985). He is also the editor of Ethics. His articles on rational choice, moral and political philosophy, and nuclear defense policy have appeared in many journals and books. He is a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Eric Mack is an Associate Professor of Philosophy, and a member of the faculty of the Murphy Institute of Political Economy, at Tulane University. He has published a wide range of articles in moral, political, and legal philosophy in journals such as Ethics, Philosophical Studies, and Philosophy and Public Affairs, as well as in numerous anthologies. He has edited several books, including Herbert Spencer's The Man Versus The State (Liberty Press, 1982).

Holly M. Smith is Professor of Philosophy and Head of the Philosophy Department at the University of Arizona. Having previously taught at the
CONTRIBUTORS

University of Pittsburgh, the University of Michigan, and the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, her publications focus on normative theory and applied ethics. She is currently working on a book exploring how moral theories ought to accommodate human cognitive shortcomings.

Stephen L. Darwall is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan. He is the author of *Impartial Reason*, a work that criticizes instrumental theories of rationality and develops a substantive account of practical reason, according to which ethical conduct is rational. His other writings span a variety of topics in moral psychology and moral and political philosophy. More recently, his research interests have turned towards the history of ethics. He is currently working on a book on British moral philosophy in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.

Peter Railton is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. He received his Ph.D. from Princeton in 1980. His principal areas of research are ethics and the philosophy of science, and his work has appeared in *Philosophy and Public Affairs, Philosophical Review, Ethics, and Philosophy of Science*, as well as other journals. He has also written papers in applied ethics and value theory for the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy and the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences.

Allan Gibbard is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and has been there since 1977. Previously, he taught at the University of Chicago and the University of Pittsburgh, having received his Ph.D. from Harvard University. He is the author of numerous articles on topics in ethical theory, especially on the structure of utilitarianism and the nature of normative judgments. He has also published in economics journals on the theory of social choice. He is presently finishing a book on moral judgments, and more broadly on judgments of what it makes sense to do and to feel.