

ABSTRACTS FROM INQUIRY

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Kierkegaard's concept of the self, Paul DIETRICHSON, University of Washington.

Anti-Climacus (Kierkegaard) maintains that the self is, not the human psycho-physical synthesis of polarities, but the synthesis or relation "related to itself", which is "freedom". The author shows that this type of freedom or selfhood, though attained by free choice, is not itself freedom of choice. He contends that Anti-Climacus' statement about the self is too abstract and elliptical to be understood adequately from *The Sickness Unto Death* alone but is intelligible in terms of Judge William's doctrine of "choosing oneself" ("Equilibrium ...", *Either/Or*, Vol. II), and that Anti-Climacus in all likelihood intended it to be so interpreted. Arguing that for the synthesis to "relate to itself" and become "freedom" is identical with its "choosing itself" through despair and repentance so as to become liberated from aesthetic bondage, the author explains William's and Anti-Climacus' use of "aesthetic" and draws attention to their pervasive distinction between innocent and culpable aestheticism.

Morality, Choice and Inwardness. Judge William's distinction between the aesthetic and the ethical way of life, Harald OFSTAD with Åke Löfgren, University of Stockholm.

The present paper tries to analyse the way in which Judge William, in Søren Kierkegaard's work *Either/Or*, distinguishes between the aesthetic and the ethical way of life. Basically his distinctions seem to be that the ethicist is a seriously committed person (has inwardness) whereas the aestheticist is indifferent, and that the former accepts universal rules whereas the latter makes an exception for himself.—In order to come from the aesthetic to the ethical stage one must, according to Judge William, make a choice of oneself. We try to show that such a choice is only one among several factors implicit in his reasoning and that he does not at all consider it as a "leap", but as based upon reasons, though his reasons are mostly of an aesthetic nature. Far from seeing the Judge as a champion of choice, we maintain that the book primarily contains a plea for a certain personality ideal. This probably has to do with the fact that he does not seem to be in doubt as to what one ought to do, only as to how to become a person who does what he ought to do. We shall also argue that a choice of oneself, as a matter of fact, is neither necessary nor sufficient in order to bring a person within the ethical stage, as described by the Judge.—A person who lives ethically does not, according to Judge William, necessarily act rightly, but his actions are either right or wrong, as opposed to the actions of the aestheticist which fall outside the domain of the ethical. In order to obtain a tenable distinction within his philosophy between "being within the ethical stage" and "acting ethically rightly" the first concept should be defined in terms of inwardness (serious commitment), the latter as inward conformity with certain universal rules.—This idea of inwardness, probably the most original and fruitful contribution of "Equilibrium", seems to be based, however, like most of his ethical reasoning, on certain controversial assumptions about human nature.

The concept of a christian in Kierkegaard, Hidehito OTANI, Kitasato University, Tokyo.

Though Kierkegaard's writings were intended to convey how a man is to become a Christian, his main works give no account of the content of the concept of a Christian: they treat only of its formal side. The author proposes, however, that Kierkegaard's views on the concept's content are to be found in the uncompleted manuscript, "Armed Neutrality". In this, aspects of pietistic veneration and of mystery combine with Kierkegaard's affirmation of humanity to constitute the idea of a Christian as an individual existing in relation to the decisive truth—an idea that is the basis of Christian Humanism.

Immediacy—Subjectivity—Revelation. An interpretation of Kierkegaard's conception of reality,
Ingvar HORGBY.

Kierkegaard's fundamental view of life was negative and Gnostic. It was through his interpretation of life that his vision of the nothingness of existence became positive. What formed the material of Kierkegaard's interpretation was the common experience of existence, what "all" men know. His concept of existence has a threefold content: immediacy, subjectivity, and the Christian Revelation. Immediate reality that is not made content of subjectivity becomes empty changeableness, and subjectivity that does not appropriate immediacy deprives itself of the concrete (as with the mystic). Immediacy's "text" first acquires a qualitative transcendent content through the "repetition" of subjective choice. Kierkegaard takes this appropriation of the immediate to be also the self-development of subjectivity. Consciousness of guilt is an expression of a God-relationship. Implicated with this consciousness is the consciousness of the nothingness of everything—echoed in man as dread. Yet even when subjectivity is conscious of guilt the truth remains immanent in subjectivity. In the Christian Revelation truth is outside man: subjectivity is untruth (sin).

The paradox in Kierkegaard's religiousness A, Richard SCHMITT, Brown University.

To be religious in the sense which Kierkegaard calls "religiousness A" involves one, according to him, in a paradox. If we take the terms in which he describes this paradox in ordinary senses, it is not clear what this paradox consists of. If we take the terms in a technical sense, the description of being religious involves a paradox. But the paradox is of such a nature that it is now logically impossible that anyone should be religious. If we attach a slightly different meaning to Kierkegaard's terms, being religious is possible but does not involve a paradox. Also on this interpretation, religious conduct becomes indistinguishable from non-religious conduct.

On alienation, Arnold S. KAUFMAN, University of Michigan.

A definition of "alienation" is proposed which is a rational reconstruction of the term as it is used in primarily moral contexts. Special attention is given to the Marxist tradition. It is argued that the earliest, moral form of Marx's economic determinism can be expressed in terms of *the principle of the sufficiency of unalienated labor*. In this connection four main kinds of alienation are distinguished. In the final section, it is argued that while "alienation" has and should have an important theoretical role in the context of moral discourse, social scientists, and in particular sociologists, would be better off if they eliminated "alienation" from their *scientific vocabulary*.

The logic of conditionals, Ernest ADAMS, University of California, Berkeley.

The standard use of the propositional calculus ("P.C.") in analyzing the validity of inferences involving conditionals leads to fallacies, and the problem is to determine where P.C. may be "safely" used. An alternative analysis of criteria of *reasonableness* of inferences in terms of conditions of *justification* rather than *truth* of statements is proposed. It is argued, under certain restrictions, that P.C. may be safely used, except in inferences whose conclusions are conditionals whose antecedents are *incompatible* with the premises in the sense that if the antecedent became known, some of the previously asserted premises would have to be withdrawn.

Quine on translation, Patrick WILSON, University of California, Berkeley.

Against Quine's thesis of the "indeterminacy of translation", in *Word and Object*, it is argued that the extension of terms, where determinable at all except by arbitrary decision, is determinable by empirical means other than comparison of "stimulus meaning", that translation of terms does not presuppose prior translation of syncategoremata, that parallelisms of function of syncategoremata in different languages can in part be discovered on the basis of stimulus

meanings, that it is incorrect to speak of bilinguals' necessarily using "analytical hypotheses", that in one form the thesis is correct and uncontroversial, that in another it is controversial but both unacceptable and at variance with Quine's own views on language.

Discussion: *On misunderstanding Mr. Winch*, A. R. LOUCH, Syracuse University.

Review Discussion: *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, edited by Maurice Natanson, Robert M. BARRY, Loyola University, Chicago.