MARTI IN THE UNITED STATES: THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE. Edited by Louis A. Pérez, Jr. (Tempe: Center for Latin American Studies, Arizona State University, 1995. Pp. 120. $25.00 paper.)


CUBA: THE SHAPING OF REVOLUTIONARY CONSCIOUSNESS. By Tzvi Medin. (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990. Pp. 191. $35.00 cloth.)


U.S. foreign policy has rarely included the past as a factor in diplomatic strategy. Instead, domestic pressures, demonstrated hegemonic power, and protection of economic interests usually influence responses to international tensions, and the wisdom of history is passed over. As a
consequence, opportunities are lost to address the concerns of all parties and to implement judicious agreements by which all nations can abide. The only permanent feature of ahistorical diplomacy, particularly between Cuba and the United States, has been crisis management. Constructive conflict resolution has been an anomaly, and the consequences of hostile disagreement have been the separation of families, the suffering of the Cuban people, the embarrassment of the U.S. government, and the prolonging of the Castro administration’s nondemocratic traditions. Constructive engagement is not an option for Cuba, although it has been for South Africa, China, and Vietnam. Understanding the raison d’être of the Cuban Revolution and appropriate responses to the form it takes today could inspire a policy that would resolve issues surrounding immigration, the rafters, the demise of the Cuban economy, and the nurturing of a democratic Cuba.

Information has always been available about Cuban realities, but only the interested have sought it out. Since 1990, a number of excellent books have appeared that explain Fidel Castro, the revolution, and U.S.-Cuban diplomatic relations, works that should influence policy making in the United States. They share two major assumptions: first, that U.S. history and Cuban history have been comingled since the middle of the nineteenth century; and second, that the Cuban Revolution of 1959 was the logical outgrowth of a century of U.S. hegemonic intentions in the Western Hemisphere and Cuban determination to resist them.

Cuban independence was declared, not won, almost a century ago, after heavy travail by Cubans, who fought three wars of independence between 1868 and 1898. The final unification of patriots and Cuban émigrés in the United States occurred because José Martí defined the movement in new terms. A poet, philosopher, and separationist, Martí argued for the unification of all factions and the integration of a racially torn society. He also urged armed revolt against Spain and warned against the probability of U.S. expansion.

Martí was most influential among the exile community in the United States, where his writing and lectures were familiar to anyone interested in Cuban independence. He appealed to humble cigar workers, intellectuals, former landholders, and professionals who had left Cuba to escape Spanish domination. Martí lived and worked in New York City, but he took inspiration from humble refugees who shaped the philosophy of Cuban nationalism in Florida. Louis Pérez’s edited volume Martí in the United States: The Florida Experience focuses on independence organization and popular responses to Martí’s presence in Tampa, where he wrote The Resolutions of Tampa and The Principles of the Revolution.¹ Perez’s vol-

1. The Resolutions of Tampa laid out the objectives of the final war of independence. Cubans were to fight for liberation from Spain, racial and social justice, resistance to U.S. expansion, and the unification of all factions.
volume differs from other books on Martí in that it focuses on his presence and influence in Tampa and his interaction with other independence organizers. Pérez joins Gerald Poyo in examining an obvious but neglected aspect of Cuba's independence period: exile organizations in their local contexts as they responded to the cause of Cuban independence and the need to survive racial and class prejudices in the United States. Pérez's study focuses on Martí's friendships in Tampa, the mechanisms by which local associations integrated themselves into the Partido Revolucionario Cubano, the ways that Cuban émigrés responded to Martí, his position on women in modern Cuban society, and Martí's legacy in contemporary perceptions about Cuba. These dimensions allow the reader to grasp the symbiotic relationships existing between Martí and the Cuban community that at once embraced and influenced Martí's philosophy and revolutionary stance. *Martí in the United States* is worthwhile reading, although the essays are uneven in quality. Contributors are North American, Cuban American, and Cuban scholars who bring their various views and training to bear on the topic of Martí in Tampa. This volume will serve popular audiences, academics, and high school readers throughout the United States and most certainly history buffs in Florida.

U.S. claims to jurisdiction over Cuba came after the War of 1895, the Spanish American War. It was famously described by then Colonel Theodore Roosevelt as not much of a war, but the best little war we've got, envisioned as a triumphant ride up San Juan Hill by his Rough Riders. The U.S. general public assumed that superior force and command won the war handily for the deserving side. That was not how U.S. soldiers remembered it, however. In *The Santiago Campaign of 1898: A Soldier's View of the Spanish-American War*, A. B. Feuer has collected soldiers' letters and re-created that campaign from the vantage point of the men who fought in it. He has thus rescued the Spanish American War from the myth perpetrated by the yellow press and politicians anxious to convince fellow citizens that the United States was indeed a major nation boasting a

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expansionism, democracy, workers' rights, and modern government. The *Principles of the Revolution* organized the Partido Revolucionario de Cuba, stating the requirements for membership, the preeminence of the party over other organizations until independence was won, leadership positions, and the means to ending Spanish colonial rule in Cuba.


powerful military. This era was, after all, the coming of age of a new empire.

The Santiago campaign was the only battle that the United States fought on Cuban soil during the Spanish American War. It was hastily planned and poorly outfitted. General William Shafter took the bare minimum of supplies from Tampa and little, if any, medical equipment. Landing in Santiago harbor and covered by the barrage of U.S. gunboats, U.S. troops splashed ashore, certain of a quick and heroic victory. If planning was poor, military command and logistics were worse. Men were sent out to attack the enemy ahead of supplies. Reinforcements were then forced off trails by supply mule trains. The entire attack was diverted at El Caney, a sugar mill where Spanish troops ran a maneuver intended to move U.S. forces away from Santiago. The Spanish had superior guns, Mausers that left no smoke to identify the position of an ambusher. And the Spanish fought bravely.

As the battle wore on, U.S. troops ran short of food, leftover rations from the Civil War that proved to be inedible. Troops had to pitch camp in the cold spring rains at night and fight in humid heat by day. They took ill with malaria, and casualties found no medical supplies to treat their wounds and no evacuation strategy to remove them from the field. The conflict lasted only fourteen days—a contest waged not between superior military forces but among men trying to survive battle and the elements despite inept commanders. U.S. determination, perhaps, and low Spanish supplies eventually won the day for the United States. But the U.S. military left more than four thousand men behind to die of malaria in Cuba. The survivors returned home mere skeletons, leaving the press and politicians to ignore or excuse the military’s abuse of its own men.

*The Santiago Campaign* is a good piece of military history. Feuer recounts battle tactics and tells the realities of a war. Placed in Cuban historiography, the study reveals that the U.S. victory was nearly a defeat and that the United States was less commanding than the hype of the day led observers to believe. Feuer substantiates one contested myth about that war: apparently Theodore Roosevelt did ride up San Juan Hill, and he strode unprotected before Spanish fire to rally his troops and hold a strategic spot until reinforcements could continue the battle. *The Santiago Campaign*—based on letters written by men in the field, some of them commanders in the know and others simple soldiers confused and frustrated by conflicting and dangerous orders—sheds light on the incompetence and good luck of this U.S. campaign, which won the United States its first colony.

In *Cuba and the United States: Intervention and Militarism, 1868–1933*, José Hernández has written a compelling account of the period following 1898. It refutes two prevalent but opposing views: that Cuban independence would have resulted in some sort of social democracy had the...
United States left Cuba alone; and that U.S. intervention was necessary to bring stability and order to the new nation. Hernández asserts that the United States actually wanted to introduce modernization and stability but also wished to keep Cubans quiet and to subvert dissidents who demanded the rights and participation called for by Martí. Hernández’s fundamental thesis is that the Cuban military forces—composed of former slaves, some property owners, freed blacks, and professionals—fought for independence and believed that they inherited the victory. Much like other Latin American military governments, the commanders wanted to replace Spanish rule with their own, forgetting the ideals of José Martí. They could not dominate through overt brute force, however, because the United States was counseling democratic rule. To obviate the excesses of military will, General Leonard Wood, U.S. commander of Cuba between 1899 and 1902, disbanded the rebel army. But to maintain order, he discharged and dismissed black soldiers and organized white soldiers into police forces throughout the country. These forces could command and exploit small regions for their own profit. The result was an elusive democracy and the foundation for the eventual military takeover by Fulgencio Batista—and, one might argue, of Fidel Castro as well.

The strength of Cuba and the United States is its demonstration of how some Cubans became accomplices to the demise of democracy on the island. The United States alone could not have debilitated pure democratic urges, for such was not its intent. The U.S. goals were peace and “quiet,” but quiet came at the expense of putting down militant sectors of society, an act that some Cuban veterans of independence were happy to carry out because it awarded them the spoils of war. They could not, however, unleash federal armies against the population and convulse the nation into civil war, as happened in most other Latin American nations, because the United States opposed open warfare.

Hernández touches on other questions raised by prominent historians. Louis Pérez and Rosalie Schwartz have debated about whether banditry in Cuba evidenced class warfare or merely wanton marauding. Hernández offers the opinion that it was both. When independence soldiers had strong leaders with a sense of what independence meant, they were social bandits. When they became discouraged with war and lost faith in their leaders, their crimes displayed no redeeming value in Robin Hood–style adventures. Hernández also portrays Cuba as being more like other Latin American republics in the postcolonial period: nations at

war with themselves over the issue of how to separate the military from the state and the proclivity toward caudillismo. He also demonstrates that the U.S. presence reduced warfare but abetted the rise of a class of white veterans who acquired power and wealth by using disguised force.

The beginning of Cuba and the United States is much stronger than the end. Hernández presents a masterful argument on Cuban independence, the United States, and the liberation army. Unfortunately, however, the last chapter assessing the liberators and leaders until 1933 is superficial, although it should be one of the bases of Hernández’s argument. He fails to explain why Cuban military leaders settled for power and sinecures rather than for property, as Latin American militaries elsewhere have fiercely taken and defended. This account also fails to discuss the disruption of 1912, when the United States advised and aided the suppression of the Partido Independiente de Color, a party founded by black Cuban veterans demanding the pay they had been promised.

This omission adds to the historiography that has denied the participation of black Cubans in any part of national history other than slavery. More important for Hernández’s argument, omission of the 1912 massacre lost the chance to demonstrate how the United States and the white military class cooperated to suppress black citizens’ demands for payment and representation, the cause for which they sacrificed mightily in the wars for Cuban independence. Regardless of these flaws, Cuba and the United States is a well-researched work that adds a credible new dimension to study of the effects of U.S.-Cuban associations immediately after Cuban independence.

Jules Benjamin’s The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution: An Empire of Liberty in an Age of National Liberation traces the origins of the Cuban Revolution from the time of independence through the Batista era. His perspective falls into the camp of those who believe that Cubans had little choice other than revolution in 1959 and that the United States was the major contributor to the shortcomings in liberty and honest government during the early republic. In this way, Benjamin’s view counterbalances that of Hernández. Hernández contributes to general knowledge about internal Cuban choices following independence, while Benjamin offers insight into contradictions within U.S. policy. He explains U.S. hegemonic tendencies by breaking them down into concise and understandable components. The United States wanted modernization for Cuba, which required substantial political, cultural, and economic changes. These changes imposed U.S. models of democracy and capitalism, which served U.S. interests first and Cuban needs only secondarily. As important as prescribed changes was the imposition of stability. Cubans

could not war against themselves over the matters of social injustice projected by Martí. Herein lay the fatal contradiction in U.S. policy: massive change and imposed stability were conflicting missions that required overt repression of the poor, the dark-skinned, and all opponents of U.S. standards of rule. Because the U.S. position was insensitive, uninformed, and ahistorical, it created nationalistic anti-U.S. sentiments among Cubans.

Three U.S. interventions destroyed any sense of Cuban sovereignty, imposed a false stability, and opened economic opportunities for foreign investors. Cubans could not solve their own domestic problems. The demise of the revolution in 1933 testified to the orchestrated defeat of a nationalist movement by the United States while empowering Cubans who resisted change. After 1934, with the military and the new Cuban upper class firmly in control, U.S. leaders were willing to countenance wholesale corruption under Presidents Ramón Grau San Martín and Carlos Prío Socarrás and the Batista dictatorship because they believed the alternative was the growing power of the Partido Socialista de Cuba. Cuban presidents, for their part, used U.S. fear of communism to protect their office. They cooperated in international efforts, such as World War II, and suppressed national drives against U.S. economic domination. In return, they obtained trade and diplomatic treaties with the United States that girded Cuban prosperity as well as their own. These same presidents also invited and sustained Mafia crime that increased to historic proportions while lining their own pockets with untold wealth. A close reading of Benjamin's argument finds him in agreement with Hernández in one sense: both believe that U.S. objectives were contradictory and mistaken. The inevitable consequence was first dictatorship and then revolution.

The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution provides the last word on the position that the United States bears serious responsibility for legitimating the Cuban Revolution. Lectures on U.S.-Cuban relations can be drawn from Benjamin's analysis. It is, however, a work based on secondary sources and thus the culmination of the work of other scholars.

Thomas Patterson's Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution focuses on the years from 1952 to 1959 and the advent of the Cuban Revolution. Using U.S. documentation, Patterson explains "how the United States lost Cuba," "how we let this one get away." His theory holds that U.S. officials, constrained by anticommunist fanaticism and arrogantly certain of their control over the Western Hemisphere, miscalculated the depths of Cuban hatred of U.S. hegemony. First, U.S. officials believed they could control President Batista, even to the point of convincing him to resign. Second, they underestimated the liability borne by Cuban presidents for their close association with the United States. Third, these officials misjudged the popularity of the revo-
volutionary movement and the radical nationalism that gripped the island between 1957 and 1959. Fourth, they misunderstood Fidel Castro's fanatical opposition to the United States and his fixed determination to defeat U.S. domination of the island and himself. The failure of the U.S. diplomatic core and private entrepreneurs to read the situation accurately and to provide appropriate responses fueled anti-U.S. sentiment throughout the island.

Patterson's analysis counsels the limits of hegemony, limits learned but forgotten after Korea, Vietnam, and Guatemala in 1979. When a nation is undergoing civil war, international powers must act within the contexts of regional, national, historical, and cultural constraints. To forego that lesson invites a contract for failure.

Contesting Castro is well written and an excellent reference on U.S.-Cuban diplomatic history during the 1950s. No other study treats this period in such detail. It reveals many new stories, such as rebel kidnappings of U.S. citizens to gain publicity and concessions from the United States. At the same time, the book exhibits some annoying inaccuracies and omissions. The account of the Cuban kidnapping of Canadian and U.S. engineers was drawn from U.S. Consul Park Wollam's notes and contains no information from Cuban archives. Use of these archives would have challenged the Cuban exile myth that Castro forced his will on an entire nation otherwise favorably disposed toward the United States. This assumption (which Patterson seems to accept) ignores popular action protesting U.S. influence. Mining Cuban archives will reveal new knowledge about the profound and diverse resistance to Batista and will provoke serious research on how Castro consolidated power over loosely associated rebels. 6

Perhaps the best of this group of outstanding books is Van Gosse's Where the Boys Are: Cuba, the Cold War, and the Making of the New Left. Named after the song that topped pop music charts in the early 1960s, this study examines the inception of the New Left in the United States, identifying the effects of domestic forces and the Cuban Revolution as the unifiers of the U.S. generation of the 1960s. The book is brilliant in its breadth of coverage, profound understanding of intellectual currents of the 1950s and 1960s in the United States, and valid analysis of the impact of the Cuban Revolution on these elements. Where the Boys Are equals

Fredrick Pike’s work that combines intellectual history and diplomatic analysis to explain the concept of Manifest Destiny in terms of nineteenth-century Anglo mentalité. Gosse concentrates on the radical decade now so misrepresented and defiled, preserving both the good-heartedness and the shortsightedness of those who challenged McCarthyism and U.S. foreign interventions.

Robert Quirk has portrayed Fidel Castro as an overgrown Boy Scout, but Castro had his contemporaries in the United States. According to Gosse, U.S. students rejected a disagreeable diet of anti-communist propaganda in school. Bald racism practiced in the U.S. South and flagrant imperialism in Latin America confounded U.S. youth brought up on the idea that the United States of America stood for higher ideals and was committed to the principles of the American Revolution. When members of this generation witnessed the carelessly veiled illegal ouster of President Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala by U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother, CIA Director Allen Dulles, the glory of national revolutions transformed them into rebels with a cause. They then had reason to stand against their government’s excesses and the effects of capitalism. Communists they were not, but radical liberals they were. Their recognition of historical truth unified them in a struggle to restore the American dream. They matched their commitment to change with the confidence of U.S.-style youthful romanticism in believing that they had the heroic power to make a difference.

Sympathy for the Cuban Revolution coalesced into an organization that called itself Fair Play for Cuba, now infamous because of the affiliation of presidential assassin Lee Harvey Oswald. Never numbering more than five to six thousand members, Fair Play practiced bake-sale politics rather than underground subversion of the American way. It held seminars and raised funds for its own activities. Its mission was to counter the rough treatment given to the Cuban Revolution in the mainstream U.S. press. The group ended by becoming a political center for an ideologically disjointed group of individuals throughout the country, especially on U.S. college campuses. Their mistake was to project onto Cuba their own goals and to assume that Castro would heed U.S. revolutionary ideals rather than his own. This error led to the New Left’s lingering support for a revolution that had become authoritarian and narrowly Cuban nationalist. The members’ own shortsightedness, not Cuban trickery, left them with little basis for loyalty after 1970. They had lost Cuba and were discredited in the United States. The disappearance of Fair Play began the silence in the United States about Cuban reality and Cuban history.

8. See Quirk, Fidel Castro.
Gosse explains how the New Left had placed stock in Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, not dreaming that Cubans had their own imperatives for revolution that were completely unrelated to a U.S. search for national rejuvenation. Like politicians and policy makers of today, these young people did not understand that the Cuban Revolution was about sovereignty and cubanidad. As Castro turned increasingly to socialism and rebuffed U.S. sympathizers unwilling to go all the way and become communists, idealists floundered in attempting to excuse the hard turn to the communist Left. Gosse sets a new standard for writing the history of international relations by linking the effects of foreign events and U.S. foreign policy abroad with domestic events. The traditional approach usually reverses the analysis by studying the effects of domestic events on foreign policy.

The six books discussed thus far offer new and informed explanations of U.S.-Cuban relations from the viewpoint of the United States. Hernández’s contribution goes one step further in balancing U.S. objectives in Cuba against indigenous postindependence struggles for control. Gosse reveals the effects of the Cuban Revolution on the New Left during the 1960s, which marked a generational mentalité. All these books chronicle U.S. aggression and its consequences in the United States and to a limited extent in Cuba. They allow understanding of the roots of the revolution in 1959 and sympathizing with Cuba’s legitimate call for sovereignty. Cubans’ refusal to rebel against Fidel Castro in the face of today’s misery, however, demands further explanation.

Two books have been written on postrevolutionary Cuba and the creation of the revolutionary mystique that holds a volatile people together under extremely difficult circumstances. Tzvi Medin explains in Cuba: The Shaping of Revolutionary Consciousness how Fidel Castro used communications media, education, and military channels to create a revolutionary consciousness capable of repelling the most determined propaganda and intervention efforts by the United States. Castro built on the disgruntled nationalism characteristic of the first fifty-six years of the Cuban republic, and he grafted it onto socialist values while achieving a level of military preparedness not evident before 1959.

Castro had to persuade Cubans, some of whom strongly opposed him, to accept socialism. His message of hope and social justice converted many to a supportive posture. The institutional carriers of the revolutionary message were film, the print media, education, mass organizations, and the military.

Throughout this transition, the United States was equated with imperialism and the Soviet Union with aid and succor. Revolutionary instruction on nationalism and ideological alignment with the socialist bloc created an emotional state of mind among Cubans that allowed Castro to restructure Cuba’s governing institutions. The assumption of
socialist principles coincided with a heroic moment in Cuban history: the victory at the Bay of Pigs. Socialism took root as much as a reaction to U.S. belligerence as an acceptance of a collective and centralized system of production and government. Cuba’s historic anti-imperialistic stance against U.S. efforts to reconquer Cuba made the step toward the Soviet alternative predictable, although its longevity was not anticipated.

The Cuban socialist mode also included a new nomenclature, symbols, and even syntax in revolutionary language. Castro came to embody the revolution, and the Cuban people were his disciples. True Cuban revolutionaries accepted government-driven values as their own. National self-absorption, unquestioning loyalty, and revolutionary clichés elicited blind faith in Castro and the revolution.

The revolution’s survival has depended on opposition embodied by Cuban exiles (“gusanos” and “villains”) and by the United States (“the executioner of nations,” “the great enemy of mankind”). Without villains, Castro’s histrionics would have made no sense. Sacrifice, heroism, and death—images central to Cuban nationalism—require an adversarial monster. Regarding heroism, Cubans know that sacrifice for an idea ennobles the cause and its champion. Fallen heroes are constantly placed before the Cuban public to remind them that valiant struggle triumphs over death and sacrifice dignifies the cause. Cubans are conditioned and committed to fight to a heroic death or to leave quietly. A blockade, an exalted ultra-right exile community, and the U.S. role as the antihero are indispensable to the revolution’s survival.

*Cuba: The Shaping of Revolutionary Consciousness* offers excellent insight into the intellectual and spiritual orientations of the Cuban Revolution. The book’s weakness lies in its discussion of the means of communicating these principles to the Cuban people. Medin rightly pinpoints basic mechanisms: education, film, detective fiction, poetry, popular music, theatre, testimonial literature, the armed forces, mass organizations, and the Cuban Communist Party. His treatment of these channels is superficial, however, and invites scholars in diverse disciplines to put Medin’s theory to the test. In large part, their results should support his views.

Donald Rice apparently did not know about Medin’s work when he chose to study how Fidel Castro projected leadership and how he communicated his authority to Cubans. Rice’s narrower and more detailed study of the politicization of Cuba, *The Rhetorical Uses of the Authorizing Figure: Fidel Castro and José Martí*, reinforces Medin’s theory. A professor of rhetoric and communication, Rice examined Castro’s speeches to discern how he boosted his authority and increased his power. Rice claims that Castro depended on past figures of authority (Martí and other revolutionary heroes) to elevate his own image. Castro figuratively wrapped himself in the mantle of Martí’s philosophy and his martyrdom.
Martí’s fierce nationalism and his warning against U.S. expansionism have thus ended up undergirding Castro’s struggle for sovereignty.

While Castro has certainly usurped Martí’s legend, he has also depended on the United States, the omnipresent and looming opponent, and its embargo to keep his interpretation of international events and national objectives uncontested in Cuba. Without the long and disagreeable history of hostility between Cuba and the United States, Castro would not have been able to deify himself. But the most important element (and perhaps the least valued in all studies) is the Cuban popular consciousness to which all of these allegories and metaphors appealed. Without the sense of defeat and humiliation following a half-century of U.S. domination, Cubans would not have listened to Castro nor understood his self-association with José Martí.

Rice chronicles in much more detail than Medin the parallels between Castro and Martí, and he explains how Castro linked José Martí with Karl Marx. Martí set the directions, Marx modernized them, and Castro realized them. Some have argued that only the passage of time made the difference between the ideas of Martí and Marx. Projecting their images and icons, Castro defined a movement and led a people. Under his own leadership, Marxism, and the struggle for nationhood, all problems of social injustice in Cuba were to be resolved. Rice traces his perspective into the 1980s and presents the current conundrum: will Castro be able to disengage his personality from the progress of the revolution so that it can stand alone? In short, will the Cuban Revolution survive beyond Fidel?

Neither Rice nor Medin points out that from the beginning, Castro strayed from the teachings of Martí and Marx. He has used both philosophers’ work in an ahistorical fashion, extracting their words and ideas to suit his own crises. Castro has also adopted other nationalists’ means of leadership, including those of Adolf Hitler. Rice emphasizes Fidel Castro’s speech “History Will Absolve Me” as the rearticulation of Martí’s principles of Cuban independence. The title, however, was taken from Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf, in which the Führer set down his principles for Nazi national socialism. Rice also neglects to discuss the allegiance that other opponents of Batista’s felt for Martí. The Partido Auténtico as well as the Partido Ortodoxo each maintained that its members were the true interpreters of Martí, and both parties opposed the Batista dictatorship. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that Castro wrested Martí’s icon away from other opposition groups. Taken together, the studies by Medin and Rice demonstrate how Cubans have willingly embraced revolutionary ethics.

Two other recent books merit notice here. Leslie Bethell has extracted a concise history of Cuba from three chapters of The Cambridge History of Latin America. His Cuba: A Brief History provides an overview of
Cuban economy, society, and politics from the middle of the eighteenth century to the present. This volume could be useful in survey classes that give scant attention to Cuba. A better, albeit much more detailed, book for survey classes is Louis Pérez's *Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution*. Bethell's brief history is not intended to add original analysis to scholarly knowledge of Cuba's history.

In *The Cuban Revolution and the United States: A Chronological History*, Jane Franklin offers a detailed chronology of events occurring between the United States and Cuba from 1959 through 1990. The book lists events and offers interpretations of the relationship between the two countries that yielded controversy and limited negotiations. Franklin's sympathy obviously lies with the revolutionary government: she explains the Cuban condition at length but pays little attention to the U.S. rationale for action. Read as a whole, this book demonstrates how one event led to others and why the government in Cuba made the decisions it did. The reader can perceive the finite options at any given moment. This volume attends to detail, amazing detail, and should be available for consultation by anyone doing research on the revolutionary period. Specialists also should read it to sharpen their control of facts, at least facts as the Cuban government defines them. Franklin's dictionary history of the revolutionary period clearly required tremendous discipline and concentration.

Cubans have loved their revolution and have been proud of having resisted U.S. domination for thirty-six years. But now they are exhausted from years of sacrifice, and many are frustrated by the lack of democratic empowerment. The economic structures of socialism have dissolved, leaving only the political shell as a legacy of the past. That shell can also become the bridge to change, if change is introduced peacefully. Accurate information about Cuban history and Cuban thinking could gird a wise and lasting foreign policy between the United States and Cuba. The books reviewed in this essay provide the information needed to implement astute strategies for bringing peaceful coexistence to the Caribbean.