

foreign (mostly German-language) press reports dealing with the Russian emigration; a list of archival and other sources; genealogical tables of the Russian imperial family; and an extensive and useful bibliography in which the Russian items are, however, somewhat haphazard. There is also an appendix containing three unpublished documents concerning Bermond-Avalov.

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RIZHSKII MIR: IZ ISTORII BOR'BY SOVETSKOGO PRAVITEL'STVA ZA USTANOVLENIE MIRNYKH OTNOSHENII S POL'SHEI (KONETS 1918—MART 1921 G.). By P. N. Olshansky. Moscow: "Nauka," 1969. 260 pp. 1 ruble, 7 kopeks.

The Treaty of Riga of 1921 is more of a "forgotten peace" than Brest-Litovsk was when Wheeler-Bennett devoted his excellent monograph to it. Except for the well-documented memoirs of the chief Polish delegate in Riga, there is no single study in any language dealing with this peace settlement which not only determined Soviet-Polish relations during the interwar period but stabilized the situation in East Central Europe for almost two decades. Hence the appearance of a Russian book entitled "The Riga Peace" is bound to arouse the interest of diplomatic historians.

Olshansky's slender volume is, however, totally disappointing. Nearly half of it concerns the preconference Soviet-Polish relations, and that part is filled with worn-out clichés, omissions, and misinterpretations. The two chapters that deal with peace negotiations at Minsk and Riga are hardly better. Although the author has made some use of Polish archives, he refers only seven or eight times (throughout the entire volume) to Soviet archival material, and in no case does he produce new or interesting evidence. It is surely paradoxical that this reviewer in his work on Soviet-Polish relations could bring forth more archival material—for instance the Trotsky papers—than a Soviet historian writing in Russia. Many important questions that could be answered only by dipping into the Soviet archives are ignored. One learns nothing about Soviet peace preparations, if any, on the eve of the stillborn Borisov conference. Marchlewski's diary, which is supposedly in Moscow, is not used. It is hard to imagine that the Russian delegation in Riga kept no protocols, and we do know that it was in frequent correspondence with Lenin. But Olshansky produces no material of this type and far too often uses as his sources *Pravda* or *Izvestiia*.

*Rizhskii mir* can hardly be regarded as a scholarly monograph, and its value to historians is minimal at best. It could only be useful to "Sovietologists" insofar as it may be indicative of trends in Soviet historiography. While it is not puzzling to see Trotsky and Radek mentioned only once each, it is surely interesting that Stalin's name does not appear in the book at all. The Red Army's defeat in Warsaw, which had once been explained as Tukhachevsky's fault, and then—for a brief period—as Stalin's, is now blamed by Olshansky on, of all people, Wrangel.

Based on little archival material, and ignoring monographs (even early Soviet ones) which are inconvenient to the author's thesis, Olshansky's book is a weak apologia for Soviet foreign policy in 1918–21.

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