DISUNITY IN DIVERSITY
Party System Fragmentation and the Dynamic Effect of Ethnic Heterogeneity on Latin American Legislatures*

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Received: 5-16-2005; Revise and Resubmit 10-24-2005; Revised Received 11-29-2005; Final Acceptance 1-31-2006

Abstract: This paper demonstrates that in Latin America a significant portion of the increased legislative party system fragmentation since the 1980s is explained by the recent political incorporation of ethnic populations. Until now, scholars have likely not identified this relationship because they have not used the nuanced measures of ethnic fractionalization that account for internal diversity of indigenous populations and race, and because they have not focused on the time period when ethnic peoples were politically incorporated. In addition to demonstrating this relationship statistically, we use two case studies from Bolivia and Ecuador to illustrate how in recent years the dynamic relationship between ethnic groups and political parties in Latin American legislatures has changed and resulted in the statistical association between ethnic fractionalization and party system fragmentation that we observe.

High levels of legislative party system fragmentation—measured in terms of the number of parties winning seats in legislative elections—are detrimental to the proper functioning of democratic regimes and are a particular concern in new democracies. Fragmentation complicates coalition building in the legislature and inhibits compromise on policy issues (Laakso and Taagepera 1979; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Cox

*We would like to thank Jesse George and Andrew Gunnoe for valuable research assistance. We also thank Jeffry Lewis, Franco Mattei, and Michael Thies for statistical advice, Scott H. Beck, Michael Coppendge, Mark P. Jones, Steven Levitsky, Kenneth J. Mijeski, and José E. Molina V., for data, and Henry Dietz, Raul Madrid, Marc Rosenblum, and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts. A prior version was presented at the 2004 Congress of the Latin American Studies Association. All errors and omissions are the authors’.

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https://doi.org/10.1353/lar.2007.0000 Published online by Cambridge University Press
Highly fragmented party systems appealing to ethnic cleavages are considered particularly dangerous, owing to the difficulties associated with policy compromise across cleavages. These underlying ethnic cleavages interact with institutional barriers partly to determine the number of parties in the legislature. In general, the greater the social diversity, the greater the fragmentation of parties in the legislature, since parties will appeal to and represent distinct social cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Powell 1982; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Cox 1997; Coppedge 1997b; Mozaffar et al. 2003). The political implications of ethnic cleavages are particularly important in newly democratic countries, where social structure may have a larger impact than institutions in shaping political life (Rosenblum and Huelschoff 2004). Yet studies of the political implications of ethnicity in Latin America have failed to produce a clear picture of the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and important political variables, such as party system fragmentation.

There are several possible reasons why the theoretically expected relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and political variables has been curiously absent from the Latin American electoral literature and has not been verified empirically. First, the political mobilization of cleavages into support for political parties depends on institutional constraints and other barriers to the representation of different groups (Chandra 2004; Posner 2005; Birnir 2004, 2007; Madrid 2005a; Van Cott 2005). Second, since ethnic cleavages in Latin America only recently have become politicized, the literature on party systems mainly focuses on the historical development of politicized class cleavages and fails to account accurately for the impact of recently mobilized ethnic cleavages on long-standing and more recent processes of party fragmentation (Collier and Collier 1991; Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Consequently, scholars likely have mainly used measures of cleavage fractionalization that fail to accurately capture the number and intensity of intracleavage divisions and the resulting effect on party systems. Third, perhaps the political implications of ethnic heterogeneity vary among world regions and over time depending on the particular political culture, history, social structure, and the relative number and configuration of ethnic groups common to each (Mozaffar et al. 2003).

In this paper we explore these possibilities. We find that in Latin America the relationship between party system fragmentation and underlying ethnic cleavages today is strong and robust, particularly with respect to indigenous ethnic groups. Interestingly, this relationship

1. See, for example, Shugart and Carey (1992); Jones (1994, 1995); Mainwaring and Shugart (1997); Payne et al. (2002); Moreno (2003). Exceptions include Madrid (2005a, 2005b) and Van Cott (2000; 2005).
does not occur the same way as in Europe, where each ethnic group often forms its own political party as a result of becoming politicized through a long historical struggle. In Latin America, in contrast, until recently indigenous peoples have frequently been prevented from fielding their own political parties. However, in recent years electorally viable indigenous political parties emerged to represent increasingly mobilized but divergent segments of the indigenous population (Van Cott 2005).

Contrary to the predictions of the party system literature that party systems "freeze" after suffrage is expanded to incorporate all adult citizens (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), in Latin America the delayed emergence of ethnic political mobilization continues to contribute to increasing party fragmentation. Rather than cohesively supporting a single party, the underrepresented cleavage—ethnicity—fractures along internal fault lines and supports many different nonethnic parties that appeal to distinct segments of the cleavage. We argue that the empirical verification of the relationship between ethnic cleavages and party system fragmentation has eluded researchers because existing measures fail to account for recent mobilization and internal divisions within ethnic groups. Using illustrative case studies from Bolivia and Ecuador, we argue that more nuanced measures of social diversity and more recent electoral data—since unrestricted indigenous mobilization under fully democratic conditions has only just begun—are necessary to capture the effect of social cleavages on party system fragmentation. We test this argument by juxtaposing the explanatory capabilities of distinct measures of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization over the period of time since suffrage was extended fully to indigenous and other underprivileged groups in Latin America. We test for the effect of ethnic fractionalization on party system fragmentation, holding a number of institutional, economic, and demographic variables constant, on a dataset containing national electoral results for all democratic Latin American countries between 1980 and 2000. We show that even when we control for institutional barriers, population size, and economic conditions, party system fragmentation increases significantly as ethnic groups mobilize politically. Furthermore, our data indicate that the most important institutional barriers are the timing of and electoral formula used in presidential elections, while the number of seats in an electoral district also has an effect.\footnote{This confirms the work of Ordeshook and Svetsova (1994) and Amorim Neto and Cox (1997), qualifying Mainwaring and Shugart's (1997) and Rosenblum and Huelshoff's (2004) findings.} Second, we show that this increase is attributable to the political incorporation of a new cleavage in the late 1990s in Latin America's more heterogeneous countries, rather than to long-standing high levels of ethnic diversity in those countries, or to...
a more generalized trend toward further party system fragmentation in the entire region.

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND PARTY SYSTEM FRAGMENTATION

How does ethnic diversity contribute to high party system fragmentation in Latin America? We illustrate this relationship by focusing on Latin America’s diverse indigenous populations, although we believe our findings are relevant for other unincorporated or recently incorporated ethnic and/or racial groups as well. The term “indigenous peoples,” when used in the Americas, refers to the peoples who populated the Western Hemisphere prior to the arrival of Europeans. There are an estimated 34–40 million indigenous persons in Latin America, comprising approximately 8–10 percent of the region’s total population and belonging to hundreds of distinct culture and language groups. Contemporary Latin American party systems are likely to be fragmented in countries with large indigenous populations for four reasons.

First, although nonelites entered party systems in most Latin American countries before World War II, political elites in countries with significant indigenous populations maintained old and adopted new patterns of exclusion and coercion—such as literacy and residency requirements—to prevent the formation of an independent indigenous electoral bloc. The rigid race-based social and economic hierarchy in countries with large indigenous populations also enabled elites to dominate the national political system more effectively—and longer—than in less ethnically segmented countries (Van Cott 2000). Furthermore, in a number of Latin American countries with indigenous populations, electoral institutions interacted with the demographic distribution of the indigenous groups to prevent them from fielding separate political parties when the franchise was fully extended. In the 1990s, institutional reforms removed barriers to new party registration and competition and, thus, opened party systems to underrepresented sectors of society. Eased registration requirements and decentralization were particularly important in opening electoral terrain to new groups, particularly indigenous peoples, who tend to be geographically concentrated (Birnir 2004; Van Cott 2005). Consequently, as Madrid (2005b) argues, in the absence of an authentic indigenous electoral alternative through ethnic parties or among the dominant nonethnic parties, once the franchise was fully extended the indigenous population splits its vote among a variety of nonindigenous parties, further contributing to the fragmentation and dealignment of Latin American party systems.3

Second, indigenous populations have tended to vote for three types of political parties: clientelist, populist, and leftist. Clientelist parties offer

3. For example, in our sample the statistically significant (one tailed) average increase in Effective Number of Parties with Seats from the time a country enters the data until the last election is 0.76.
material rewards, which are attractive to indigenous peoples living in conditions of scarcity. In the late 1970s through the 1980s, typically one or a few clientelist or populist parties effectively captured the limited indigenous vote by appealing to indigenous peoples as a homogeneous peasant caste. In the 1980s, after the return to elected, civilian rule, constraints on economic resources caused by structural adjustment reduced the ability of clientelist parties to supply patronage and of populist parties to deliver on campaign promises. These major economic changes also caused greater differentiation within and among indigenous communities, forced many indigenous peasants off of long-held communal lands and into non-farm occupations, and generated massive urban migration. During this time many indigenous voters switched their allegiance to the left, whose programmatic agenda supported key indigenous demands, such as agrarian reform and subsidies for the poor. Compared to the right side of the political spectrum, the left tends to offer a larger number of electoral alternatives (Coppedge 1997a). Thus, in a country where leftist parties are receiving support from a large, politically mobilized indigenous population, we may expect to find a relatively higher level of party system fragmentation, owing to the internal fragmentation of the left.

Third, large indigenous populations have persisted mainly in geographic enclaves that are defined by rugged and inhospitable terrain. Thus, to some extent, ethnicity is a proxy for territorial fragmentation, which tends to breed regional parties. Moreover, the concentration of indigenous populations in particular provinces or departments adds to the regionally fragmented nature of political competition, as different areas have different social profiles. Indeed, the most profound distinction in most countries within the indigenous group is that between those settled in lowland areas—where they tend to be sparsely settled and have had less contact with the state, the market, and Western culture—and those settled in highland areas—where they are usually more densely settled, have had greater contact with the state, the market, and political parties, and are more assimilated into Western culture. Highland and lowland Indians tend to belong to different ethnolinguistic groups, although migration of highland Indians to lowland areas in search of land has been common since the 1960s. Within these larger geographic categories, linguistic and cultural distinctions vary in importance, generating persistent low-intensity competition over access to land and resources and over leadership

4. In addition to Bolivia, prior to the 1990s, Mexico’s Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) captured the indigenous vote by controlling votes in rural areas through fraud, coercion, and patronage. In Venezuela, until the emergence of viable leftist parties in the 1980s, two elite parties—Acción Democrática and COPEI—dominated the indigenous vote through the creation of dependent peasant and indigenous organizations.

5. Our conservative count of parties that Coppedge classified finds that leftist/center-left parties outnumber right/center-right parties by 248 to 186.
positions within local and zonal organizations or violent confrontations that prevent cooperation on issues of common concern. Intragroup conflicts can be manifested within indigenous organizations that aggregate multiple indigenous identities or in the creation of rival organizations in the same geographic space.

Fourth, in geographic enclaves where the state has a poor presence we see the development of what O’Donnell calls “brown areas,” in which the rule of law and democratic institutions are weak (1994, 163). In countries with large indigenous populations, large areas of territory are brown areas. Party system fragmentation in brown areas is a symptom of poorly institutionalized political parties (Mainwaring and Scully 1995).

The greater social and economic differentiation within the indigenous category, combined with the proliferation of electoral vehicles appealing to indigenous voters in the absence of ethnic parties after redemocratization, increased the importance of existing intraethnic distinctions among indigenous peoples, which often line up with increasing inequalities in income and differences in lifestyles. We concur with Madrid (2005b) that in the absence of ethnic parties that represent a “best” alternative to the whole ethnic group or an effective appeal from a major party, fragmentation increases as groups internally split their votes.

In the following section we briefly describe the degree of internal diversity of indigenous populations and political movements in Bolivia and Ecuador with respect to the explanations for internal diversity outlined above, as well as the diversity of indigenous-party alliances made in each case. Thus, the two case studies illustrate our argument that indigenous groups fracture politically along multiple internal cleavages, including ethnic and linguistic fault lines. Furthermore, the cases show that divergent factions often support different parties, thus contributing to increases in party system fragmentation in the absence of a viable and unifying ethnic option. We chose Bolivia and Ecuador because they illustrate ethnic mobilization before and during the fully competitive period of democracy under study here. In both countries indigenous peoples formed their own successful parties in 1995 and 1996, respectively, allowing us to observe voting behavior before and after an electorally viable ethnic option is available. The case studies also demonstrate the distinct nature of contemporary relations between political parties and ethnic minorities in Latin America compared to other world regions. The statistical analysis that follows concentrates on ethnolinguistic cleavages and race to demonstrate that improved accounts of internal ethnic and linguistic diversity and the addition of race better predict concomitant party fragmentation than measures that report less of this divergence.
THE BOLIVIAN AND ECUADORIAN CASES

Bolivia

Bolivia has the largest indigenous population in South America: 62.05 percent of the population according to the 2000 census. The government recognizes thirty-seven distinct “indigenous” ethnic groups. Most Indians belong to one of two western highland ethnic groups: the Aymara (25 percent) and Quechua (31 percent). Within these two groups, the indigenous are divided into territorially defined extended kinship groups called ayllus with historical roots that predate the conquest. The remainder lives in the eastern lowland departments, where the largest groups are the Guaraní (75,500) and Chiquitano (61,520) (Instituto Nacional Estadistico 2001; VAIPO 1998, 35).

The Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) mobilized and armed indigenous peasants and miners in order to win the 1952 revolution. Afterwards, the party controlled the highland indigenous population by imposing a sindicato structure that replaced in many areas traditional organizations. Grateful for the agrarian reform and for the right to vote bestowed by the MNR, indigenous voters supported the party. They often had no choice, since opposition party ballots—which parties were responsible for distributing—didn’t arrive in many rural locations (Ticona et al. 1995, 167). Well into the 1980s the MNR was the only party capable of dispensing patronage with a presence in much of the rural highlands. As the MNR moved to the right during the neoliberal restructuring of the 1980s, it gradually lost its rural hegemony to various populist and leftist parties.

The political opening during the tumultuous democratic transition (1978–1982) resulted in significantly increased political fragmentation among Bolivian Indians in the highlands (Van Cott 2005). The emergence of independent indigenous political movements prompted most parties to court the indigenous vote. Furthermore, two distinct movements to form indigenous political parties emerged: one leftist-oriented tendency developed from the Aymara and Quechua peasant movement, while Aymara intellectuals elaborated a more radical, ethno-nationalist discourse. In the early 1980s, the burgeoning highland indigenous movement’s key organizations supported these parties, while maintaining covert relations with newly created mestizo-led leftist parties in order to maintain access to patronage. But none of the indigenous parties ever won 2 percent of the vote, leading many indigenous voters to support parties more likely to win and to dispense patronage.

The main organization representing highland Indians is the Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB), with which most highland Indians, as well as peasant farmers in other areas of the country, are connected through local and
departmental affiliates. But rather than consolidate the indigenous vote, this organization further fragments it. CSUTCB was founded by Aymara intellectuals and union leaders in 1979. By the late 1980s, the predominance of the Aymara in this organization had been eclipsed by the greater dynamism and militancy within the affiliated mainly Quechua coca growers’ organizations. In the mid-to-late 1980s, competition among leftist, clientelist, and populist parties to capture the indigenous vote became more fierce and overt, and many CSUTCB leaders became attached to particular leftist parties, which “purchased” particular leaders, gained entry to CSUTCB conferences by funding travel and logistical needs, and distributed patronage in indigenous communities. Whereas at the beginning of the decade communities tended to reach consensus on political affiliations and to vote en masse for particular parties, by the end of the 1980s communities were more fragmented and voting more individualistically (Ticona et al. 1995, 169). In addition, the CSUTCB has been fiercely divided since 1998 by personal, ethnic, and ideological feuds among its principal leaders. In the 1990s a movement to reconstitute the ayllu and to unite them into regional federations increasingly challenged the hegemony of the CSUTCB in the highlands.

The MNR recaptured part of the indigenous vote in 1993 by allying with an indigenous party. In the 1990s the populist party Condepa also attracted indigenous voters by using symbols of Aymara culture and language and offering patronage to the urban indigenous elite. The death of its founder in 1997, however, led to the collapse of this party prior to the 2002 elections. The Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) gained considerable ground with the indigenous electorate during the Banzer-Quiroga administration (1997-2002), when the party used its control over the indigenous affairs office to co-opt indigenous organizations. But the most important challenger for the indigenous vote emerged in 1995, when the mostly Quechua coca growers’ movement led a campaign within the CSUTCB to form a new indigenous party, the Assembly for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (ASP). In 1997, ASP garnered 3.7 percent of the national vote—the highest proportion at the time for any indigenous party—and elected four national deputies. Regional and interpersonal rivalries caused the party to split before the 1999 elections. Coca growers’ leader Evo Morales led the splinter Instrumento Político para la Soberanía del Pueblo (IPSP), while Quechua leader Alejo Veliz led the rump ASP. In the 2002 national elections, the IPSP, using the registration of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), finished second with 20.94 percent of the vote. The ASP did not compete independently; its main leaders ran with a regional party. But the IPSP was not the only indigenous party in the race. The Aymara leader Felipe Quispe’s Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti, formed in 2000, won 6.09 percent of the vote. In order to compete with the two main indigenous
parties, in 2002 traditional parties invited more indigenous leaders than ever before to run on their congressional tickets (author interviews, La Paz, Santa Cruz, June 2002).

The electoral picture is equally fragmented in the lowlands, where regional federations are constructed over ethnic building blocks. The Guaraní, Ayoreo, Chiquitanos and Guarayos formed the largest such organization, the Confederation of Bolivian Indians (CIDOB), in 1982. Until the mid-1990s, many lowland Indians did not participate in elections. Most were not registered to vote. In some cases, local indigenous elites would vote on behalf of a largely politically disengaged population. This changed after the 1994 municipal decentralization law stimulated voter registration and electoral participation. But the newly enfranchised and mobilized lowland indigenous population did not vote as a block (author interviews, June 23–July 3, 2002, La Paz, Santa Cruz). In 1995’s first-ever nationwide municipal elections, local indigenous organizations negotiated with whatever parties seemed best in their areas. In some cases, members of the same language group allied with competing parties (Pessoa 1998, 184; Albó 1997). CIDOB leaders’ decision to ally with the Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL) for the 1997 national elections provoked protests from CIDOB members who believed the party had poor chances of winning. Many affiliates set out on their own. Santa Cruz affiliate CPESC allied with the leftist Eje Pachakuti, the Chiquitanos allied with the MNR, while the Guarayos in the same district allied with the MIR. Thus, in many districts indigenous candidates competed against each other representing as many as three or four different parties (CIDOB 1996, 17–18; Pessoa 1998, 201). Similar results followed the decision in 2002 to allow member organizations to make their own partisan alliances (author interview, June 23, 2002, La Paz).

Thus, in Bolivia, after the MNR lost hegemony, indigenous voters divided their votes among a number of parties willing to distribute patronage or to appeal to the distinct economic interests and identities of this diverse population. From within the indigenous movement, a variety of parties emerged representing various ethnic and regional identities and purporting to defend various economic interests. These failed to unite indigenous voters until the emergence of the MAS. After two national elections in which it increased its vote share from 3.7 to 20.9 percent, in 2005 the party won an unprecedented 53.7 percent, yielding both the presidency and a congressional majority.

Ecuador

Estimates of Ecuador’s indigenous population vary dramatically. A 2001 Ecuadorian government survey estimates the indigenous population to be between 6.1 and 14.3 percent (Guzmán 2003; SIISE 2003). This estimate is far lower than those used by scholars and international
agencies, which range from 15 to 45 percent. The largest indigenous subgroup is the Quichua. The highland Quichua population is estimated at approximately 1.3 million. Within the Quichua group the government recognizes 17 distinct cultural subgroupings. In the Amazon, twelve distinct “nationalities” are recognized. The largest consists of approximately 90,000 Quichua who migrated from the highlands, followed by the Shuar, with approximately 40,000 members (Pallares 2002, 6).

The highland indigenous population has a long history of contact with the highly fractionalized political left (Lucero 2002; Pallares 2002). However, the utility of these contacts for parties was limited until 1979, when the literacy requirement for voting was removed and the rate of voter participation in Ecuador increased from 19 to 45 percent of the population in 1986 (McDonald and Ruhl 1989, 314). In the early 1980s, some indigenous leaders ran as candidates with leftist and center-left political parties, and some parties formed alliances with local and provincial-level indigenous organizations (Andolina 1999, 217; Pallares 2002, 168; Birnir 2004). In a 1988 election-day survey of highland indigenous voting preferences, 69.65 percent of respondents reported voting for center-left candidates, 11.54 percent for populist parties, and 9.01 percent for the right (Chiriboga and Rivera 1989, 193). The authors concluded that modern indigenous voters were influenced by programmatic appeals and institutional affiliations with the left, rather than the clientelist relations of the past.

Indigenous political organization began first in the highlands and mainly focused on agrarian reform. Quichua Indians formed Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui (ECUARUNARI) in 1972 to coordinate these actions. In the lowlands, Indians organized as distinct ethnic groups to resist incursions by the military, colonists, and extractive businesses. Federations of the strongest groups formed the Confederación de Nationalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana (CONFENIAE) in 1979. ECUARUNARI and CONFENAIE formed the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) in 1986. Politics within CONAIE at the national level has tended to pit highland against lowland leaders. Within each regional confederation, the stronger departmental and ethnic federations maintain considerable autonomy. CONAIE’s affiliates comprise approximately 80 percent of Ecuador’s Indians, grouped into approximately 220 regional and zonal organizations (PRODEPINE 1998). Its hegemony is challenged by the peasant-indigenous-black organization Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras (FENOCIN), founded in 1968 as FENOC, and the evangelical Christian indigenous organization Federación Ecuatoriana de Indígenas Evangélicas (FEINE), formed in 1980.

In 1995 a political party based in the indigenous movement but incorporating independent intellectuals and other popular movements was formed. The impetus for this came from CONFENIAE, which was working
independently to establish an indigenous party to run candidates in the 1996 elections and had made an alliance with a coalition of social movements calling itself Nuevo País. The new party took the name Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik-Nuevo País (Pachakutik). By this time, much of the left was in disarray, having been decimated by neoliberal economic policies and internal disunity. Many orphaned leftists joined Pachakutik or allied with the coalition—as occurred in Bolivia between 1997–2002, when the IPSP-MAS absorbed much of the fragmented left.

Although Pachakutik has enjoyed stunning success, its formation has not healed the persistent organizational fragmentation of the indigenous movement. This friction is particularly noticeable between highland and lowland party leaders and congress members. The party was unable to run its own presidential candidate in 2002 because of a conflict between the lowland organization, which initially backed former CONAIE leader Antonio Vargas, and highland groups, who preferred Cotacachi mayor Auki Tituña. Instead, Pachakutik allied with the populist Patriotic Society Party (PSP), while Vargas ran with the highland-based Amauta Jatari, a party formed by FEINE as a challenge to Pachakutik. In the end, Vargas received less than 1 percent of the vote, but the struggle increased regional and other frictions within the indigenous movement. The disastrous alliance with Gutiérrez further fragmented the indigenous movement, even leading to the fracture of the lowland movement itself (personal communication, Theodore Macdonald, May 6, 2005).

TESTING THE EFFECT OF ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION ON PARTY SYSTEMS

Two principal observations emerge from the above case studies. As they enter electoral politics, the once-excluded ethnic minorities fragment along intragroup fault lines in their support for divergent political parties. Therefore, we expect that measures accounting for a greater number of intragroup fault lines will better capture the emerging effect of ethnic diversity on party fragmentation in recent years. Furthermore, at least since the 1990s, Latin America’s mobilized indigenous groups have augmented the number of viable contenders for legislative elections. Consequently, we expect equivalent increases in legislative party fragmentation in homogeneous and heterogeneous countries in the 1980s, but divergence in the 1990s as party fragmentation increases more in ethnically heterogeneous countries. Thus we expect the number of parties represented in legislatures to stay the same or increase slightly in homogeneous countries but increase significantly in heterogeneous countries.

6. Pachakutik won 10 percent of the national congressional vote in its first outing in 1996. In 2002 it was part of a coalition that won the presidential elections.
The data we use to test these hypotheses are national-level electoral data because our argument is a comparative account of changes in party fragmentation at the national level over time. In contrast, Madrid (2005b) examines differences in party fragmentation among districts with respect to differences in demographics. He argues that within each country, fragmentation should be higher at the district level where indigenous voters are more numerous and irrespective of which parties run in what district (the same or different ones). We do not use district data because theoretically it is possible that a country experiences no increase in fragmentation at the district level but at the same time sees significant augmentation in fragmentation at the national level because the parties competing differ from district to district (Riker 1986). For example, in the current Ecuadorian congress the elected deputies from Bolívar represent the DP, Pachakutik, and ID, but in Imbabura they are from the AN, Pachakutik, and an independent. Consequently, the effective party fragmentation in each province is three parties (accounting for the independent candidate) but the national legislative party fragmentation accounting for just these two provinces is 4.5. In such a case statistical analysis at the district level would not reveal the true systemic level of fragmentation or systemic changes over time. Only through qualitative analysis at the district level that articulates the differences between district parties—or quantitative analysis at the national level—do we detect changes in party system fragmentation over time.

In countries with large recently mobilized indigenous populations, the effect on party fragmentation can only be verified with a nuanced measure of ethnic fractionalization that accounts for at least some of the divisions within the indigenous category. This argument need not, however, be restricted to indigenous groups. In other Latin American countries with small indigenous populations, where other large social groups, such as the poor or Afro-descended populations, have recently been formally incorporated into the system, we posit that after restrictions on suffrage are lifted, the underrepresented cleavage will fracture early on as it mobilizes, producing high fragmentation of the party system. The reasons to expect fragmentation in the political support of those groups are similar to those of the indigenous. The poor, for example, are often divided by region and culture, and tend to support the left, which tends to be more fragmented. In a number of heterogeneous Latin American countries where the indigenous population is small, economic differences are often synonymous with racial differences. Therefore, we would expect that an index that adds racial differentiation will better capture a recent increase in party system fragmentation due to increasing inclusion of the racially divergent poor than prior indices accounting only for linguistic differences.

Until recently the common source for a measure of ethnic diversity was Taylor and Hudson’s (1972) Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization
The Herfindahl concentration index (minus one) Taylor and Hudson applied to ethnic groups calculates the probability that two individuals picked at random from the population will belong to different language groups. The index varies from 0 in a perfectly homogeneous country to 1 when every individual belongs to a different group. The Herfindahl index has, in some scholarly work, given way to the effective number of ethnic groups (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Amorim Neto 1997; Cox 1997).

Recently a number of alternative indices have been calculated in response to dissatisfaction with the ability of the linguistic measure to capture relevant detail of political divisions (Annett 2001; Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg 2003; Fearon 2003; Mozaffar et al. 2003; Posner 2004). For example, Alesina et al. (2003) construct an alternative ethnic index that takes into account additional linguistic detail as well as racial characteristics. The addition of race is especially important to Latin American countries with small indigenous populations. They find that the more detailed index better predicts economic growth than Taylor and Hudson’s (1970) more aggregate Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization index.

Our primary concern is the connection between ethnic fractionalization and the effective number of parties in Latin American legislatures as internally divided ethnic groups mobilize. We argue that ethnic cleavages significantly affect party system fragmentation in Latin America, but this relationship likely does not show up in a statistical study conducted on these variables, Madrid’s (2005b) analysis, because of his choice of fractionalization measure. Using the effective number of ethnic groups, derived from national census data, Madrid concludes that ethnic diversity only affected party system fragmentation within one of five countries he examined. This measure does not fully account for diversity within ethnic groups, particularly within the indigenous category. As Madrid observes, the measure also underreports the size of the ethnic groups because of the way it is collected. In contrast, we aim to elucidate how party systems in ethnically heterogeneous countries differ from those in more homogeneous countries.

We experiment with the Annett and Alesina et al. measures, both of which follow the example of Mozaffar et al. (2003) by accounting for both inter- and intragroup fractionalization in Latin America. We

7. The formal definition of the Herfindahl index used by Taylor and Hudson to calculate Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization is\[ 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i^2 \] where \( s_i \) is the \( i \)th share of group \( i (i=1...n) \).

acknowledge that static national indices of social fractionalization are fraught with problems. More importantly, as we emphasize in the case studies, indigenous politics incorporates many dimensions of political divisions such as personal conflicts between indigenous leaders like Morales, Veliz, and Quispe in Bolivia. We do not contend that the more detailed ethnic fractionalization measures constructed by Annett or Alesina et al. capture any of these divisions. But the more detailed measures incorporate more of the relevant internal divisions than older measures—in this case additional ethnic and racial divisions. Consequently, although imperfect, the new measures should do a better job than older measures of accounting for the effect of social diversity on party system fragmentation. To test this expectation we compare Annett’s and Alesina’s et al. indices to the predictive capabilities of Taylor and Hudson’s Ethno Linguistic Fractionalization index. As shown in table 1, the greatest discrepancies between Taylor and Hudson’s Ethno Linguistic measure and those provided by Annett and Alesina et al. occur in countries with small indigenous populations, such as in Brazil and Colombia, which have large Afro-descended populations. But it is worth reiterating that our argument is not restricted to indigenous groups. Rather, in the absence of political alternatives that represent large underrepresented groups, as these mobilize we expect that voters in the group will fracture along internal fault lines in their support for a multitude of non-cleavage-specific parties. In Ecuador, the relevant underrepresented cleavage is ethnicity; in Brazil this cleavage may be socioeconomic class, likely compounded by African ancestry captured with the addition of racial categories, but not indigenous heritage.

TESTING THE EFFECT OF DIVERSITY

In this section we discuss each of the variables we use in our statistical test of the impact of ethnic heterogeneity on party system fragmentation in the legislature, the methods we use, and the results of our test. Our cases include all Latin American countries.9 We study the period from 1980–2000, when the franchise was fully extended and competitive democratic elections were held consistently. We only included elections that were commonly considered competitive.10 The total number of elections included in the analysis is eighty-five.

To measure party system fragmentation we use the effective number of parties with legislative seats (ENPS) in the lower chamber rather than the

9. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

10. This rule excludes, for instance, Mexico until 1982, Bolivia until 1980, Ecuador until 1984. For the full data please contact the authors.
### Table 1 Ethnic Heterogeneity in Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>ELF&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>EFAn&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>EFAI&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>% Indigenous Population&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>% African-American Population&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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<td>.54</td>
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<td>.54</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>1.48</td>
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Notes:
- c. Ethnic Fractionalization (EF) calculated by Alesina et al. (AI) (2003).
- d. Deruyttere (1997, 1); except Bolivia (from 2001 census); Colombia (from 1993 census).

Absolute number of parties with seats or the number of parties with votes for two reasons. ENPS is sensitive to extreme fragmentation (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 80) and, more importantly, it takes into account the relative size of the party in the legislature, which allows for important conclusions about the effect of fragmentation on legislative output. The Effective Number of Parties with Seats is calculated by squaring the proportion of seats won by each party, adding up all of the squares, and dividing one from that number (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 80). We use Schiavon's (n.d.) data for ENPS.
We control for a variety of variables that may affect the relationship between ethnic diversity and the number of parties in the legislature.\footnote{The sources are Mainwaring and Scully (1997), Schiavon (n.d.), Latin American Statistical Abstract, and the World Bank (www.worldbank.org/data).} This includes electoral rules, particularly the number of seats in each district (district magnitude): the higher the district magnitude the greater the number of parties in the system (Cox 1997; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Mozaffar et al. 2003; Taagepera and Shugart 1989).\footnote{For modifications of this argument see Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) and for exceptions see Rosenblum and Huelshoff (2004).} Since the average or median district magnitude does not make a substantive difference for expected results (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997, 157), we rely on averages to test for impact of district magnitude. For mixed systems (some legislators elected proportionally and others under plurality rule) we take the average magnitude of both tiers combined. Finally, studies that focus on district magnitude and ethnic cleavages show that the interaction between these two variables causes party system fragmentation in the legislature (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Cox 1997; Mozaffar et al. 2003). Therefore, we consider the effect of this interaction.

Timing of presidential elections relative to legislative ones and the electoral formula used to elect the president also affect party system fragmentation in Latin America (Shugart and Carey 1992; Jones 1994; Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). The consensus is that concurrent elections, where the president is elected via plurality rule, decrease party system fragmentation compared to concurrent elections, where the president is elected under a majority runoff formula, and nonconcurrent elections. Following Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), we included three variables accounting for the timing of presidential elections and formula. The first denotes systems with concurrent elections where the president is elected by plurality, the second accounts for systems with concurrent elections but the formula for presidential election is majority runoff, and the third accounts for countries where elections are nonconcurrent and / or presidential election formula is other than plurality or majority.\footnote{We used Mainwaring and Shugart's codification, and filled in recent years with information from the Latin American Statistical abstract and Schiavon's election site. Mainwaring and Shugart code Colombian elections as nonconcurrent because legislative elections occur three months prior to the presidential election and Chile as having concurrent elections in 1989 and 1994, whereas other sources code Chile as having non-concurrent elections. After 1997 we code Colombia and Chile as concurrent and nonconcurrent, respectively.}

Economic conditions affect both the emergence of new parties and the likelihood that voters will switch their party allegiance (Downs 1957). For instance, a politician likely evaluates her chances for reelection with an established party or a new party in light of the economy. There is little
consensus as to which economic conditions influence voters, and how.\textsuperscript{14} Nevertheless, we believe a measure of personal income is the most important control in studies of the indigenous because the majority of Indians live in poverty (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 1994). Therefore, we include per capita GDP. On average, larger countries may accommodate more parties than small countries. Consequently, we control for population size.

Finally, party system fragmentation in legislatures increased during the period studied. Much of this increase is likely unrelated to changes in ethnic diversity, which has remained fairly stable. The contemporary trend in Latin America toward increasing party system fragmentation is attributable to the decline of once-dominant parties, the collapse or dealignment of party systems, the relaxation in the 1990s of rules that once impeded the formation of new parties, and the proliferation of personalist electoral vehicles (Levitsky and Cameron 2001; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Roberts 2002; Van Cott 2005; Birnir 2004; 2007). Therefore, we include a variable accounting for the year of the election.\textsuperscript{15}

All models in table 2 support Mainwaring and Shugart’s (1997) findings that in Latin American elections, timing and formula of presidential elections matter.\textsuperscript{16} Of the control variables, only year of election is significantly and positively related to increasing Effective Number of Parties with Seats. The improved overall fit of model two indicates that both population and per capita GDP may be important control variables. Therefore, we include both in the following specifications.

Model three shows that, as expected, Taylor and Hudson’s Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization index is not a good indicator of party


\textsuperscript{15} Since ENPS is a continuous variable, we used Ordinary Least Squares regression to estimate the effect of ethnic fractionalization on legislative fragmentation. The data are pooled times series data. We use Huber-White robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity because the number of effective parties varies significantly more at higher levels of ethnic fractionalization. The only exception is model one, which replicates the findings of Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), who do not use robust standard errors. Thus model one includes only the log of district magnitude and the two variables accounting for concurrent presidential election using plurality and majority, respectively, in reference to nonconcurrent elections and/or formula used for the presidential election other than plurality or majority. Model two adds control variables for population, year of the election, and per capita GDP. Model three adds Taylor and Hudson’s ethnic fractionalization measure. Model four substitutes Taylor and Hudson’s measure for Alesina et al. measure. Model five substitutes with Annett’s measure. Finally, model six interacts average district magnitude with Annett’s fractionalization measure.

\textsuperscript{16} Alternate runs (not included) showed that the variable accounting for plurality electoral formula and concurrent elections reduces the number of parties significantly (at the 10 percent level or better) when compared to majority formula concurrent elections. We found no evidence, however, that our sample plurality formula for election of the president and concurrent elections produces a significantly different number of parties than other formulas (not majority or plurality) for presidential election and/or nonconcurrent elections.
system fragmentation in Latin America. The variable is not statistically significant and the fit of the model remains unchanged. Model four, however, strongly supports our argument that 1) ethnic cleavages affect party system fragmentation, and 2) a more nuanced measure of ethnic fractionalization, which captures additional intergroup detail such as race as well as greater intragroup linguistic detail, is a good predictor of party system fragmentation in Latin America. In model four, the Alesina et al. measure of ethnic fractionalization is statistically significant and positively related to increasing Effective Number of Parties with Seats. Model five, using the alternative nuanced measure constructed by Annett, shows the same result as model four. Model six, using Annett’s measure, which produced the greatest fit among the ethnicity variables, confirms the result of model five. The improved fit indicates that we must statistically account for the interaction of district magnitude and ethnic fractionalization.

The use of logarithms and interaction terms in the statistical tests makes it difficult to interpret the substantive effect of ethnicity from the regression model directly. Therefore, using model six, figure 1 shows the effect of increasing ethnic fractionalization on the effective number of legislative parties, holding all other variables constant at average values. The effect of going from the least fractionalized country in the sample (Paraguay at .17) to the most fractionalized (Bolivia at .71) increases the number of effective parties by one and a half. By comparison, the average number of effective parties in Latin American legislatures is nearly 3.5 parties. A 50 percent increase in the number of effective parties as a result of changing ethnic fractionalization is substantively quite significant.

A nuanced measure of ethnic fractionalization shows that ethnic diversity strongly predicts party system fragmentation in Latin America since the time that the franchise was fully extended to all adults. The remaining question is whether party systems in ethnically heterogeneous countries were always more fragmented than those in homogeneous countries, even when ethnic populations were politically excluded and their electoral choices restricted. We think not. Fragmentation of party systems in heterogeneous and homogeneous countries was similar when the indigenous population was politically excluded but increased significantly more in ethnically diverse countries after a meaningful incorporation of the ethnic diversity.

17. To ensure that the analysis is not driven by any single country we ran a random effects model and models including country dummies for one country at a time. Our results are robust and no single country drives the result. Even with dummies for a group of highly fractionalized countries such as Ecuador, Bolivia, and Brazil the results remain substantively the same.

18. This finding supports Ordeshook and Shvetshova (1994) and Cox (1997), who argue that the expression of cleavages is indeed subject to the restrictions of district magnitude.
Table 2 Regression Results  
**Dependent Variable Effective Number of Parties with Seats**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)^</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log of Average District Magnitude</td>
<td>0.178 (0.149)</td>
<td>0.278 (0.219)</td>
<td>0.270 (0.229)</td>
<td>0.285 (0.225)</td>
<td>0.308 (0.224)</td>
<td>1.058 (0.500)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President elected through plurality, concurrent elections with legislature^^</td>
<td>-0.408 (0.354)</td>
<td>0.230 (0.399)</td>
<td>0.283 (0.389)</td>
<td>0.217 (0.386)</td>
<td>0.216 (0.388)</td>
<td>0.143 (0.399)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President elected through majority, concurrent elections with legislature.^^</td>
<td>1.550 (0.396)**</td>
<td>1.702 (0.476)**</td>
<td>1.659 (0.513)**</td>
<td>1.472 (0.485)**</td>
<td>1.380 (0.485)**</td>
<td>1.354 (0.476)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of population</td>
<td>0.470 (0.299)</td>
<td>0.476 (0.296)</td>
<td>0.300 (0.322)</td>
<td>0.198 (0.337)</td>
<td>0.320 (0.339)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year of the election</td>
<td>0.061 (0.030)*</td>
<td>0.062 (0.030)*</td>
<td>0.063 (0.029)*</td>
<td>0.069 (0.029)*</td>
<td>0.068 (0.028)*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (constant 1995 U.S.$)</td>
<td>-1.013 e-04</td>
<td>-0.959 e-04</td>
<td>-0.537 e-04</td>
<td>-0.711 e-04</td>
<td>-1.237 e-04</td>
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<td>Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (Taylor and Hudson- ELF)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.283 (1.115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization (Alesina et al. - EFAI)</td>
<td>1.846 (0.743)*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization (Annett-EFAn)</td>
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<td>5.324 (2.180)*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Log of Average District Magnitude*</td>
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<td>-1.612 (1.160)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.948 (0.354)**</td>
<td>-126.912</td>
<td>-127.368</td>
<td>-128.853</td>
<td>-139.888</td>
<td>-139.170</td>
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<tr>
<td>(60.231)*</td>
<td>(60.415)*</td>
<td>(59.432)*</td>
<td>(59.379)*</td>
<td>(55.746)*</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Observations</td>
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<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.39</td>
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Note: OLS with Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
^Standard errors are not robust in the first model.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
^^Reference category President elected using formula other than plurality or majority and/or presidential election non-concurrent with legislative election.
By meaningful incorporation we refer to the first year a democratic election without significant restrictions (such as literacy requirements or physical coercion) on ethnic voters is held. In most cases this occurred in the early 1980s, but in a few countries the first fully competitive democratic elections were held later (Van Cott 2005).

Testing this idea poses empirical challenges. Teasing out a linear relationship at each level of fractionalization and the ENPS is difficult because of the small number of cases and the current complexity of the sixth model specification. Consequently, we simplified the test by dividing the cases into heterogeneous and homogeneous countries using the middling Alesina et al. measure to err on the side of caution in case Annett's measure overestimates ethnic heterogeneity. According to Alesina et al. the average ethnic fractionalization in the sample is 0.43. Thus, we consider countries with levels of diversity above .43 highly diverse. Then we averaged and graphed the ENPS in each election (1–9) for each group. Figure 2 shows the results. In the first fully competitive election there is no significant difference between the Effective Number of Parties with Seats in homogeneous and heterogeneous countries. In the second fully competitive election, however, the ENPS in ethnically diverse countries increases substantially and continues to rise, whereas this number in more homogeneous countries remains quite similar.
over the number of competitive elections. The table accompanying the figure demonstrates this difference numerically using an interaction term between high fractionalization and number of elections. Over the course of fully competitive elections the ENPS in highly fractionalized countries increases significantly and substantially above and beyond that in homogeneous countries.

CONCLUSION

During mobilization and political incorporation once-excluded ethnic groups in Latin America fracture along internal fault lines. To capture the effect of ethnic fractionalization on party systems in Latin America a nuanced measure must be used—one that takes into account important divisions within major ethnic groups. Commonly used measures of ethnic diversity fail to pick up important intragroup divisions within
the indigenous category. Further research is needed to illuminate why the more detailed measure better captures the effect of the underlying social diversity on party system fragmentation in countries with few indigenous peoples, but we propose that the same logic applies. Where major groups, such as racial groups, go underrepresented, they fracture in their support for competing parties. Prior linguistic measures did not capture this important intergroup division nor any of the internal cleavages of these groups, whereas later measures do.

We confirm the notion that ethnic cleavages matter for party support in Latin America, a region where ethnic parties have been uncommon until quite recently. Despite the absence of ethnically defined parties in most countries, the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and party system fragmentation holds. More importantly, ethnic cleavages significantly elevate party fragmentation above and beyond that of homogeneous countries, demonstrating that party systems in Latin America are far from "frozen." Rather, the party systems examined here continue to respond dynamically to newly mobilized constituencies. The normative question that remains unanswered is whether this demonstrated dynamism, which tends toward augmenting fragmentation in heterogeneous countries, is detrimental to long term democratic functioning, as suggested by the literature. In our opinion this is not clear because of the tradeoff involved. That is, in Latin America increased party system fragmentation is due to the recent incorporation of previously under- or unrepresented segments of society. We submit that such underrepresentation is potentially more deleterious than party system fragmentation to the spirit of democracy and to its proper functioning.

Furthermore, as indigenous political mobilization matures and vestiges of institutional barriers to participation are dismantled, we may see some consolidation of the vote for ethnic parties. For example, in Bolivia ethnic parties failed to unify the indigenous vote until the recent emergence of the IPSP-MAS as a national electoral option. Subsequently, fragmentation decreased slightly. The effective number of parties for seats measured 3.71 in the 1993 elections and rose to 5.36 in 1997. That year the new indigenous political party ASP elected four members to Congress. For the next national election, held in 2002, many leftists and popular leaders supported the new party, now competing under the registration of the MAS, siphoning support from other leftist options and reducing the Effective Number of Parties with Seats to 4.96. In 2005 the MAS dominated national elections, reducing ENPS to 2.36.\(^19\) Only one party that competed in 2002 gained a seat in Congress as indigenous voters flocked to the option that led public

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19. ENPS in Bolivia in 2002 and 2005 is calculated from figures given at the Bolivian Electoral Tribunal at www.cne.org.bo
opinion surveys and abandoned elite-led parties that had failed to fulfill their promises.

As in Bolivia, Ecuador’s indigenous organizations have pursued numerous, ephemeral alliances with political parties, but most rallied around the new indigenous-movement-based party Pachakutik. We see some signs of a subsequent decrease in legislative fragmentation, although the pattern is less clear than it is in Bolivia. In the national elections prior to Pachakutik’s formation, the Effective Number of Parties with Seats measured 6.61 (1994). The year in which Pachakutik first competed (1996) the ENPS dropped to 5.0; it rose slightly to 5.43 in 1998, but this is still below the average of 6.04 for the 1990s, and 5.65 for the 1980s. Most of the vote share picked up by Pachakutik in legislative elections came at the expense of small leftist parties, some of which joined the Pachakutik coalition or won seats through alliances with that party. Interestingly, the ENPS jumped again to at least 7.6520 in the 2002 national elections, in part due to the numerous different alliances Pachakutik makes at the local level. Whether this alliance activity indicates that Pachakutik is not a viable indigenous representative or simply is successful at reaching across ethnic lines is unclear at this point.

Time will tell if indigenous political participation will continue toward greater unity in party representation in these and other ethnically diverse countries. The fact remains that the incorporation of indigenous peoples irrevocably has altered party system profiles in heterogeneous Latin American countries, introducing greater fragmentation during the period studied.

20. This number is calculated from figures given at the Ecuadorian Congress at www.congreso.gov.ec and counts thirteen independents.
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