To THE EDITOR:

In his article, "The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements" (this REVIEW, June, 1967, pp. 343–358) Professor Robert C. Tucker formulates a series of generalizations on the processes and causal factors of deradicalization of Marxist movements on the basis of his examination of the history of Soviet Communism after Stalin and the German Social Demo-

cratic Party around the turn of the century. When I review in my own mind the history of the Chinese Communist movement and regime, I find some of Professor Tucker's concepts and generalizations very illuminating but others difficult to apply.

Let us start by asking a basic question which looks simple but is actually difficult to answer in terms of Professor Tucker's categories: Can one regard the Chinese Communist movement in the period 1935–1946 as an historical instance of deradicalization in terms of the "symptoms" and "causal factors" suggested by him? During this period the Chinese Communists modified the tactical part of the ideology by stressing short-term objectives and non-radical means of attaining them. The CCP adopted the policy of establishing a united front against Japan which at first excluded Generalissimo Chiang and later included him. It replaced the policy of confiscating the land of landlords by a program of reducing rent and interest rates. It put forward the theory of New Democracy and gave outsiders the impression that the New Democratic society and "state form" would last for a long time. It advanced the policy of establishing a coalition government. In their informal remarks, Chinese Communist leaders gave certain hints that the CCP might come to power through peaceful means. They made conscious efforts to adapt Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions. These and many other facts support Professor Tucker's assertions about the first symptom.

But with regard to a second symptom, i.e., practice or pattern of action, the evidence points both ways. Reformist patterns of action were adopted in the base areas and within the Kuomintang territory, but revolutionary patterns were continued in the form of limited war behind the Japanese lines against both the Japanese and the Nationalist forces. Even here, however, one could define the transition from all-out war to limited war against the Kuomintang as a manifestation of deradicalization, although the over-all pattern of action was still more revolutionary than reformist.

True to Professor Tucker's description of a third symptom, there was a conflict within the movement over the question of deradicalization. But in contrast to the cases of the SPD and Soviet Communism, this attack came from the right wing rather than the left wing of the Chinese Communist movement. The struggle was between Mao Tse-tung and the minority of "right opportunists," notably Chang Kuotao and Wang Ming. The criticism of the Party Center's policy stemmed from a feeling that deradicalization in the form of coopera-
tion with the Kuomintang did not go far enough.

Finally, the CCP affirmed its ultimate goals. Mao declared in his famous speech, "On Coalition Government," in April, 1945: "We communists do not conceal our political views. Definitely and beyond all doubt, our future or maximum programme is to carry China forward to socialism and communism." Professor Tucker's discussion of the deradicalization of radical movements implies that in the process of deradicalization, the affirmation of the radical goals is hypocritical and has no operational consequences. But it can be argued that the continuing desire of the one-time radical movement to change the existing society is itself a necessary factor in the process of tactical deradicalization. If this desire is absent, the radical movement may adhere to its fundamental tenets without change and remain a permanent and insignificant minority as is the case with many fundamentalist religious sects.

Professor Tucker's formulation of two causal factors, i.e., "leadership change" and "worldly success," also leads us to conflicting conclusions. Just prior to the inception of the process of deradicalization, there was a change in leadership. Mao captured the party apparatus at the Tsun-yi meeting in early 1935. But in 1946 Mao himself inaugurated the process of reradicalization which, in spite of its fluctuations, is still going strong. At this point, one cannot help but think of the case of Tito's Yugoslavia in which a process of deradicalization was accompanied by continuity of leadership.

Professor Tucker's second causal factor, "worldly success," deserves more lengthy comment. To me, the most interesting statement made by Professor Tucker is the following one: "It appears to be the fate of radical movements that survive and flourish for long without remaking the world that they undergo eventually a process of deradicalization." But in the case of the Chinese Communist movement, the process of deradicalization was greatly accelerated during the Long March when the fortunes of the CCP were at a low ebb. In China, it was worldly failure rather than worldly success which led to a process of rapid deradicalization. This development shows, to use Professor Tucker's terminology and method, that "it appears to be the fate of radical movements that cannot survive and flourish after a period of attempting to remake the world by radical methods that they will undergo a process of deradicalization." Thus, the juxtaposition of the two cases examined by Professor Tucker to the case of the CCP in 1935 shows that two diametrically opposite conditions, i.e., worldly success and worldly failure, can produce a similar result, deradicalization. Moreover, a process of re-radicalization began after 1946 in the Chinese Communist movement in the form of open civil war which began after the CCP had survived and flourished under its deradicalized program. To put it simply, worldly success was followed not by deradicalization but by re-radicalization. This development suggests that under certain circumstances, radical movements that survive and flourish will undergo a process of re-radicalization. Thus, the juxtaposition of Professor Tucker's two cases to the case of the CCP after 1946 shows that a similar condition, i.e., worldly success, can lead to two diametrically opposite results: deradicalization on the one hand and re-radicalization on the other.

The attempt to apply Professor Tucker's concepts and generalization has thus led us to a dilemma. If one wants to uphold the universal applicability of Professor Tucker's theory, one must take the position that the history of the Chinese Communist movement from 1935 to 1946 does not represent a case of deradicalization, despite the existence of some of the symptoms described by Professor Tucker. But if one admits that it represents a different type of deradicalization, i.e., a tactical change and a forced adjustment to political reality, three additional intellectual tasks must be undertaken. First, we must formulate concepts and generalizations applicable to this type of tactical deradicalization as distinguished from the genuine cases of deradicalization cited by Professor Tucker. Second, since these two different types belong to one general class of phenomena, i.e., deradicalization, we must formulate concepts and theories applicable to this class of phenomena as a whole. Third, if it is true that a process of genuine deradicalization or a decline in revolutionary commitment is usually preceded by deradicalization of a tactical nature forced by circumstances, we must raise a significant question as to the conditions under which the latter becomes or leads to the former.

To carry out these tasks, we would have to stress other variables which Professor Tucker mentions explicitly in his narrative or implies in his discussion but which he does not single out as "causal factors." I shall mention two of the most obvious ones. The first is the strength of the existing social order as perceived by the radicals or the one-time radicals. If the existing social order is perceived by the radicals as so strong that they cannot survive and flourish by the use of radical methods, the process of
deradicalization will set in. This variable must be taken into account to explain the deradicalization of the Chinese Communist movement in 1935. It also sheds some light on the contrast between the deradicalization of Soviet Communism and the radicalization of the Chinese Communist movement on the question of world revolution. On the one hand, the Soviet Union sees the United States as so strong militarily that she could not be challenged by revolutionary methods. On the other hand the Chinese Communists believe that she can eventually be defeated by a global strategy which is essentially a projection of their revolutionary strategy employed in the Chinese civil war.

The second variable which comes readily to mind is the presence or absence of a well-defined and stable political system in which a radical movement can find its place. This variable is implicitly recognized by Professor Tucker in his phrase, "stake in the status quo." In contrast to the SPD, the Chinese Communist movement in 1946 could see no stable and well-defined political system in which it could survive and flourish. Therefore, the deradicalization process could not be continued. At the present moment, the Soviet Union has a recognized and respected place in what she considers to be a relatively stable and well-defined international system whereas the Peking regime is an outcast and considers the international system as unstable and evil.

I have merely given two very simple examples for the purpose of illustrating the need to identify other important variables in a very complex situation besides the two "causal factors" mentioned explicitly by Professor Tucker. But the identification of additional variables and the discovery of two types of deradicalization merely mark the beginning of the far more difficult task of formulating a theory of deradicalization. The value of any concept or theory varies with its generality. The more generally applicable it is, the greater its explanatory power. Professor Tucker's concepts and generalizations derive much of their appeal from the universality claimed for them. But as we discover historical cases of deradicalization which do not fit the generalizations, we are forced to distinguish particular types of deradicalization. If we then proceed to compare the different sociopolitical contexts from which the different types of deradicalization emerged, we discover additional variables which must be taken into account. As we proceed to construct a typology of many different types of deradicalization, compare the many different socio-political contexts, and discover many more variables, we obtain propositions of a decreasing order of generality and lower level of abstraction. By moving closer and closer to the uniqueness of history, we shall be able to explain the individual cases more adequately, but in the process our concepts and generalizations will have lost much of their explanatory power. Thus, the task of formulating a theory of deradicalization will not be complete until we can formulate a set of propositions which can explain all types of deradicalization and which, with the addition of specified variables, can be used to differentiate one type of deradicalization from another. These difficult intellectual tasks must be performed in the construction of theories of this type. These are the problems which we must resolve in order to pursue further Professor Tucker's germinal ideas.

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**TO THE EDITOR:**

In their article, "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam" (this REVIEW, June 1967) Sidney Verba and his associates quote from their original Stanford report as follows: "The American public is clearly concerned about Vietnam. . . . But their opinions appear to be moderate and responsible. . . . They reject those solutions that require irresponsible abandonment of our commitments." (emphasis added)

The authors are certainly entitled to their own opinion, but it should not be interjected into what purports to be a purely descriptive presentation of scientific findings. There is nothing in the authors' data to indicate that a "moderate" (i.e., middle ground) opinion which advocates maintaining the present level of military involvement is "responsible," while an opinion which advocates withdrawal as an immediate policy objective is "irresponsible." Indeed, nothing in the measurement of an opinion distribution provides us with evidence for labeling one opinion more or less responsible than another unless the concept of "responsibility" itself were operationalized and given an empirical meaning pertinent to the data—something the authors do not do.

Those of us who believe it is possible to arrive at scientific, value-free findings—and this, I know, includes Verba and his associates—would do well to choose our terms with more care.

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