The plans for Tokyo Bay: the challenge of urban policy, 1950s–1990s

Junichi Hasegawa*  
Faculty of Economics, Keio University, Tokyo, Japan  
*Corresponding author. Email: hasegawa@econ.keio.ac.jp

Abstract
At the conclusion of the 1950s in Japan, plans to reclaim and develop Tokyo Bay were proposed by the Japan Housing Corporation’s president and a private think tank on economic affairs. The vision was incompatible with dispersion, the basic direction of the state’s policy, so it was quickly rejected, but its legacy lived on as the trans-Tokyo Bay highway in 1997. This article argues that the lack of an effective national policy led to contradictory initiatives and divisions among the stakeholders, leaving open the way for the large-scale reclamation and development of Tokyo Bay.

Introduction
Two visions of large-scale land reclamation and development in Tokyo Bay were proposed in the late 1950s, one by Hisaakira Kano and the other by an institute called Sangyo Keikaku Kaigi (Council for Industry Planning; CIP). Kano, having worked as a banker for years, became the president of the Japan Housing Corporation (JHC) in 1955. He was the elected governor of Chiba Prefecture in 1962. He announced the Tokyo Bay reclamation plan in 1958. He also served in a leadership role in the development of the CIP vision, which inspired architects to present their own ideas for development in Tokyo Bay. The CIP was a private think tank established in 1956 by Yasuzaemon Matsunaga, a powerful figure in the political and business world active in the electric power industry. Due to Matsunaga’s personal connections, the CIP’s members included important figures in politics, business, government and academia, and had considerable influence over the national government on development and economic policy issues. The Tokyo Bay reclamation vision was the CIP’s seventh recommendation, published in 1959.¹

By consulting various sources including national newspapers, minutes of the National Diet (accessed by https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/) and the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly (TMA; held at the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly

Library) and materials held at the Tokyo Metropolitan Archives (TMArchive), this article examines the fate of these visions by Kano and the CIP and their legacies: notably the Tokyo Bay Aqua Line Expressway (Aqua Line) opened in 1997 which crosses Tokyo Bay, as shown in Figure 1. It also considers the visions by the architects inspired by Kano and the CIP as well as the waterfront mega-projects from the 1980s, which are usually regarded as their legacy.

In so doing, and by positioning the various efforts related to the development of Tokyo Bay in the evolution of post-war Japan’s urban and regional policy, this article argues the following: the lack of a consistent and effective national policy led to contradictory initiatives and divisions among the stakeholders and left the way open for reclamation and development in Tokyo Bay that went against dispersion, the initially intended basic direction of national policy. It also contends that, with the basic direction of urban policy uncertain, and in the midst of these complications, the development concept for the Tokyo Bay area had lost the comprehensive nature that Kano and CIP envisioned. Instead, it became individual projects whose primary purpose was not to serve as effective urban policy for Tokyo, but to expand domestic demand for large-scale construction projects.

The scale and character of the Tokyo Bay reclamation visions by Kano and the CIP stand out in the long history of land reclamation. As of 2015, globally, there are 45 zones with over 20 km² of surface area gained through reclamation from the eighteenth century. Asian ports occupy the leading positions in the ranking of the greatest areas reclaimed from the sea, with Shanghai (400 km²), Tianjin (365 km²) and Tangshan (275 km²) the three largest. They are followed by Tokyo Bay (250 km²). In their visions of the future, Kano and the CIP intended to create a virtually new city, Neo Tokyo, by reclaiming 800 km² or two-thirds of Tokyo Bay.

There are negative assessments regarding Kano’s and the CIP’s visions. Japanese national newspapers such as Mainichi Shimbun (Mainichi), Asahi Shimbun (Asahi) and Nihonkeizai Shimbun (Nikkei) recently expressed the view that Kano’s and the CIP’s visions were considered unrealistic at the time: their reclamation vision was unrealized because no one seriously considered them as possible and due to the huge cost involved. However, their visions have attracted scholars as having marked a specific epoch in urban history, especially that for Japan. One important claim concerns the impact on post-war architecture and urbanism. As Raffaele Pernice and Zhong-Jie Lin noted, they pioneered various visions of urban expansion on the water by exciting young architects, who contributed to the pursuit of a model for future urban development. Many such architects belonged to the avant-garde architectural movement called Metabolism. The vision of a marine city on Tokyo Bay by Kenzo Tange, a leading Japanese architect, published in 1961 became the most

---


famous maritime city concept. The significance of these visions and particularly Tange's is seen as having spearheaded the world-wide megastructure trends in the 1960s and influenced the actual waterfront mega-projects from the 1980s such as Yokohama's Minato Mirai 21 and Tokyo Teleport Town.4

Another interpretation emphasizes the influence that Kano's and the CIP's visions had on important regional plans. André Sorensen noted that the CIP plan was the source of a number of similar projects by public and private organizations including the Construction Ministry. The plan encountered considerable opposition within the Liberal Democratic Party, the ruling party in power. Sorensen criticized the construction of the Aqua Line as a futile and harmful public expenditure whose primary purpose was to implement public works projects, without regard to profitability. At the same time, he indicated that it was because the Construction Ministry never gave up on the idea of reclaiming Tokyo Bay that the Aqua Line was eventually completed as the CIP plan's legacy.5

Richard Samuels praised the CIP plan as the most important and comprehensive regional development plan during a period of rapid growth. At the time his study was published in 1983, construction of the Aqua Line had stalled for a decade due to the opposition from the left-wing Metropolitan Governor Ryokichi Minobe. With that in mind, Samuels made important points. In the history of the Tokyo Bay development concept, the formation of a consensus among the central government, various prefectures and ordinance-designated cities involved was important. But forming this consensus was by no means easy. There was a difference in attitude among prefectures and ordinance-designated cities regarding the development of Tokyo Bay. This was not so much due to differences in political principles or affiliations. Sufficiently industrialized Tokyo and Kanagawa prefectures with the ordinance-designated cities of Yokohama and Kawasaki in Kanagawa were not keen on further concentration of industry compared to Chiba Prefecture, which was still considered a backwater by comparison, and wanted to attract industry. This was the reason why a proactive consensus for the construction of the trans-Tokyo Bay bridge, which had the potential to encourage the concentration of development in the Tokyo metropolitan area, could not be reached even in the 1960s, when there was supposed to be a firm consensus on high growth.6

While these important points have been made in these studies, the details and implications of the fact that the large-scale reclamation as envisioned in Kano's and CIP's vision was not implemented remain to be elucidated. As this article


famous maritime city concept. The significance of these visions and particularly Tange’s is seen as having spearheaded the world-wide megastructure trends in the 1960s and influenced the actual waterfront mega-projects from the 1980s such as Yokohama’s Minato Mirai 21 and Tokyo Teleport Town.

Another interpretation emphasizes the influence that Kano’s and the CIP’s visions had on important regional plans. André Sorensen noted that the CIP plan was the source of a number of similar projects by public and private organizations including the Construction Ministry. The plan encountered considerable opposition within the Liberal Democratic Party, the ruling party in power. Sorensen criticized the construction of the Aqua Line as a futile and harmful public expenditure whose primary purpose was to implement public works projects, without regard to profitability. At the same time, he indicated that it was because the Construction Ministry never gave up on the idea of reclaiming Tokyo Bay that the Aqua Line was eventually completed as the CIP plan’s legacy.

Richard Samuels praised the CIP plan as the most important and comprehensive regional development plan during a period of rapid growth. At the time his study was published in 1983, construction of the Aqua Line had stalled for a decade due to the opposition from the left-wing Metropolitan Governor Ryokichi Minobe. With that in mind, Samuels made important points. In the history of the Tokyo Bay development concept, the formation of a consensus among the central government, various prefectures and ordinance-designated cities involved was important. But forming this consensus was by no means easy. There was a difference in attitude among prefectures and ordinance-designated cities regarding the development of Tokyo Bay. This was not so much due to differences in political principles or affiliations. Sufficiently industrialized Tokyo and Kanagawa prefectures with the ordinance-designated cities of Yokohama and Kawasaki in Kanagawa were not keen on further concentration of industry compared to Chiba Prefecture, which was still considered a backwater by comparison, and wanted to attract industry. This was the reason why a proactive consensus for the construction of the trans-Tokyo Bay bridge, which had the potential to encourage the concentration of development in the Tokyo metropolitan area, could not be reached even in the 1960s, when there was supposed to be a firm consensus on high growth.

While these important points have been made in these studies, the details and implications of the fact that the large-scale reclamation as envisioned in Kano’s and CIP’s vision was not implemented remain to be elucidated. As this article


will show, Kano’s and CIP’s ideas received serious attention in the general media and especially in political debates, reflecting the keen awareness of them. However, although rarely mentioned, the vision of large-scale reclamation at this scale was rejected by the government as early as 1962. This was the case because reclaiming and developing Tokyo Bay was considered incompatible with the national urban and development policies based on dispersion.

The government’s Comprehensive National Development Plan in 1962 demonstrated its desire to curb concentration in major cities and promote industrial development in each region.7 Meanwhile, the government’s statutory plan for the metropolitan area in 1958 intended to encircle Tokyo’s ward area with a green belt and disperse industry and population away from Tokyo. In contrast, the development and particularly the reclamation of Tokyo Bay was considered a measure to promote concentration in Tokyo. However, the dispersion policy did not function and the proposed green belt was abandoned in 1965.

Regarding reclamation, there emerged contradictory initiatives by influential politicians and business interests, as well as divisions within the central government and among the local authorities. Notably, distinguished former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida kept the dream of realizing the CIP vision alive. He endeavoured to obtain foreign investment, because it was thought difficult to allocate significant public financial resources for the projects that went against dispersion. Another influential politician, Ichiro Kono, who was dispersion-oriented and as construction minister rejected large-scale land reclamation in 1962, also sought to promote infrastructural developments like a coastal highway and an airport that were based on land reclamation in Tokyo Bay, even though these contradicted dispersion away from Tokyo.

Moreover, infrastructural developments based on land reclamation (albeit on a relatively small scale) were normalized because the Tokyo Bay Comprehensive Development Council, an organization led by the relevant local governments and private companies, kept calling for infrastructural developments including a trans-Tokyo Bay bridge. Furthermore, the business interests were willing to appeal to central government figures to overcome local opposition to promoting reclamation.

Even when the idea of the Tokyo Bay development based on land reclamation, which seemed to have died out in the 1970s, was revived in the 1980s, the government was still unable to come up with an effective policy for dispersal away from Tokyo. However, it was so determined to expand domestic demand for large-scale construction projects that it demonstrated an unprecedented ability to execute development in the Tokyo Bay area, resulting in projects that disregarded the principles laid out in urban policy.

Media and political reaction to large-scale reclamation proposals

Kano presented his vision in the November 1958 issue of Geijutsu Shincho (New Trend in Arts), one of Japan’s leading art magazines. As the Japan Housing

Corporation’s president, Kano stated that his difficult experience obtaining affordable land while working to construct satellite cities had led him to the idea of creating a new land free from landlords. He envisioned that the mountains of his native Chiba Prefecture ‘should be levelled using dynamite or atomic bombs, that the earth and rock should be used to fill in Tokyo Bay and ideal farming villages to be founded where the mountains once stood’ (Figure 2).8

The Mainichi newspaper introduced Kano’s proposal in a series of 10 articles in January 1959. A total of 833.25 km² of the Tokyo Bay would be reclaimed. A 37-km stretch between Harumi Wharf in Tokyo and Futtsu Cape in Chiba prefectures would be constructed with a comb-wave quay that could accommodate 100,000-tonne class tankers and nuclear-powered merchant ships, followed by a waterfront industrial zone and then a green belt, as well as residential areas and forests behind the quay. The goal was to avoid overcrowding, with residential buildings of six or more floors.9 In the second article of the series, Kano reiterated his difficulties as the Japan Housing Corporation’s president regarding the acquisition of housing lots and argued for using a nuclear explosion to procure rocks to reclaim Tokyo Bay. Considering the national sentiment of being the only country to have experienced atomic bombings, there were surprisingly few statements questioning or opposing nuclear explosions. For example, the Mainichi article states only that ‘there is a problem of radiation hazard from nuclear explosions, but that is a subject for future research’.10

The series also introduced the Tokyo Bay reclamation visions by the CIP and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).11 It indicated that even within the Metropolitan Area Development Commission (MADC; chaired by a state minister and established as an external bureau of the Prime Minister’s Office), consideration of constructing two satellite cities with a population of 1.8 million people on a large reclaimed site in Tokyo Bay had already begun. The MADC was the first government agency to allocate funds for a land use survey of Tokyo Bay in the 1959 budget, and it decided to conduct a two-year deep and shallow survey of the bay.12 The LDP had established a special committee for the development of Tokyo Bay to create a plan to reclaim approximately 100 km² of land for industrial and residential use.13

Shortly after the Mainichi series, the Asahi newspaper introduced the CIP’s recommendations regarding the reclamation of Tokyo Bay. Its subcommittee chaired by Kano was central to the preparation of the plan to reclaim 660 km² of Tokyo Bay.14 The CIP’s plan was as comprehensive as Kano’s original plan, calling not only for the creation of industrial zones, but also for the deployment of residential zones with a capacity of 5.6 million people, airfields, international trade centres, government offices and recreational zones consisting of parks, zoos, golf courses, etc. (Figure 3).15

9Mainichi, 5 Jan. 1959, 12.
10Mainichi, 6 Jan. 1959, 10.
11Mainichi, 7 Jan. 1959, 10.
12Mainichi, 11 Jan. 1959, 10.
14Asahi, 5 Mar. 1959, 1.
15Sangyo Keikaku Kaigi, Tokyowan Niokutsoumetate nitsuiteno Kankoku, 6–11.
Figure 2. Kano’s vision of reclamation and development of Tokyo Bay.
Source: Based on Sangyo Keikaku Kaigi, Tokyowan Niokuboumeette nitsuiteno Kankoku, 81.
Figure 3. CIP’s vision of reclamation and development of Tokyo Bay.

Source: Based on Sangyo Keikaku Kaigi, Tokyowan Niokutsuboumetate nitsuiteno Kankoku Kōsa, 9, 24, (Figure 7) and 28–9.
The August 1959 *Asahi* column underscored the crux of the contradiction between large-scale development of Tokyo and dispersion. It criticized Kano and the CIP visions as antithetical to the central government’s policy regarding Tokyo and argued for the dispersion of the metropolitan area. One strategy for dispersion was the construction of new industrial cities that were also associated with the correction of regional imbalances. In July 1963, 13 districts were nominated by the Cabinet to be listed as ‘New Industrial Cities’ as a basis for regional development. Another initiative involved constraining the growth of major cities based on the Metropolitan Area Development Plan (Metropolitan Plan), which was formulated in 1958 with a particular focus on Tokyo. Drafted by the MADC, this plan was based on the Metropolitan Area Readjustment Law passed in 1956. The plan was to control urban land expansion by establishing a 10-km wide, 1,100-km² green belt, called a suburban zone, within a radius of 15–25 km from the city centre, which would enclose the metropolitan ward area and several adjacent cities and disperse the population and industry to the existing regional cities. The problem with the reclamation vision was that it was ‘premised on the idea that the population and industry can gather in Tokyo as much as they want’. Architects’ ideas for marine cities were also introduced in newspaper media as cutting-edge proposals. In October 1960, Kenzo Tange’s New Tokyo project based on a transportation axis was introduced in *Shukan Asahi* (a weekly magazine published by *Asahi*) and the *Yomiuri* newspaper. It was a ladder-and-bridge-like trans-Tokyo Bay traffic structure, which would form an urban axis of office districts. Road branches would be extended at right angles on both sides of this axis to create a multi-storey residential area (Figure 4).

In July 1961, *Yomiuri* published a commentary on architects’ growing willingness to create city plans. Tange’s New Tokyo Plan was ‘the first and best of its kind’, and was based on the idea that ‘a city of 10 million, like Tokyo, should have the city centre as an axis, like the vertebrae of a higher animal, and extend that axis over Tokyo Bay and build a new city there’. Proposals by younger architects, including Metabolists Kiyonori Kikutake and Kisho Kurokawa, for a maritime city, a remodelling of Tokyo and a new capital construction project were also noted as generating public interest.

In the National Diet, the reactions to Kano’s and CIP’s reclamation visions were mixed. A member of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), Hajime Tanaka, stated that he ‘bought Kano’s enthusiasm’, while Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda referenced...  

---


18 *Asahi*, 3 Aug. 1959, 1.


Kano’s activities in making reclamation plans.\(^{22}\) However, while the grandeur of the vision was respected, a more sobering opinion concerning technical feasibility persisted during the discussion of the Waterfront Area Development Promotion Bill (Waterfront Bill). The bill, proposed by LDP lawmakers, intended to promote the development of waterfront areas, and it was said that the primary goal of the

---

bill was the issue of reclamation in Tokyo Bay. First, concern was expressed about Kano’s plan that reclaiming the land on top of 40 m of alluvial mud would render it impossible to construct any buildings there. Tomoka Hisa, a journalist versed in national land development, stated as a witness in the Diet, ‘unless it is investigated scientifically, it is not easy to jump into this issue’. Umekichi Nakamura, an LDP member who submitted the Waterfront Bill as a Diet member’s bill, also said that technically, the bill was ‘open to criticism’. In addition, Yoshio Fujimaki, secretary of the Prime Minister’s Office (and director general of the Economic Planning Agency’s General Development Bureau), stated that ‘without further study, I cannot give any opinion on the matter’.

However, Metropolitan Governor Ryotaro Azuma discussed the visions of Kano and the CIP more positively than the LDP Diet members. At the March 1960 TMA meeting, Teizo Tanaka (JSP) mentioned the CIP’s vision in connection with the development of the port reclamation site by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG). Governor Azuma responded, ‘I have seen these visions, and I think it is me who would like to build something like this more than anyone else.’ At the March 1962 TMA meeting, Sukeo Okada (JSP) mentioned the CIP’s, Kano’s and Tange’s new Tokyo visions regarding the development of Tokyo Bay. In response, Azuma stated that they were each rich in original ideas and highly thought provoking, and the TMG was interested in developing such a vision.

**A deadlock of large-scale reclamation visions**

However, apart from the technical feasibility issue, National Diet members within the ruling LDP intended to place the waterfront development under the state control. The intention was reflected in the Waterfront Bill, under which a Bay Area Development Council would be established in the Prime Minister’s Office, chaired by the prime minister and composed of relevant ministers, governors of relevant prefectures and academic experts. The prime minister was to determine the basic plan for the development area following deliberation by the council. The government was concerned that various reclamation projects were being undertaken in an unregulated manner. It was a drastic proposal to limit the authority of land reclamation licences originally held by the prefectural governors concerned and instead place it under the control of the state ministers.

The Waterfront Bill was clearly intended to promote development led by the national government. It was passed by the House of Representatives in May 1960. However, due to the confusion surrounding the revision of the Security Treaty with the United States, it was not debated in the House of Councillors.

---

24 Minutes of the House of Representatives Special Committee on National Land Comprehensive Development (HRSCNLCD), 18 Nov. 1959, 15.
27 Minutes of the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly Plenary Session (TMAPS), 8 Mar. 1960, 302.
28 Minutes of the TMAPS, 7 Mar. 1962, 185.
30 Minutes of the House of Representatives Plenary Session (HRPS), 13 May 1960, 525.
Meanwhile, in July 1961, the CIP finalized its recommendation to build a crossing dike in Tokyo Bay. Following Typhoon Vera in 1959 that left more than 5,000 people dead or missing in Japan, the CIP sought the structure that would prevent the storm surge. The structure was to be 10 km long and 200 m wide, connecting Kawasaki and Kisarazu, the same points as the present Aqua Line and crossing the centre of Tokyo Bay from east to west, opening a 1-km wide channel at each end. If an expressway and railroad were constructed atop this crossing dike, it would directly connect the Tokyo/Kanagawa and Tokyo/Chiba industrial zones and form part of a major ring road encircling Tokyo and Tokyo Bay. It was expected to become an important route connecting the regions in eastern Japan and easing congestion in Tokyo. This crossing dike plan, together with the Tokyo Bay reclamation plan and others, was to form the basis for the construction of a metropolitan area.

Business interests were willing to appeal to central government figures to overcome local opposition in promoting reclamation. Asahi reported in August 1961 that a view was reinforced in the business community and related ministries that various visions should be co-ordinated. The CIP had just announced the Kisarazu–Kawasaki dike project, in addition to the large-scale reclamation vision. Other land reclamation plans included those for each of the three prefectures of Tokyo, Chiba and Kanagawa, in addition to a 70 km\(^2\) reclamation plan for the Kisarazu area by the *Kokudo Sogo Kaihatsu Kaisha* (National Land Comprehensive Development Company). However, these plans were often messy. A prime example was the confrontation between Chiba Prefecture and the National Land Comprehensive Development Company. Chiba Prefecture had a 100 km\(^2\) reclamation plan for the coastal area of Tokyo Bay in its territory, much of which overlapped with the plan of the National Land Comprehensive Development Company. If Chiba Prefecture were to grant the company comprehensive reclamation authority, it would undermine the prefecture’s plans, which the prefecture strongly opposed. However, the company’s shareholders included major Japanese steel, electric power and former zaibatsu financial companies, as well as major city banks. By approaching influential ministers, it had ‘obtained the unusual approval of the Cabinet’ to support its vision. Moreover, there was almost no consultation between the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) and Chiba Prefecture on their reclamation plans. Furthermore, Matsunaga, the founding leader of the CIP, and other influential figures in the business world lobbied political leaders to promote the CIP’s dike project. Consequently, the business community was increasingly calling for the establishment of a council directly under the Cabinet and a liaison conference among the three prefectures concerned.

Among politicians, former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida worked hard to obtain foreign capital to finance the LDP’s draft Tokyo Bay development plan. This was because allocating significant domestic financial resources for the

---

reclamation and development of Tokyo Bay was considered difficult, as it went against the top priority statutory policy for the development of underdeveloped areas in the country to correct regional disparities in income. *Asahi* reported in May 1962 that the LDP plan proposed a new landfill of 332 km\(^2\) in Tokyo Bay at a total cost of 6.5 billion USD and a 220-km-long ring road, including the dike crossing, around Tokyo Bay by 1980. Yoshida took the plan with him when he and two LDP politicians left for the United States and discussed the need for foreign capital with US officials and planned to hold similar negotiations in West Germany and the Netherlands.\(^{34}\) At a press conference after returning to Japan, it was revealed that, in fact, the countries were interested in the CIP reclamation project and that if Japan would implement the project, related Western countries would be willing to co-operate.\(^{35}\)

Yet comments made by two ministers in this context served to halt large-scale reclamation visions. In August 1962, the construction minister, Ichiro Kono, a powerful politician and considered one of the candidates for future prime minister, stated at a press conference that curbing the excessive concentration of population in large cities must be the keynote of future urban policy and in that sense he was opposed to reclaiming Tokyo Bay.\(^{36}\)

The following month, *Asahi* reported that the government would unify development and reclamation plans for the Tokyo Bay area based on the initiative of Shojiro Kawashima, chairperson of the MADC, who had a reputation as an able co-ordinator within the LDP. The governors of the three prefectures and the mayors of Yokohama and Kawasaki were invited to the prime minister’s official residence. At the meeting, Kawashima, although elected in Chiba’s bay-area constituency and keen on the prefecture’s industrial development, stated that to avoid excessive concentration of industry and population in the coastal areas of Tokyo Bay and to ensure orderly development, a comprehensive Tokyo Bay development and reclamation plan should be established, and all three prefectures should implement reclamation projects accordingly. Additionally, the secretary general of the MADC presented the basic policy on land use in the Tokyo Bay area, which outlined drastic restrictions on new factory expansion. In response, Hitoshi Shibata, the governor of Chiba Prefecture, stated that he would like to see Chiba attract factories for the sake of regional development. However, finally, the governors and mayors agreed to reduce industrial expansion. Accordingly, the three prefectures, the MADC and the Ministries of Construction and Transport were to prepare a comprehensive plan in line with this basic policy.\(^{37}\)

**Confusion over the proposed infrastructural developments**

Thus, the government halted the promotion of comprehensive development and large-scale reclamation at the level of Kano’s and the CIP’s visions. However, calls to promote the infrastructural developments in the Tokyo Bay area remained.

---

\(^{34}\) *Asahi*, 16 May 1962, 1.

\(^{35}\) *Asahi*, 8 Jun. 1962, 2.

\(^{36}\) *Asahi*, 1 Aug. 1962, 1.

\(^{37}\) *Asahi*, 15 Sep. 1962, 1.
It was the Tokyo Bay Comprehensive Development Council (Tokyo Bay Council), the liaison councils of the three prefectures and concerned companies established in December 1962 at the urging of Matsunaga that continued to make such demands. In July 1963, the Tokyo Bay Council resolved to petition the government, both houses of the Diet, the LDP and others for the construction of a trans-Tokyo Bay road connecting Kanagawa and Chiba prefectures, construction and improvement of coastal transportation routes and construction of the New Tokyo International Airport.  

Notably, its advisors included former Prime Minister Yoshida, who still demonstrated enthusiasm for large-scale reclamation. In an interview with Asahi in November 1963, Yoshida was asked about CIP’s Tokyo Bay reclamation plan. He replied that it would be necessary to borrow about $2 billion from the US to implement the plan, but that preparations were steadily underway. The article was headlined ‘Tokyo Bay reclamation is my dream’. Moreover, a Mr Schwarzenbach from Smith and Barney, an American investment banking company, visited Japan and met with TMG’s Vice Governor Shichiro Hibino to discuss the possibility of financing the development of Tokyo Bay and showed particular interest in the Tokyo Bay Council.

In March 1964, the CIP also decided on its recommendations regarding the New Tokyo International Airport and sent them to the government and other relevant organizations. The recommendation stated that the existing Haneda Airport should be abolished and a new airport should be constructed on reclaimed land in Tokyo Bay, with the area off Kisarazu as the best candidate site provisionally. The CIP’s recommendation stated that even if 33 km² of the over 1,000 km² of sea area were to be reclaimed to construct an airport, only a small percentage of the area would be used. Moreover, future capital development would be possible only by expanding into Tokyo Bay.

A new airport on reclaimed land in Tokyo Bay was considered controversial because it contradicted the Transport Ministry’s Civil Aviation Council’s report, which, based on the premise of Haneda Airport’s continued existence, emphasized air traffic control conditions and selected the inland Tomisato area of Chiba Prefecture as the optimal site. In addition, the CIP’s recommendation was premised on the construction of the trans-Tokyo Bay dike, and there was a question of whether it would be completed in time for the scheduled completion of the new airport, around 1970. However, Ichiro Kono, who was then construction minister, favoured a new airport within Tokyo Bay, and the Aviation Council’s report had to be reconsidered due to opposition from Kono. As seen, Kono was cautious about the large-scale reclamation of Tokyo Bay itself. Moreover, he enthusiastically supported the relocation of the capital’s core legislative, administrative and judicial functions. In June 1964, Kono developed an idea that he reported to the Cabinet for a ‘new capital’. This involved relocating the Diet, the Supreme Court, the

---

41 TM Archive, ki503.15.1, letter from E.B. Schwarzenbach, to Shichiro Hibino, 3 Dec. 1963.
43 Asahi, 5 Mar. 1964, 4; and Yomiuri, 5 Mar. 1964, 1 and 2.
prime minister’s residence and central state institutions to Hamana Lake in Shizuoka Prefecture, 200 km west from Tokyo.44

Nonetheless, he insisted that the new airport should be constructed by reclaiming part of Tokyo Bay. His conflict with the transport minister, who insisted that it was impossible to use reclaimed land in Tokyo Bay, was exposed in their statements in the Diet. Kono underscored that although the Transport Ministry was in charge of the airport issue, the construction minister had been specifically ordered by Prime Minister Ikeda to promote the issue.45 However, Transport Minister Kentaro Ayabe said he was ‘extremely dissatisfied’ and ‘regretted’ Kono’s remarks.46 As the construction minister, Kono was also open to constructing a 100-m-wide road along the Tokyo Bay coast.47 The TMG’s Bureau of Port and Harbour, under ‘strict orders’ from Kono, decided to rush to create a provisional 16-km road site by reclamation.48

However, Kono became the vice prime minister and state minister in charge of the Tokyo Olympics in July 1964. Ikeda stepped down due to illness shortly after the Tokyo Olympics that year and died in August of the following year. Kono had also passed away suddenly the month before, forcing yet another change in candidate sites for a new airport, which eventually fell upon what became the current Narita Airport. However, the Tokyo Bay Council continued to submit requests to the government for the construction of a bridge as well as a dike across Tokyo Bay and other projects.49 The three prefectures even held a conference to promote the building of a bridge across Tokyo Bay at a hotel in Tokyo that was attended by 800 people, including the ministers concerned and the LDP political research chairperson.50

Demise and resurrection of the Tokyo Bay area development from the 1970s

However, a progressive metropolitan governor, Ryokichi Minobe, introduced a new wrinkle to this issue. In 1973, Minobe filed a notice of withdrawal from the Tokyo Bay Council in opposition to the trans-Tokyo Bay bridge as a highway, on the grounds that it would promote automobile pollution and overcrowding in Tokyo.51 Minobe’s announcement of his withdrawal shortly before the TMA elections was seen by the Yomiuri newspaper as an attempt to counter the LDP government of Kakuei Tanaka, which was trying to pursue a development path based on the theory of remodelling the Japanese archipelago, and win a major victory over the LDP in the capital’s assembly.52 In fact, the TMG recognized the need

45Minutes of the House of Representatives Construction Committee (HRCC), 12 May 1964, 4.
47Asahi, 24 Mar. 1964, 1.
50Asahi, 9 Sep. 1966, 2.
52Yomiuri, 10 Jul. 1973, 1.
Minobe’s withdrawal was more or less in line with his attempts to get pollution and waste matter under control, and it brought the realization of the trans-bay bridge concept to a standstill. In the TMA, LDP member Masahiro Ito criticized the withdrawal from the council. In response, Minobe said that it was ‘not in the interests of the people of Tokyo to remain in a council whose main campaign objective is the construction of a highway crossing that will pollute Tokyo Bay, spur automobile pollution and promote the concentration of population in the Tokyo metropolitan area’. While such exchanges between the LDP’s TMA members and Minobe continued, the Tokyo Bay Council was reformed in 1974. The organization was to be composed solely of local governments, without private corporations. Large-scale projects such as the trans-Tokyo Bay highway were to be re-examined and reoriented towards the welfare of residents. The Minobe Metropolitan Government, for one, was recognized for its pioneering efforts in expanding welfare for the elderly and disabled, ahead of the national government, and for enacting the anti-pollution ordinance with stricter standards than those of the national government.

However, the election of new Metropolitan Governor Shunichi Suzuki supported by the LDP in 1979 changed the situation. He was said to be positive about the trans-Tokyo Bay bridge as a highway. At the TMA meetings, it was now the left-wing members belonging to the JSP and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) that questioned the wisdom of the governor’s stance. They argued that the plan was based on the idea of prioritizing the interests of large corporations while disregarding the lives of citizens, which would lead to new traffic congestion, ecological disturbance and many forms of pollution. In response, Suzuki reiterated his stance shown in his statement in 1980, ‘We believe that it is basically desirable because it will play an effective role in terms of the proper placement of various functions in the Tokyo metropolitan area, help form a multicore city and reduce the amount of traffic in the wards.’ In 1981, Suzuki reported to the TMA that the six metropolitan prefectures and cities concerned had reached a common understanding of the need for a trans-Tokyo Bay highway.

Moreover, in late 1985, the development of Tokyo Bay was raised among the ministers concerned and within the LDP as a candidate for private-sector activities based on Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone administration’s policy of expanding domestic demand. The government was eager to promote waterfront subcentres to consider large-scale land reclamation beyond the Port of Tokyo area, precisely to secure relocation sites for pollution-generating factories and waste disposal sites.

53TMArchive, tsu408.08.05, ‘Tokyowan no umetate nitsuite’, minutes of the meeting of executive officials held on 26 Mar. 1971.
58M. Minagawa, Tokyoshisei (Tokyo, 2007), 274–6.
by constructing high-rise buildings on reclaimed land. A central figure was Kosei Amano, who chaired the LDP’s working group on private-sector activities and then became the construction minister under the Nakasone administration. The *Asahi* newspaper reported that Amano had made a bold statement that the land reclamation of 10 km offshore from Harumi Wharf in Tokyo Bay should be done by the private sector. Another driving force was Shin Kanemaru, who as the secretary of land and infrastructure stated in the Diet in 1976 that while overcrowding would be alleviated by relocating the capital to a new location, it was not possible to regard the reclaimed Tokyo Bay as a candidate site. In 1986, he became the deputy prime minister in charge of promoting private-sector activities and pushed forward in the exact opposite direction.

The newspapers reported that Premier Nakasone approved the start of the waterfront redevelopment project in the next fiscal year and that Amano and Kanemaru pressed Metropolitan Governor Suzuki to push for construction of waterfront subcentres on reclaimed land. According to a January 1988 *Yomiuri* article, there were more than 40 development projects on the Tokyo Bay waterfront, including Tokyo Teleport Town and Minato Mirai 21, which were collectively called the Tokyo Bay Renaissance. The article mentioned Kano’s and Tange’s plans from some 30 years ago, particularly emphasizing the influence and novelty of Tange’s vision. In 1986, Tange forwarded the ‘Tokyo Plan 1986’, a similar Tokyo Bay development plan (Figure 5). Also mentioned was Kisho Kurokawa’s ‘Neo Tokyo Plan 2025’, publicized in 1987 to create an artificial island in Tokyo Bay that could house 5 million people.

Meanwhile, the materialization of the trans-Tokyo Bay highway also became a reality almost suddenly as an important part of the policy to expand domestic demand for large-scale construction projects. The Trans-Tokyo Bay Highway Company was officially established in 1986, and the amount of investment by concerned prefectures and other local governments was also decided. In the TMA, JSP and JCP members continued to demand that the trans-Tokyo Bay highway project be scrapped and that the TMG’s investment in the Trans-Tokyo Bay Highway Company be withdrawn. However, there was no way to stop the project, which the central government had positioned as one of the centrepieces

---

64 Minutes of the HRCC, 12 Feb. 1975, 10.
67 *Yomiuri*, 4 Jan. 1988, 12. The Neo Tokyo Plan 2025 can be found at the following URL: www.kisho.co.jp/page/216.html.
68 Minutes of the TMAPS, 4 Mar. 1986, 23.
of private-sector projects and had put so much effort into that it enacted the Special Measures Law on the construction of the trans-Tokyo Bay highway in 1986.72

---

Failure to formulate an effective dispersion policy

While the fever of development in the Tokyo Bay area was revived, the basic orientation of state initiatives against overcrowding and urban expansion remained unrealized since the 1960s. Regarding planning for the new industrial cities to absorb industrial development, the Economic Planning Agency had already reported in 1967 that land prices in these cities skyrocketed, but the rate of population increases fell well below the target rate.\textsuperscript{73} It is commonly accepted that the correction of regional disparities based on the attraction of industry to new industrial cities had failed.\textsuperscript{74}

Dispersion from Tokyo based on the 10-km wide ‘suburban zone’ of the green belt in the Metropolitan Plan did not function because the landowning farmers sold some of their farmland within the scheduled suburban zone for housing development as a sign of opposition. They wanted their farmland sold in small lots for housing development whenever they wished and thus were opposed to the green belt. Accordingly, the Metropolitan Area Readjustment Law was revised in 1965 to establish a ‘suburban development zone’ forming an area within a 50-km radius of central Tokyo, and the construction minister accordingly authorized the new Metropolitan Plan in 1968.\textsuperscript{75} As underlined in the MADC’s official journal, ‘whether we like it or not, there will be calls for a land use policy that sees this region as an integrated whole’.\textsuperscript{76} Meanwhile, Osanori Koyama, who succeeded Kono as construction minister, underscored the need for careful consideration of relocating the capital, which was understood ‘to signal a considerably more cautious outlook in comparison to the positive stance…shown by former Construction Minister Kono’.\textsuperscript{77}

The Third Metropolitan Plan in 1976 called for curbing the concentration of industry and prohibiting, in principle, land reclamation along the Tokyo Bay coast.\textsuperscript{78} It also planned to decentralize the central administrative functions that had been concentrated in central Tokyo to major cities in Tokyo suburbs and neighbouring prefectures.\textsuperscript{79} However, the \textit{Asahi} newspaper argued that this was not a sufficient dispersion measure and that the capital should be relocated outside the metropolitan area.\textsuperscript{80}

However, the Fourth Metropolitan Plan of 1986 again called for the dispersion of business functions to major cities in the metropolitan area as in the Third Metropolitan Plan. This policy was criticized, and the necessity for relocating the capital outside the metropolitan area was reasserted.\textsuperscript{81} It was just at the same time that the development concept of the Tokyo Bay area was flourishing. In 1987, the Transport Ministry announced the basic concept of the Tokyo Bay port plan. What had been a government policy of restraining land reclamation in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{73} \textit{Asahi}, 14 May 1967, 2.
\item \textsuperscript{74} T. Nakamura, \textit{Showasi Ge} (Tokyo, 2012), 679–82.
\item \textsuperscript{75} Ishida, ‘Dairondonkeikaku no fusho no deshi’, 180–5 and 193–4.
\item \textsuperscript{76} Y. Santo, ‘Shitokuseibikankeininho no kaisei nitsuite’, \textit{Shitoken Kenkyu}, 29 (Oct. 1965), 16.
\item \textsuperscript{77} \textit{Nikkei}, evening edition, 2 Oct. 1964, 7.
\item \textsuperscript{78} \textit{Yomiuri}, 13 Mar. 1976, 3.
\item \textsuperscript{79} \textit{Mainichi}, 30 Oct. 1976, 3.
\item \textsuperscript{80} \textit{Asahi}, editorial, 5 Nov. 1976, 5.
\item \textsuperscript{81} \textit{Asahi}, editorial, 22 May 1986, 5.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Tokyo Bay was once again steered in the direction of promoting it in order to create a receptacle for various development projects such as the Tokyo Teleport Town.\(^{82}\)

However, the projects that were realized emphasized commercial facilities, with limited housing construction, inconvenient travel to other locations and high transportation costs. Tange’s and Kurokawa’s new Tokyo Bay development plans in the 1980s were regarded as visions that, unlike the projects such as Tokyo Teleport Town, rejected private speculation and aimed to invest more in housing complexes and recreational green spaces and other public spaces.\(^{83}\) As for the Aqua Line, it opened in 1997 and consisted of a bridge over and a tunnel under the Bay, in contrast to the original concept of a road, railway and breakwater on reclaimed land. On its opening, Japan was already in a recessionary period, and newspapers expressed concern about repayment of construction costs, prospects for profitability and high tolls.\(^{84}\)

**Conclusion**

As we have seen, the large-scale reclamation visions by Kano, the CIP and the architectural community were taken up seriously in the popular media and in political debates of the time. Regarding the Kano vision, there were questions and criticisms in the National Diet about the technical feasibility of reclamation, but that also reflected a keen sense of awareness of it. The government and the LDP were eager to take the lead in co-ordinating a flurry of plans for waterfront development. At the same time, development based on large-scale reclamation of Tokyo Bay was incompatible with the national urban and development policy directed to dispersion. Understandably, the government curbed promotion of large-scale land reclamation.

While the government was unable to establish an effective dispersion policy away from Tokyo, influential politicians like Yoshida and Kono sought measures based on the capital’s development. Yoshida endeavoured to obtain foreign investment for the CIP vision. As construction minister, Kono rejected large-scale reclamation in favour of dispersion, while nevertheless pushing hard for infrastructural developments based on reclamation. Moreover, the statutory plan for Tokyo was inconsistent. The Metropolitan Plan shifted from the original policy of controlling Tokyo’s expansion with the green belt to integrated development of a 50-km radius from the mid-1960s onward. Then, the Third Plan of 1976 and the Fourth Plan of 1986 emphasized the dispersion of functions within the Tokyo metropolitan area to eliminate the uneven distribution of administrative central functions hitherto concentrated in the city centre. This was despite the fact that the dispersion of functions from the city centre to within the metropolitan area was likely to simply encourage concentration.

These circumstances created an opening for politics in the development and reclamation of Tokyo Bay. Against this backdrop, the waterfront mega-projects and the Aqua Line, which seemed cut off in the 1970s, were promoted by the

---

\(^{82}\) *Asahi*, 25 Mar. 1987, 1.

\(^{83}\) Pernice, ‘Japanese urban artificial islands’, 1852.

government in the 1980s with full force for the single major goal of expanding domestic demand, but with little regard to the voices doubting their effectiveness as urban policy for Tokyo. The way in which the idea of developing the Tokyo Bay area has been handled shows the failure of the government to formulate a firm and effective urban policy, leaving only a tortured path of unending reclamation and development debates.

Acknowledgements. I would like to thank Professor Rosemary Wakeman and the two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions, which have done much to improve this article. I am also grateful to Mr Keegan Cothern for his valuable comments and suggestions.

Competing interests. The author declares none.