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stalinist Poland. While I do discuss a range of reasons why different social groups were obedient, my ultimate judgment on Polish stalinism was that it did not establish legitimacy. From the complaint above it should also be clear that I do not believe that material gain is a basis for legitimate authority, as Williams asserts. I talk about it only as a basis for obedience. Finally, his criticism that a book concerned with the "origins of democratization" does not draw broad theoretical conclusions on democratic consolidation seems misplaced.

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Kieran Williams replies:

I did not miss Professor Bernhard's definition of non-legitimate and illegitimate domination. If my account gives the impression that he does not provide a definition, I certainly apologize, as it was not my intention. Instead, my point was (and is) that the operational boundaries of these types are unclear, as is the heuristic value of the distinction. Does a regime cease to be non-legitimate and become illegitimate once it fails to fill the shops or coerce the masses into submission? Does it revert to being non-legitimate once the crowds are dispersed and sausage delivered? Is it not a spectrum of illegitimacy or degrees of efficacy that is at issue, rather than two discrete types? The typology is logically neat and interesting, but I think that Jan Pakulski provides a more helpful analytical framework in his 1986 article on conditional tolerance.

Although it is clear that Bernhard argues that Polish stalinism did not establish legitimacy, and that he does not consider material gain a basis for legitimacy (I merely questioned whether he saw it as the source of support among certain groups, which is a separate matter), he does make passing reference to some "followers of the party leadership" obeying "out of a fanatical sense of commitment" under the influence of Stalin's charisma and ideology. He also notes that many intellectuals subscribed to stalinism out of conviction and "self-delusion." I read this as implying that stalinism was indeed legitimate in the eyes of many members of the elite "staff" of post-war Poland. Had Professor Bernhard distinguished more systematically between Poles inspired by true belief in stalinism and those who obeyed out of fear or opportunism, I might have presented his arguments more faithfully. Above all, I make these criticisms of chapter two because it distracts from chapter seven's truly illuminating account of worker disaffection.

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