Authors’ reply We are grateful to Bracha et al for their interesting comments regarding primary agoraphobia as a potential evolutionary adaptation. First, we should clarify that we did not propose an additional diagnostic category; rather, we proposed that agoraphobia itself should be a stand-alone diagnosis in DSM–V (as in ICD–10), like other phobias. Subdividing what has historically been called agoraphobia may be useful, but we are concerned that clinicians and researchers are adopting Klein’s narrower conceptualisation of agoraphobia as simply fear of panic in typical agoraphobic situations (Klein, 1980), without considering the possibility that a broader conceptualisation may be useful. Epidemiologists are increasingly adopting the definition of agoraphobia as ‘fear of fear’ (e.g. Grant et al, 2006), rather than the broader fear of difficulty in escaping, etc., in characteristic situations. As noted in our article, what has historically been called agoraphobia is strongly but not exclusively associated with panic, and, when the association exists, agoraphobia is not always preceded by panic.

The concept of an evolutionary basis for the development of phobias is not new (Seligman, 1971; Marks, 1987). Nevertheless, the reasons why people with agoraphobia develop fear and avoidance of particular situations remain important. Bracha et al suggest that fear of open spaces is an evolutionary remnant of primates’ use of trees to escape from predators. However, although some people with agoraphobia are fearful of open spaces, the list of typical agoraphobic situations is broad (Marks, 1987). Thus, hypotheses with an evolutionary basis to explain agoraphobia will be expected to cover reasons why persons fear and avoid a variety of situations. Although it is difficult to ‘prove’ such hypotheses, we agree with Bracha et al that researchers can make falsifiable predictions that can continue to illuminate the field.

We agree that cognitive–behavioural techniques may be particularly important for persons whose agoraphobia is primary. However, many people with agoraphobia can benefit from such treatment, whether the syndrome is primary or secondary (Klein, 1980). By implication, the pain which accompanies a retrospective view of immoral acts should vary according to effective and physiological conditions. Now it is evident that in introducing here the word ‘physiological’ one assumes a causal nexus between physiological conditions, such as, for example, intravascular tension, heart beat, excretory elimination and neurotrophic functions on the one hand, and the effective elements which contribute to the production of such moral feelings and sentiments as joy, anger, fear, sympathy and hate on the other – an assumption which the intellectuals, who regard the somatic phenomena as consecutive and reflex, would say simply begs the whole question. Notwithstanding, however, the inherent difficulty of analysing the emotions, it may be fairly stated, we think, that probably most psychologists, and certainly the majority of alienists to-day, are supporters of the

One hundred years ago

Remorse in melancholia

REMORSE – that most poignant emotion – has often been depicted for us with a wealth of imagery in words which raise it at once to the chief place in human suffering. It has been described as the biting of teeth which, once fleshed in sin, now tear the heart of the evil-doer, of whom it has been written that “terror “takes hold on him as waters and a tempest stealeth “him away in the night”; as the torment of a galled conscience; as “a still baking oven, another hell”; and as the overwhelming revulsion of feeling loosed by

The print and perfume of old passion,
The wild-beast mark of panther’s fangs.

But, wherever described by writers unversed in modern psychology, it will be found that this exquisite moral pain is attributed solely to a realization of the shortcoming of some actual conduct, as compared with ideal standards of behaviour, founded on logical concepts of good and evil – that is, to an intellectual judgement. This conception, implicit in most religions, is still held by the commonality of people, and is, further, firmly maintained by some important intellectualistic schools of philosophy, for whom such terms as “conscience,” “morality,” and “moral sentiment” connote simply and entirely rational processes or states. Opposed to this Kantian conception of morality are the views of those who maintain that moral reactions are determined, not only by the voice of reason, but by the effective or emotional character; that conscience is not an omnipresent, infallible guide to conduct, identical in all men, but that it varies in different people, and even fluctuates in the individual himself, according to the state of his mental and emotional poise, or what Janet has called the niveau mental.

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