POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN BRAZIL*

Scott Mainwaring
University of Notre Dame


THE WORKERS’ PARTY AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN BRAZIL. By Margaret E. Keck. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992. Pp. 315. $37.00 cloth.)

As recently as the early 1970s, the literature on Brazilian parties was thin. This situation has changed dramatically in the past two decades with the publication of many fine studies. The three books under review here represent only a small sample of the production of the past few years.¹ These studies cover three different periods in Brazilian politics—1945–1964, 1966–1979, and 1979–1992—and will be discussed in chronological order.

Antônio Lavareda’s A democracia nas urnas: O processo partidário eleitoral brasileiro is in one respect the most ambitious work of the three. While the other two works focus on one party, Lavareda provides an innovative interpretation of the party system of 1945–1964. He argues that the party system was more consolidated than previous analyses have judged,² that Brazilian parties were not as fragile as most of the literature

*¹I am grateful to Frances Hagopian and Gláucio Soares for helpful suggestions. The views presented here are mine alone.


2. A partial exception to this rule is Gláucio Dillon Soares’s seminal book Sociedade e política no Brasil (São Paulo: Difel, 1973). Soares emphasized the structuring and stability of the party system from 1945 to 1964. Some of the best works that emphasize party weakness
has suggested, and that the party system was not primarily responsible for the breakdown of democracy in 1964.

Lavareda makes a number of claims based on his view that the party system did not contribute significantly to the 1964 breakdown. He argues that the party system did not undergo a process of destructuring after two decades of populist democracy. Lavareda supports this contention by showing that the number of parties competing in elections did not increase over time. Yet the effective number of parties, a measure more indicative than the number of parties that ran candidates, increased substantially after 1945 both in the Câmara de Deputados (from 2.77 effective parties in 1945 to 4.10 in 1950, 4.59 in 1954, 4.50 in 1958, and 4.55 in 1962) and in the Senado (from 2.24 in 1945 to 2.72 in 1947, 5.25 in 1950, 3.61 in 1954, 3.22 in 1958, and 4.26 in 1962). Lavareda states that the percentage of blank and null votes did not increase over time, but the information he presents does not support this claim (see his Table 2.2).

Lavareda's arguments do not convincingly refute the contention that the party system reached a crisis after 1961. It is possible for a party system to unravel without an increase in the number of parties or in the proportion of blank and null votes. The crisis in the party system was manifested not only in the indicators discussed by Lavareda but also in the election of a viscerally antiparty president (Jânio Quadros) in 1960; in growing intraparty conflict within the major parties; and in the eclipsing of parties by supraparty fronts as the major axes for organizing the congress.

Lavareda persuasively argues against hypotheses that the party system had a dominant party or that the system tended toward bipolarization. Some of the evidence he presents to refute the alternative interpretations, however, is technically flawed. He classifies each state's party com-


3. The effective number of parties is a formula that weights the number and size of parties. If three equal parties each have one-third of the seats (or votes), the effective number of parties is 3. If one party has one-half and two parties each have one-quarter, then the effective number of parties is 2.67, reflecting the existence of three parties but the larger share of one. The effective number of parties is equal to I divided by the sum of the squares of each party's share of votes or seats. See Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera, "The Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe," Comparative Political Studies 12, no. 1 (Apr. 1979):3–27.

4. My calculations are based on seats rather than on votes.


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petition as noncompetitive, bipolar, or multipolar, depending on the effective number of parties. Although the effective number of parties is a useful indicator for understanding the structure of party competition, Lavareda uses this index in a misleading way. He classifies party competition as bipolar when the effective number of parties ranged from 1.51 to 2.50. But in order to have 1.5 effective parties, mathematically, one party would have to win 79 percent of the vote against only one other competitor and even more than 79 percent if more than one competitor captured votes. Such a situation is clearly not bipolar, evincing instead the overwhelming dominance of one party.

In assessing arguments on electoral trends, Lavareda correctly insists that analysts should focus not only on congressional elections (as most have done previously) but also on presidential and gubernatorial contests. The presidency was the dominant position in the Brazilian political system from 1945 to 1964, and state governors were also powerful actors. Lavareda’s careful analysis confirms earlier arguments about the decline in support for the Partido Social Democrático (PSD), the largest party that had a dominant centrist orientation. He also shows that the União Democrática Nacional (UDN), the most conservative of the three major parties, declined in congress but fared better in the 1960 presidential and gubernatorial elections than in previous contests. Consequently, previous works portraying the unilinear demise of both of these parties need some qualifying. While Lavareda’s argument on the UDN has merit, he may overstate the degree to which the presidential victory of Quadros in 1960 really offset the UDN’s congressional demise. Quadros registered as the candidate of the small Partido Trabalhista Nacional (PTN); the UDN split over endorsing him and did so in part for lack of a better alternative. The decisive argument for supporting Quadros was that no UDN candidate could have won the presidency. Finally, Lavareda agrees with previous assessments that the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB), the most progressive of the three major parties, expanded substantially over time, mainly in legislative elections. He concludes from these trends that the party system was not realigning. But the PSD’s sharp decline and the PTB’s dramatic ascension suggest that realignment was indeed occurring, as argued in the classic works of Gláucio Ary Dillon Soares and Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza.

Lavareda cites correlations in party-system fragmentation over time to suggest that the party system was consolidated. But even if his argument about consolidation has some merit, the measure Lavareda

7. See Soares, Sociedade e política no Brasil; and Souza, Estado e partidos políticos no Brasil (1930 a 1964).
8. Party-system fragmentation refers to the dispersion of seats or votes among parties. It is based on the same information as the effective number of parties but is the mathematical inverse: the sum of the squares of each party’s share of votes or seats.
chose to make the argument is inappropriate. Party-system fragmentation could have remained constant even in a party system characterized by a high degree of instability.

Consider the following hypothetical example. In Election 1, four parties (A, B, C, and D) win 40 percent, 30 percent, 15 percent, and 15 percent of the votes (or seats), respectively. In Election 2 (the following contest), the same four parties win 15 percent, 30 percent, 0 percent, and 15 percent respectively, while new party E comes on the scene and wins 40 percent (see table 1).

Such a party system would be highly unstable (although in recent years, the party systems in Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia have all approximated this degree of electoral volatility). Yet despite sea changes in the party system from one election to the next, party-system fragmentation would not change at all. Clearly, stability in party-system fragmentation does not imply party-system consolidation, although sharp changes in fragmentation necessarily indicate a lack of party-system institutionalization. A better measure of party-system consolidation is electoral volatility, that is, the aggregate turnover that parties experience from one election to the next.9

In one interesting chapter of *A democracia nas urnas*, Lavareda examines the parties’ penetration in society by analyzing previously untapped survey data. IBOPE, one of Brazil’s best-known survey companies, conducted many political surveys between 1948 and 1964. Citing IBOPE results, Lavareda shows that levels of party identification were moderately high, indicating reasonably solid party penetration of society, in marked contrast to the situation after 1985.

Yet the congruence between voters’ stated party preference and their preferred presidential candidates was much lower than in the United States and almost certainly lower than in Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile. In this sense, the data are open to an interpretation different from Lavareda’s: that despite moderately high levels of party identification, party rooting in society was shallow. In a

9. Data on electoral volatility support the view that the party system was not well institutionalized. Volatility in presidential elections averaged a high 29.7 percent between 1945 and 1960. Volatility (based on seats) averaged 13.8 percent for elections to the Chamber of Deputies and 25.6 percent for Senate elections. These volatility levels are nonetheless lower than those for the period since 1985.
1960 survey in the city of São Paulo, only 39 percent of PTB sympathizers said that they planned to vote for the party’s presidential candidate, compared with 44 percent backing the other two candidates and 17 percent undecided. Even in Porto Alegre, a PTB stronghold, only 50 percent of PTB identifiers planned to vote for the party’s candidate, compared with 37 percent favoring other candidates and 13 percent undecided (p. 149). If parties had been deeply rooted in Brazilian society, citizens would have voted more consistently for their party’s candidate. In a similar vein, Lavareda’s data show countless cases of striking incongruence between citizens’ preferred presidential and vice-presidential candidates in the 1960 elections (p. 151). In only two of ten major cities for which Lavareda presents data did a plurality of the supporters of UDN presidential candidate Quadros also favor the UDN’s vice-presidential candidate, Milton Campos. Widespread ticket splitting between the president and the vice-president, which was legally permissible under the 1946 constitution, indicates relatively weak attachments to party labels. All these findings suggest a more ambiguous picture than the one Lavareda paints in A democracia nas urnas regarding party rooting in Brazilian society.

Lavareda avers with strong supporting evidence that the radicalization that corroded Brazilian democracy after 1961 was fundamentally an elite phenomenon rather than one attributable to mass opinion. He ultimately concludes that the parties and the party system were not major causes of the breakdown of democracy, contrary to what previous analyses have maintained. Yet this conclusion is so dependent on dubious premises that it too must be questioned.

Despite the flaws in A democracia nas urnas, Lavareda has uncovered an array of new data. He has also taken on major questions related to the Brazilian party system and contributed to rethinking important issues. For all these accomplishments he deserves ample credit.

In 1964 the military coup that toppled President João Goulart ended what Thomas Skidmore has termed “Brazil’s experiment in democracy.” But as Maria D’Alva Gil Kinzo argues in her fine study, Legal Opposition Politics under Authoritarian Rule in Brazil: The Case of the MDB, 1966–1979, the military government was ambivalent and divided regarding its own objectives. Some factions within the military wanted to impose hard-line authoritarian rule, but others hoped to retain some institutions characteristic of liberal democracy and return to a restricted democracy in the relatively near future. During most of the following twenty-one years of military rule, the more moderate faction won out. The presidency of General Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1969–1974) represented a partial exception, but even then the military did not completely eliminate liberal democratic institutions.

Kinzo argues that this initial military ambivalence, coupled with the fact that civilian politicians were deeply involved in the 1964 coup, helps explain why the military allowed the Brazilian Congress and the parties to continue functioning and did not cancel the October 1965 elections. My emphasis would diverge from her argument slightly. The Chilean coup against Salvador Allende in 1973 showed that many politicians can conspire against democracy, only to be denied a significant role under military rule. The fact that key political actors (the military, capitalists, the media, and the middle sectors) felt less threatened in Brazil in 1964 than they did in the recent military dictatorships in the Southern Cone also helps explain why the military governments that took power in the 1970s in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile imposed a more drastic rupture with democratic institutions.

In October 1965, gubernatorial elections in the key states of Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais did not turn out as the military had hoped. This outcome led to President Humberto de Castelo Branco’s decision to cancel the unfavorable election results and ban the old parties. But rather than outlaw all parties, the military fostered the creation of a pro-regime party, the Aliança Renovadora Nacional (ARENA), and an opposition organization, the Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB).

Drawing on her extensive interviews and documentary research, Kinzo carefully traces the history of the MDB from its creation in 1966 to its end in 1979, when the military government imposed another major change in party and electoral legislation and ended the two-party arrangement it had created thirteen years earlier. The first part of Legal Opposition Politics under Authoritarian Rule examines the creation, organization, and electoral performance of the MDB, while the second part traces the MDB’s role in national politics.

During its early years (1966–1974), the MDB struggled to survive. Although the military regime allowed congress to function most of the time and permitted legislative elections, outspoken MDB politicians risked losing their mandates and their political rights. In December 1968, the dictatorship took a more repressive turn. President Artur Costa e Silva decreed the closing of the national congress, which reopened ten months later.

In response to the ensuing repression against opposition leaders, the MDB became more quiescent. Yet compliance had its costs: in the 1970 legislative elections, the MDB suffered sharp reverses. At times, party leaders even discussed the possibility of dissolving the MDB. Yet gradually between 1971 and 1974, the party began to shed its excessively quiescent image and to challenge the regime more forcefully.

In 1974 President Ernesto Geisel took office promising a “gradual and secure” political opening. The MDB took advantage of the more open political climate that year to campaign more vigorously for the legislative elections. The results surprised even the MDB’s most optimistic suppor-
The party won sixteen of twenty-two senate seats and increased its share of the chamber vote from 21 percent in 1970 to 38 percent. The MDB won decisively in the more industrialized and wealthier regions of the country and in the large cities. Demographic changes in Brazilian society were increasing the share of the population living in areas where the opposition party won convincingly. Although the social composition of MDB support varied significantly from one municipality to the next, the party in general fared especially well in poor urban areas.

Kinzo emphasizes that this electoral outcome posed a new dilemma for the military rulers: they could not expect to win open and free elections, but they wanted to continue the process of political liberalization. As a result, the government frequently manipulated electoral laws to give ARENA, the pro-regime party, an edge. Despite these manipulations, the MDB managed to hold its own or gain more ground. As Kinzo and Bolivar Lamounier have convincingly demonstrated, elections became a critical part of the political dynamic that led to the restoration of democracy in 1985. Thus paradoxically, a party system that the military regime created in part to bolster its own legitimacy ultimately helped bring about that regime’s demise.

It became obvious to the military and its civilian allies after 1974 that two-party competition was turning elections into plebiscitarian affairs that increasingly favored the MDB. Yet the government did not undertake party reform until 1979, when a new law on political parties dissolved both the MDB and ARENA. The law was intended to splinter the opposition party and keep ARENA’s successor mostly intact, and it succeeded in both respects. Kinzo’s analysis largely ends at this point.

Although Kinzo sticks closely to analyzing the MDB, her book illuminates many of the key issues that characterized the military period as a whole. Legal Opposition Politics under Authoritarian Rule in Brazil implicitly calls attention to a lacuna in the literature on Brazilian parties: no major work has been written on ARENA. This lack of attention is not entirely surprising because ARENA was subservient to the military regime. Yet politicians were important to the functioning of the authoritarian regime in Brazil, and much could be learned about the regime from an analysis of ARENA as engaging as Kinzo’s study of the MDB.

Margaret Keck’s The Workers’ Party and Democratization in Brazil is a carefully researched and well-written account of the Partido dos Tra-


12. Important aspects of ARENA politicians are analyzed, but without focusing on the party per se, in Frances Hagopian’s excellent study, Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). See also Timothy Power, “The Political Right and Democratization in Brazil,” Ph.D. diss., University of Notre Dame, 1993.
balhadores (PT) and its relationship to democratization. Since its founding in 1979, the PT has been the most significant leftist party in Brazil. After expanding throughout the 1980s, it had become a major electoral force by 1988. The PT represents a significant innovation in Brazilian politics in several respects: its emphasis on developing an internally democratic and participatory organization, its efforts to represent Brazilian workers, its disciplined legislative party, and its attempts to develop a dense party life. These party characteristics are unique in a country where parties have been notorious for their elitist character, malleability, and weak organizational structure.

Although Keck places her study within the broader context of leftist working-class parties, she underscores the distinctive nature of Brazil’s political formation and calls attention to the difficulties faced by the PT in mobilizing workers in the ways developed by European working-class “parties of integration.” In late-industrializing countries, workers have accounted for a much smaller share of the economically active population than in many European countries earlier in the twentieth century. Keck also mentions (although she may not emphasize the point enough) that television has changed the role of political parties. Today, candidates can establish direct links to the electorate via television, thus partially displacing one function of party organizations in earlier decades.

Keck argues that formation of the PT was driven by contextual factors, and she therefore analyzes several aspects of the Brazilian transition to democracy. The relatively conservative, elite-led transition created a situation in which the PT was an anomaly, a political outsider that was ambivalent about whether it wanted to win elections and govern. This outsider status worked against the party until 1985, when twenty-one years of military rule came to an end. After that point, the PT’s outsider status enabled the party to capitalize on growing disgruntlement with inept civilian governments between 1985 and 1990 (when Keck’s research ended). In 1989 PT candidate Luis Inácio da Silva (Lula) finished second in the first round of the presidential elections, forcing a runoff with eventual winner Fernando Collor de Mello.

The Workers’ Party and Democratization in Brazil goes into greatest detail about the period from 1979 to 1982. Keck justifies this emphasis on the grounds that the formative period shapes subsequent party development. In some senses, this point is valid, but I found more interesting her analysis of the party’s significant changes after 1985, when some early positions and political styles were reversed. These changes were broad enough to dispel any argument that the early period determined later party evolution. Keck particularly emphasizes the role of the industrial working class in creating the PT, although she notes the influence of Catholic Church activists and revolutionary leftist groups.

Keck pays close attention to many of the dilemmas confronting a
relatively small leftist party fighting to survive and expand under a military regime. In the 1982 elections, the PT fared worse than even the most pessimistic party sympathizers had imagined, winning only 8 seats of 479 in the Chamber of Deputies and none in the Senate; it was also shut out of gubernatorial posts. From then until the 1985 municipal elections, the party functioned in a state of nearly constant internal crisis.

Keck’s analysis of the PT’s attitude toward political institutions is the most intriguing chapter of the book. On the one hand, PT leaders said that the party was committed to winning elections. On the other hand, the leadership was initially ambivalent about participating in institutional politics and maintained some problematic attitudes. For example, when in 1982 a PT candidate unexpectedly won the race for mayor of Diadema (a large working-class city outside São Paulo), severe tensions developed between local party officials and the mayor. The party expected the mayor to act as a party representative and to emphasize popular councils in the local governing process. The mayor argued in response that he had been elected to govern the whole population and that the popular councils paid little attention to efficiency and results. This instance is only one of many that reveal the PT’s occasionally rigid, but always fascinating, conception of politics.

Keck argues persuasively that the PT underwent important transformations after 1985. It became more attentive to the need to form political alliances and less concerned with maintaining distance from political institutions. Most leaders came to recognize that PT party leaders needed to grant more autonomy to PT mayors because municipal governments could not be perceived as captive agents of the party. Congressional representatives also gained more autonomy and clout within the party. All this change took place while the PT was transforming itself from a minor party into a major contender for power.

Keck rightly suggests that the PT’s presence has had salutary effects on Brazilian democracy. In a context where other parties often seemed to be similar clientelistic machines, the PT gave voters a real alternative. Amidst weak parties, the PT has established a relatively solid organization and is much more disciplined than the other major Brazilian parties, internal factionalism notwithstanding.

*The Workers’ Party and Democratization in Brazil* is so thoughtfully argued that it is difficult to find more than minor quibbles. At times, Keck perhaps fails to question sufficiently the party’s own discourse on the

nature of the organization. She is correct that the party was more democratic and participatory than most other Brazilian parties have been, but some revolutionary PT factions were quite authoritarian. Keck correctly argues that workers played a major role in creating the party in São Paulo, but in aggregate terms, party sympathizers are better educated and better-off than the average Brazilian. Moreover, civil servants, most of whom are middle class, have increasingly formed the major part of the PT’s unionized support. Keck perhaps understates the dilemmas associated with being a leftist party during a period of worldwide bankruptcy of real socialism. Some factions of the party remained wedded to Leninist or Trotskyite visions even after the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, while others maintain romantic visions of how to effect social and political change or cling to conspiratorial explanations of the ills of Brazilian society.

The Workers’ Party and Democratization in Brazil is the best book available on the PT and is an important contribution to the literature on Brazilian politics and on leftist parties. The definitive study of the period from 1979 to 1985, it is theoretically and comparatively well informed.

The plethora of works on the PT contrasts with the paucity of analyses of parties that have consistently outpolled it, especially the centrist Partido Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) and the conservative Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL). The fascination with the PT is understandable: the party represented something new and important in Brazilian politics, whereas the other parties were more traditional in terms of organization and their style of doing politics. Fascination with the PT also reflects an intellectual predilection among political scientists and sociologists studying Latin America (and among funding agencies) to investigate the new and pay less attention to the old. The Center-Left, Center, and Right still dominate politics in most Latin American countries, but these forces have received less attention than the Left. Fortunately, this imbalance in focus has started to shift in recent years.

Perhaps the most striking observation emerging from reading these

15. On this point, see Francisco de Oliveira, “Qual é a do PT?” in E agora, PT?, 9–34.
books together is how profoundly Brazilian party systems have changed in the past fifty years: from the fragmented multiparty system between 1945 and 1964, to the "hegemonic" party system with two parties between 1966 and 1979, to a two-party system at the national level but moderate multipartism in several key states (São Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, and Rio de Janeiro) between 1979 and 1984, to fragmented multipartism since 1985. The party labels of the most recent period are almost completely different from those of 1945–1964. As Lamounier and Menguello have emphasized, the changes from one party system to the next have been abrupt. The ephemeral nature of parties contrasts markedly with what has occurred in more economically developed countries in Latin America. The weakness of parties thus places Brazil in a category closer to much poorer countries in the region such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru.

The great difficulties Brazil has had in institutionalizing a democratic party system in the period since 1985 could easily lead one to read into the past the kind of party weakness and party-system volatility that has characterized the present. To some degree, Brazil does reveal a history of party weakness. If the parties operating between 1945 and 1964 had possessed strong identities and organizations, government efforts to create a two-party system in 1966 would have met with more resistance. One of the virtues of Lavareda’s *A democracia nas urnas* is its suggestion that the party system of 1945–1964 was moderately consolidated, which is more than can be said of the post-1985 system so far.

The other striking point that emerges from reading these three books together is the quality of the work that is being carried out on Brazilian parties. Much remains to be done, but a great deal has been accomplished in the past two decades.

18. The notion of a hegemonic party system comes from Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). According to Sartori, in a hegemonic party system, "The hegemonic party neither allows for a formula nor a de facto competition for power. Other parties are permitted to exist, but as second-class, licensed parties... [T]he hegemonic party will remain in power whether it is liked or not" (p. 230).