

eign travelers. But an eight-day journey on the Trans-Siberian Railway is dismissed in just five pages. That is precisely a time when the foreign traveler could use a good guidebook, such as the fine Soviet guide *Moskva-Vladivostok*, edited by V. V. Pokshishevskii and V. V. Vorobiev (Moscow: "Mysl'," 1968).

After examining the two latest guidebooks, a devotee of travel guides still yearns for the perfect product. Will there ever again be one like Baedeker's *Russia*, published in 1914?

THEODORE SHABAD  
New York

THE SUPERPOWERS AND ARMS CONTROL: FROM COLD WAR TO INTERDEPENDENCE. By *Walter C. Clemens, Jr.* Lexington, Mass., Toronto, London: Lexington Books, D. C. Heath, 1973. xxvi, 181 pp. \$13.50.

Walter C. Clemens, Jr. has written a timely analysis of the problem of arms control. As the author states, this study is an attempt to explain the impact of the West upon Soviet policy with regard to arms control and "to learn what the Soviet leaders were doing—and why—so that Westerners could better decide what to do about it."

He proceeds to submit six propositions characterizing Soviet foreign policy directed at controlling the arms race. The first proposition is that Soviet external behavior since the death of Stalin has reflected a "hierarchy of values" which places the security of the Soviet rulers and the legitimization of their regime at the top. Second is the security of the Soviet state. Maintaining and influencing Soviet control over the bloc comes next, then industrialization of the country and improvement in living standards of the Soviet people. Finally there is the maintenance and strengthening of Soviet influence in the international Communist movement and the Third World. One cannot disagree with this order of priorities.

Nor can one quarrel with the author's other propositions: that Soviet military actions have been defensive—except to recover territories within the confines of the tsarist regime; that Soviet military policy stems from a perception of military inferiority; that Soviet proposals for arms control with the West have been influenced more by military-strategic interests than by the requirements of the Communist doctrine; that the more the United States and the USSR become similar in military structure the greater the likelihood of an arms agreement; and so forth. Professor Clemens does concede that Soviet actions in foreign policy have led to the atmosphere of suspicion that surrounds the East-West relationship. However, he points out that the fault is not always on the side of the USSR. The West, led by the United States, has often carried out policies toward the USSR which have exacerbated the mutual distrust. Clemens cites the West's rejection of the Rapacki Plan as an example. He also takes the position that the United States, with its strategic superiority over the USSR from the end of World War II to the late 1960s, will continue to have strategic superiority in the 1970s, in spite of the Soviets acquiring stronger nuclear and naval power. Clemens does believe that the Salt I—1972 agreements benefit both sides, and although both sides could intensify the arms race, they also could enact further agreements in Salt II.

As Clemens develops his essay he raises many other basic questions in regard to assessing the Soviet-American arms equation. The book is stimulating, scholarly

in documentation and thoughtful but at times a bit difficult to follow. His general propositions are most helpful, though, to all of us who are perhaps too inclined to miss the forest and see only the trees.

WILLIAM B. BALLIS  
*University of Michigan, Ann Arbor*

THE SOVIET SEA CHALLENGE. By *Ernest McNeill Eller*, Rear Admiral, USN (ret.). Foreword by *Admiral Arleigh Burke*. Chicago: Cowles Book Company, a subsidiary of Henry Regnery Company, 1971. xvi, 315 pp. 11 maps, 41 photographs. \$8.95.

This is a serious study, by the former director of naval history, evaluating Soviet naval power in the context of the naval history of Russia and the United States. Rear Admiral Eller intends to alert the American people to the respectable Soviet naval build-up over the last decade. He understands naval strategy well. On the eve of the Korean War, he was appointed commander of the Middle East Force in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean sectors.

According to the author the British withdrawal in the 1960s from the waters extending from Singapore to Suez created a vacuum into which Moscow and Washington have entered. Hence the Soviet presence in Mauritius; the American in Diego Garcia. Both Washington and Moscow understand fully that the Middle East constitutes the strategic land and sea crossroads of our globe. (The recent oil cutoff by Arab countries revealed that tankers steering out of the Persian Gulf are indispensable to the security of Western Europe and Japan.) However, the author's assumption that Egypt is firmly in the Soviet camp is of course by now out of date.

Despite the understandable pride Moscow attaches to her new and powerful fleet (now the largest in naval tonnage), Eller indicates that neither side has forsaken strategic considerations governing their navies. Washington continues to focus attention on strike-carriers, while Moscow is just completing her first. The United States has not abandoned its superiority in the Polaris-Poseidon-Trident submarine concept, which remains an effective trump card for NATO.

The book touches on a number of important issues. Some responsible American leaders argue that it is not, at this time, necessary to redress the naval balance favoring the USSR in naval tonnage. But they also contend that the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean are areas in which the United States cannot afford to become inferior in naval strength. United States naval strategists ask the question: Does the West have the naval capability to retain access to the vital seas and oceans given that NATO is dependent on maritime communications? And is the Soviet Union likely to deny the United States and NATO the water communications vital to the West's economic and military security? These questions obviously remain paramount.

To put naval capability within the framework of the general nuclear power possessed by both sides, perhaps C. G. Jacobsen's *Soviet Strategy-Soviet Foreign Policy: Military Considerations Affecting Soviet Policy-Making* (Glasgow, 1972) could serve as a handy complement to Eller's illuminating work. Jacobsen's part 3,