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The Rule in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co., Ltd.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2009

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Extract

It may be convenient in conclusion to attempt to restate the ambit of the first two exceptions in the light of cases decided since Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co., Ltd.:—

(1) The court is entitled and bound to decide which of two conflicting decisions of its own it will follow, whether the second decision was reached in ignorance of the first, or the first decision was discussed and distinguished in the second. (The rider to the formulation of the exceptions in the Young Case is the product of the subsequent decisions in Battersby v. Anglo-American Oil Co., Ltd. and Fisher v. Ruislip-Northwood U.D.C.)

It appears that when the court has once decided that there is a conflict between two or more previous decisions and purported to resolve it that resolution is final in the sense that a subsequent court cannot then prefer the rejected decision. It is doubtful whether it is open to a subsequent court to decide there was no conflict at all, but it is suggested that no such power should be conceded, although Fisher v. Ruislip-Northwood U.D.C. permits it where the second exception is concerned.

When the court has once decided that there is no conflict between two or more previous decisions, it is not open to a subsequent court to hold that there is in fact a conflict and thereby confer upon itself jurisdiction to make a selection: Hogan v. Bentinck Collieries. Fisher v. Ruislip-Northwood U.D.C. is to the contrary, but should be overruled on this point. The Court of Appeal has, of course, power to choose between these two conflicting authorities when the point again comes before it.

(2) The court is bound to refuse to follow a decision of its own which was reached in ignorance of a previous decision of the House of Lords that covers the point, or which, though not expressly overruled, cannot, in its opinion, stand with a subsequent decision of the House of Lords, or which is expressly disapproved in considered dicta by a majority in the House of Lords: Leathley v. John Fowler and Co., Ltd. [1946] K.B. 579.

Where the House of Lords decision comes first, and the decision is discussed and distinguished in the later Court of Appeal decision, the Court of Appeal in the case sub iudice is bound by the Court of Appeal decision according to Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co., Ltd. and Williams v. Glasbrook Brothers, Ltd., but according to Fitzsimmons v. Ford Motor Co., Ltd., is under a duty to follow the House of Lords decision if, in its opinion, there is a conflict. There is stronger authority in support of the Williams v. Glasbrook Brothers, Ltd. decision, that of a ‘full’ court, but the ruling in the Fitzsimmons Case should be preferred, as it is unreasonable to treat the first and second exceptions differently. The Court of Appeal has, of course, power to choose between the two lines of authorities when the question next arises.

If the Fitzsimmons Case is preferred, it has been held in Fisher v. Ruislip-Northwood U.D.C. that a subsequent court can decide that there was no conflict at all, and revive the discarded Court of Appeal decision, but it is suggested that this view should not be followed.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 1950

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