Nazis and Slavs: From Racial Theory to Racist Practice

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INCREASINGLY, historians have been turning their attention to the effects of Nazi racism. In recent years major studies have appeared on forced sterilization, euthanasia, theft of “racially valuable” children, and “antinatalism,” as well as the destruction of “racially undesirable” groups: the handicapped, certain foreign laborers, and homosexuals.

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1. Ulrich Herbert has defined racism as a “self-contained and consistent worldview, claiming to offer a cogent and all-embracing explanation for developments, contradictions, and problems in human society. Moreover, it proposes to elucidate events not on the basis of myths or superstition, but the postulates of natural science. In essence, racism can be paraphrased as the “biologizing of society.” “Racism and Rational Calculation: The Role of ‘Utilitarian’ Strategies of Legitimation in the National Socialist ‘Weltanschauung’” in Yad Vashem Studies 24 (Jerusalem, 1994): 135.


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NAZIS AND SLAVS

With the exception of studies on the Jews and Gypsies, however, relatively little attention has been paid to ways in which racism drove Nazi policy toward groups outside Germany. This is also true of recent work on Eastern Europe, which mostly neglects the long-term racial impulses behind Nazi policy. One influential school of interpretation relegates racism in Nazi policies in Eastern Europe to secondary importance, and argues that plans for the New Order sprang from the ambitions of architects, agronomists, economists, and other "experts" seeking to realize a Nazi version of "modernity." At first glance, there seems to be good reason to doubt the explanatory force of racial ideology for the policies that emerged in Eastern Europe. Despite a general consensus that Slavs, along with Jews and Gypsies, were among the most menaced groups in this region, policies toward Slavs suggest an erratic relation between ideology and practice, and appear, in Czeslaw Milosz's words, to be "nonsense" when viewed in retrospect.

On the one hand Poles, Ukrainians, White Russians, Russians, and Serbs were subjected to the crudest barbarity, yet on the other the Bulgarians, Slovaks, and Croats, became allies and puppets. Yet much of the literature suggests some deeper Nazi aversion to "Slavs" to explain policies adopted in Eastern Europe; characteristic is a statement of Polish historian Czeslaw Pilichowski that a "main goal of the war" was to "gradually denationalize and destroy the Slavic peoples, who were described as 'inferior' and 'subhumans' in Nazi racial ideology." The foremost expert


4. Major studies of Nazi plans for Eastern Europe, the Generalplan Ost of the SS, do not consider prewar origins. See Helmut Heiber, "Der Generalplan Ost," Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 6 (1958): 281–325; Mechthild Rössler and Sabine Schliefer, eds., Der "Generalplan Ost": Hauptlinien der nationalsozialistischen Planungs- und Vernichtungspolitik (Berlin, 1993); Rolf-Dieter Müller, Hitler's Ostkrieg und die deutsche Siedlungspolitik (Frankfurt am Main, 1981); Czeslaw Madajczyk, ed., Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan (Munich, 1994).


7. Czeslaw Pilichowski, Es gibt keine Verjüngung (Warsaw, 1980), 11. W. W. Kulski has written that "The war, which started as a war against Poland, turned into a general war
on losses to Polish science during the war has written that “Hitlerism” attempted to realize its goals “at the cost of Central and Eastern Europe, mainly of Slavs, but above all of Poland. Hitler expressed this as early as 1925 in Mein Kampf.” When one examines the early writings of Adolf Hitler and other Nazi leaders, however, one finds few signs of intentions toward Slavs. Especially noticeable in Hitler’s writing is an absence of hostility toward Poles. If any Slavic people provoked Hitler’s ill will it was the Czechs, about whom he had formed opinions as a young man in Austria.9 Yet as will be shown, the Czechs survived the war in relative peace.

This article attempts to assess the relationship between ideology and practice in Nazi policies toward the Slavs, with special emphasis on Nazi understandings of race. It makes use of a heterodox mixture of classical interpretations of National Socialist policy in the East—especially Alexander Dallin, Norman Rich, and Gerhard L. Weinberg—writings and statements of leading Nazis from before and after 1939, and recent work of Central European authors.10 Attention to the Slavs provides basic orientation in the Nazi racial world, and helps illustrate the unique position of the Jews: not only that there could be no compromise with them, but that this uncompromising approach grew out of a sort of racism unlike any other.11 The Nazis did not conceive of Jews as existing within against all Slavs.” Germany and Poland: From War to Peaceful Relations (Syracuse, 1976), 39. Other interpretations projecting an axiomatic relation between Nazi aversion to “Slavs” and policies adopted during the war include Eugeniusz Duráczyński, Wojna i okupacja wrzesień 1939—kwiecień 1943 (Warsaw, 1974), 92; Jan T. Gross, Polish Society Under German Occupation: The Generalgouvernement 1939–1944 (Princeton, 1979), xi; Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, “Der Überfall auf Polen und der neue Charakter des Krieges,” in September 1939: Krieg, Besatzung, Widerstand in Polen, ed. Christoph Kressmann (Göttingen, 1989), 23–26; Jochen August, “Sonderaktion Krakau: Die Verhaftung der Krakauer Wissenschaftler am 6. November 1939 (Hamburg, 1997), 15–18. For conflicting interpretations of the relation between ideology and occupation practice in the Czech lands see Miroslav Kárny, and Jaroslava Milotová, “Od Neuratha k Heydrichovi,” Shornik archivnich prac̆ı 39, no. 2 (1989), which rejects the claim of Vojtech Mastny that the early period of Nazi rule had been a time of “haphazard German improvisation.” See Mastny, The Czechs under Nazi Rule: The Failure of National Resistance (New York and London, 1971), 187.


9. This fact is noted in Martin Broszat in Zweihundert Jahre deutsche Polenpolitik (Munich, 1963), 183; Christoph Kressmann, Die Selbstbehauptung einer Nation: NS-Kulturpolitik und polnische Widerstandsbewegung (Düsseldorf, 1971), 27–29; Jerzy W. Berejza, Antyslawizm Adolfa Hitlera (Warsaw, 1988), 12–14; Mastny, The Czechs under Nazi Rule, 11.

10. This study has benefited especially from the important work by Polish historian Jerzy W. Berejza, Antyslawizm Adolfa Hitlera (The Anti-Slavism of Adolf Hitler) (Warsaw, 1988). See also his “Racisme et antislavisme chez Hitler,” in François Bédarida, La politique nazie d’extermination (Paris, 1989), 57–74.

historical structures, and therefore so-called structuralist approaches are of secondary importance in accounting for the decisions leading to the Holocaust of the Jews.\textsuperscript{12} Hitler’s Judeophobia was so ahistorical that it was independent even of the number of the Jews his own regime had killed.\textsuperscript{13} Policies toward Slavs, with their constant improvisation, appear by contrast as a textbook case for structuralist and functionalist approaches. Opportunity and ideology shaped one another. Not coincidentally, one of the most forceful proponents of these approaches, Martin Broszat, began his career with studies of Poles and Croats in Nazi-dominated Europe.\textsuperscript{14}

Contradictions

Like contemporary linguists and ethnographers, leading Nazis initially understood “Slavs” to be the speakers of Slavic languages. There were three major groups: the eastern Slavs (Russians, White Russians, Ukrainians), western Slavs (Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Lusatian Sorbs), and the southern Slavs (Bulgarians, Serbs, Croats, Macedonians, Slovenes). Enjoying perhaps the highest preference both before and after 1939 were the Bulgarians, whom Joseph Goebbels referred to as “friends.”\textsuperscript{15} The Germans did not impose a military occupation regime upon Bulgaria, and the Bulgarian government even managed to pursue an independent policy with regard to Bulgarian Jews. It retained greater control over domestic

\textsuperscript{12} Steven T. Katz has written: “Hitler’s ‘Jew’ is not rooted in empirical realities, in how things are in the world.” Emphasis in original. “The Holocaust,” 60.

\textsuperscript{13} In his last military order of 15 April 1945, issued after 6 million Jews had been killed, Hitler instructed his troops that “the Jewish Bolsheviks have launched their massive forces to the attack. Their aim is to reduce Germany to ruins and to exterminate our people.” Cited in Lucy S. Dawidowicz, \textit{The War Against the Jews 1933–1945} (New York, 1986), 166; in the last sentence of his last will and testament, issued the day before his suicide, Hitler wrote “Above all I commit the leadership of the nation and my following to strict keeping of the racial laws and merciless opposition to the world poisoner of all peoples, international Jewry.” Erich Goldhagen, “Weltanschauung,” 384.


and foreign policy during the war than any other country in Southeastern Europe, and kept diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union until September 1944, when that country declared war.\textsuperscript{16}

Two other Slavic peoples were permitted to have their own puppet states: the Slovaks and the Croats. Within these states there were full native governments, police forces, education systems (including universities), and elite military units modeled on the SA and SS, alleging Slovak and Croatian racial superiority. Both states voluntarily instituted anti-Semitic legislation—including the “aryanization” of property—deportations, and in the Croat case, killing camps.\textsuperscript{17} Croatian borders were extended to include Bosnia–Herzegovina, and the fascist Ustasha regime implemented policies of racist extermination against another Slavic people: the Serbs.\textsuperscript{18} Within Germany, travel guides and picture books appeared during the war purporting to display the lives of the Slovaks and Croats, complete with smiling peasants dressed in native costumes.\textsuperscript{19}

The Czechs fared worse under Nazi rule. In March 1939 post–Munich Czechoslovakia was divided, and the Czech/Moravian/Silesian part made into the Protectorate of Bohemia–Moravia. The Protectorate had to endure six years of German occupation, and the Czech intelligentsia, as the putative national leadership, suffered severe repression. Yet for the overwhelming majority of Czechs life went on in relatively normal fashion: businessmen continued making profits, the working class increased earnings due to wartime demand, and the birthrate edged upward.\textsuperscript{20} The rations allotted to Czech workers were on a par with those of German workers.\textsuperscript{21} Czech administration was kept intact to a degree that was unparalleled in Nazi-occupied Europe—with the possible exception of Denmark.\textsuperscript{22} Though universities were closed, substantial publishing and


\textsuperscript{18} Hory and Broszat, \textit{Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat}, 93–106.

\textsuperscript{19} Ernst Tropper, \textit{Slowakei: Land zwischen Ost und West} (Brno, Munich, Vienna, 1944); Wilhelm Feuring et al., eds., \textit{Slowakei: Land und Leute} (Munich, 1944); Adolf Dresler, \textit{Kroatien} (Essen, 1942), Emil Gärtner, \textit{Kroatien in Südslawien: eine historisch-politische Studie} (Berlin, 1944); Erich Retzlaff, \textit{Länder und Völker an der Donau: Rumänien, Bulgarien, Ungarn, Kroatien} (Vienna, 1944).


\textsuperscript{22} Mastny, \textit{The Czechs}, 101.
education in the Czech language continued. The Czech Academy of Arts and Sciences continued its meetings throughout the war, and received a budget for research from the Czech officials at the Protectorate Ministry of Education. The journal of the Prague linguistic circle, *Slovo a Slovesnost* (Word and Literature), appeared until 1943, and the Czech sociological society continued meetings and publishing until 1945. Likewise, the major philosophical journal *Česká Mysl* (The Czech Mind) received a budget and continued publishing throughout the war.

Slavic groups living in the Soviet Union—Russians, White Russians, and Ukrainians—were subjected to policies of annihilation from the moment German troops crossed the Soviet boundaries in 1941. Among the earliest victims of conquest were Bolshevik commissars, who were summarily executed, and millions of captured troops, who were starved to death. The goal of occupation was short-term exploitation, both of foodstuffs and labor, and preparation for German settlement. Millions of Soviet citizens were transported to the Reich as slave laborers. The population that remained behind lived under conditions of semistarvation. The brutality of the German occupation called forth almost immediate resistance, and in the words of Omer Bartov a “vicious cycle of violence and murder.”

23. Czech students of medicine and technical sciences could study in Germany, though few took advantage of this option. A number of medical, scientific, and even historical and legal journals continued appearing in the Czech language throughout the war, as did Czech language editions of the works of Czech scholars such as Václav Richter and Zdeněk Kalista (art history), Jan Mukařovský (Czech literature), Josef Peskař (history). In 1943 alone 3 million copies of Czech language fiction, scientific, religious, and school texts appeared in the Protectorate. See Jiří Doležal, *Česká kultura za protektorátu: Školství, písemnictví, kinematografie* (Prague, 1996), 151.

24. See the “Výroční zpráva České společnosti sociologické,” 28 June 1943, in Král papers, Czech Academy of Sciences, i.e. 654; reports on *Česká Mysl* in ibid., i.e. 661–62.


27. The Germans were able to raise the level of production in the occupied areas to about 10 percent of the prewar total in industry, and 50 percent in agriculture. Müller and Ueberschär, *Hitler’s War, 309.*
evolved, with the Germans eradicating villages suspected of aiding partisan or withholding grain, and thereby further decreasing productivity, and driving more people into the underground.\(^{28}\) These were territories which the Germans held for a shorter time than areas further west, but they made up in devastation what they lacked in duration of occupation: as the army withdrew, it evacuated inhabitants, and destroyed practically everything, from crops, to industrial equipment, to private dwellings.

As is well known, many Ukrainians had looked upon the Nazis as potential liberators, and leading Nazis toyed with the idea of permitting a Ukrainian state to emerge.\(^{29}\) Hitler would have none of such plans, however, and placed most of Ukraine under the direction of East Prussian Gauleiter Erich Koch, who publicly emphasized his contempt for Ukrainians as "racial inferiors," and forbade his subordinates any social contact with them. As in other areas of occupied Eastern Europe, these subordinates were often former SA men with no training in administration, who saw their new posts as opportunities for self-enrichment.\(^{30}\) One letter the Nazis confiscated lamented a situation "one hundred times worse" than under the Bolsheviks, yet such sentiments did not concern Koch, who vowed to "pump every last thing out of this country."\(^{31}\) Considering the local inhabitants no better than animals, he literally hunted them in special reserves.\(^{32}\) Despite the effect of fully alienating a potentially pro-German population, these policies were maintained to the end.\(^{33}\)

Yet the situation of Ukrainians in the former Polish eastern territories (Galicia) differed significantly.\(^{34}\) In 1939 the Germans tolerated the foundation of a Ukrainian Relief Committee (renamed in 1940 Ukrainian Central Committee) which oversaw a strengthening of Ukrainian social, cultural, educational, and economic organization within the General-

\(^{28}\) Any villages which partisans had visited were subject to obliteration. Bartov, Eastern Front, 119–41.

\(^{29}\) Reich minister of the occupied territories A. Rosenberg thought of Ukraine as a balance to Russia and Poland, and wanted to foster the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian literature and art, and establish a Ukrainian university in Kiev. All of this would take place in an independent Ukrainian state. Rich, Hitler’s War Aims, 373–74; For Rosenberg’s visions of Ukrainian policy, see his Der Zukunftsweg einer deutschen Aussenpolitik (Munich, 1927). Several leading officials, like Otto Bräutigam, supported a more liberal approach to the occupied territories. Jonathan Steinberg, “The Third Reich Reflected: German Civil Administration in the Occupied Soviet Union, 1941–44,” English Historical Review (June 1995); 626–27. Other members of the Nazi elite who were less rigorous in their thinking on racial understanding of Ukrainians included Goering and Hans Frank. Borejsza, Antyslawizm, 97.

\(^{30}\) The administrators were called “Ostnieten” [Eastern losers] and “golden pheasants,” because of the color of their uniforms. Chiari, “Deutsche Zivilverwaltung,” 74.

\(^{31}\) Rich, Hitler’s War Aims, 375–81.

\(^{32}\) Josef Ackermann, Heinrich Himmler als Ideologe (Göttingen, 1970), 211, n. 99.

\(^{33}\) Dallin, German Rule, 123–67; Müller and Ueberschär, Hitler’s War, 305–7.

\(^{34}\) Ryszard Torzecki, Polacy i Ukraincy: sprawa ukraińska w czasie II wojny światowej na terenie II Rzeczpospolitej (Warsaw, 1993).
gouvernement. Before the war there had been 2,510 Ukrainian language schools in this region; by 1942/43 the number had increased to 4,173, including several secondary schools. The German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) offered scholarships for study in Germany to Ukrainian students. Furthermore, the economic position of many Ukrainians improved as the Germans permitted an expansion from 161 cooperatives in 1939 to 1,990 in 1941. 35 In April 1943 the Germans recruited a Ukrainian SS division (Galicia) and attracted 80,000 volunteers, of whom some 12,000 received training. 36

Ukrainians in the Generalgouvernement enjoyed these relative “privileges” because the Germans hoped to play them off against the Poles. 37 Poland endured a Nazi regime of unsurpassed destruction longer than any other area in Europe. 38 Soon after crossing the Polish border in 1939 the Nazis began mass executions of Polish intellectuals and others considered potentially hostile to Germany. 39 The difference from policies toward the Czechs was so striking as to elicit the following boastful remark of the top German administrator in Poland, Hans Frank, who visited Prague early in 1940:

There were large red posters in Prague announcing that today seven Czechs had been shot. I said to myself: if I wanted to hang a poster for every seven Poles that were shot, then all the forests in Poland would not suffice in order to produce the paper necessary for such posters. 40

Throughout the war there was no Polish government or even administration above the level of municipality, and the Nazis imposed forced labor

35. Gross, Polish Society, 188–89.
36. Torzecki, Polacy i Ukraincy, 247; Dallin, German Rule, 598. Himmler rationalized the recruiting of this division as a continuation of Habsburg military tradition, and tried to make use of former Austro-Hungarian army officers. Mulligan, Politics of Illusion, 156.
37. Using Ukrainians to displace Polish influence was a favorite idea of Alfred Rosenberg, but had been proposed by publicists in the nineteenth century. See for example Karl Emil Franzos, Aus Halb-Asien: Culturbilder aus Galizien, der Bukowina, Sudrussland und Rumanien, part 1, 2d ed. (Leipzig, 1878), 16–17.
39. The number executed in Western Poland in September and October 1939 is estimated at 42,000. Wlodzimierz Borodziej, Terror i polityka: polska niemiecka i polski ruch oporu w GG 1939–1944 (Warsaw, 1985), 22.
40. This remark was made to a correspondent of the Völkischer Beobachter on 6 February 1940 and is reproduced in Pilichowski, Es gibt keine Verjähnung. This fragment was not included in the published interview.
even for teenagers, starvation rations, and permitted practically no autonomous Polish cultural life. As in the Czech lands, the occupiers closed universities, but they also closed secondary schools. To keep “order” they instituted a random, yet pervasive terror. On any given day of the occupation, a Pole might be apprehended in a mass street arrest (lapanka) as the Nazis without notice routinely cordoned off sections of streets and arrested anyone who happened to be there. Those arrested might be held hostage and shot, or sent to a camp or forced labor. The situation was even worse for the Poles who lived in western areas attached directly to Germany: the age for taking forced labor was lower, the educational opportunities close to nil, and the system of terror more pervasive. As in the occupied Soviet Union, Nazi brutality called forth vigorous partisan activity, culminating in the Warsaw Uprising of 1944 which left over 250,000 civilian dead.

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Several factors which have little to do with racial policy account for much of these differing approaches toward Slavic peoples. Southeastern Europe had not figured in Hitler's schemes for attaining living space (Lebensraum), and until 1943 much of it belonged to the Italian sphere of influence. In Slovakia, the Germans had set up a “showcase” which was intended to reveal to the countries of Southeastern Europe the supposed advantages of collaboration. The need for war materials dictated a more balanced policy toward the Czech lands with their advanced armaments industries. Russia, by contrast, was central to the Nazi strategy of attaining living space, a need articulated in Hitler's earliest writings. There cities and industry were to be destroyed, to make way for German rural settlements. The simple imperial design—rooted in Hitler's racist understanding of human events—necessitated conflict with Russia.

Yet the question of racial ideology remains, for Poles and Russians were discriminated against in ways not dictated by the logic of wartime strategy, or the ultimate goals of living space. Why did the Nazis place these two groups near the bottom of the hierarchy of foreign workers within Germany? Why did they hardly bother to seek collaborators in

41. Lapanka is usually translated as “manhunt.” For recollections of a narrowly missed manhunt in Warsaw, see Czesław Miłosz, The Captive Mind (New York, 1981), 90. Jan T. Gross has argued that the randomness of such terror encouraged opposition, because Poles had no basis upon which to calculate survival. Polish Society, 238.


44. Matthias Hamann, “Erwünscht und unerwünscht: Die rassenpolitische Selektion der
Poland, and exclude Poles from all but the lowest ranks of administration? At-tempts were not made to field a Polish SS division, though there was a White Russian division. Why were Polish industrial laborers in Silesia treated worse than their Czech counterparts in Pilsen? Both areas were arguably of similar value to the war effort. Why were only Poles, Ukrainians, and Russians punished by death for sleeping with Germans? There was also a distinct racial discrimination against the Poles built into the Nazis’ postwar plan for Eastern Europe, the Generalplan Ost, which stipulated deportations to Siberia from areas of Eastern Europe to make way for German settlers: 80–85 percent of the Poles, 75 percent of the White Russians, and 64 percent of “western” Ukrainians. Those not deported would either be “eliminated” or germanized.

One is tempted to conclude that a racial hierarchy existed among the Slavs in the Nazi mind: at the bottom the Russians, Poles, and Ukrainians, above them the Serbs, further up the Czechs, and at the top the Croats, Bulgarians, and Slovaks. Yet when one looks at the writings of major Nazi officials from the prewar period one finds no hints of such a hierarchy; “Slavs” were thought of as a vague and undifferentiated generality. Thus Adolf Hitler referred in Mein Kampf to the “Austrian Slavs”—presumably including Czechs, Poles, Croats, and Slovenes—and lectured Hermann Rauschning on the “danger of too great an infusion of Slav Ausländer,” Beiträge zur nationalsozialistischen Gesundheits- und Sozialpolitik, vol. 3; Jochen August et al., Herrenmensch und Arbeitsvölker (Berlin, 1986), 163.

45. From an early point Ukrainians and Russians were used in the administration; even in White Russia Poles were excluded from administration, however, though in many re-gions they comprised the elites. Chiari, “Deutsche Zivilverwaltung,” 75.

46. Overtures were, however, made to the mountain people of southern Poland, the “Gorales,” but efforts to recruit an SS legion among these ostensible Germans failed. Janusz Berghauzen, “Grupy nacisku w niemieckiej polityce zagranicznej i w systemie okupacyjnym,” Dzieje najnowsze 3, nos. 1/2 (1971); 224–25.

47. According to “Instructions for dealing with foreign workers in the Reich” from 1943. Raimond Reiter, Tötungsstätten für ausländische Kinder im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Zum Spannungsverhältnis von kriegswirtschaftlichem Arbeitseinsatz und nationalsozialistischer Rassenpolitik in Niedersachsen (Hanover, 1993), 237–38. In the Czech lands, on the other hand, German soldiers and officials were permitted to marry Czech women. Mastny, The Czechs, 134–35. Indeed, in 1938 Joseph Goebbels almost toppled over an affair with the Czech actress, Lida Baarova. For a general description of the hierarchy established for foreign workers, see Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany, 127.


49. The process was supposed to take several decades; in their new “homes” the Slavs were to be given only the most rudimentary possibilities of survival, and not permitted independent culture or statehood. Madajczyk, “Vom ‘Generalplan Ost,’” 13. The estimates of people to be removed from Poland, the Baltic states, and the Soviet provinces of Zhitomir, Kamenets-Podolsk, and Vinnitsa varied between 31 million (SS) and 46 to 51 million (Eastern Ministry). In both estimates some 14 million persons were to stay behind for germanization. Ackermann, Himmler, 223.
blood into the German people,” promising measures to limit “the further increase of the Slav races.”50 As mentioned above, Hitler reserved his contempt for the Czechs.

Similarly, when one looks for the prewar sources of Nazi anti-Polonism, one finds little of substance. Despite the apparently well-planned and thorough policies of wartime destruction, there was no set National Socialist policy toward Poland before 1939. Poland appears marginally in Hitler’s writings and speeches. Hitler clearly thought of Poles as “racially foreign elements,”51 yet according to Martin Broszat, the Polish victory over the Soviet Union in 1920 had made it difficult for him to conceive of Polish racial inferiority.52 For him Poland was above all a “border state” to be courted for alliance against “enemy No. 1”: the Soviet Union.53 In January 1934 Germany and Poland concluded a nonaggression pact, and the Nazis reversed the pointedly anti-Polish policies of Weimar. The German-Polish trade war came to an end, and Warsaw and Berlin took pains to consult one another in matters of mutual concern. Berlin for example gave its blessing to Polish pressures on Lithuania and Czechoslovakia in 1938. Nazi leaders respected Polish counterparts: Hermann Goering, who visited Poland repeatedly on hunting excursions, even wrote the introduction to the German edition of Pilsudski’s collected works.54

Because they figured so centrally in his plans for the future, Hitler had a more distinctly racist conception of the Russians, or as he called them, “Slavs of the Russian nationality.”55 In his view, cooperation with Russia

52. Broszat writes that “Hitler’s admiration for Pilsudski, vanquisher of the Red Army (1920), led him to a rather sympathetic assessment of the political and military ability of the Polish nation, which obscured (überdeckte) broad notions of Slavic racial inferiority for many years.” Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik, 10-11.
54. As late as the first months of 1939 a pro-Polish book could be printed in Germany, with an enthusiastic contribution by Hjalmar Schacht. See Polen von Polen gesehen, mit einem Beitrag von Reichsminister Dr. H. Schacht (Berlin, 1939). During the war the Nazis kept a guard of honor at Pilsudski’s grave in Kraków. Christoph Klessmann, Die Selbstbehauptung einer Nation: Nationalsozialistische Kulturpolitik und politische Widerstandsbestrebungen im Generalgouvernement 1939-1945 (Düsseldorf, 1971), 27. On Hitler’s respect for Pilsudski, see also Borejsza, Antyslawizm, 67-68; Harry Kenneth Rosenthal, German and Pole: National Conflict and Modern Myth (Gainesville, 1976), 103-4, 108.
55. Hitlers zweites Buch, 158-59. Here, too, one senses ambivalence, however. In Mein Kampf (p. 326) Hitler referred to the Russians as a “great people” which had suffered the domination of a “gang of Jews, journalists and stock exchange bandits.” For the development of Nazi views toward Russians, see Manfred Weissbecker, “‘Wen hier Deutsche wohnten...’ Beharrung und Veränderung im Russlandbild Hitlers und der NSDAP,” in Das Russlandbild im Dritten Reich, ed. Hans-Erich Volkmann (Cologne, 1994), 9-54; Edmund Dmitrow, Obraz Rosji i Rosjan w propagandzie narodowych socjalistów 1933-1945: Stare i nowe stereotypy (Warsaw, 1997).
had been possible for Bismarck’s Germany because at that time Russia was no “typically Slavic state,” but rather a state ruled by an upper class and intelligentsia which were of Germanic origin. Without this Russianized Germanic leadership, no “Great Russia” would have emerged in the first place, for Slavs were supposedly not capable of forming their own state.56

In the late nineteenth century the Germanic stratum had supposedly diminished under attacks of Pan-Slavists, and during the First World War it was almost entirely eliminated. For Hitler, the October Revolution represented the ascendance to power of a new race in Russia: the Jews.57

Before 1939, a vague notion thus seems to have existed in leading Nazis’ minds that Slavs constituted an inferior group, but just how inferior was an issue to be decided later. In the meantime it was possible to think of them not only as potential allies, but also as Europeans. A brochure was issued for the 1938 Nuremberg rally proclaiming Slavs part of the “Indogermanic peoples.”

Central and Northern Europe are the homeland of the Nordic race. At the beginning of the most recent Ice Age, around 5,000 BC, a Nordic-Indogermanic Urvolk of the Nordic race [artgleicher nordrassischer Menschen] existed, with the same language and unified mode of behavior [Gesittung], which divided into smaller and larger groups as it expanded. From these went forth Germans, Celts, Romans, Greeks, Slavs, Persians, and Aryan Indians . . .

The original racial unity and common ownership of the most important cultural artifacts remained for thousands of years the cement holding together the Western peoples.58

Russia was presented as a “Land between Europe and Asia” where the “World War and Bolshevism have, for the time being, fully eradicated the European elements.”59 Yet these words were not written in stone; a certain range of views on Slavs existed among those writing on the subject within Nazi Germany. Early the following year a prehistory of Eastern Europe admitted that the “racial history of the Slavs” was still an “open question.” Major racial theoreticians Hans F. K. Günther, Otto

56. “Dem Slawentum selbst fehlen im allgemeinen staatenbildende Kräfte.” Hitlers zweites Buch, 156. See also Rosenberg, Der Zukunftsweg, 87–90. The idea that Czechs did not possess “abilities to form a state” was current in the press of Vienna in the early years of this century. See the thesis of Elenora Kandl, Hitlers Österreichbild (Vienna, 1963), 77 at Institut für Zeitgeschichte of Vienna University, cited in Borejsza, Antyslawizm, 131, n. 19.
57. Hitlers zweites Buch, 158–59; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 12–13.
Reche, and Egon von Eickstedt had determined that the oldest Slavic remains were "mostly Nordic," yet it seemed that later Slavic populations were by no means racially uniform; according to the work of von Eickstedt and Polish anthropologist J. Czkanowski they exhibited "eastern Baltic and dark forms." These unsettled questions on Slavs' racial attributes invited opportunistic wartime practice.

**Contradictions in Practice**

Hitler's views on Poland changed radically in the course of 1939. After the Munich crisis of the previous year, the Germans had made three demands of Poland: the surrender of Danzig, the construction of an extraterritorial rail- and highway through the Polish Corridor, and Polish collaboration in the Anti-Comintern Pact. In return, they offered to guarantee Poland's borders, and dangled a share of the spoils of war with the Soviet Union. Poland decisively refused these proposals, and to Hitler's outrage, received promises of support from Great Britain in late March 1939, should its sovereignty be "clearly threatened." The following month, Hitler renounced the pact of 1934, and began planning Poland's destruction; if he could not immediately have the space he desired in Russia, he would seize what he could in Poland.61

Soon after launching war against Poland in September 1939, the Nazi leadership and the supporting scientific community convinced themselves of Polish racial inferiority. With the ruins of Warsaw still smoldering, leading Eastern expert and historian Albert Brackmann of the University of Berlin hurried a booklet into print relegating the Poles and other Slavs to non-European status:

The German people were the only bearers of culture in the East and in their role as the main power of Europe protected Western culture and carried it into uncultivated regions. For centuries they constituted a barrier in the East against lack of culture (Unkultur) and protected the West against barbarity. They protected the borders from Slavs, Avars, and Magyars.62

60. Karl-Heinz Schroetter, "Die Vorgeschichte des Ostens im Lichte neuer Erkenntnisse," in *Europas Schicksal im Osten*, ed. Hans Hagemeyer (Breslau, 1939), 90; see also Ilse Schwidetzky, *Rassenkunde der Altslawen* (Stuttgart, 1938), which summarizes the views of German as well as Polish and Czech anthropologists.


Later that fall Joseph Goebbels noted after a visit that Poland was already “Asia.” Later Hitler and Rosenberg too learned from new experiences. The latter noted in his diary in late September:

The Poles: a thin Germanic layer, underneath frightful material. The Jews, the most appalling people one can imagine. The towns thick with dirt. He’s [Hitler] learnt a lot in these past few weeks. Above all, if Poland had gone on ruling the old German parts for a few more decades everything would have become lice-ridden and decayed.

Two years later, while German troops were advancing deep into the Soviet Union, Hitler would proclaim that the border between Europe and Asia ran between the Germanic and Slavic peoples. The issue was to “place it where we wish.” He and Goebbels routinely referred to Russians as “beasts” and “animals.”

As the learning process continued, Nazi leaders began to recognize that certain Slavs could be useful. Hitler, though harboring the strongest suspicions of germanizing foreign populations, ruled in September 1940 that the assimilation of the greater part of the Czech people is possible for historical and racial reasons.” In March of the following year he praised to Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels the “hard work and inventiveness of the Czechs” and in 1942 he told his dinner companions that the Czechs were “industrious and intelligent workers.” Nazi racial experts estimated that up to half of the Czechs were of Nordic origin, and Hitler agrees. He also came to view the Croats as fully assimilable, though he never wavered in antipathy toward Serbs.

Even the Ukrainians were gradually seen in a more favorable light. Though he continued to oppose plans for Ukrainian statehood, visual impressions gained in the Ukraine softened Hitler’s views on Ukrainians’
racial character. In September 1941 Hitler approved the use of women from the East as domestic servants in Germany, and he instructed aids to revise “school knowledge about the great migration of peoples,” for the many blond, blue-eyed Ukrainians might be “peasant descendants of German tribes who never migrated.” In a June 1942 visit to Poltava, Hitler had seen so many blue-eyed and blond women that, when he thought of the photographs of Norwegian and Dutch women submitted with marriage applications [by German soldiers—JC], he prefers to speak of the need to introduce southern elements [Aufsüden] into our European northern states, rather than northern elements into the south [Aufnorden].

In August 1942 Hitler came out in support of assimilating Ukrainian women, who would help foster a “healthy balance” among the Germans. A “ludicrous hundred million Slavs” would either be absorbed or displaced.

Though perhaps the most determined racist in the upper leadership of the Nazi movement, Heinrich Himmler likewise wavered under the pressures of war. Ukrainians were seen fit to join the SS, and were also used as police and camp guards. Those who doubted the racial logic of such moves were accused of lacking an understanding for the “revolutionary idea of National Socialism, which transcended the boundaries of national states.” According to a training brochure for ideological schooling of the SS and police (ca. 1943), the force of the war had caused the “common roots of the European family of peoples to come to the surface.” Indeed, the “blood ties [blutmässige Verwandtschaft] of Europe were based . . . upon the ancient [einstmalig] Germanic settlements between the Baltic and Black Seas, extending to the Atlantic Ocean and North Africa.” When entire regiments of Cossacks went over to the German side, the SS determined that they were remnants of the Germanic “Chatten” once described by Tacitus. The undeniable fact that the Soviet Union remained organized and under the hand of a strong leader caused Himmler to revise ideas about the loss of the Germanic leadership stratum in the East: like Attila,

71. On the Nazis’ persistent brutalization of Ukrainians who had lived in the Soviet Union, see Dallin, German Rule, 123–67, 442–71; and on the Nazi leadership’s stubborn resistance to ameliorating Ukrainians’ living and working standards in the Reich even after 1943, Ulrich Herbert, Fremdarbeiter Politik und Praxis des “Ausländer-Einsatzes” in der Kriegswirtschaft des Dritten Reiches (Bonn, 1985), 263–69.
72. Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers, 188.
73. Picker, Tischgespräche, 345–46.
74. Again, Hitler was impressed by the preponderence of blond and blue-eyed people, which were evidence of “enormous Germanic racial fragments” (riesige germanische Volkssplitter), Jochmann, ed., Monologe, 331 (6 August 1942).
75. An SS training brochure wrote that “it was probably the Germanic blood which had caused the freedom-loving soldier-peasants [Wehrbauern] to take this step.” Ackermann, Himmler, 185.
NAZIS AND SLAVS

Genghis Khan, and Tamerlane, Stalin was a “lost Nordic-Germanic-Aryan blood type.”

The crudeness of Nazi racial science made such opportunism all but inevitable. The only “scientific” tools the Nazis possessed to discover “valuable blood” among the Slavs were eye color, hair color, physical dimensions (e.g., skull), and various measures of intelligence. Casual observation caused the leading Nazi officials of the occupied Czech lands and of Poland to enthuse about the potentials of the people under their rule. Konstantin von Neurath, the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, when judging the racial qualities of the population there, wrote that the “high number of fair-haired people with intelligent faces and well-shaped bodies, would not stand out unfavorably even in central and southern Germany.”

In an attempt to recover “German blood” among the Gorales and other mountain peoples in Southern Poland, Himmler gave directions to note how many “blond and blue-eyed students there were in relation to the total number of students.” Hans Frank told his police chiefs in May 1940: “Frequently, we are surprised to find a blond and blue-eyed child speaking Polish and I say to myself: If we were to educate this child as a German then it would be a pretty German girl.” Only in the Czech lands did Nazis actually get around to “measuring” Germanic blood, and discovered to their surprise that the Czechs were actually of higher racial value, i.e., more Germanic, than the Sudeten Germans.

Nothing seems to have shaken Hitler’s or Himmler’s views of the weakness of Germanic blood among Poles and Russians, however, and gradually the former subscribed to the view that was universal among anthropologists: namely that in the racial sense, there was no such thing as “Slavs”:

Hitler said that nothing in general could be said about the germanizability of the Slavs, because the word “Slavs” had been propagated by Tsarist
Russia in the wake of its Pan-Slavic policy as a collective description for peoples that are completely different racially. For example it is complete nonsense to call the Bulgarians Slavs, because they are of Turkic origin. And you only need to let a Czech grow a mustache and you will see by the way it grows downward that he is a descendent of Mongoloid tribes. The so-called Southern Slavs are almost entirely Dinarian. For that reason the germanization of the Croats would be welcome from the racial [volkstumsmässigen] point of view, but from the political point of view it is out of the question.

In any attempted germanization one may not act on the basis of abstract collective concepts, but has to ask in each individual case whether the person to be germanized belongs to a race which would improve our own people [Volkstum], or whether the person exhibits qualities of a race which, like the Jewish, would have a negative effect of mixing with German blood.82

Thus in Hitler’s mind small doses of German blood could dominate other sorts of blood—except in the case of the Jews, where the opposite was the case. Hitler imagined that even tiny amounts of Jewish blood could assert themselves after many generations.83

From the belief that there were no “Slavs” in the racial sense, it was a short step to the recognition that there were no Russians, Ukrainians, or Poles in the racial sense, that is, to a belief that these groups were not real. Thus Martin Bormann spoke of “so-called Ukrainians”84 and racial

82. This was supposed to be a “general statement about the germanizability [Eindeutschungsfähigkeit] of the Slavs,” in response to Gauleiter Albert Forster’s view that Poles might be germanized even if their German descent could not be definitively established. Forster favored a positive judgment on assimilation if the “complete impression” given by the Pole led one to believe that “in appearance, character, and intelligence he reveals Germanic characteristics.” See the conversations from 12 May 1942 in Picker, Tischgespräche, 286–88. For the “scientific” consensus that the “Slavic peoples are of diverse racial composition” see Otto Reche, Rasse und Heimat der Indogermanen (Munich, 1936), 34. This point was emphasized in a report of the SD of 11 November 1940, which directed attention to the increasing tendency to speak of “Slavs” in speeches, newspaper articles, and school books: “This way of speaking is popular but extremely disturbing. The first thing to note is that it does not correspond to our racial way of thinking. The term ‘Slav’ comes from linguistics. The racial picture corresponds to linguistic affinities to a far lesser extent than is the case with Germanic peoples. Ukrainians and Poles, Bulgarians and Croats, Russians and Czechs are so different in a racial sense, that they cannot be understood as a common racial unit... It is a basic mistake to conceal the natural enmity of certain Eastern (Poles—Ukrainians) and Southeastern peoples (Czechs—Slovaks).” Emphasis in original. Heinz Boberach, ed., Meldungen aus dem Reich: Die geheimen Lageberichte des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS 1938–1945, vol. 5 (Herrsching, 1984), 1756–57. For the continued use of the term “Slavs” to denote race by leading Nazis, see below n. 118.

83. “The Jewish people are tougher” (Das jüdische Volkstum ist eben zäher) Picker, Tischgespräche, 398–99 (1 July 1942); also 24 July 1942: “Geschäftlich suche das Judentum Europa, Europa müsse es aber schon aus Säkroegoismus ablehnen, da das Judentum rassisch härter sei.” 456.

84. Picker, Tischgespräche, 453 (22 July 1942).
expert Reche tried to sow doubts as to the existence of "Russians." 85 Officials in the Generalgouvernement, in collaboration with other "experts" on race, began to break down the Poles as a group. 86 The director of the department of internal administration in the Generalgouvernement, Dr. W. Fohl, explained that he and his colleagues had gone through a learning process:

During the World War we used to think that the Polish people belonged to the great "Slavic family of peoples" . . . The postwar period has opened our eyes to the profound differences among the Slavic family of peoples, and thanks to the rapid progress of the field of racial science we have learned to identify the structural differences within the individual peoples. During the present ethnic cleansing [in vollem Gange befindlichen völkischen "Flurbereinigung"] of East Central Europe, we have started to use ever more precise methods of ethnography and racial science [Volks- und Rassenkunde] to take apart the notion of the Pole . . . 87

Partly using—and citing—the work of Polish scholars Oskar Kolberg, Eugenia and Kazimierz Stolyhwo, Jan Czekanowski, Jan Mydlarski, and Stanislaw Srokowski, the Germans had divided central Poland into five racial zones, with varying concentrations of "Nordic, Subnordic, Dinarian, Praeslavic, and Eastern" types. 88 Correlations were made between racial mixture and inborn characteristics of the peoples of these regions. The Masovian (the singular was invariably used in these depictions) was "care-free and so daring as to be foolhardy; lively; even gay and adventurous,

86. For further references see Tomasz Szarota, "Stereotyp Polski i Polaków w oczach Niemców podczas II Wojny Światowej," Sobótka 33, no. 2 (1978): 197–98.
88. Polish works cited include Kazimierz Stolyhwo, Analiza typów antropologicznych (Warsaw, 1924) and Ludność Województwa Lubelskiego (Lublin, 1932); Stanislaw Srokowski, Geografia gospodarcza Polski (Warsaw, 1939); and Oskar Kolberg, Lud, jego zwyczaje, sposób życia, mowa, podania (Kraków, 1864–91). See also the use of Czeckanowski’s work (in particular his depiction of certain Eastern Poles as “Lappanoide”) in the “thoughts” of Dr. Erhard Wetzel on the Generalplan Ost of 27 April 1942 in Madajczek, ed., Vom Generalplan Ost, 6. Though Czeckanowski’s early work had been produced in Piłsudski’s Poland, it proved of use both to the Nazis, in their program to declare Poles racially inferior, and to the postwar Polish Communist regime, in its efforts to legitimate Polish presence in recently German territories. Czekanowski’s Introduction to the History of the Slavs (Wstęp do historii Slowian: perspektywy antropologiczne, etnograficzne, prehistoryczne i językoznawcze) appeared as volume one of the Lwów Slavonic library in 1927, and as volume twenty-one in the studies of the Western Institute in Poznań thirty years later. In an introduction to the latter work Czekanowski reported that the “original homeland” of the Slavs had been located in the “basin of the Oder and Neisse rivers . . . contrary to the traditional theses of German scholarship.” 5–6.
but also stubborn and dogged... loves drink, play, and dance”; the Krakovian
was “belligerent and hot-blooded... but also hospitable, helpful, and
generous... dexterous in his work, but not systematic or persistent. His
favorite motto [Merkspruch] is three days work then three days loafing.”

On the basis of the work of Polish scholars Studencki and Rosiński the
Germans had determined that the population of central Poland (mostly
Praeslavic) was “impulsive, of low intelligence, and emotionally unstable...
” Further Polish groups identified were the “Kurpier, Podlachier, Lubliner,
Lasowiaker, Lachen, and Sieradzaner.”

More positive judgments were made of the mountain people of southern
Poland—the Gorales—and of the Western Ukrainians. The latter were
found to be akin to the South Slavs, “especially the Bulgarians, Croats,
and Slovenes.” Again, the work of Studencki and Rosiński was used to
determine dominant characteristics, but since Polish ethnographers had
not devoted much time to the study of Ukrainians, it was not until 1942/43
that Föhl could fully categorize the West Ukrainians, who supposedly
consisted of “Dolynianer, Buzaner, Pidhirianer, Batken, Batiuken, Opolener,
and Podolianer.” Despite the lack of “dependable studies” of Ukrainian
racial characteristics, Föhl cited the works of a Ukrainian (Rudnyckyj),
Pol (Sawicki), and Austrian German (Sacher-Masoch) on the “Ukrainian
national character.” The last, as chief of police in Lwów, had in 1863
described “the Ruthenian [as] the born democrat in the noblest sense of
the word.”

This racial “science” corresponded to and reinforced the logic of poli-
tics. In May 1940 SS chief Heinrich Himmler wrote his “Thoughts on
the Treatment of the Alien Population in the East”:

In our treatment of the foreign ethnic groups in the east we must
endeavor to recognize and foster as many such individual groups as
possible, i.e., apart from the Poles and the Jews, the Ukrainians, White
Russians, Gorales, Lemkes, and Kaschubians. If there are any more ethnic
splinter groups to be found, then these too.

I mean to say that we not only have a major interest in not uniting
the population in the east, but, on the contrary, we need to divide them
up into as many parts and splinter groups as possible.

90. Ibid., 45.
91. Other ethnographers upon whose work the Germans drew were Kolberg’s students
Udziela, Antoniewicz, and Byströń See Walter Föhl, “Die Bevölkerung des Generalgouverne-
ments,” in Das Generalgouvernement: Seine Verwaltung und seine Wirtschaft, ed. Josef Bühler
(Kraków, 1943), 50–57. The Nazis also made use of Bystroń’s work on the polonization of
names; see Kurt Lück, Der Lebenskampf im deutsch-polnischen Grenzraum (Berlin, 1941), 79.
92. Cited in Pridham and Noakes, Nazism, 932. These “thoughts” were subsequently
approved by Hitler. In February 1940 Himmler had given a secret speech to Gauleiter and

Racism and the Peoples of the East

Policies adopted by Nazi Germany toward Slavic peoples cannot be fully explained by Nazi racial ideology. This is evident both in the contradictory and opportunistic nature of policies pursued during the war, and in the absence of any coordinated thinking on this issue in the prewar period. Hitler in particular had at best a vague notion of what “Slavs” were, and precise connections between his supposed “anti-Slavism” before 1939, and the policies adopted toward Slavic peoples after 1939, defy attempts at documentation.93

How then can one explain the actual practice of racism toward Poles, Russians, White Russians, Ukrainians, and Czechs? Historians who have studied Nazi wartime policies have almost entirely neglected the question of the prewar origins.94 With the exception of the peoples of the Soviet Union, no clear connection has been drawn between the policies adopted after 1939, and statements of intention before that period. Since the Soviet Union played a central role in Hitler’s plans to achieve Lebensraum, he had not been able to avoid thoughts about these territories: they would be emptied of a population largely contaminated by “Judeo-Bolshevism.” But Hitler did not say precisely how this would take place, and seems to have envisioned some combination of killing, transfer, and sterilization.95

One response to the difficulty of tracing ideological origins of wartime policy has been to portray such policy as a function of “modernity.”96 One influential school has emerged which traces the origins of the Generalplan Ost—and indeed the Holocaust of the Jews—to the concerns of economists in the 1930s about Eastern Europe’s “surplus population” (Übergußbevölkerung): “they wanted to solve the supposed surplus population problem that they had analyzed and modernize the structure of Europe in the German interest”97. This scheme leaves central questions unanswered.


93. Jerzy W. Borejsza writes that it is impossible to discover any “great precision in Hitler’s use of the words Slawen, Ostvölker, Oststaaten, Ostrum, Ostpolitik, Osteinsatz.” Antyslawizm, 28.

94. For example, the most extensive treatment of Nazi wartime policies in Poland devotes only a few pages to the prewar period. Czesław Madajczyk, Polityka III Rzeszy w okupowanej Polsce: okupacja Polski, 1939–1943, 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1970).


96. See esp. Bauman, Modernity.

Ethnic hatred was widespread in the Europe of the 1930s—as it is today—but why did it develop as it did in Germany? Causal links remain symptomatically weak in work that attempts to explain Nazi wartime policy via “modernity,” and that is not surprising, since the Nazi concern during World War II was not that Eastern Europe was “overpopulated,” but that it was populated by the wrong kind of people. Furthermore, in Hitler’s mind these regions were underpopulated. That is part of the reason that he saw them as fit for colonization.

How then can one account for the development of policies of annihilation against some groups of Slavs and not others? This question awaits detailed case studies, but the discussion above highlights the importance of Lebensraum, itself a thoroughly racist concept, according to which the German people had to grow if it was to survive, and could grow only toward the “East.” A precise definition of what was the “East,” and therefore which “Slavs” had to be assimilated, destroyed, or displaced, could emerge only in the practice of war. All that seemed certain beforehand was that the race war would involve the peoples of the Soviet Union.

But Nazi intentions toward the Poles and other Slavic groups in Eastern and Southeastern Europe were relatively open. If the Polish state had been willing to collaborate with Hitler in 1939, it might have survived as a satellite similar to Slovakia, that is, a land to the south of the corridor leading to Lebensraum. It was by blocking that path that the Poles became the sort of “Slavs” destined for destruction. Thus it was not long-standing Nazi plans to destroy the Poles which engendered Polish resistance in 1939 and thereafter, but rather Polish resistance which brought forth


99. Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 13; Dmitrow, Obraz, 125, 134.

100. Dallin, German Rule, 7–9; on the location of Lebensraum see also Hitlers zweites Buch, 155; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 12–14; Broszat, Zweihundert Jahre, 182–83; Borejsza, Antyslawizm, 30.

101. Klessmann, Selbstbehauptung, 27–28; Broszat, Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik, 10. “Lebensraum” did not need to be a neat contiguous entity: the first places the Nazis intended to annex after the War were the Baltic states, Galicia, and the Crimea. Rich, Hitler’s War Aims, 327.
such plans. To make the point absolutely clear: this Polish defiance trig-
gerated Nazi violence, it did not produce it, for, as Jonathan Steinberg has
written, a “will to destroy” lay at the center of the Nazi enterprise.102

In the Czech lands there was no initial spark of defiance; German troops
moved unopposed into border areas in the fall of 1938, and completed
their occupation without a shot in March of the following year. Neither
Czechs nor Germans had an incentive to upset the relative calm; the
Germans valued the steady production of war materials from Czech
industry, and the Czechs the significant spaces that remained for pursuit
of economic and cultural interests. So powerful was the dynamic of
mutual accommodation that even the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich
in 1942 could not upset it. After the Germans had obliterated two villages
and executed hundreds of suspected and actual opposition members,
both sides returned to a strained coexistence which lasted until shortly
before Russian and American troops liberated the Czech lands in the
spring of 1945.

As mentioned, Slovakia became a model of “cooperation” for the lands
of Southeastern Europe, and German interference in the domestic affairs
of the Slovak state was minimal. One can, however, well imagine a different
fate for the Slovak lands if a united Czechoslovakia had opposed Hitler:
either complete annexation to Hungary, or some sort of occupation re-
gime similar to the Protectorate or Poland. If the Slovaks showed the
benefits of cooperation, the Serbs demonstrated the price of defiance.
The vengeance taken upon Belgrade and other Serb towns had nothing
to do with “anti-Slavic” ideology, but, similar to Poland, with Hitler’s
rage that a small country would dare stand in his way.103 Continued Serb
resistance exacted withering punishment, so that the sort of cycle of murder
and violence that Omer Bartov has spoken of in the Soviet case could
emerge in German-occupied Yugoslavia as well. Slavic states willing to
cooperate—like Bulgaria and Croatia—shared in the spoils.

These patterns of resistance and accommodation between Germans and
Slavs were not entirely new. For their part, Czechs had learned to sur-
vive and even prosper under German-Austrian rule; and the German world
was a place where the older generation, if not completely at home, was
also not entirely foreign. Many Poles of the older generation by contrast
knew traditions of conspiratorial resistance to attempted denationalization.

102. Steinberg *The Third Reich*, 648–49.
103. Vojtech Mastny has written that the “Nazis did not follow any master plan for the
administration of their rapidly growing European domains. The circumstances of their sei-
zure varied, leaving a permanent imprint upon the character of each occupation regime.”
Yugoslavia and Poland were both punished for resistance, unlike the Czechs who had “peacefully submit[ted] to German overlordship.” *The Czechs*, 99.
This included armed uprisings, but also such things as “flying universities,” that is, networks of underground education. Such networks reemerged throughout Poland after 1940, with the same structures and idioms (nauka w tajnych kompletach) as in the pre-World War I period.\footnote{104} They were weakest in Galicia, the former Austrian part of Poland, whose Polish elites—like Czech counterparts—had developed strategies of accommodation. Though universities were closed in the Czech lands as well, no networks of conspiratorial education emerged there.

The Germans also drew upon tradition. Images of inferior and hostile Slavs—above all Russians and Poles—had been nurtured in certain quarters for centuries, and served as justification for aggressive designs upon the East.\footnote{105} Colloquial German speech was suffused with negative references to the Pole: polenvoll, polnischer Reichstag, polnische Wirtschaft.\footnote{106} Anti-Polish sentiments were exploited by aggressively chauvinistic organizations of the late nineteenth century, like the Pan-German League or the Eastern Marches Society,\footnote{107} but were by no means limited to the far Right. Max Weber had argued that only a “systematic colonization of German peasants on German soil” could hold back the “Slavic flood.”\footnote{108} Both Poles and Czechs were feared for their propensity to demographically overwhelm German settlements: the former through fecundity, the latter through

\begin{enumerate}
\item[104.] See Walczak Szkolnictwo; Józef Buszko and Irena Pacyzńska, ed., Universities during World War II (Kraków, 1984); Karl Hartmann, Hochschulwesen und Wissenschaft in Polen; Entwicklung, Organisation und Stand, 1918–1960 (Frankfurt am Main, 1962).
\item[106.] From the spring of 1939 German propaganda returned to traditional stereotypes of Poles from the nineteenth century. Borejsza, Antislawizm, 102–3; Szarota, “Stereotyp Polski,” 191; Rosenthal, German and Pole, 102–3. For a history of German images of Poland, see Hasso von Zuzewitz, Das deutsche Polenbild in der Geschichte: Entstehung—Einflüsse—Auswirkungen (Cologne, 1993).
\item[107.] Roger Chickering, We Men Who Feel Most German: A Cultural Study of the Pan-German League 1886–1914 (Boston, 1984), 242–43; Adam Galos, Felix-Heinrich Genth en, Witold Jakóbczyk, Der deutsche Ostmarken verein (1894–1934) (Berlin, 1966), 199–206.
\item[108.] Kathé Schirmacher, a representative of the radical wing of the bourgeois women’s movement, claimed that the “racial” differences between Poles and Germans were too great to allow for common ancestry; the Poles were descended from a “primordial ant-eater” (Urschuppentier) Wippermann, “Wie modern,” 128.
\end{enumerate}
The racial hierarchy that emerged during the war in occupied territories reflected Nazi interests—for example for living space in western Poland—but also matched and reinforced age-old prejudices.

For his part, Hitler served to combine and radicalize the diffuse anti-Slavic sentiments of Austrian and Prussian Germany. On the one hand there could be no binding agreements with Russia, supposedly the originator of the Pan-Slavism that had destroyed the Habsburg Empire, and on the other hand German policy would focus on the colonization of the East. What was “shockingly new and original” in Hitler’s eastern policy, writes Jerzy W. Borejsza, were the methods. Hitler found plenty of willing accomplices for his ideas, in the form of underappreciated and underqualified administrators from the Reich, anxious to be recognized as a “master race,” and in the form of a young and ambitious technocratic elite—which Karl Heinz Roth has called a “Nazi intelligentsia”—eager to make careers as agronomists, anthropologists, economists, architects, and development planners. These people shared the ethnic stereotypes of the older generation, but gave them a new racist edge: no longer would the people of the East be “civilized,” they would be either germanized or swept away.

The ultimate trajectory of this wartime anti-Slavic crusade, in the opinion of a number of historians in Central Europe, was the complete elimina-

110. According to Jerzy W. Borejsza, German anti-Slavism of Hitler’s time did not result from the works of Gobineau or Houston Stewart Chamberlain; the latter had even written positively about the Slavs. Rather, “this racism was connected to a mass mentality formed over decades and centuries, and shaped in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by popular newspapers . . . a feeling of superiority became one of the major components of the mentalities of millions of Germans even before 1933, and was later raised to the level of an official state doctrine. This doctrine then served as the ideological motivation for the extermination of millions of people.” Antyslawizm, 18.
112. Borejsza, Antyslawizm 110–11, 123 (quote). Hitler’s Polish policy “echoed but went beyond those which Pan-Germans such as General Ludendorff had attempted to realize during the First World War and which had been kept alive by academics and right wing pressure groups during the 1920s and 1930s.” Pridham and Noakes, Nazism, 923.
tion of the Slavs. Concluding his study of Nazi anti-Slavism Jerzy W. Borejsza writes that

in accordance with the theories of race of the Third Reich, the fate of the Jews also awaited the Poles . . . After the complete extermination of the Jews the Third Reich would have to organize total hatred against the next mythologized enemies: the Russians, and then the Poles. Was this degree of total hatred against the Russians not realized? The plans of Adolf Hitler were not precise, but they assumed destruction, and did not exclude complete extermination.114

The Holocaust of the Jews is therefore not seen as some special event, qualitatively different from policies toward other East European peoples, but rather as the first event in a sequence. Eugeniusz Duraczyński describes “the Nazi extermination of the Polish Jews [as] a monstrous component of a large plan to destroy the peoples living in the territories of Poland, Ukraine, and White Russia.”115

Comparison makes other aspects of Nazi policies toward Jews seem less singular. Charles S. Maier has identified a unique sort of “moral threshold” that the Nazis crossed in dehumanizing the Jews, which meant that abandoning the Madagascar plan and moving to “poison gas hardly seemed a step different in kind.”116 Yet in the view of Polish historian Tomasz Szarota, this barrier was also crossed in the case of Poles: “the stereotype of the Jew—a parasitical insect, did not differ in the least from similar stereotypes of the Pole.”117 Likewise the method of killing did not differ: many thousands of Poles were also gassed at Auschwitz.

115. Duraczyński, Wojna, 102. For similar views see C. Madajczyk, “Wojna i okupacja w Polsce jako instrument zniszczenia narodu,” Dzieje najnowsze, 1 (1969); 15–25; Roth, “Generalplan Ost’—‘Gesamtplan Ost,’” 38–89; Dmitrów, Obraz, 130; Gross, Polish Society, 75; Richard C. Lukas, The Forgotten Holocaust (New York, 1997), 2–5. These views are also widespread among the Polish educated public (see for example the comments of Władysław Sīta-Nowicki in Antony Polonsky, ed., “My Brother’s Keeper?” Recent Polish Debates on the Holocaust (London and New York, 1990), 65–66, and seem to have their origins in wartime fears of Poles and other Slavic peoples that the Nazis intended their complete destruction. See for example the reports on western Poland from March and June of 1941 in Boberach, Meldungen, vols. 6–7; 2157–58, 2434–35. In 1942 according to a report from the Brest-Litovsk area, a rumor was “going round in the population that after the Jewish action first the Russians, then the Poles and then the Ukrainians will be shot.” White Russians had begun to hide their children “convinced they were next on the list.” Steinberg, “Third Reich,” 639, 643. See also: Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, Student Edition (New York and London, 1985), 196, 215–16.
117. He continues: “The goal in each case was identical: to break down psychological barriers to the killing of people, and to convince Germans that they are dealing with
Yet an important distinction does remain, and it derives from a distinction in ideology. Only in the case of the Jews did Nazi racial ideology overpower every other consideration, whether of the economy, of military strategy, or of racial science. In the case of the Slavs Nazi ideology gradually adapted to the contours of conventional racial theory, though it was never officially codified. The sources of Nazi racial thinking on Slavs were not entirely German; among the unwitting contributors to the belief in Polish inferiority were Polish anthropologists. In the case of the Jews, however, the relationship was the opposite: racial theorists adapted to the Nazi understanding of Jews as a race.

Before the seizure of power in 1933, Hitler and other Nazis repeatedly referred to the Jews as a race, much in contrast to leading racial expert Prof. Hans F. K. Günther, who argued that the Jews could not be considered a “race” but rather a “racial mixture.” For racial theorists, the characteristics of Jews differed according to the components present in any particular group—for example the Jews in Central Europe were thought to be superior to those of Eastern Europe. Thus for Günther there was no general “scientific” basis for speaking of Jewish “inferiority,” though he strongly favored the segregation of Jews and Aryans. After the Nazi seizure of power, leading race experts revised such views in favor of the monolithic Nazi anti-Semitism, however. In 1938 director of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut for Anthropology, Prof. Eugen Fischer, spoke of the Untermenschen, i.e., insects. And one does not fight insects (because a fight is between partners) as much as one exterminates them as vermin, for reasons of hygiene.” Szarota, “Stereotyp Polski,” 200.

118. Though racial “experts” in the Eastern administrations and the SD opposed popular beliefs in a unified racial entity called “Slavs,” one finds continued reference to Slavs by Nazi leaders to denote a group based in race, and located mostly in German-occupied Europe, especially Russia. See Himmler’s secret speech of 24 October 1943 in Poznań, and its reference above all to “Russian space,” because “Russia is the mother of all Slavs.” Ackermann, Himmler, 290–96. See also the remarks of Reinhard Heydrich to leading officials in Prague on 2 October 1941. Referring in one moment to the people of the East (Ostläume), Heydrich declared that “the Slav . . . did not wish to be treated as an equal,” and in the next to the Czechs as Slavs who interpret “kindness as weakness.” Miroslav Kariy, et al., Protektorátu politika Reinharda Heydricha (Prague, 1991), 102, 105. See also Martin Bormann’s hateful remarks about “Slavs” from August 1942 in Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem internationalen Militärgerichtshof, vol. 19 (Nuremberg, 1948), 558. All of these officials subscribed to the notion of racial variations among the Slavs, however.

Jews as an “oriental-near eastern amalgamated race.” And in an attempt to synthesize “anthropological science” with the newer ideological dictums, Fischer’s successor, Prof. Otmar Freiherr von Verschuer of Frankfurt, imagined that “the Jews have ‘bred’ their own race.”

These differing logics of racial ideology had decisive implications for Nazi practice in Eastern Europe during the war. Because the Nazis did not understand the Poles or the Russians—let alone the Slavs—as a race, there could be no policy of complete eradication. Any proponent of complete destruction of Poles or Russians would have first stumbled upon the difficulty of defining who a Pole or Russian was in the racial sense; there was no equivalent of the Nuremberg laws for this purpose. In practice, every level of the Nazi hierarchy, whether the top leadership and its most inveterate Slavophobes, racial “scientists,” or the army and SS, constantly made distinctions within various Slavic groups. There was not a region in Poland where some “Nordic” elements were not imagined; in the western and northern areas it was thought to be more than half. Entire groups of speakers of Slavic languages within Poland, like the Gorales, or the Lemkos, were thought of as essentially Germanic.

121. He concluded with a defense of the “complete racial separation of Jews and Germans,” contending that the “maintenance of the character of our people was directly threatened by racial infiltration [Überfremdung].” Otmar Freiherr von Verschuer, “Rassenbiologie der Juden,” Forschungen zur Judenfrage, vol. 3 (1938), 149. Verschuer succeeded Fischer at the Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute in 1942, and taught in Frankfurt until 1951, when he moved to Münster, where he was professor until his death in 1969. Kürschners deutscher Gelehrten-Kalendar 1930 (Berlin, 1950), 2153; Kürschners deutscher Gelehrten-Kalendar 1970 (Berlin, 1971), 3115, 3438. See also the references to a Jewish race in Munich Professor Richard Fester’s “Das Judentum als Zersetzungselement der Völker: Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen,” Forschungen zur Judenfrage, vol. 6 (1941), 29, 38. Much of the popular literature on race continued communicating Günther’s view of Jews as a “racial mixture,” mainly of the “Near Eastern” (vorderasiatisch) and “oriental” (orientalisch) races; see for example Karin Magnussen, Rassen-und bevolkerungspolitisches Rustzeug: Statistik, Gesetzgebung und Kriegsaufgaben (Munich, Berlin, 1943), 32; Albert Höft, Rassenkunde, Rassenpflege und Erbrechte im volksbezogenen lebenskundlichen Unterricht (Osterwieck/Harz and Berlin, 1936), 159; Ernst Dobers, Rassenkunde: Forderung und Dienst (Leipzig, 1939), 95; Heinz Woltereck, ed., Erbkunde, Rassenpflege, Bevölkerungspolitik: Schicksalsfragen des deutschen Volkes (Leipzig, 1940), 145. The tension is reflected in an SS training brochure, Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei. Schutzstaffel, Rassenpolitik (Berlin, 1942?), 8, which speaks on the same page of Jews as a “racial mixture,” and as “race”: “through its parasitical instincts the Jew keeps his race pure.”
122. This analysis contrasts with that of leading Polish expert on German National Socialism Franciszek Ryszka, who writes that “every Pole by virtue of belonging to a definite breed [gatunek]” became an “enemy” of Germany. U źródeł sukcesu i kleski: Szkice z dziejów hitleryzmu (Warsaw, 1972), 129.
123. Race expert Prof. Günther said after completing a ten-day trip in Danzig-Westpreussen that four-fifths of the Poles in the North could be germanized. See the conversations from 12 May 1942 in Picker, Tischgespräche, 286–88. Indeed, many hundreds of thousands of Poles in the annexed regions were made into Germans by the institution of the Volkslisten during the war. For exact figures and a discussion of the four varieties of the Volksliste, see Madajczyk, Die Okkupationspolitik, 458, 469.
The practical consequence was compromise with the Slavs, refusal to compromise with the Jews. The German occupiers began yielding ideological ground to the non-Jewish “racially mixed” population in Soviet territories soon after entering them. The cases of Ukrainian and Cossack SS units have been mentioned. In 1941 Hitler had given strict orders that Russians were not to be used as soldiers, yet by the end of the war tens of thousands were fighting on the German side. The breakdown of his injunction was gradual and opportunistic: first German troops (esp. NCO’s) began using Russian POW’s as helpers and servants of all kinds, for cooking, carrying ammunition, clearing mines. They learned that if one gave them proper rations they worked better. As early as 1941 these Hilfswillige were used for guard and police functions, then as soldiers. Beginning in 1943, the Nazis had begun offering grants of Lebensraum to “eastern soldiers”—many of them Russian—who had distinguished themselves in service. These compromises were necessitated by the thinness of the German military and administrative presence, which hardly permitted contact with the local population, let alone governance. The use of supposed “subhumans” as soldiers increased as the situation on Germany’s many fronts became more desperate, and the killing of Jews accelerated.

What if the Nazis had won the war? All available evidence suggests that massive use of Slavic peoples, as labor of all sorts, would have continued, precisely because of the assumption that Slavs were potentially “useful.” In 1940 a confident Himmler had predicted that Slavs would become a “leaderless work force . . . and be called upon, under the strict, consistent, and fair direction of the German people, to help in the construction of its eternal cultural deeds and monuments, and perhaps, in view of the amount of unskilled labor required, make these things possi-

125. Dallin, German Rule, 533–44. Omer Bartov has detailed the escalating compromises in the operations of the German 18th Panzer Division, which began using local “Hilfskräfte” in May 1942, within two months had established armed “volunteer” units to guard lines of communication, and in August set up “self-defence” units in villages it controlled. By December two companies of over 300 Russians were involved in “security” operations. In August of 1943 the division numbered 7,415 German soldiers and 1,053 Hiwis. Bartov, Eastern Front, 138–39. In 1942 a self-administering area behind the front was created near Lokot, with no German occupying forces, which organized the local economy, deliveries to the Germans, and also antipartisan forces. By the end of 1942 these forces totaled over 10,000 men, and were the beginning of the so-called Russian Popular Army of Liberation. Schulte, The German Army, 172–79.
126. Between 21 April and 20 May 1943, 172 Russians serving in police military units, or with the civil administration, received land grants of one to seven hectares. Alarmed at this report, Himmler stipulated that the number of Eastern nationals in German service receiving land would not be greater than 2 percent (about 24,000) of their number each year. Mulligan, The Politics of Illusion, 154.
ble in the first place.” Millions of foreign workers were planned for yearly planting and harvests. In October 1943 the SS leader said in a secret speech in Poznani in reference to the Russian area: “If we treat it properly, we can mine endless quantities of value and energy from the human mass of this Slavic people.” A future was imagined in which the Germans would “understand how to govern foreign peoples numbering a hundred million at least as well as the English do today.” Hitler too had referred to the future regime in Eastern Europe as approximating that of the English in India.

When attempting to imagine a Nazi victory, historians tend to think of the Nazi state as all-powerful, somehow relieved of its endemic confusion of competences, and a hostile surrounding world. But Nazi planners anticipated many challenges in realizing their projects for a postwar world. The greatest difficulty would simply be to find colonists: not only for Bohemia and Moravia, but for all of Poland, the Baltic states, much of Ukraine and Russia, and the Crimea. Experiences during the war did not inspire confidence in the practicability of settling many tens of millions in an area inhabited by over 100 million people: only a few hundred thousand “Germans” were found for the rather limited task of settling western Poland—and most of these had been taken from Ukraine and Russia to begin with! They continued a decades-old tradition of German migration to economically more developed western areas, for example from Silesia to Berlin and the Ruhr.

Precisely because West Germans were imbued with stereotypes of a culturally inferior East, German authorities in the East would need to attract settlers there, and they knew this. The Nazi leadership counted

129. From Himmler's thoughts on “future German peasant settlements,” 24 June 1940, ibid., 303.
130. Wenn man dieses slawische Volk richtig behandelt, kann man aus der Masse Mensch unendliche Werte herausholen und unendliche Kräfte schaffen.” Cited in ibid., 292–94.
131. For German population losses from Silesia until 1939 see Andrzej Brożek, Ostflucht na Śląsku (Katowice, 1966). Between 1939 and 1945 approximately 400,000 “ethnic Germans” were settled in areas of Poland that had been attached to the Reich. Of these over 90 percent came from areas further East in Poland, the Baltic states, the Bukovina, and Bessarabia. Robert L. Kochl, RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy 1939–1945 (Cambridge, MA, 1957), 254. On the impracticality of Himmler’s programs of resettlement in the East, even in the event of victory against the Soviet Union, see idem., 227–28. One major attempt to settle “Germans” in the Zamość region in Poland in 1942/43 ended in failure, because of massive Polish resistance, including the killing of new settlers, and the refusal of some of the supposed Volksdeutsche (Alsatians, Slovenians, and Luxemburgers) to move eastward. Czesław Madajczyk, Generalna Gubernia w planach hitlerowskich. Studia (Warsaw, 1961), 111–86.
132. See for example Walter Geisler, Der deutsche Osten als Lebensraum für alle Berufsstände (Berlin, Prague, Vienna, 1941); Walter Geisler, Deutscher! Der Osten ruft Dich! (Berlin,
on the additional "Germanic people" from Norway, Holland, and England, but also the descendants of Germans who had once migrated to Africa and America. Still, the most optimistic projection (ca. 1942) of a situation decades in the future left SS planners millions of settlers behind plan, even when they imagined that the fourteen million "germanizable" Eastern Europeans would be left in the East, and not moved to central Germany, as a strict adherence to racial guidelines would have required.

The pressures for plan fulfillment necessitated compromise. Because relatively few Germans could be spared for the vast territories Germany was to control, administrators would be procured from elsewhere: from the peoples judged to lie racially between the Germans and the Russians (Mittelschicht): Latvians, Estonians, and even Czechs. Because of its high level of socioeconomic development, Germany’s birthrate was in decline; and in order to forestall "national suicide," it would have to develop industry in the lands further east that were not scheduled for German settlement, for example in the Baltic area and parts of the Ukraine, in order to drive down birthrates there as well. But most importantly, there would have to be a reassessment of how much Germanic blood resided in the East. Director of the Advisory Board (Beratungsstelle) of the Office of Racial Politics of the NSDAP, Dr. Erhard Wetzel, complained of racial standards for judging Slavs that were so strict that even populations in Germany would not meet them, and suggested a more liberal application, as well as attempts to attract people to "Germandom," for example by giving members of the intelligentsias positions of responsibility in the Reich—like state officials and university teachers. If not treated properly, these "valuable" elements would remain hostile to Germany.

Final judgments, even on Russian racial "value," had yet to be made. Professor at the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institute for Anthropology in Berlin, Wilhelm Abel, "discovered" in 1942 that Russians consisted of Nordic types to a higher degree than previously thought, and Wetzel suggested transferring...
these several million Russians directly into the Reich, where they could replace "unwanted workers from the south and southeast of Europe," and gradually mix with the Germans. In the case of the Poles, policies were determined not so much by racial considerations, as by the recognition that this was the people "most hostile" to Germany. They would have to be dispersed over regions of Siberia, and encouraged to emigrate to South America, perhaps in exchange for Germans living there. Neither in the case of Poles nor Russians could the leading Nazi planners advocate "liquidation." The reasons were of a practical nature. Wetzel wrote in his "thoughts" on the Generalplan Ost of 27 April 1942:

It should be obvious that the Polish question cannot be solved by liquidating the Poles in the way the Jews are being liquidated. Such a resolution of the Polish question would weigh upon the German people deep into the future, and cost us sympathies everywhere, because neighboring peoples would have to figure on being dealt with the same way, when their time came.136

Dr. Hans Ehlich, expert on Volkstum at the RSHA, wrote in December 1942 that the fate of 70 million people in the East could not be decided by "total physical destruction . . . because we would never have enough people to even come close to replacing these 70 million."137

During the war the Nazis did not approach the complete destruction of those parts of Slavic populations supposedly slated for immediate destruction: the intelligentsia. Hitler had said in the fall of 1940 that "all members of the Polish intelligentsia must be killed,"138 but the wartime losses of members of the Polish intelligentsia—including Jews—amounted to 57 percent of all lawyers, 39 percent of all physicians, 29.5 percent of all university teachers; and in general 37.5 percent of all Polish citizens with higher education.139 Many of the 20,000 Polish officers captured by the Germans in 1939 belonged to the intelligentsia, but the Nazis did not attempt to kill them off, though they remained in POW camps throughout the war.140


140. University teachers among the Polish prisoners of war even organized higher education...
The central difference to the Jewish case is obvious: the Nazis could imagine the Slavs as useful. The case of the Gypsies, or Sinti and Roma, falls somewhere between these two. As in the case of the Slavs, Sinti and Roma had played a marginal role in Nazi thinking, and are not mentioned at all in Mein Kampf or the records of Hitler’s conversations with close aids. Like Slavs, Gypsies were differentiated. Certain Gypsies (full-blooded) were thought racially valuable, because of their supposed derivation from “Aryan stock.” Unlike Jews, the Nazis never precisely defined what a “Gypsy”—or the true target of persecution, a “Gypsy half-breed” (Zigeunermischling)—was.141 The difference in thought was reflected in action: there was no Europe-wide manhunt for every last Gypsy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% Gypsies killed (Based on 1939 population)</th>
<th>% Jews killed (Based on pre-Final Solution population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany/Austria</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech lands</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>12</td>
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For the Nazis, the Jews were not a race among races. They were the race that destroyed (zerstören) race, the very substance of human existence.142 There was a uniquely metaphysical dimension in the Nazi hatred in the camps Woldenberg, Gross Born, Edelbach, and Murnau with partial knowledge of the Germans. The prisoners collected libraries of many thousands of volumes; in Woldenberg alone 20,000 scholarly and 30,000 popular books. Some 1,200 prisoners attended the courses in Woldenberg. In Edelbach Polish and French scholars had been permitted to coorganize a Université française de captivité. Stanisław Mauersberg, “Nauka i szkolnictwo wyższe w latach 1939–1951,” in Historia Nauki Polskiej, ed. Bogdan Suchodolski, vol. 5, part 1 (Wrocław, 1992), 381–83. For a description of university courses, as well as the hardships of life in these camps, see also Walczak, Szkolnictwo, 173–78.

141. See Zimmermann, Rassenutopie, 372–73; Mosse, Toward the Final Solution, 220–21. Rassenpolitik, 8–9 (see n. 121); Fester, “Das Judentum.”
of Jews: Jews were the anti-race; or, as Hitler is supposed to have said to Hermann Rauschning, “the Jew is the anti-man, the creature of another god . . . He is a creature outside nature and alien to nature.” Even after the Jewish question in Europe had been “solved,” thoughts of Jews continued to vex Hitler: in February 1945 he told Martin Bormann that there was no such thing as a Jewish race “from the genetic point of view,” but that Jews were “a spiritual race.” Indeed, discussions of Jews had always transcended the categories of racial “science.” It was beside the point to attempt to measure the amount of Indo-European or Near Eastern blood present in Jews; and to imagine “blond and blue-eyed” Jews becoming German was simply absurd. The dangers emanating from Jews defied the evidence of the senses. Dr. Walter Gross, head of the Nazi Party’s Office of Racial Politics, justified the exclusion of Jewish children from schools because of their “invisible influence” on the “soul” of German children.

Unlike policies toward the Slavs, or toward any other identifiable human group, policies toward the Jews were an end in themselves. Read backward, the final solution to the “Jewish question” appears as the logical culmination of an essential ideological predisposition, whereas policies toward Slavs appear as constant improvisation, in which opportunity and ideology shaped one another. The absolute dominance of ideological considerations—whether or not Nazi leaders knew from the beginning precisely where they would lead—accounts for the total and uncompromising nature of the final solution of the Jewish question. There was but one attempt to destroy the whole of a people, there was but one Holocaust.

144. Such at least was the view of Heinrich Himmler. Hilberg, Destruction, 252.
146. Mosse, Toward the Final Solution, 221.
148. Erich Goldhagen has described the theory of a “Jewish conspiracy” as the “core of the constitutive myth of the National Socialists.” Ibid., 380.
149. “Holocaust” is derived from the Greek holokaustos: holos (whole) and kaustos (burnt). Webstar’s New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, MA, 1960), 394.