opportunities for the reconstruction of a truly international organization of trade unions and for the refashioning of the trade union presence within the European Union. In the end, they fall victim to the national orientation they so denounce. No mere tactical reorientation of the French labor movement can produce internationalism but only international organizations and the strategies for building them; no such proposals emerge in this book.

Michael Hanagan


Until recently German-language studies of the Vichy regime and the German occupation of France in World War II were far fewer in number than relevant French, British and American studies. But this situation has been changing. Bernd Zielinski’s book (based on his doctoral dissertation) on the cooperation between Vichy and occupation authorities in the sphere of forced labour fits into this new research trend. It must be stressed that this owes a considerable debt to earlier work done on the other side of the Rhine, and also, in this specific case, to Ulrich Herbert’s studies on foreign workers.

Zielinski provides a chronology of the various phases of the forced-labour policy in occupied France between 1940 and 1944 on the basis of the relevant French literature, which is introduced in detail and relied on extensively, and by evaluating a large number of documents mostly from the Archives Nationales in Paris and the Militärarchiv in Freiburg. He concentrates on the inherent conflict, clearly evident by the end of the occupation, between the parallel strategies of exploiting French workers locally or transferring production to France on the one hand and deploying French workers in Germany on the other. He details the various pressures and justifications for French-based employment (economic revival, army construction sites, the Todt organization, later the relocation of production from bomb-damaged Germany in “S-firms”, S-Betriebe). With regard to the use of French workers in Germany he highlights in particular the smooth transition from the initially “guided voluntary nature” of recruitment to the agreed exchange of workers against prisoners of war (known as the relève) and the rounding up and deportation of French workers during the so-called “Sauckel actions” of 1942/1943.

Zielinski concludes that, despite all the different options and methods used, the guiding principle remained the optimal exploitation of the occupied country’s labour for the benefit of the German war economy. Against this background the frequently highlighted conflicts between the German military administration, the plenipotentiary-general for the allocation of labour and his representative in France, and the armaments ministry (under Albert Speer) appear to be of secondary importance.

It is also worth noting that both strategies paved the way for a restructuring of the French labour market and for a strong concentration and rationalization of French industry. Zielinski does not examine this issue systematically, as it is outside the scope of his study, but this is surely among the most important consequences of Franco-German economic cooperation during World War II.
This chronological survey is linked to an analysis of the Vichy regime's collaboration policies and the willingness of its leading political representatives to pursue them. This is revealing not only because the Franco-German negotiations on "labour service" (Arbeitseinsatz) in the Reich and on the modalities of German armaments production in France were invariably given the highest priority and conducted at the highest level (e.g. Sauckel-Laval, Speer-Bichelonne), but also because, as Zielinski shows, the French side took initiatives of its own to direct the labour market and organize forced labour and because the Vichy regime's ability to control its own labour force, conscript it in a quasi-military way and put it at the Germans' disposal would eventually develop into a touchstone of "state collaboration". The outrage felt by wide sections of the French public, the strike movements, the mass boycott of "compulsory labour service" (service du travail obligatoire) and the growing workers' resistance to forced recruitment, which from 1943 formed the key social basis for the Maquis, are rightly stressed by Zielinski as the real constraints of Vichy's collaboration policy. The regime tried to overcome these in 1944 with openly fascist measures, not least in the sphere of forced labour.

Zielinski deliberately restricts himself to the "political and administrative aspects of forced labour and collaboration" and hence does not provide a "description of the situation of the victims" (p. 22), i.e. the more than one million French people rounded up and deported to work in the Reich. The Bundesarchiv-Militäarchiv holds extracts of letters by these men and women recorded and evaluated by the German censors.¹ They throw a rather different light on the bureaucracy of "labour service". Perhaps it is because it lacks this additional perspective that Zielinski's study remains rather conventional, despite the large amount of new material presented by the author and despite many informative details about unemployment, working hours and wages, foreign labour and other matters in occupied France. Some facts are joined together without definition, carried only by the chronology (which leads to some repetition) and without discussion of their labour-market and socio-political contexts. Other policies pursued by the German occupation authorities barely get a mention. Some obvious links are ignored altogether, such as the relationship between anti-Jewish measures and forced labour, the overlap among the various deportation programmes, or the parallels with "aryanization" in France, which, together with the expropriations and round-up actions to obtain workers, were pursued by the economic department of German military command and which also accelerated the process of business concentration.

But these criticisms, as well as some shortcomings and mistakes,² should not detract from the fact that this book constitutes an important contribution to the study of the history of the German occupation of France in general and of labour policy under the Vichy regime in particular. In any case it represents a gain for the German-speaking public, which is presented with an excellent review of the results of French research.

¹ RW 35/228, Propagandaabteilung Frankreich [Propaganda Section France].
² For example, Michael R. Marrus, not Marrius; Jacques Desmarest, not Desmarets; Section Contemporaine, not Cotemporaine; Institut d'Histoire, not Institut de Histoire, etc.; "the second Sauckel action" or "the Second Sauckel Action"; Elmar Michel was not "appointed head of the economic department" in August 1942 (p. 116), but put in charge of the whole administration.
I must comment on one final point, however. Zielinski has taken the term “state collaboration” (collaboration d'état), commonly used in France, as the title for his study. One might therefore assume that he would explain the origins and contents of this concept in the introduction. But in his extensive survey of the state of research he does not mention that the term was coined by the American historian Stanley Hoffmann to characterize the Vichy regime's overriding aim to protect French interests and preserve its sovereignty, and to differentiate it from other, ideologically motivated, forms of collaboration. Instead he mentions “state collaboration” in the context of Eberhard Jäckel’s Frankreich in Hitlers Europa [France in Hitler’s Europe], published in 1966, in Zielinski’s view a “turning point” heralding a “change of paradigm” in Vichy studies (p. 12). I do not want to dwell here on the apologetic tendencies evident in Jäckel’s work as well as in other older German-language studies of the German occupation of France. Suffice it to say that the description of the German military administration as a “supervisory administration” (Aufsichtsverwaltung), which Zielinski uses here to describe the occupation reality in France (pp. 21, 29), was introduced into the literature by Jäckel without comment. Jäckel in turn had taken the term from Werner Best, the SS’s leading lawyer, theoretician of the police state and head of the administration department at German military command in France, who had coined it in the context of his notion of a “grand hierarchy of nations” (völkische Großraumordnung) under German leadership. That is how the language of the Third Reich survives in the specialist vocabulary of the historian.

Ahlrich Meyer


In this somewhat abridged and modified version of the thesis that Keller defended at Freiburg (Baden-Württemberg) in 1990, she questions the extent to which German social democracy served as an example for Italian social democracy. The author’s perspective ties in with Ernesto Ragionieri’s frequently quoted Socialdemocrazia tedesca e socialisti italiani 1875–1895 (1961), which advances the unchallenged thesis that the German movement exerted considerable influence on its fledgling Italian counterpart. Keller accepts Ragionieri’s findings and investigates the continuation of this influence after the period covered by Ragionieri. Keller begins her research with the establishment of the Partito Socialista Italiano in 1892 and concludes with the International Socialist Congress in Amsterdam in 1904, where Jean Jaurès’s impressive criticism of the German party signified the first massive international opposition to the claim to leadership by the German socialists. Keller rightly notes that her study is more than a mere chronological extension of Ragionieri’s research strategy. While Ragionieri could – and did – largely limit his work to reconstructing the exchange of ideas between the German and Italian socialist leaders, the organization became crucial after 1892. This change led to a different use of sources as well. While Ragionieri’s work is based primarily on the correspondence and journalist writings of the concerned individuals, Keller’s primary sources of documentation are party newspapers, especially regional publications.