transnational exiles, dissidents, and artists bears witness to the fragile, fractious dimensions of national belonging” (277), and in this the book triumphs.

Gronbeck-Tedesco describes how the US–Cuban dialogic underwrote much of the twentieth century’s most explosive political and cultural moments, creating the kinds of success and failure that propelled new ideas about nationalism, culture, art, and war, especially as Cuban notions of tricontinentalism abounded, connecting the island to global politics in a fashion that directly refuted American unilateralism. Charting the cross-pollination of ideas between Havana and the US through intellectual productions of Carrie Chapman Catt, Heloise Brainerd, Ofelia Domínguez Navarro, Doris Stevens, Robert F. Williams, Malcolm X, Stokely Carmichael, Amiri Baraka, Harold Cruse, Carlos Moore, Frantz Fanon, Huey Newton, and Che Guevara, the book emphasizes that the global circulation of new strategies for engaging nationalism across the globe provided new contact points for the production of ideology. My only quibble with these later chapters is the loss of focus on the actual texts that built this constitutive relationship in the early half of the century in deference to the inclusion of so many participants that helped shape the US–Cuban relationship.

Nonetheless, at the moment, the US and Cuba are enjoying a moment of reconciliation as a new wave of transnational exchange begins. Whereas earlier periods of US–Cuban interaction were characterized by controversial and often contentious policy, the current political climate demands scholarly attention to just the kinds of antagonism and cooperation that Gronbeck-Tedesco has so artfully portrayed, since it seems quite clear that the transnational relationship between the two countries will continue. With particular attention to contemporary identity politics, forthcoming scholarship on the special relationship between the US and Cuba should model this kind of thoughtful analysis.

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Transatlantic historiography commonly gets enacted one way, whether tracing the transplanting of peoples or recording the migration of ideas. Occasionally scholars can discern exchanges and reciprocity, as intellectuals learn from one another, or as institutions seek to emulate what is admired across the ocean. The Weimar Century offers something special, a kind of triangulation: five German thinkers who reached maturity after the First World War find refuge in the United States, and then manage to project their political views back after the Second World War, mainly in the land of their birth. One was a Protestant (Carl J. Friedrich); one was a Catholic (Waldemar Gurian); and the other three were Jews (Ernst Fraenkel, Karl Loewenstein and Hans J. Morgenthau). In their homeland the Third Reich had aborted their hopes for a viable democracy. But America gave this quintet a chance to promote free institutions during the postwar occupation. It facilitated the exiles’ influence, even as the pressures of the incipient Cold War accelerated the inclusion of the Federal Republic in the Atlantic alliance. Udi Greenberg’s meaty book makes this triangulation quite fascinating, and thus adds further luster to the vibrant field of
German intellectual history. The haven that the United States provided for these five scholars is nevertheless crucial to his story. The American fulcrum reduced the likelihood that Bonn would repeat the tragic fragility of Weimar.

The author nevertheless finds problematic the top-down tendency common to the political thought that he examines. His five subjects were, after all, mandarins. Yet Greenberg does not account for their justifiable fear of the masses during the interwar period, nor does he acknowledge that such elitism enjoys a respectable lineage—starting with Jefferson and Adams. Greenberg also criticizes at least four of his protagonists for a hostility to Communism that he deems excessive. His book is peppered with adjectives modifying “anti-Communism” such as “fierce” (59), “virulent” (95), “extreme” (122) and—inevitably—“paranoid” (167).

Yet only very rarely does The Weimar Century quote the actual language that would warrant the application of such adjectives. This failure is especially egregious when considering an important work like Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (1956), which Friedrich co-authored. In the first decade or so of the Cold War, when another world war was hardly unimaginable, and when Stalinism had installed itself in the heartland of Europe, the struggle to secure democratic institutions should not in retrospect be so easily disparaged. Of course not every effort to neutralize Soviet influence can be defended. For example, the West German judiciary banned the Communist Party in 1956, when it had no prospect whatsoever of gaining power peacefully. Thus Loewenstein’s invocation of “militant democracy,” which entailed intolerance for groups who professed intolerance of the rules of representative government, was certainly misapplied (though the policy might have been worth trying three decades earlier against the Nazis). The notion of “militant democracy” also helped rationalize the round-up of suspected Axis saboteurs in Latin America during the Second World War, though Greenberg concedes that assorted caudillos hardly needed Loewenstein to fortify their impulse to violate elemental rights.

The profile of Morgenthau is something of an anomaly. Unlike the other four figures, he had little to do with postwar Germany. He did not return to live there (unlike Fraenkel, a socialist attorney). Nor did the University of Chicago political scientist devote himself to the revitalization of education and law there (unlike Friedrich, Gurian and Loewenstein). Though the origins of Morgenthau’s fabled “realism” could indeed be traced to his studies and writings in the 1920s, The Weimar Century oddly enough neglects to mention Friedrich Meinecke’s Die Idee der Staatsräson in der neueren Geschichte, which was published in 1924. The line from Meinecke would have been easy to draw to Morgenthau’s mantra that international affairs constitute the site of power and interests. That is why he refused to see the Cold War primarily in ideological terms (unlike Hannah Arendt, for example). As early as 1955, Greenberg reports, Morgenthau returned from a trip to South Vietnam to dismiss any claims that it had strategic value; and, from then on, he consistently opposed American military intervention in Indochina.

Such conspicuous dissent from so obsessive an ingredient of American statecraft distinguished him from the other émigrés. But The Weimar Century breaks off too soon. During the 1968 presidential campaign, for instance, Morgenthau advanced a case for favoring Richard Nixon, even though the Democrats’ Hubert Humphrey shared with Morgenthau a history in the liberal group Americans for Democratic Action. But he argued that the Republican nominee would peel away votes from George C. Wallace, who threatened to become “the American Hitler.” In a striking essay that was
reprinted in *Truth and Power* (1970), Morgenthau discerned in the GOP a willingness to compete for “the potential fascist vote” (205), and thus the refugee intellectual surely intended to evoke the specter of Weimar.

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With her study of three generations of women in the California chapters of the Communist Party (USA), Beth Slutsky adds to the growing body of literature that examines the intersection between “old” left-wing radicalism and activism for women’s rights. In recent years, work by Dayo F. Gore and Erik S. McDuffie has prompted a reevaluation of the ways that the Communist Party offered opportunities for African American women’s radicalism, outside and parallel to the mainstream liberal civil rights movement. For Slutsky, the Communist Party was an often contradictory space for women to develop radical strategies and ideas in a world where both women and left-wing politics were marginalized. Drawing on an impressive range of primary source material from archives across California, she details the lives of three women who shaped the face of Communist activism from the first red scares of the early twentieth century through to the uneasy alliance between Communism, civil rights and the New Left. The activities of Charlotte Anita Whitney, Dorothy Ray Healey and Kendra Claire Harris Alexander represent major shifts in ways that American society viewed Communist radicalism, but more importantly Slutsky offers us in-depth biographical portraits of three women who were fighting for their own place in a society that sought, for various reasons, to exclude them. In this, Slutsky carefully creates a world where the public face of activism intertwines inevitably with the private lives of the activists.

The book is organized around these three biographical chapters, each progressing in chronological order. We first meet Anita Whitney, a socially elite leftist, whose prolonged legal battles, imprisonment and subsequent campaign for release forced the issue of free speech to the forefront of the party’s platform in the heady days of the first red scare, and also provided opportunities for alliance with other radical and reformist organizations. By mid-century, after the party had aligned itself with the mainstream through the Popular Front era, postwar Stalinism caused many to reassess their allegiance to the CPUSA. Dorothy Ray Healey emerged as a leader of a new generation of activists devoted to labour organization and radical activism within an increasingly hostile domestic political situation. The third protagonist, and only woman of colour of the three, is Kendra Alexander, who simultaneously aligned herself with the party, the civil rights movement, and the black power movement, and would eventually head Angela Davis’s defence team in 1972 when Davis faced charges of kidnapping, conspiracy and murder.

Across these biographical chapters, three common strands emerge: radicalism through the performance of imprisonment, the importance of the Communist Party in a larger network of radical organizations, and the ways that all three women deal with contradictory expectations around gender within the Party. For