as good, but is nevertheless extremely able. The work of the moral philosophers Schneewind discusses is clearly and accurately summarized, and the weighting is well balanced. The author shows a thorough grip on the problems of moral philosophy – though he is better acquainted with substantive questions than on questions of moral epistemology – and the comment is judicious and illuminating. It is not exactly an exhilarating book, but the subject does not lend itself to this. I can thoroughly recommend Professor Schneewind’s work and, even at the price, it is well worth buying by anyone who can afford it. There are three extremely useful bibliographies.

Jonathan Harrison


The range of consultation and cross-fertilization between theologians and social scientists has greatly increased even in the last two or three years. It is no longer a matter of the odd sociologist such as Peter Berger who happens to be theologically educated, or of theologians who pick up *en passant* the relevance of anthropologists like Mary Douglas and Victor Turner. It is rather a genuine meeting of minds, in which theologians empathize the social scientific task and social scientists openly expose their own quest for meaning.

Of course, the two approaches to man and meaning remain logically distinct, and Meyer Fortes in his Preface to this volume on ‘Sacrifice’ explores both the differences and the overlaps. Theologians remain part of the traditions they study, whatever their capacity to stand back, analyse and make comparisons. All the same, the theological side of this particular discussion of sacrifice is not at all intrusively normative. If, for example, one reads J. W. Rogerson’s account of sacrifice in the Old Testament, the distinguishing mark is not a normative approach, but the special method needed to reconstruct different strands of tradition formed over several hundred years. *Per contra,* if one turns to Mrs Campbell-Jones’s account of changing understandings of the Mass as between radical and conservative nuns, a great deal of the context has to be theological, though, of course, not normatively so. In other words, there is a middle area of description, reconstruction and analytic brooding where theologians and anthropologists may safely graze together.

Perhaps the purest anthropology is provided by John Beattie in his semifunctionalist analysis of sacrifice. His piece sets out some of the more interesting problems to which the subject has given rise in recent anthropology. The nub of the chapter concerns a nature of the sacrificer’s viewpoint and the central theme of power, whether individualized or diffuse, whether contacted or channelled away. Again, on the other side, Professor Sykes paper
on sacrifice in the New Testament and Christian theology is (inevitably) the most theological. It is a complex paper, providing a rich meditation on the sacrificial themes more or less present in different strata and different parts of the New Testament. The questions he raises are carried forward in the final postscript by S. Barrington-Ward and M. F. C. Bourdillon, ‘A Place for Sacrifice in Modern Christianity?’ The only article dealing with another world religion is Audrey Hayley’s characteristically crisp and incisive discussion of ‘The offering in Assamese Vaishnavism’.

This volume seems to me to offer a comprehensive introduction to the main themes of sacrifice as they are embedded in rituals and theologies. It is a most useful and distinguished collection.

David A. Martin


This book is a translation and revision of a book first published in Poland in 1969. The revision was ‘established in collaboration with the author’ by Dr Tymieniecka. Footnotes have been added to the original edition; these have the approval of the author but it is not clear to what extent, if any, they are the result of his active collaboration.

The author is concerned with what he calls ‘the problem of the subject, namely, the problem of the person, or of the human being as a person’. This problem, ‘is completely new in relation to traditional philosophy (and by traditional philosophy we understand here the pre-Cartesian philosophy and above all the heritage of Aristotle, and, among the Catholic schools of thought, of St Thomas Aquinas)’. The problem in question is that of giving an accurate ‘phenomenological’ description of the person.

A phenomenological description of a person would be a description of the person as he is presented to himself— as he appears in his own consciousness. The present book is an attempt to answer the following question: What can be learned about the nature of a person as such— about what it is to be a person— by studying the way in which he is manifested to himself in his own actions?

It is apparent from the description offered here that the author is very much under the influence of Max Scheler. (The original Polish edition carried the subtitle: ‘An Attempt at Constructing Catholic Ethics on the Basis of Scheler’s Philosophy’. This subtitle is not used or mentioned in the present edition.) The author does not discuss Scheler or any other philosopher in detail, but restricts himself to phenomenological description. To a remarkable extent, he has been able to bracket theological considerations in his analysis.

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