

Although Linke traces the course of events with great care, there is very little interpretation. For the most recent thoughtful perspective the reader should consult Hermann Graml's article in the October 1970 issue of *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*. It is unfortunate that Linke did not combine his scholarly effort with any interpretations or conclusions of his own, and that the publisher failed to provide a subject index and otherwise to give this important monograph the format it deserves.

GERHARD L. WEINBERG
University of Michigan

JAPANESE RECOGNITION OF THE U.S.S.R.: SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS, 1921-1930. By *George Alexander Lensen*. Tokyo: Sophia University, in cooperation with the Diplomatic Press, Tallahassee, 1970. 419 pp. \$15.00.

For an understanding of international politics in East Asia during the interwar period, a study of Japanese-Soviet relations is of paramount importance. However, the subject has had very little scholarly attention in the past. Thus the appearance of Dr. Lensen's latest book, the first significant monograph dealing with Japanese-Soviet relations in the 1920s, is a welcome event.

The author painstakingly traces a series of attempts by the Japanese and Soviet governments to resume diplomatic relations following the Japanese Intervention in Siberia. These efforts finally resulted in Japanese recognition of the Soviet Union in 1925. But even after recognition, problems remained. Suspicion and mistrust rather than friendship characterized Japanese-Soviet relations for the remainder of the decade.

Strictly speaking, this book is a history of Japanese-Soviet negotiations. Rather than dealing with the problem in the broad context of international relations, the author chose to limit himself to describing the events in the conference rooms. Proposals and counterproposals, the personalities of the negotiators, and the process of negotiation are presented in minute detail and with scholarly accuracy. Lensen skillfully uses both Russian and Japanese sources, though his documentation is not extensive and relies mostly on published materials.

Those who are interested in more fundamental problems, such as the position of Japanese-Soviet relations in the overall foreign policy of each country, or in the related problems associated with decision-making processes, or the influence of public opinion, or the conflict between ideology and national interests may be disappointed with this study. Eight of the twelve chapters are concerned exclusively with eight particular sets of negotiations. For the reader to follow the course of these tedious discussions is made even more difficult by the author's failure to illuminate the developments between conferences that influenced and guided their direction. For instance, he does not even explain what led up to Japanese recognition of the Soviet Union.

Another weakness is the excessive use of direct quotations, which occupy almost a third of the text. Though interesting, many documents do not warrant being quoted. For example, I question the necessity of quoting in full a draft proposal by the Far Eastern Republic (seven pages), a Japanese counterproposal (three and a half pages), and a revised Japanese proposal (five pages) at the Dairen Conference, when all these proposals were rejected and the conference produced no tangible results. Important documents could better be placed in the ap-

pendix. For example, chapter 6, "The Basic Convention," and chapter 10, "The Fishery Convention," are diplomatic documents and should not constitute independent chapters.

Despite some obvious weaknesses, this book offers a significant contribution to the diplomatic history of East Asia. It is to be hoped that it will stimulate scholarly interest in the subject both in Japan and the Soviet Union as well as in the West.

TSUYOSHI HASEGAWA

State University of New York, College at Oswego

RECOGNITION OF RUSSIA: AN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY DILEMMA. By *Edward M. Bennett*. Waltham, Mass., Toronto, and London: Blaisdell Publishing Co., 1970. vii, 232 pp. \$2.95, paper.

PROGRESSIVNYE SILY SShA V BOR'BE ZA PRIZNANIE SOVETSKOGO GOSUDARSTVA, 1917–1933. By *D. N. Stashevsky*. Akademiia nauk ukrainskoi SSR, Institut istorii. Kiev: Izdatel'stvo "Naukova dumka," 1969. 213 pp. 1.06 rubles.

Two more volumes have appeared on the recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States in 1933. In view of subsequent dramatic events in our relations with Russia, the continued interest in this episode may seem at first glance surprising. Yet it was a "happening" that highlighted much of the past and future course of the Soviet-American ordeal.

Making excellent use of the important source materials that have now become available, Professor Bennett has retold the story with new insights, broad strokes of perceptive interpretation, and graceful prose. He begins with a review of the recognition policy of the United States before 1913, when Woodrow Wilson added the test of constitutionality or legality in his consideration of the Huerta government in Mexico. In 1917 the president applied the same standard to the Soviet regime. But unlike the relatively brief Mexican embroilment, the Bolshevik experiment persisted. During the twenties Washington was faced with the fact of a viable Soviet state, playing an increasingly important role in international economic and political affairs, with which it had no official relations. The diplomatic problems involved in a reversal of this unrealistic position were complicated by emotional public attitudes on the issue, in part generated by the government itself. In the early thirties Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, influenced by ominous events in the Far East, reconsidered the nonrecognition policy, but any contemplated change was vetoed by President Hoover, who remained to the end of his life an opponent of diplomatic relations with Communist Russia. Stimson did, however, manage to lay some of the groundwork for Franklin D. Roosevelt's decision in 1933.

Today it seems inconceivable that Roosevelt could have acted otherwise. Recognition was necessary and beneficial. Its tragedy lay in the unfounded optimism that motivated many of the American negotiators, compounded by an apparent inability to profit in the decade following from the lesson of 1933–36—the folly of utopian hopes in dealing with the USSR. In his summation the author stresses these and other conclusions in the same engaging style that marks the rest of his narrative. Unfortunately the volume is marred by the absence from the bibliography of a number of authors who have made major contributions to the subject, such as Foster Rhea Dulles, Meno Lovenstein, T. A. Bailey, Louis Fischer, Christopher