tions, that the Victorians learned what they
needed to know about anatomy from statues
and paintings. Gay reminds us that "though
they were normally idealized, private parts
were public property." Perhaps but in 1885,
Henry Horsley, signing himself "A British
Matron," launched an attack upon the de-
piction of the nude by such painters as
Leighton and Watts that was quintessen-
tially Victorian in its overheated indigna-
tion. Gay's last chapter, "Fortifications for
the Self," explains as a defense what seems
to be hypocrisy in figures such as Horsley:
"Evasiveness, cant, prudishness, hypoc-
crisy, were cultural defense mechanisms in
a time of upheaval, a search for safety."

If this first volume has more questions
than persuasive answers and leads to as much
impatience as enlightenment, it usefully
forces us to look anew at old data, and it
presents us with a Victorian repast of new
data, complete with a wonderful biblio-
graphical essay. We look here through a
funny keyhole. We get an alien, jumbled,
frequently steamy view of the unconscious
life of an era. The steam may have distorted
the view, just as the authoritative voice of
the historian may have skewed the evi-
dence. WW

Correspondence

THE POST-PERSHING WORLD
To the Editors: Peter Goudinoff's review of
Paul Bracken's The Command and Control
of Nuclear Forces (Worldview, June) should
have dealt with the book's implications for
the post-Pershing II world, which can be
characterized as follows:
1. The Soviets said that deployment of
the Pershing IIs would require them to go
to a "launch upon electronic warning" state
of readiness—i.e., whenever their network
of radar and computers indicated that the
Pershing IIs had been fired at them, their
missiles would automatically fire in re-
response.
2. Because of the speed and devastating
accuracy of the Pershing IIs, they could
wipe out the Soviet ability to respond within
six-to-eight minutes after being launched.
This would leave the Soviets no time to
double check, and nothing happened other than an increase in the stress
level of the missile and bomber crews.
3. The U.S. radar/computer networks,
NORAD, etc. have produced false "elec-
tronic warnings" many times: Computer
chips have failed which were interpreted at
the time as confirmation that the Soviets
had launched their missiles, a U.S. spy
satellite interpreted a fire in a gas pipeline as
a launch of Soviet missiles based nearby,
etc. Fortunately, because we were not in a
launch-on-electronic-warning posture, we
took the time to double check, and nothing
happened other than an increase in the stress
level of the missile and bomber crews.
4. The Korean airliner atrocity indicated
that the Soviet ability to detect, intercept,
and identify an incoming flying object was
quite deficient: It took them two-and-a-half
hours to get close enough to shoot. Nonethe-
less, because of their paranoid suspicion
of our intentions, they were willing to shoot
first and ask questions later.

Thus, the Pershing IIs have not added to
our security or to that of Western Europe.
Rather, they have reduced us to hostages
to the Soviet radar/computer network. The
establishment of the jointly staffed "crisis
centers" described by Mr. Goudinoff in the
next-to-last paragraph are imperative, and
U.S.-Soviet talks to that end should be ini-
tiated immediately.

James A. Bush
Detroit, Mich.

GRENADA & THE PRESS
To the Editors: I read with interest in the
July Worldview the piece on the press and
censorship in the Grenada episode ("War
News: Under New Management," by Ber-
ard Diederich). Since it was written by a
newspaper, the paintone side of the picture
was given to by the press. The press did not explain the last par-
agraph of the Bernard Diederich article in
which he described how a bunch of soldiers
in a jeep "accelerated and snarled" when
approached by a newspaper.

I happened to have been on the nearby
island of Petit St. Vincent immediately after
the invasion and met to talk to quite a few
of the officers involved, all of whom
were Vietnam veterans. I was amazed at
the depth of resentment these men—ordi-
nary combat captains, majors, and lieu-
tenant colonels—displayed with respect to the
way they felt the press had treated them in
the past. They all can't be wrong.

Maybe the press should listen to what
these men are saying rather than talk of "Mr.
Reagan's victory over the press."

I V. de Chellis
New York, N.Y.