Update: Paik Nakchung Has Been Arrested

To the Editors: In early October, 1978, an intermediate appeals court in Seoul, Korea, acted on the cases of Paik Nakchung and Lee Yong Hui. (See "Paik Nakchung Has Been Arrested," Worldview, June, 1978.) We have heard about the action only in the last few weeks. Both convictions were affirmed, but the sentences were reduced. Mr. Lee's sentence—one year plus one year—was suspended. We understand that they are now appealing to the Korean Supreme Court, but no further modification of judgments, or mitigation of the sentences, can be reasonably expected, although their friends continue to hope.

The chances are we will never know whether efforts on behalf of these men had any effect on the results of their trials. We feel reasonably satisfied, however, that the sentence would have been harsher had there been no expressions of disapproval sent to the Korean Government and our own nor the national and international publicity that surrounds us.

For many years this has been the official doctrine of the totalitarian regimes of Eastern Europe and the Communist world and has been enforced there with unremitting harshness. In its own way the West is today doing the same thing, and increasingly will continue to do so. This is not surprising when one considers that the humanistic materialist base—philosophically and morally—is now the same in both East and West, and we can expect such unthinkable as actual repression of religious bodies in our society in the not-so-distant future if they do not conveniently limit themselves to what secular society will consider the areas they may operate in. If this is to be averted or at least postponed, the time to speak out is now. Professor Hitchcock has done so in one area, and I congratulate him.

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What Revolution Is

To the Editors: In his article "What Revolution Is—and Is Not" in the November issue of Worldview, Robert Weir claims that nonviolent revolution is a contradiction in terms. That is certainly true if one accepts his definition of revolution. Indeed, it seems he has formulated this definition precisely in order to bring this contradiction about.

Asserting that violence is a defining feature of revolution is somewhat like saying that the color red is a defining attribute of art. Violent acts constitute a subset of all possible acts, and the entire spectrum is available to anyone, including revolutionaries. Weir's contention—that there never has been or will be a government that could be undone rapidly—seems insupportable. No reasoning from instances can establish this, though a single counterexample can disprove it.

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to analyze and assess political leaders who have successfully attained great power and influence. This question does not imply its own answer.

Oil Politics in the 1980's: Patterns of International Cooperation
by Øystein Noreng
(McGraw-Hill; 171 pp.; $5.95 [paper])

The author is an economist based in Oslo, and the book is another in the 1980's Project of the Council on Foreign Relations. The argument is that both West European (OECD) countries and the oil producers are hurting badly and will hurt worse because of instability in the international oil market. Noreng proposes that OECD and OPEC negotiate a comprehensive agreement as a basis for stable and mutual economic growth. It is a constructive and persuasive statement, and although it now seems somewhat out of touch with political realities, it could suggest a blueprint for a new arrangement beyond present uncertainties and confrontations.

On Becoming American: A Celebration of What It Means and How It Feels
by Ted Morgan
(Houghton Mifflin; 336 pp.; $10.95)

Ted Morgan used to be Sanche de Gramont, scion of a noble French family. Although a successful journalist under his former name and a man not indifferent to his entree to the elegance of Europe, he finally resolved a life-long love affair with the United States by becoming Ted Morgan, American Citizen. The book is indeed a celebration of being American and has, understandably, been welcomed by many Americans who had forgotten the wonder of it all. Morgan's politics are rather eclectic, but his appreciation of the kookiness and majesty of the American social experiment ties everything together in a theme of winsome amazement. At one point in the writing of the book he woke up with the nightmare that the whole thing was just going to be a disconnected jumble of bits and pieces of Americana. The nightmare was not entirely unjustified, but his persistence and good humor finally offset the reader's impatience. It is worth waiting for the really incisive moments. For example: "This country is a success, in the same way that a Broadway show is a success. People are lined up at the box office for tickets of admission." In truth, his extensive remarks on the importance of immigration to America are pointedly relevant to public policy decisions that Americans will have to make in the years immediately ahead.

The Middle East in the Coming Decade: From Wellhead to Well-Being?
by John Waterbury and Ragaei El Mallakh
(McGraw-Hill; 219 pp.; $5.95)

One in a series of studies sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, the book's argument is essentially a positive answer to the question posed in the subtitle. Subsequent events in Iran and elsewhere may throw into doubt the author's rather optimistic estimate of patterns of stability in the region, but they are no doubt on solid ground when they propose that thinking about North-South economic relations must take into account more fully the unique role that will be played by regional interests in the Middle East.

Correspondence (from p. 2)

miss it. In this situation it is curious to find Weir speaking of India. His excuse for not granting revolutionary status to India's self-liberation from British rule is that Gandhi would have been "immediately imprisoned or killed" by a totalitarian government. Since the British did imprison Gandhi, it is difficult to make sense of this statement.

Weir is also lacking support among his sources. According to T.S. Kuhn, a scientific revolution occurs when, in a certain area of study, research becomes informed by a new paradigm, incompatible with previous orthodoxy. The revolutionary nature of this change is a consequence of the incommensurability of the conflicting ideas (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1970).

Hannah Arendt, while saying that revolutions are violent, finds that their distinguishing feature is the fundamental novelty of the change in government that they institute (On Revolution, 1977, p. 35; included is the passage quoted by Weir).

In a later book (On Violence, 1970) she softens the insistence on violence considerably.**

Isaac Kramnick, in the paragraph quoted by Weir, says: "Several problems arise, however, from the characterization of revolution as a violent mode of political change. It denies the possibility of non-violent revolution while at the same time overlooking the existence of non-revolutionary violence. Must sudden and profound change of a non-violent nature...be denied the status of revolution?" ("Reflections on Revolution," in History and Theory, Summer, 1972).

He, too, concludes that revolution is best characterized by the profundity of the change it brings, not by the method of the bringing ("Revolution, then, is a flagrant and abrupt change in the fundamental conditions of legality.").

Weir is also at odds with the thinking of many modern revolutionaries. In a country such as the United States, "founded," as Susan Sontag says, "on a genocide" (Styles of Radical Will, 1969), and with a history so full of violence it scarcely fits in two hundred years, the practice of nonviolence may be the most revolutionary idea one could have.

If Weir wishes to discuss armed insurrection, that's fine. But there is no need to adjust revolution to his Procrustean definition.

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*Weir speaks of revolution in China, so evidently twenty-four years is sufficiently rapid.

**In On Violence Arendt argues that all action is uncertain and violent action particularly so. There is always the possibility that the exercise of violence in the service of distant ends will result simply in the institutionalization of violence as normal social relations. "Violence like all action changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world" (p. 80).

Violence, then, insofar as it can be justified at all, is justifiable only in pursuit of very short-term goals: "And indeed, violence, contrary to what its prophets try to tell us, is more the weapon of reform than revolution" (p. 79).