revolution of the eighteenth century set regional rights aside, the Catalans clung to these laws as the germ of their right to be free of Madrid. Thus the Usatges evolve somewhat as a parallel to Magna Carta in England, the law of a powerful feudal elite that ultimately finds application to a larger body politic. However, freedoms for anyone but themselves were the last thing that these elites intended.

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In the Conclusion of this thoughtful local history of “justice” in the seventeenth century, the author remarks: “The people of Haute Auvergne, contained by mountains and by their internal borders of property and honor, struggled for advantage and repelled threats, illuminating the territories of the interior with explosions of violence” (231). Note the order of the principal analytical terms, property and honor. Just one page later, the author reflects: “Honor, reputation, property, dignity, and worth, not easily separable, were usually the possessions most closely guarded.” This book, and in a sense, the study of criminality and social history in the Ancien Régime, is almost entirely summed up in the author’s conscientious effort to order in importance the key analytical terms, honor and property, or property and honor, as grounded historically in the sources.

To put honor before property is to suggest that it is more important, and that humans in society are primarily motivated by their sense of dignity as it is manifested and accepted as upright reputation by one’s neighbors; to put property before honor suggests that humans are possessive individuals who act primarily out of motivation to acquire and to keep their property.

Since Yves Castan’s monumental *Honnêteté et relations sociales en Languedoc au XVIIIe siècle* in 1974, historians who research the criminality of the southern French have been obliged (or almost) to face up to his finding that plaintiffs in court sought redress much more frequently as a result of offenses to their honor and reputation than for the recovery of property. Moreover, in an astonishing discovery that had very significant implications for social history in general, Castan found that Languedocians actually risked loss of property in order to pay the legal fees that gave them a chance for redress through the courts in cases involving attacks on their honor. This finding, that is of a willingness to risk financial well-being to recover honor, drove a nail (there were many others!) in the coffin that was post–World War II Marxist social history, a historiography that was grounded on the notion that primary human motivation was the acquisition of property. Castan also found that individuals from every possible social rank shared quite common attitudes about what constituted honor and reputation. Peasants could be just as prickly about a perceived offense in an inn as a nobleman.

Without tackling Castan’s findings directly, though he acknowledges their importance, Malcolm Greenshields very honestly and searchingly seeks in this book to restate the
case for the importance of economic and almost class-related conditions that account for criminality. To be sure, his statistical studies reveal that more crimes of person were brought to the attention of the maréchaussée than of property, which would seem to confirm Castan's findings for an earlier century and an adjacent region. But instead, and very thoughtfully, Malcolm Greenshields proposes using the analytically interesting term, "psychic property," defined as a "sense of oneself that included both inner and outer territory, both honor and space, subject to violation." This extremely useful term is then deftly employed throughout the book to permit an understanding of violence as an economy.

If there had ever been any doubt whatever that the nobility of the Haute Auvergne was some sort of survival from an earlier not very chivalric age, this book's findings will disabuse the reader. Riding roughshod over persons who had no protectors, and continually skirmishing among themselves à la Hatfield-McCoy, these nobles had very well-developed notions of personal honor and reputation and were ready to use violence at the drop of a hat (literally!) to defend them against all comers, including the clergy. Royal officials were frequently made to look impotent and ridiculous as duels, vendettas, and vengeances remained the norm among these small-time aristocrats.

Malcolm Greenshields's statistics reveal that acts of violence were perpetrated much more frequently by social superiors on their inferiors than the other way around. Domestic servants and tenants rarely took seigneurs and landlords to court, simply because they did not dare to. These findings do not surprise historians; clearly the influence of urban social relations, education, and courtesy literature had made few inroads into the haut pays around St. Flour. And with some irony the author observes: "wine could blur the borders of psychic property, and increase the possibilities of confrontation and conflict" (79). This was a sense of honor, then, that was not the Renaissance product known as "self-fashioning" but was rather more grounded in the human condition of family and protection with carefully manifested and defined marks of respect—in other words, not only hat-doffing before the seigneur, but respect for his fences, walls, fruit trees and game. The sense of property in this "psychic property" is not unlike that which Marx characterized as prevailing in early feudal—that is pre-capitalist—relations, but still is the result of exploitation.

In fact, Malcolm Greenshields continues to be haunted by the hoary debate between the Soviet historian, Boris Porchnev, and the French historian, Roland Mousnier, over the causes of peasant revolts in the period he studies. The remarkably long (166-67) note on this subject is testimony to the ways in which scholars find their scholarly pursuits through debate that has civic undercurrents, and in this case the nobility in no way seems to rally to the state as a result of fear of peasant violence. The Grands Jours d'Auvergne was actually an incursion-acculturation by royal judges into a deeply hostile and remote society. The prosecution of nobles for violence served as an example, and no more, of what the state could do, and it did so with considerable trepidation and quasi-religious mission, but with no real intent to undermine the nobility as such. Perhaps more important, the local magistracy had clearly become intimidated by, related to, and often dominated by the local violence-prone nobles.

Malcolm Greenshields's findings, and I suspect, his contribution to the analytical vocabulary of criminality studies, will have considerable impact on the field. It will certainly frustrate the social theorists and philosophers, for the author does not easily
allow his findings to be used to support any single model or interpretation, whether Leftist or Rightist. But is that not what history is all about?

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This study of the attempts to reform the laws on marriage and inheritance in late imperial Russia is a model monograph. On one level it is a magnificent work of description. We learn how the legal institutions established by the Judicial Reforms of 1864 actually operated and what, in fact, the imperial Civil Code had to say about family and inheritance issues. We hear the voices of legal reformers and legal conservatives, as they debated the role of the law and its practitioners in helping or hindering Russia’s transition from a land-owning, agrarian society under an absolutist bureaucratic regime to a profit-oriented economy managed by professional experts sensitive to the opinions of a nascent civil society. To have made one’s way through the thicket of confused and contradictory institutional structures and tangled laws is a major achievement. To have sorted and identified the multiple voices in the reform debate is no less a feat. The source base is prodigious. It is on this level, in the analysis of the underlying assumptions at work in the legal community and the political stakes of the debate, that Wagner adds most significantly to our understanding of the condition of late imperial Russia. This is a monograph with a thesis. It is also a fine example of “gender history” in the broadest sense: by tracking the fortunes of what were framed as “women’s questions” (divorce, marital separation, inheritance rights), Wagner shows how central these issues were to the ways in which the public and the regime understood the power relations fundamental to political and social life.

The primary actors in the drama of legal reform were men of the professional elite, both within and outside the bureaucracy. Broadly speaking, they were divided into conservatives, wishing to alter the status quo only in order to preserve it, and progressives, aiming to transform the basis of social and political life in a gradual, institutionally driven fashion. Conservatives shared a set of values: they defended patriarchal authority, in the literal and figurative sense; valued the collective, whether family, social estate, or nation, over individual rights and freedoms; and considered hierarchy and religion the cornerstones of political stability. Progressives, for their part, attacked patriarchy and collectivity insofar as they curtailed individual rights and judged public values by secular standards. Neither camp, however, was homogeneous. Some conservatives saw patrimonial property as the key to gentry welfare and hence to a stable social order; others thought personal control over the disposition of property better served the same ends. Some progressives were liberals who emphasized individual rights and private ownership; others had populist sympathies that inclined them toward a vision of social equality and shared property rights.

Yet, even more interesting than what set these two camps apart, in Wagner’s view, is what they shared. In the first place, all these professional jurists and government