criminal law is one of the most appropriate opportunities to clarify the logic of these crimes in a way that could help to prevent them occurring again. The concretization of the Kantian ideals of republicanism, international law and cosmopolitanism presupposes not only punishment for crimes that violate such concretization, but also policies that seek to avoid these crimes before any punishment takes place.

SORAYA NOUR, OLIVER EBERL


Otfried Höffe’s comprehensive commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason deals with every major section of the work in order. It has in general a sympathetic and defensive approach to Kant that assesses his major claims and regards his work as the foundation of modern philosophy. It consciously sets aside such attitudes as Bennett’s ‘fighting Kant tooth and nail’ (a ‘Prinzip der Böswilligkeit’ (p. 12)) and presents a distinctive and coherent account of Kant’s work. It contains rich insights into the historical background to Kant’s thought in 1781, and makes useful references to recent commentators on Kant in both analytic and Continental traditions.

Among the distinctive aspects of Höffe’s account are the weight placed on Kant’s revolutionary intentions and his therapeutic correction for pure reason and much previous philosophy. The central place for this negative aspect is the Dialectic, but the same general message occurs much earlier, and the outcome is not merely negative but reserves a qualified, more positive, role for all the Ideas of reason. On another more positive side Höffe recognizes the importance of Kant’s conception of a ‘transcendental’ enquiry as a higher-order investigation of science and morality, and puts a corresponding weight on the notions of ‘conditions of possible experience’ and the ‘synthetic a priori’. Höffe offers some criticism of the conventional ‘two world/two aspect’ opposition in Kant interpretation. He thinks that Kant presents both aspects in different contexts, for example in that of theory and that of practice, but never rescinds a principled rejection of knowledge of a transcendent world. He generally emphasizes the modesty of Kant’s position although he recognizes that the doctrine treads a delicate line between strong and weaker claims (‘Gratwanderung mit Absturzgefahr’ (p. 111 f.)), such as that between ‘eternal truths’ and a mere consensus of belief.

It is in terms of that ascribed modesty that he defends Kant’s views against many of the harshest criticisms by analytic philosophers such as Russell, Strawson and Quine. The suggestion is that a determinedly ‘linguistic’ approach to philosophy is actually grounded on a Kantian project of investigating the pre-conditions of language and philosophical appeals to it. Höffe is also strongly critical of an analytic over-emphasis on formal
logic, for example in his criticisms of Michael Friedman (p. 288). The extreme traditional pictures of Kant as either arrogant or else thoroughly confused are rejected at many points throughout the commentary. Höffe aims at an integration of Kant's views of science and morality even in the nominally epistemological first Critique. In line with this he emphasizes a link between Kant's epistemology and his political philosophy, which represents the former's appeal to an 'epistemic world republic' (p. 29) as part of a more general social/political cosmopolitanism, a 'democratization of reason' (pp. 71–2). Readers may be surprised to find how much of that link is already present in the first Critique itself.

Höffe aims to provide a clear resolution of the major controversies over Kant's position in the Critique. Throughout the commentary he records the apparent pros and cons of Kant's position and regularly summarizes the outcome in a series of 'balance sheets'. In more detail he offers accounts of the distinction between 'appearance' and 'thing in itself', of the character of Kant's 'transcendental' idealism, and of the a priori structure that governs experience in both its scientific and moral aspects. At these points Kant is represented as rejecting both an empiricist naturalism and a 'realism of everyday understanding' (p. 51). Höffe elucidates Kant's ultimate 'subjectivity' as compatible with, and even justifying, the objectivity of experience and calls it an 'over-subjectivity' ('Übersubjektivität') or a theoretical 'intersubjectivity'. He considers at some length, and dismisses, the historicist arguments that limit the application of Kant's arguments to the mathematics and science of his time. To that end he draws a distinction between what is called a 'transcendental' and a specifically 'Euclidean' geometry.

He insists on the limitations to knowledge that Kant expresses in the Dialectic, and adjudicates between Kant's Platonic and Aristotelian tendencies. Throughout his exploration of the text, and of Kant's relationship to his predecessors, Höffe is careful to distinguish between different versions of the cited positions, and is generally inclined to summarize such positions in lists. So, among many such examples, he cites at least three ways in which Kant retains a link with Platonic views despite his severe criticisms of Platonic metaphysics (p. 51); seven criteria for a scientific philosophy are listed (p. 42); nine aspects of cosmopolitanism are identified (pp. 71–3); there is a seven-fold clarification of the step to the table of categories (p. 129); and eight forms of anti-solipsism are noted (p. 338). Though Höffe does not explicitly make the point his position indicates that Kant's rejection of previous philosophy also generally recognizes a residual truth in its doctrines. So Kant rejects dogmatism and scepticism, realism and idealism, empiricism and rationalism, but allows that properly understood and formulated they each point to worthwhile insights, captured adequately only in the Critical philosophy itself.

It is impossible to discuss all the items which Höffe considers throughout such a comprehensive commentary, and it would be miraculous if any reviewer found nothing to question. Although not by any means the largest in size of such works nevertheless the text provides readers with many insights into Kant's thought and that of his predecessors. The items picked out in the summary above seem to me to be thoroughly congenial.
both in their ascription to Kant of a generally revolutionary posture and in the articulation of that attitude in the treatment of specific passages. Höffe's principal merits lie in his identification of the overall structure of Kant's argument, a careful attention to the implementation of that argument in each of the sections, a full set of references to, and comparisons with, past philosophers, and useful notes on many contemporary and near-contemporary commentators.

By the same token the extensive attention to Kant's project and to the historical background is not entirely matched by the references to contemporary, especially analytic, commentators and by the philosophical significance of the Kantian position. References to Kripke and Quine in the context of Kant's 'analytic/synthetic' and 'a priori/a posteriori' distinctions record and comment on the outcome of their views but often do not engage their specific arguments. Sometimes, similarly, Kant's text is dealt with rather summarily. The Aesthetic arguments for the a priori and non-conceptual character of space and time are summarized but not examined in detail, and the same is notably true of the discussions of passages at the end of the Analytic of Principles, such as the Refutation of Idealism, Amphiboly, and Phenomena and Noumena. One consequence is that in some of these cases readers are left with an open-ended outcome on which they will have to reflect for themselves. Although Höffe generally approves of some form of transcendental idealism, its specific character is in the end open-ended in just this way. His view is that Kant's 'subjectivity' allows room for, and even justifies, the required 'objectivity' of experience, but the notion of 'Übersubjektivität' invites some queries. The simple oppositions between subjectivity and objectivity, and their philosophical correlates idealism and realism, are notoriously ambiguous, and Kant's more complex scheme underlines that point. Höffe, surely rightly, puts forward some provisos about the commonly favoured expression 'intersubjectivity' but he also endorses its use himself (pp. 17, 341), and the preferred alternative is in some danger of merely marking, rather than adequately justifying, Kant's aspiration towards objectivity. The danger is present, for example, in the account of the Second Analogy, where Hume's position is described as a 'subjective subjectivity' in contrast to Kant's 'objective subjectivity' (pp. 192–3). More generally Kant's transcendental form of idealism is said to be a denial of everyday realism, but this also remains open to question. The Refutation of Idealism might be seen as a defence of everyday realism against the philosophical theories of Berkeley and Descartes.

Höffe similarly takes the view that Kant's project is one of justifying, against a sceptic, aspects of our experience such as its 'objectivity', but it is doubtful how far this succeeds in his account. The project is said to be grounded in the universal and a priori truths of the established sciences but several difficulties arise about this response. For one thing the appeal to established science occurs more in the Prolegomena than in the Critique, and where it does occur there is evidently a danger that Kant simply begs the question against the sceptic. One way of avoiding that hazard would be to deny Kant's preoccupation with the relevant traditional scepticism, but Höffe does not take that route. For another it might be questioned how far
the appeal to scientific a priori truths resolves the sceptical problem, particularly where there is more to say about the ‘synthetic a priori’ classification and the twin contrasts on which it rests. The appeal to an epistemic cosmopolitanism is an interesting and undoubtedly correct account of Kant’s own view, but it may be questioned how far it answers, or is designed to answer, a traditional sceptic.

No commentary on Kant’s Critique can expect to resolve all its problems, and Höffe has chosen to emphasize more the summaries of, and historical background to, Kant’s work, than the philosophical issues arising from it. In the concluding summary there is more of an appeal to illuminating quotations from historical figures, ranging from Cato, Erasmus, La Rochefoucauld, Pascal, Montaigne, Nietzsche and Peirce, to Apel, Habermas, Quine, Rorty, Feyerabend and Foucault, than a specific resolution of the philosophical issues. This preference will encourage some readers to doubt the claim that Kant has provided ‘the’ foundation of modern philosophy. Properly understood even in Höffe’s terms, Kant, it might be said, has provided one fruitful and still lively template for a serious philosophy, but there are alternative procedures and projects that are not necessarily vulnerable to the complaints against contemporary empiricism, naturalism, the overuse of formal logic, or everyday realism. Within the framework of his preferences Höffe has undoubtedly provided a rich account of Kant’s text and a correspondingly insightful reference to its historical background. Readers will be guided towards a better grasp of Kant’s central ideas in the Critique and of its significance for the development of philosophy.

GRAHAM BIRD


In 2007, the Danish daily Jyllands-Posten published a number of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed and mocking Islamic justifications of religious fundamentalism. This triggered widespread outrage and debates about the scope and limits of the freedom of speech. For many Muslims, these cartoons were an insensitive and deliberate act of provocation and injury, aimed at consolidating prejudices against Islam. For many others, the extreme reaction following the publication of the cartoons showed the extent to which the freedom of speech was a liberty under threat by illiberal forces, which needs to be safeguarded and protected. Similarly, recent legislation passed in the House of Commons designed to prohibit the glorification of terrorism fuelled similar controversies in Britain. Is the freedom of speech an all-encompassing right to state, publish and broadcast one’s opinion and views? How, on what grounds and by whom can the freedom of speech be limited? When are restrictions to the freedom of speech legitimate? Is the freedom of speech an inalienable individual human right or is it a public good that carries responsibilities? Is the freedom of speech