value-freedom or objective history. To be sure, the indeterminacy of language has limits. That said, generalized awareness of those limits does not, on its own, produce a fully worked-out understanding of them, of the full universe of positions that may take root in their folds. The “play” of the sociopolitical lies precisely there. Yet Beyond the Veil, even so, substantially clarifies both the scope of the problem and the nature of the need, and for this it merits considerable praise.


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Anyone older than 40 working in the field of international security studies will have a well-developed attitude to yet another talk, paper, or discussion of deterrence. Those younger than that are more likely to be confused to yet another talk, paper, or discussion of deterrence. The Cold War is gone, and those younger than that are more likely to be confused by or uninterested in the fuss. The Cold War is gone, and so is the bipolar world so amenable to the deterrence everyone reads (or at least used to read) in graduate school. It is hard to care how one defines deterrence if one views it as a strategic option whose day is past and whose pursuit is idealistic at best, resource draining at worst. The language used here is deliberately provocative to make the point that a strong deterrence skeptic (for cybered conflict) such as myself was surprised and informed by this book.

In their edited volume, Erik Gartzke and John Lindsay assemble 15 discussions addressing “cross-domain deterrence” to see if this iteration of the more traditional concept is a fit for today’s world. The book contains excellent and compact summaries of the deterrence concept’s logical and empirical evolution, married to the researchable question whether cross-domain deterrence (CDD) can iterate deterrence into usefulness again. A different title might have been “Deterrence: What Needs to Be Researched Today for It to Work Again.” One could design multiple research programs or dissertation proposals on the questions raised in the first half of the book alone.

Given that the edited book is about laying out logic, empirical examples, and questions, each chapter is an exploration, not a solution, and is less a proffered argument than an opening salvo for which future work is much needed. The authors largely tie CDD to their topic, and the coeditors integrate the discussions at the beginning and the end with observations on CDD’s paradoxes, complex systems surprises, whole-of-society threats, and rising uncertainty about defense traditions in implicitly consolidated democracies.

In exploring whether CDD helps update a dated, eraspecific topic, the first handful of chapters constitute a particularly nice tour de force summarizing the intellectual, historical, and logical conundrums of applying deterrence theory to today’s major challenges. In their respective chapters, Patrick Morgan, Jacqueline Schneider, Ron Lehman, and the coauthors Michael Nacht, Patricia Schuster, and Eva Ulribe concisely lay out the challenges, historical baggage, and the uncertainties of dragging deterrence into the current and increasingly post-western era. If one had only two slots in the syllabus for articles on deterrence updated for the coming post-western era, any two of these would do very well to inform students about what lay behind and to stimulate discussion of what lies ahead.

In their well-crafted introduction and conclusion, the coeditors incorporate complexity and the ambiguities of changing means, circumstances, or political interests into the discussion of what the “cross-domain” aspect of CDD reflects. Might CDD be a way to name and therefore adapt to the unavoidable uncertainties that the coming international system redefinition will pose to westernized states? In that vein, inclusion of the Chin-Hao Huang and David Kang chapter outlining the more complacent, less militarized approach to the rise of China pursued by most of its regional neighbors is excellent. If cross-domain deterrence would be hard, then in today’s coming world, CDD strategies that require the involvement of friendly non-allied Asian states that do not see a Chinese military threat are likely to be very challenging indeed.

Having said that, several chapters might be better suited for a different collection of essays. Historical explanations or orthogonal conceptual attacks on a topic are always desirable. Of course, one can easily understand how the authors would have endorsed trying CDD out as a reinterpretation of history, as an acknowledged conceptual child of particular strains of political science, or in unusual applications such as coercive migration. Accordingly, various chapters approach CDD from the history of satellites, strategic bombing, and Athens versus Sparta, as well as international law, linkage politics, and mass human movement as deliberate deterrence. However, some of these chapters were less persuasive as good fits for the volume’s mandate. The chapter on international humanitarian law, for example, presents an argument well known in the modern security studies debate (especially in discussions of cyber norms), but did not exceptionally advance the CDD case. The linkage politics chapter argued for a theoretical approach to CDD that would situate the newly reborn deterrence concept in a known niche in political science. Unfortunately, it is more of a scholarly argument for the modern relevance of “linkage politics” than a test of CDD, and it also belongs elsewhere.

The historical case studies have mixed results with respect to the persuasiveness of their reinterpretation of
have focused on the number of women in politics (descriptive representation) and their impact on policy, particularly whether women promote policies that further women’s empowerment and gender equality (substantive representation). Much of the research on women and politics examines women legislators and their impact on policies at the domestic level. The work on the connection between women, gender, and foreign policy, particularly the gender gap between men and women and the use of force, has focused primarily on legislatures, as well as public opinion and peace activists.

However, there is a growing body of research on women in executive positions (presidents, prime ministers, cabinet-level ministers/secretaries), including works by Mary Caprioli and Mark Boyer; Valerie Hudson and Patricia Leidl; Farida Jalalzai; Nancy McGlen and Meredith Reid Sarkees; and Ann Towns and Birgitta Niklasson. This research makes clear that it is important to consider whether women are represented—what positions they actually hold. Men are more likely to be in positions considered prestigious (defense, economy/trade, foreign policy), whereas women are more likely to hold positions in what are considered to be “soft” or “feminine” areas (education, health).

Sylvia Bashevkin’s book is therefore a welcome contribution to this scholarship on women, gender, and politics, specifically focusing on women in foreign policy. Using a case-study approach, Bashevkin provides an illuminating study of four women appointed to high-level US foreign policy and national security positions in the executive branch: Jeane Kirkpatrick, Madeleine Albright, Condoleezza Rice, and Hillary Rodham Clinton. She focuses on two main research questions: “[T]o what degree were these appointees transformative decision-makers who made a measurable difference to the understanding and practice of international relations in a global superpower?” and “how did they operate with respect to matters of political conflict and gender equality?” (pp. 15–16). She argues, “Each held a senior foreign policy position during a pivotal moment in international affairs, when a seat in the top ranks of the US executive branch brought with it the real possibility of shaping world politics” (p. 15). The contributions to foreign policies made by each woman “were inconsistent with prevailing assumptions” of women promoting pacificist policies (essentialism) or that women would promote “masculine norms of aggression and belligerence” on assuming their positions. Rather, “all four women advocated a forceful defense of US national interests on the global stage” (p. 16).

In the first two chapters, Bashevkin provides an overview of the literature on women, gender, and politics and research on political executives and, more specifically, on women in executive positions. She further narrows the focus to women and foreign policy, using feminist historiography as her starting point to trace the evolution...