No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Law Production in Multiparty Presidentialism: Veto Player Theory and its Application to Korea
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 January 2022
Abstract
In this article, I offer a theory of lawmaking in multiparty presidential systems with different legislative institutions. I present a model that combines Krehbiel's pivotal politics theory with Tsebelis's veto players theory. This model simplifies various institutional veto players into the de facto veto players. I analyze the model to explain how the government type (unified versus divided governments), the legislative rules (majoritarian versus supermajoritarian rules), and the party system (two-party versus multiparty systems) affect legislative productivity. I apply the theoretical results obtained to solve the puzzle about the nondifferential legislative performance between unified and divided governments in the National Assembly. I test a hypothesis stating that the distance between the ideological positions of the agenda-setter and the de facto veto players has a negative effect on the proportion of controversial bills enacted between the 16th and the early 21st National Assemblies.
Keywords
- Type
- Article
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the East Asia Institute
References
Binder, Sarah A. 2003. Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.Google Scholar
Fang-Yi, Chiou, and Rothenberg, Lawrence S.. 2003. “When Pivotal Politics Meets Partisan Politics.” American Journal of Political Science 47 (3): 503–22.Google Scholar
Coleman, John J. 1999. “Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness.” American Political Science Review 93 (4): 821–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jeon, Jin Young. 2010. “Party Cohesion of the 18th National Assembly.” Korean Party Studies Review 9 (2): 119–38.Google Scholar
Jeon, Jin Young. 2011a. “Speaker's Discharging Power in the National Assembly of Korea: Its Functions and Political Implication.” Journal of Korean Politics 20 (2): 53–78.Google Scholar
Jeon, Jin Young. 2011b. “The Causes of Legislative Gridlock in Korean National Assembly.” Korean Journal of Legislative Studies 17 (2): 171–96.Google Scholar
Jeon, Jin Young. 2015. “Does the Revision of National Assembly Reform the 19th National Assembly?” Journal of Contemporary Politics 8 (1): 99–125.Google Scholar
Jeon, Yong Joo. 2006. “A Study on the Executive-Legislative-Political Parties Relations During the Period of the 17th National Assembly of Korea.” Korean Journal of Legislative Studies 12 (1): 31–54.Google Scholar
Ka, Sang joon, Cho, Jin Man, Choi, JunYoung, and Sohn, Byoung Kwon. 2008. “Characteristics of Standing Committees’ Operation in the National Assembly with an Analysis of Assembly Records.” The 21st Century Political Science Review 18 (1): 47–68.Google Scholar
Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lee, Hyunchool. 2014. “The Appraisal of National Assembly Advancement Act.” Journal of Contemporary Politics 7 (2): 5–34.Google Scholar
Lee, Myung Nam. 2002. “A Comparative Study of the Relationship Between Divided Government and Political Efficiency.” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 25: 227–51.Google Scholar
Lee, Sang Sin. 2015. “The Revisions of National Assembly Act in 2012 and Gridlock in South Korea.” Journal of Future Politics 5 (1): 69–86.Google Scholar
Mainwaring, Scott P. 1993. “Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination.” Comparative Political Studies 26 (2): 198–228.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mayhew, David R. 2005. Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946–2002. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Moon, Woojin. 2011. “Party Voting and Party Loyalty in Multiparty Party Systems: An Analysis of Roll Call Data from the 17th and the early 18th National Assemblies.” Korean Journal of Legislative Studies 17 (2): 7–37.Google Scholar
Moon, Woojin. 2013. “Presidential Powers, Executive Agenda-setting, and Legislative Outcomes in South Korea: Veto Player Theory.” Korean Political Science Review 47 (1): 75–101.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moon, Woojin. 2014. “Veto Players, Agenda Setters, Party Discipline, and Legislative Efficiency: Veto Player Theory and Empirical Analyses.” Korean Political Science Review 48 (5): 67–95.Google Scholar
Moon, Woojin. 2018. The Working Mechanism of Korean Democracy: How Is the Majority Formed in South Korea? Seoul: Korea University Press.Google Scholar
O, Seung Yong. 2004. “The Legislative Impact of Divided Government in Korea, 1988–2003.” Korean Political Science Review 38 (1): 89–112.Google Scholar
Park, Chan Wook, and Park, Hong Min. 2003. “Relationship between the National Assembly and the Administration Under the Presidency of Kim Dae-Jung.” Korean Journal of Legislative Studies 9 (2): 132–60.Google Scholar
Power, Timothy J., and Gasiorowski, Mark J.. 1997. “Institutional Design and Democratic Consolidation in the Third World.” Comparative Political Studies 30 (2): 123–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sabato, Larry, and Ernst, Howard R.. 2007. Encyclopedia of American Political Parties and Elections. New York: Checkmark Books.Google Scholar
Stokes, Donald E. 1963. “Spatial Models of Party Competition.” American Political Science Review 57 (2): 368–77.Google Scholar
Tsebelis, George. 1999. “Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis.” The American Political Science Review 93 (3): 591–608.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tsebelis, George. 2002. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar