Article contents
Condorcet versus Borda, a response to: Comment on “A New Method to Obtain a Consensus Ranking of a Region's Vintages' Quality”
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2013
Extract
In response to the work of Borges et al. (2012), Hulkower (2012) poses questions regarding the relative merits of the Condorcet and the Borda methods; a topic which has been taking place in socio-political studies for a very long time. While both approaches have their supporters and their detractors (Young, 1988; Risse, 2005; Saari, 2006), below we present the reasons for choosing Condorcet's method to obtain a consensus ranking of a region's vintage quality (Borges et al., 2012).
- Type
- Commentary
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © American Association of Wine Economists 2013
References
Balinski, M. and Laraki, R. (2011). Majority Judgment: Measuring, Ranking, and Electing. 1st ed., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Borges, J., Real, A.C., Cabral, J.S., and Jones, G.V. (2012). A new method to obtain a consensus ranking of a region's vintages’ quality. Journal of Wine Economics, 7(1), 88–107.Google Scholar
CRG4 (2012). Against the Borda count. Retrieved October 2012, from http://math.crg4.com/borda.html.Google Scholar
Hulkower, N. (2012). Comment on “A new method to obtain a consensus ranking of a region's vintages’ quality”. Journal of Wine Economics, 7(2), 241–244.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Risse, M. (2005). Why the count de Borda cannot beat the Marquis de Condorcet. Social Choice and Welfare, 25(1), 95–113.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Saari, D.G. (2006). Which is better: the Condorcet or Borda winner?”. Social Choice and Welfare, 26(1), 107–129.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Young, H.P. (1988). Condorcet's theory of voting. The American Political Science Review, 82(4), 1231–1244.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Young, P. (1995). Optimal voting rules. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(1), 51–64.Google Scholar
- 1
- Cited by