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Condorcet versus Borda, a response to: Comment on “A New Method to Obtain a Consensus Ranking of a Region's Vintages' Quality”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2013

José Borges
Affiliation:
INESC TEC, Faculty of Engineering, University of Porto, Portugal, Rua Dr. Roberto Frias, 4200-465 Porto, Portugal, email: jlborges@fe.up.pt.
António C. Real
Affiliation:
INESC TEC, Faculty of Engineering, University of Porto, Portugal, Rua Dr. Roberto Frias, 4200-465 Porto, Portugal, email: acreals@gmail.com.
J. Sarsfield Cabral
Affiliation:
INESC TEC, Faculty of Engineering, University of Porto, Portugal, Rua Dr. Roberto Frias, 4200-465 Porto, Portugal, email: jacabral@fe.up.pt.
Gregory V. Jones
Affiliation:
Southern Oregon University, Department of Environmental Studies, 1250 Siskiyou Blvd, Ashland, OR 97520, email: gjones@sou.edu.

Extract

In response to the work of Borges et al. (2012), Hulkower (2012) poses questions regarding the relative merits of the Condorcet and the Borda methods; a topic which has been taking place in socio-political studies for a very long time. While both approaches have their supporters and their detractors (Young, 1988; Risse, 2005; Saari, 2006), below we present the reasons for choosing Condorcet's method to obtain a consensus ranking of a region's vintage quality (Borges et al., 2012).

Type
Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © American Association of Wine Economists 2013

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