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## **Two Special Articles and Seven More that Merit Greater Attention**

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I had the honor of working from the *IO* editor's chair during 1992 through 1996. Two articles that appeared in the journal during that period achieved special impact, and seven others deserve greater attention than they have received so far. I could name more and these are personal opinions; other scholars will have their own ideas.

My predecessor, Stephen Krasner, accepted "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," by Alexander Wendt, which was published in 1992. Wendt's very highly cited article helped launch the constructivist approach to international relations.

I remember Steve telling me in 1991 that, given the rate of submissions and that referees were rejecting 90 percent, he had sometimes worried he would not have enough manuscripts to fill the issue by the publisher's deadline—believe it or not. I took several steps to increase submissions and they rose by more than half. I also believed *International Organization* would be strongest and most effective if it were known as a place to find the best new knowledge generated by every major theoretical and methodological approach to international relations in the broad sense, including but not limited to international institutions and political economy.

Among these steps, I encouraged a number of esteemed authors, who were publishing in other highly selective journals but not submitting to *IO*, to send papers for normal review. One response was James Fearon's "Rationalist Explanations for War" (published in 1995), which had outstanding impact in rationalist literatures on war and bargaining.

I think each of the following articles especially merits reading today as well, for different reasons.

**James K. Sebenius. 1992. Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities. *International Organization* 46 (1): 323–65.** Negotiation analysis may have broader interest than game-theoretic models.

**Ronald Mitchell. 1994. Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance. *International Organization* 48 (3): 425–58.** An exemplary use of the contrasting-case research design for strengthening possible causal inferences.

**Hendrik Spruyt. 1994. Institutional Selection in International Relations: State Anarchy as Order. *International Organization* 48 (4): 527–57.** Why and

how the nation-state triumphed over alternatives as the dominant form in the world power structure.

**John Goodman, Debora Spar, and David Yoffie. 1996. Foreign Direct Investment and the Demand for Protection in the United States. *International Organization* 50 (4): 565–91.** FDI reshuffles trade politics. Investment that complements imports splits protectionist coalitions, and FDI that substitutes for imports creates convergent interests between local and foreign producers.

**William R. Thompson. 1996. Democracy and Peace: Putting the Cart Before the Horse? *International Organization* 50 (1): 141–74.** The usual correlation might be spurious; prior peace facilitated the formation of important early liberal republics and democracies.

**Michael C. Williams. 1996. Hobbes and International Relations: A Reconsideration. *International Organization* 50 (2): 213–36.** Both realist and constructivist interpretations of Hobbes miss the mark.

**Barbara F. Walter. 1997. The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement. *International Organization* 51 (3): 335–64.** Published analysis is wrong in many cases. The critical barrier is parties' inability to make their commitments to peace credible. Negotiations succeed when outside powers guarantee the parties' safety during the transition.

It is still a pleasure to recall working with fellow board members and many authors who submitted and published fine work during those years.