Explaining it Away?

On the Enigma of Time in Husserl's Phenomenology of Time-Consciousness

Renxiang Liu (renxiang.liu@mail.mcgill.ca)

PhD candidate, Dept. of Philosophy, McGill University, Montreal, Canada

This paper is motivated by what I call the “enigma of time”, the paradox that, on the one hand, the givenness of a temporal entity *takes time*, i.e., comes in installments and is never complete, while, on the other hand, at each moment of manifestation the entity is grasped as a unity, i.e., “pretends” to be complete. A methodological assumption underlying my investigation is that the paradox cannot be “solved” by positing a timeless foundation while compartmentalizing temporality to the extent that it becomes ontologically superfluous. Such an attempt only obscures or postpones the problem, for time *is* that paradox, and to eliminate the paradox is to eliminate time. By contrast, a thinking that takes time seriously must *comprehend* the paradox and make it the productive core of theorizing. Only in this way can time cease to be a petrifying impasse and instead redefine the landscape of philosophy.

To this end, I take Husserl's phenomenology of time (along with some contemporary interpretations of it) as an instance. Rather than taking what Husserl said as presenting a mature doctrine, I want to show that he had in view the enigma of time, was troubled by it, and developed his account of time-consciousness as a response. The response, however, was not a complete success, and time continued to haunt his phenomenology: from a regional problem in *Ideas I*, it eventually outgrew what Husserlians call the “schematic model” and became an overarching theme of Husserl's later thought. Any attempt to characterize the problem of time as “solved” in Husserl, therefore, would entail a reintroduction of atemporal thinking and thus miss the genuine promise of Husserlian phenomenology. Specifically, I shall argue that the notion of “absolute time-consciousness” in Husserl's 1905 lectures on time-consciousness (Husserliana X)¹, contrary to the interpretations by John Brough, James Mensch and Dan Zahavi, names a problem rather than a solution.

¹ Husserl (1991).

1. The enigma of time in Husserl's melody-example

The example of hearing a melody Husserl gave in *Husserliana X* has been sufficiently discussed. Rather than adding to the discussion *per se*, I would like to question why Husserl *needed* the example at all. For Husserl, a melody is a “temporal Object” [*Zeitobjekt*]², whose givenness necessarily takes time. One can never grasp a melody all at once. This is not as obviously the case for other Objects, such as a geometrical law.³

When composing his lectures on time-consciousness in 1905, Husserl was still working within the conceptual framework he inherited from Brentano and A. Meinong—which was largely Kantian when it comes to the apprehension of an Object—though he already had some reservations. In that framework, apprehension is discussed under the notion of synthesis. The manifold to be synthesized, e.g., the tone-components of a melody, is taken for granted. Each tone can exist apart from one another. The unity of the Object, then, comes from an act of synthesis which puts the manifold together and gives it organization. However, in the case of a *temporal* Object, synthesis becomes a problem. Since the Object is always given in *partial* fulfillments, it is impossible to have the totality of its moments all at once so as to synthesize them. This constitutes the core of Husserl's critique of Brentano's theory of original association [*ursprüngliche Assoziation*]:

An idea [...] works as a driving motive in Brentano's theory: namely, the idea that in order to grasp a succession of representations (a and b, for example), it is necessary that the representations be the absolutely simultaneous objects of a knowing that puts them in relation and that embraces them quite indivisibly in a single and indivisible act. [...] the intuition of an extent of time occurs in a now, in one time-point.⁴

If Brentano posits the *simultaneous* presence of the moments of a temporal Object while they are synthesized in a punctual act, then he would assume that the Object may be given all at once and hence would miss its temporal character. What is needed instead is an ongoing, *temporal* synthesis that does not have to encompass the entire manifold before beginning to work.

² Husserl (1991), p. 21. Following James Churchill's choice in his 1964 translation of *Husserliana X*, I consistently translate *Objekt* as “Object” and *Gegenstand* as “object”. Husserl's use of these two terms are not always rigorous, but, roughly, *Gegenstand* is close to the commonsense meaning of “object”, i.e., an “transcendent” entity found in the world. An *Objekt*, on the other hand, means an intentional correlate of apprehension and thus can be either immanent or transcendent. Both refer to constituted unities as opposed to constituting consciousness.

An interesting fact is that Husserl's name for objective time is *objektive Zeit*, not *gegenständliche Zeit*. From the distinction made above, it seems that, for him, the reality of objective time is never taken for granted but is always a product of constitution. After all, the theme of the entire Section Two of *Husserliana X* is the constitution of *objektive Zeit*.

³ To be sure, in later Husserl's genetic phenomenology all objects take time to manifest themselves, even a geometrical law, as is shown in his famous manuscript “The Origin of Geometry”. See Husserl (1970), pp. 353-378.

⁴ Husserl (1991), p. 21.

It is now clear why melody becomes Husserl's favorite example when discussing time-consciousness. On the one hand, as we have seen, time is a necessary dimension in the presentation of a melody. On the other hand, we grasp a melody we hear as a unity even if the melody has not yet come to an end. There is an interplay between completeness and incompleteness: while "strictly speaking" the presentation of a melody is ever incomplete, it nonetheless "pretends" to be complete in each moment it is given.

Though Husserl was well aware what makes a temporal Object (like a melody) peculiar, he was not completely successful when accounting for its peculiarity. The paradoxical nature of time continued to disturb him. One of the major difficulties for him is shown in the following passage:

Time is fixed, and yet time flows. In the flow of time, in the continuous sinking down into the past, a nonflowing, absolutely fixed, identical, Objective [*objektive*] time becomes constituted. This is the problem.⁵

Directly at issue here is the contradiction between (a) the reality ("fixed" character) of what has happened in time and (b) the fluidity of time, i.e., the idea that what happens does not remain but rather continuously "sinks down into the past".

This contradiction is slightly different from the one aforementioned between completeness and incompleteness, but the former can be seen as derived from the latter. For if one denies the actual incompleteness of any moment of presentation of a temporal Object, it would follow that every moment can be separated from, and is independent of, one another. One would then see those moments as fixed, while the reason why they "give way to" one another in time remains obscure. This amounts to a unilateral commitment to (a).

Conversely, if one denies the *semblance* of completion in the givenness of each moment (despite its actual incompleteness), then the temporal synthesis would never yield any unity. We would thus be unable to trace any temporal Object as identical in its successive manifestation; all we have would be fluctuant impressions, each elusive and leading to another, without letting us grasp any identical Object. This is a unilateral commitment to (b).

Now it is clear that both the "fixedness" and the fluidity of time should be kept in view so that the interplay between completeness and incompleteness is preserved. But how could one commit to *both*? Specifically, how could a moment of a temporal Object sink down to the past *and* remain identical over time? It seems that we need a sophisticated notion of modification which accommodates both aspects. Thus Husserl says:

⁵ Husserl (1991), p. 67.

Every original temporal field contains the continuous modification with respect to the act-characteristics constituting the field. This modification must not be understood as if, in the series of apprehensions belonging to a phase of the object—that is, the series beginning with the emergence of the apprehensions as now-positing and descending into the last accessible phenomenal past—there took place a continuous modification in the objective [*gegenständlichen*] intention. On the contrary: the objective intention remains absolutely the same and identical. For all that, however, a phenomenal shading-off does exist, and not only with respect to the apprehension-contents that have their fading-away [...] The now that is just sinking into the past is no longer the new but that which the new has pushed aside. In this being-pushed-aside there lies an alteration. But while what has been pushed aside has lost its characteristic of being now, it remains absolutely unchanged in its objective intention.⁶

Here, the fixedness of temporal moments is ascribed to the objective [*gegenständlichen*] intention, which “remains absolutely the same and identical”, while the fluidity aspect is traced to “a phenomenal shading-off”, i.e., an *alteration* which is to be distinguished from a mere modification of content.⁷ Husserl adopts a customary strategy when faced with a paradox (here between fixedness and fluidity): he delineates two domains and encloses the conflicting terms in them respectively. What is only presumed in his discussion here later developed into the famous act/content distinction in his “schematic” model. The schema comprises two parts: (a) the apprehension-content, which remains identical over time and accounts for fixedness in the paradox above; and (b) the act of apprehension, which characterizes the *formal* aspect of time-consciousness where the new “pushes aside” what is no longer new, which, in turn, sinks into the past. Fluidity is not to be found in the content but in the act. It seems that, by making the act/content distinction, Husserl has satisfactorily solved the paradox between fixedness and fluidity. A fixed content appears fluid because the act makes it so.

2. The absolute time-consciousness: a solution to the problem of infinite regress?

But does the schematic model, with its clear-cut distinction between the apprehension-content and the act of apprehension, sufficiently address the interplay between completeness and incompleteness as opposed to explaining it *away*?

In this model, apprehension is a process where the act of apprehension accords an immanent content to an intentional Object. In the case of hearing a melody, the Object is the melody as an

⁶ Husserl (1991), pp. 64–65.

⁷ The actual fading of a tonal sensation (mere modification) is not equivalent to the shading-off of the sensation in retentive consciousness (alteration), since the latter may happen without the former.

object [*gegenstand*] transcendent to consciousness. When hearing a tone “C” in the melody, for example, consciousness accords immanent contents pertaining to the pitch, intensity and timbre of the tone, so that the tone is grasped as such. The curious point here, though, is that the *temporality* of the tone is also among the immanent contents that the act of apprehension accords to the tone. When the tone sounds, it begets the apprehension-content “now” in addition to (for example) the contents “C”, “40dB”, and “piano”, though, unlike other contents, the content “now” does not “materially” modify the tone. It only temporalizes it and makes it fade away, giving rise to another “now”. So, when the tone no longer sounds, it is paired with the content “just now” instead, signifying that it is pushed further into the past by the tone that sounds after it.

According to this model, however, the immanent contents that are said to temporalize Objects—contents like “now”, “just now”, and “not yet”—are themselves temporally “neutral”⁸; they only become temporal when “animated” [*beseelt*] by an act of apprehension. This confirms our earlier observation that Husserl’s act/content distinction is meant to enclose the fluidity of time in the act while keeping the contents fixed. In this way, the apprehension-contents are like inert “bricks” that are re-arranged by the act of apprehension whenever a moment of a temporal Object is constituted. As such, the domain of contents is already *complete*; what is incomplete is only the Objective world that those contents are supposed to reconstruct.

This move, Husserl will realize in 1907-1909, is deeply problematic. If the contents were indeed temporally neutral, it would be possible in principle for all the moments of a temporal Object to be present simultaneously.⁹ What is needed is simply a consciousness with immediate access to all the relevant contents, themselves already complete in an immanent domain. We would thus be driven back to Brentano and Meinong’s position, which champions a punctual rather than temporal synthesis, and the peculiarity of temporal Objects would become trivial. What remains to be said about time would boil down to the operation of a purely formal process (apprehension)

⁸ I received this idea from John Brough (1972), pp. 303-305. Brough claimed that it is summarized from what Husserl says in the *Logical Investigations*, but he did not provide any reference. The word “neutral” itself does not appear in Husserliana X when Husserl talks about the act/content distinction, but he does claim that “the continuous modification of the apprehension in the continuous flow does not concern the apprehension’s ‘as what,’ its sense.” See Husserl (1991), p. 68. If we take the “as what” as synonymous with the apprehension-content, then Husserl is saying that the content is not modified in the flow of time, i.e., is temporally neutral.

⁹ See Husserl (1991), p. 335: “But can a series of *coexistent* primary contents ever bring a *succession* to intuition? Can a series of simultaneous red-contents ever bring a duration of a red, of a tone c, and the like, to intuition? Is that possible as a *matter of principle*?”

on some timeless contents, and nothing really *takes time* to happen because already complete. Time is explained away instead of explained.

Apart from this more profound issue (to which we will return later), there is another that is more impending. If the contents are themselves fixed, it follows that temporality, or the fluidity of time, must be compartmentalized in the act of apprehension. In other words, the act itself must have phases like “just past”, “now”, and “not yet”. In this way, however, the act would be another temporal Object (this time an immanent one), and thus calls for a *further* act which constitutes its temporality by according apprehension-contents to its phases. And so on *ad infinitum*. This is the problem of infinite regress that haunted Husserl’s phenomenology of time-consciousness to the end of his career.

It is in this context that the notion of an “absolute time-consciousness” arises. In an attempt to put an end to the infinite regress, Husserl concedes, on the one hand, that the act of apprehension is itself an immanent temporal Object which is constituted by a further act, i.e. the absolute time-consciousness (sometimes termed “the flow [*Fluss*] of consciousness”). On the other hand, this absolute time-consciousness is *not* constituted by a yet further act: in addition to constituting the temporality of the first-order act of apprehension, it also constitutes *its own* temporality. Husserl says:

As shocking (when not initially even absurd) as it may seem to say that the flow of consciousness constitutes its own unity, it is nonetheless the case that it does.¹⁰

In addition, this self-constituting absolute time-consciousness is itself timeless and not an Object of constitution.¹¹ As a constituting flow, it can only be shown through the constituted Object (either the transcendent object, or the act of apprehension which is Objectified in reflection). This led Husserl to conclude that “for all of this, we lack names”¹²—for names apply only to what is constituted, not what is constituting.

It appears to me that the absolute time-consciousness is a convoluted, if not clumsy, concept. Not only is it unclear why the regress takes *exactly* two steps before stopping at it; what Husserl goes on to say about the way it manifests to us is also obscure and even contradictory. Commentators like Luis Niel have noted that the absolute time-consciousness risks being a metaphysical contrivance which goes against the principle of phenomenology, i.e., to bracket

¹⁰ Husserl (1991), p. 84.

¹¹ Husserl (1991), p. 117.

¹² Husserl (1991), p. 79.

anything that does not show itself to us.¹³ If constituted Objects alone are phenomenologically accessible, and if the absolute time-consciousness is not constituted but constituting, then the latter admits of no phenomenological verification and can at best be a metaphysical hypothesis.¹⁴

Despite these difficulties, several Husserl scholars have attempted to show that the absolute time-consciousness was indeed a *solution* to the problem of infinite regress. John Brough, for example, interprets it as a discovery that eventually led Husserl to abandon the schematic model.¹⁵ With the help of a distinction between (a) perceiving [*wahrnehmen*] a transcendent object and (b) experiencing [*erleben*] the immanent contents and acts of apprehension while perceiving the object, a process where we do not objectify the contents and acts but “look through” them¹⁶, Brough argues that the absolute time-consciousness should be understood as the “subjective” side of experiencing.¹⁷ To understand this idea, let us bear in mind that, in an event of experiencing, there is always a pair: (a) that which is experienced [*Empfindung*], i.e., the contents and acts of apprehension in an “inner” time, and (b) that which experiences [*Empfindnis*], i.e., the absolute time-consciousness which constitutes that inner time. Thus, there are three layers in total: (a) the perceived transcendent object; (b) the experienced immanent contents and acts; (c) the experiencing absolute time-consciousness. This explains why the regress takes exactly two steps. Moreover, Brough’s model accommodates the fact that the phenomenologizing of the absolute time-consciousness is difficult, if not impossible—for our awareness of it is pre-reflective, and any attempt to show it would involve a reflective act by which the constituting flow ceases to be constituting and is constituted (Objectified) instead. But then what is shown is not quite the absolute time-consciousness *at work*.

Dan Zahavi maintains Brough’s distinction between perceiving and experiencing but suggests simplifying the model so that it comprises only two layers: (a) the perceived temporal object, and (b) the inner (time-)consciousness which both experiences and is experienced. The latter is characterized as a “pre-reflective self-consciousness”¹⁸ that has a pre-being even before reflected

¹³ Niel (2013), p. 224.

¹⁴ Incidentally, this is the direction that French phenomenologists like Levinas and Merleau-Ponty pursued. In their hands, the absolute consciousness became an anonymous, timeless principle that accounts for anything temporal (hence constituted). Thus they go back to a more traditional (one may say Spinozean) conception of the “absolute”.

¹⁵ Brough (1972), p. 311.

¹⁶ Brough (1972), p. 304.

¹⁷ Brough (1972), p. 313.

¹⁸ Zahavi (2010), p. 331.

on. Zahavi notes that “reflection is characterized by disclosing, not by producing its theme”¹⁹; therefore, even if we have no direct phenomenological evidence of inner consciousness at work, we can nevertheless infer from reflective experience that inner consciousness must always already have been there. As Zahavi identifies inner consciousness with what Husserl calls the absolute time-consciousness, his explanation of the self-constitution of the absolute time-consciousness consists in the idea that the pre-reflective is already at work and, under the right circumstance, is able to *become* reflective and turn itself into an Object. Accordingly, the problem of the infinite regress is solved in the sense that it is only a *potential* infinite; one can always regress to a higher-order level of constitution but *does not have to*.

James Mensch’s interpretation is the most radical along the spectrum. Not only does he take the absolute time-consciousness as pre-reflective; he even characterizes it as a flow of non-temporal impressions or “senseless sense-data” (*sic*).²⁰ Temporalization, for him, is precisely about assigning an objective referent to the otherwise timeless “content” and thus “tensing” the content.²¹ Though this line of interpretation follows closely Husserl’s schematic model, Mensch argues that the infinite regress does not apply, since the schematic model works only for the temporal object, not for the non-temporal data by which the object appears. To look for a further act constituting the flow of data, then, would amount to a hopeless attempt to ground the ground itself.²² In this view, what is “absolute” about the absolute time-consciousness is that it is a ground, almost anonymous, that is not further grounded.

3. The specter of foundationalism and the dogma of completion

Now, I do not intend to confront these interpretations of the absolute time-consciousness by arguing that they are *not accurate*. It does not concern us here what Husserl the man thought in a certain year. Instead, the issue is whether the model according to these interpretations is tenable—and, if not, what may have forced one to adopt it in the first place.

The main problem I find in the accounts above is a foundationalism of constitution which threatens to trivialize what they are meant to explain, i.e., the enigma of time. For Brough, Zahavi and Mensch (and, in my view, for early Husserl as well), the question of constitution is about the

¹⁹ Zahavi (2010), p. 326.

²⁰ Mensch (2010), p. 64.

²¹ Mensch (2010), p. 83.

²² Mensch (2010), p. 47.

search for a ground. If something is constituted, it means that it is grounded in what constitutes it. Moreover, when it comes to time-consciousness, constitution is synonymous with temporalization. If we find an entity (e.g., a melody) to be temporal, then its temporality must be constituted by something further—it was in this search for further and further grounds that we ran into an infinite regress.

The “solution” Husserlians like Mensch offered does not abolish the foundationalism of constitution; only that, instead of letting the chain of grounding go back indefinitely, they put an end to it by positing a ground that is not further grounded. Two things make this ground unique: first, it is pre-reflective or (to borrow Husserl’s own word, later championed by Merleau-Ponty) “operative” [*fungierende*] as opposed to intentional in the strict sense—were it an object grasped intentionally, it would necessarily call for a further ground constituting it. Second, the ground is timeless, since if it were not, then its temporality would again raise the question of constitution.

But isn’t it strange to claim that something timeless is capable of “temporalizing”? Time, in this view, is only a product from the timeless; but then we have no way to account for the temporality of production (temporalization) itself: does it happen in another time? If so, aren’t we running into another infinite regress? If not, how is the producing (the timeless) and the produced (the temporal) still distinguishable? Also, it would be incomprehensible why the timeless ground would “all of a sudden” set forth to temporalize itself.

Klaus Held has noticed the problem when he criticizes Husserl’s formalism concerning time-consciousness. He argues that, for Husserl, time is a “still form” of happening but does not happen itself.²³ Accordingly, all the discussions of time-consciousness, of the structure of presentation-retention-protention, and of the layers of constitution, tend to forget what it means to be temporal, i.e., to be incomplete while only “pretending” complete. If all is traced back to a ground that is not further grounded, then incompleteness is only phenomenal, and time trivialized.

4. Theorizing incompleteness: retention as a promise

When Husserl termed the ultimate layer of consciousness “absolute”, he did not necessarily have in mind a traditional, metaphysical model of the “absolute”, as many interpreters think he did. True, he made reference to notions like *causa sui*, which have metaphysical connotations. But could this have been because he was desperately searching for an appropriate terminology when

²³ Held (2010), p. 93.

approaching the intriguing yet disturbing enigma of time but eventually could not find one? Along with Nicolas de Warren (2009), I believe that, rather than to give an “accurate” account of Husserl’s thought in different stages²⁴, what is more important is to see the *promises* of Husserlian phenomenology—after all, it is those promises that count for the later development of phenomenology, despite the fact that they are usually obscured by Husserl’s (sometimes unfortunate) choice of terminology.

To this end, I want to conclude by arguing that resources can be found in Husserl’s theoretical labyrinth that, once reconstructed, allow us to make sense of the interplay between incompleteness and completeness, which is characteristic of temporal phenomena. To see that, we need only to return to Husserl’s discussion of retention following his criticism of Brentano.

Husserl is always clear on the point that retention does *not* involve a reproduction, a duplication of past content into the now.²⁵ It is rather a horizontal awareness necessarily accompanying each presentation in the now. In retention, the past moment is *let pass*, i.e., released into the past, which gives us an instance of presence *in* absence. Precisely because of this, retention offers us an original access to the past:

If we call perception [*Wahrnehmung*] the act in which all ‘origin’ lies, the act that constitutes originally, then primary memory [here anonymous to retention] is perception. For only in primary memory do we see what is past, only in it does the past become constituted—and constituted presentatively, not re-presentatively.²⁶

This access is original, not because retention “reflects” past events in a more authentic way, but because, for any reproduction of past events to appear *as past*, a conceptual space first needs to be unfolded through a retention that releases the past into the past. In this conceptual [*begrifflichen*] space alone, things can be grasped [*gegriffen*] as temporal, as necessarily presenting itself in an interplay between absence and presence.

This interplay, then, allows us to understand the enigma of time both with respect to the actual incompleteness and with respect to the apparent completeness of temporal Objects. On the one hand, retention is a necessary horizon-component of presentation in the now. Since retention is a releasement rather than a reproduction, it is “empty” with respect to content, which means the

²⁴ Not to mention to smuggle in a Neo-Kantian problematics under a Husserlian guise. Such, I think, was the project of Mensch’s book.

²⁵ Husserl says, for example, that “each retentive phase is conceivable only as a phase; that is, a law according to which the retentive phase cannot be expanded into an extent that would be identical in all of its phases.” See Husserl (1991), pp. 34-35.

²⁶ Husserl (1991), p. 43.

presence of a temporal Object is actually incomplete. On the other hand, retention (as well as protention) joins presentation in the now to form a “broader” presence—a presence that is not contradictory with the actual absence of content in retention—so that the temporal Object *appears* complete in each moment.

It is unfortunate that Husserl was not always aware of the ground-breaking nature of his account of retention. On some occasions, he simply characterized the “originality” it offers as a matter of certainty or clarity. It is understandable that an author like him, the majority of whose works were explorative, would give rise to very different and even contradictory lines of interpretation. Bearing in mind the promise of Husserlian phenomenology, however, we should note that time as an enigma is not to be explained away with timeless grounds or forms. A thinking that takes time seriously must acknowledge that a paradoxical character is at the heart of temporal phenomena; it would thereby become a hermeneutics that renders the paradox productive.²⁷

References

- Brough, John B. 1972. “The Emergence of an Absolute Consciousness in Husserl’s Early Writings on Time-Consciousness.” *Man and World* 5 (3): 298-326. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01248638>.
- de Warren, Nicolas. 2009. *Husserl and the Promise of Time: Subjectivity in Transcendental Phenomenology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Held, Klaus. 2010. “Phenomenology of ‘Authentic Time’ in Husserl and Heidegger.” In *On Time: New Contributions to the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time*, edited by Dieter Lohmar and Ichiro Yamaguchi, 91-114. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Husserl, Edmund. 1964. *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*. Translated by James S. Churchill. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Husserl, Edmund. 1970. *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*. Translated by David Carr. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Husserl, Edmund. 1991. *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)*. Translated by John B. Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Mensch, James R. 2010. *Husserl’s Account of Our Consciousness of Time*. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press.
- Niel, Luis. 2013. “The Phenomenologizing of Primal-Phenomenality: Husserl and the Boundaries of the Phenomenology of Time.” *Husserl Studies* 29: 211-230.
- Ricœur, Paul. 1988. *Time and Narrative*, Volume 3. Translated by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Zahavi, Dan. 2010. “Inner (Time-)Consciousness.” In *On Time: New Contributions to the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time*, edited by Dieter Lohmar and Ichiro Yamaguchi, 319-339. Dordrecht: Springer.

²⁷ The idea of a hermeneutics that renders an aporia productive without eliminating the aporia is derived from Paul Ricœur’s critique of Husserl’s phenomenology of time. See Ricœur (1988), p. 4.